but if not for this, it would have to be restored intact?1 — R. Joseph replied: A beam retains its name [even subsequently], as taught: 'The sides of the house';2 these are the casings: 'and the thick planks'; these are the beams.3 R. Zera said: A change which can revert to its original state is, in the case of a change in name, not considered a change.4 But is a change in name that cannot revert to its original state5 considered a change? What then about a trough, the material of which was originally called a plank but now trough, and we have nevertheless been taught6 that a trough7 which was first hollowed out and subsequently fixed [into a mikweh]8 will disqualify the mikweh,9 but where it was first fixed [in to the mikweh] and subsequently hollowed out, it will not disqualify the mikweh!10 But if you maintain that a change in name has a legal effect, why then, even where he fixed it first and subsequently hollowed it out, should it not disqualify the mikweh!11 — The law regarding disqualification through drawn water12 is different altogether, as it is only of Rabbinic sanction.13 But if so, why even in the prior clause14 should it not also be the same? — There, however, the law of a receptacle applied to it while it was still detached, whereas here it was never subject to the law of a receptacle while it was detached.
An objection was raised [from the following]: If a thief, a robber or an annas15 consecrates a misappropriated article, it will be consecrated; if he sets aside a portion for the priest's gift,16 it will be terumah;17 or again if he sets aside a portion for the Levite's gift18 the tithe will be valid.19 [Now, does this not prove that Renunciation transfers ownership?]20 — It may be said that in that case there was also a change in name, as previously it was called tebel21 while now it is called terumah.17 So also in the case of consecration: previously it was called hullin,22 but now it is called consecrated.
R. Hisda stated that R. Jonathan said: How do we learn [from Scripture] that a change transfers ownership? — Because it is said: He shall restore the misappropriated object.23 What [then] is the point of the words, 'which he took violently away'?23 [It must be to imply that] if it still is as when he took it violently24 he shall restore it, but if not, it is only the value of it that he will have to pay.25 But is this [text] 'which he took violently away'23 not needed to exclude the case of robbery committed by a father, in which the son need not add a fifth [to the payment] for robbery committed by his father?26 — But if so, the Divine Law should have written only 'he shall restore the misappropriated object.' Why should it further be written, 'which he took violently away'? Thus we can draw from it the two inferences. Some report: R. Hisda stated that R. Jonathan said: How do we learn [from Scripture] that a change does not transfer ownership? — Because it is said: He shall restore the misappropriated object, i.e., in all cases. But is it not written 'which he took violently away'? — That text is needed to indicate that it is only for robbery committed by himself that he has to add a fifth, but has not to add a fifth for robbery committed by his father.
'Ulla said: How do we learn [from Scripture] that Renunciation does not transfer ownership? Because it is said: And ye brought that which was misappropriated, and the lame and the sick.27 'That which was misappropriated' is thus compared to 'the lame': just as 'the lame' has no remedy at all
Baba Kamma 67b
[to render it qualified for the altar],1 so also 'that which was misappropriated' has no remedy at all, no matter before Renunciation or after Renunciation. Raba said: [We derive it] from the following: 'His offering,2 but not one which was misappropriated.'3 When is this? If we say before Renunciation, is this not obvious?4 What then is the point of the verse? It must therefore apply to the time after Renunciation, and it may thus be proved from this that Renunciation does not transfer ownership. But did not Raba himself say5 that the text referred to a robber misappropriating an offering of his fellow — If you wish I may say that he changed his mind on this matter.6 Or if you wish I may say that one of these statements was made by R. Papa.7
THE MEASURE OF FOUR-FOLD AND FIVE-FOLD PAYMENTS DOES NOT APPLY EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF AN OX OR A SHEEP ALONE. But why not compare [the term] 'ox' to 'ox' in the case of Sabbath,8 so that just as there beasts and birds are on the same footing with them [i.e. ox and ass],9 so also here beasts and birds should be on the same footing with them [i.e. ox and sheep]? — Raba said: Scripture says 'an ox and a sheep', 'an ox and a sheep'10 twice, [to indicate that] only ox and sheep are subject to this law but not any other object whatsoever. I may ask: Which of these11 would otherwise be superfluous? Shall we say that 'ox and sheep' of the concluding clause would be superfluous, and the Divine Law should have written 'if a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and slaughter it or sell it, he should restore five oxen instead of it and four sheep instead of it'? Were the Divine Law to have thus written, would I not have thought that he should pay nine for each of them? And should you rejoin that it is written 'instead of it', 'instead of it' [twice in the text, so that] one 'instead of it' would then have been superfluous,12 [I might retort that] this is required for a further exposition, as taught: It might be maintained that one who stole an ox worth a mina13 would be able to restore for it five frail oxen. The text says, however, 'instead of it', 'instead of it' twice.14 ['Ox and sheep' of the concluding clause is thus indispensable]. It thus appears that it is 'ox and sheep' of the prior clause which would have been superfluous, as the Divine Law should have written: 'If a man shall steal and slaughter it or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for the ox and four sheep for the sheep.' But had the Divine Law to have thus written, I might have thought that it was only where he stole the two animals and slaughtered them [that liability would be attached]! — But surely it is written 'and slaughtered it', implying one animal! It might still be thought that it was only where he stole the two animals and sold them [that liability would be attached]! — But surely it is written, 'and he sold it' implying one animal! It could still be argued that I might have thought that it was only where he stole the two animals and slaughtered one and sold the other [that liability would be attached]! — But surely it is written, 'or he sold it' [indicating that slaughtering and selling were alternative]! I might nevertheless still argue that it was only where he stole the two of them and slaughtered one and left the other, or sold one and left the other!15 — We must say therefore that it is 'ox' of the concluding clause and 'sheep' of the first clause which would have been superfluous, as the Divine Law should have written: 'If a man shall steal an ox and slaughter it or sell it, he shall restore five oxen instead of it and four sheep instead of the sheep.' Why then do I require 'ox' of the concluding clause and 'sheep' of the first clause? To prove from it that only ox and sheep are subject to this law,16 but not any other object whatsoever.
ONE WHO STEALS FROM A THIEF [WHAT HE HAS ALREADY STOLEN] NEED NOT MAKE DOUBLE PAYMENT etc. Rab said: This Mishnaic ruling applies only where the theft took place before Renunciation; for if after Renunciation, the first thief would have acquired title to the article and the second thief would have had to make double payment to the first thief.17 Said R. Shesheth: I am inclined to say that it was only when he was half asleep and in bed that Rab could have enunciated this ruling. For it was taught: R. Akiba said: Why has the Torah laid down that where the thief slaughtered or sold [the sheep or ox] he would have to make fourfold and five-fold payments [respectively]? Because he became thereby rooted in sin.18 Now, when could this be said of him? If before Renunciation,
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