but [a minor who] was released by a letter of divorce must wait three months.1 What does he2 teach us when all these cases have already been taught:3 If [a minor] has exercised the right of mi'un against her husband he is permitted to marry her relatives4 and she is permitted to marry his relatives,4 and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest;5 but if he gave her a letter of divorce he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives and he also disqualifies her from marrying a priest?6 — He found it necessary [to restate these rulings in order to mention:] 'She must wait three months' which we did not learn.7
Must one assume [that they8 differ on the same principles] as the following Tannaim: R. Eliezer stated, There is no validity whatsoever in the act of a minor, and her husband is entitled neither to anything she finds,9 nor to the work of her hands,9 nor may he invalidate her vows;10 he is not her heir9 and he may not defile himself for her;11 this being the general rule: She is in no respect regarded as his wife, except that it is necessary for her to make a declaration of refusal;12 and R. Joshua stated, The act of a minor is valid, and her husband has the right to anything she finds13 and to the work of her hands,13 to invalidate her vows,14 to be her heir,13 and to defile himself for her;15 the general principle being that she is regarded as his wife in every respect, except that she may leave him12 by declaring her refusal against him?16 Must one then assume that Rab17 has laid down the same principle as that of R. Eliezer18 and that Samuel19 has laid down the same principle as that of R. Joshua?20 — There is no difference of opinion between them21 as to what was the view22 of R. Eliezer;23 they differ only in respect of the view22 of R. Joshua. Samuel [ruled] In agreement with R. Joshua; but Rab argued that24 R. Joshua maintained his view only there25 [where the benefits26 are transferred] from her to him27 but not [where the benefits28 are to be transferred] from him to her.29
OR TO HER WORN OUT ARTICLES. Said R. Huna b. Hiyya to R. Kahana: You have told us in the name of Samuel that this30 was taught only in respect of melog,31 but that to zon barzel31 property she is entitled. R. Papa, in considering this statement, raised the point: To which [class of women did Samuel refer]? If it be suggested: To [A MINOR] WHO EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF MI'UN [the difficulty would arise:] If [the articles] are still in existence she would be entitled to receive them in either case,32 and if they were no longer in existence she would in neither case32 be entitled to receive them.33 [Is the reference], then, to A WOMAN WHO IS INCAPABLE OF PROCREATION? [But here again, it may be objected:] If [the articles] were still in existence she would receive them in either case,32 and if they no longer existed [the ruling] should be reversed: She should receive melog property since [the capital] always remains in her legal possession34 but should not receive zon barzel property since [the capital] does not remain in her possession.35 [The fact,] however, [is that the reference is] to A FORBIDDEN RELATIVE OF THE SECOND DEGREE, in whose case36 the Rabbis have penalized the woman in respect of [what is due to her] from the man,37 and the man in respect of [what is due to him] from the woman.38 R. Shimi b. Ashi remarked: From R. Kahana's statement39 it may be inferred [that if a lawful wife] brought to her husband40 a cloak,41 the article is [to be treated as] capital and the man may not continue to wear it until it is worn out.42 But did not R. Nahman, however, rule that [a cloak must be treated as] produce?43 — He44 differs from R. Nahman.
IS NOT ENTITLED […] TO A KETHUBAH. Samuel stated: This was taught only in respect of the maneh45 and the two hundred zuz,'46 to the additional jointure,47 however, she48 is entitled. So it was also taught: The women concerning whom the Sages have ruled, 'They are not entitled to a kethubah' as, for instance, a minor who exercised the right of mi'un39 and the others enumerated in the same context,49 are not entitled to the maneh50 or to the two hundred zuz,51 but are entitled to their additional jointures; women, however, concerning whom the Sages have ruled, 'They may be divorced without [receiving their] kethubah' as, for instance, [a wife who] transgresses the [Mosaic] law, and others enumerated in the same context,52 are not entitled to their additional jointures47 and much less to [their statutory kethubahs of] a maneh50 or two hundred zuz;51 whilst a woman who is divorced on the ground of in repute53 takes only54 what is hers55 and departs. This56 provides support to R. Hunah who laid down: If she played the harlot [a wife] does not in consequence forfeit
her worn out articles that are still in existence.
A tanna recited in the presence of R. Nahman: [A wife who] played the harlot forfeits in consequence her worn out articles [though they are still] in existence. 'If she', the other said to him, 'has played the harlot, have her chattels also played the harlot?1 Recite rather: She does not forfeit her worn out articles [that are still] in existence' — Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated in the name of R. Johanan: This2 is the view of the unnamed R. Menahem,3 but the Sages ruled: [A wife who] played the harlot does not thereby forfeit her worn out articles that are still in existence.
IF THE MAN, HOWEVER, HAD MARRIED HER etc. Said R. Huna: A woman incapable of procreation [has sometimes the status of] a wife and [sometimes she has] no such status;4 a widow5 [has always the status of] a proper wife. 'A woman incapable of procreation [has sometimes the status of] a wife and [sometimes she] has no such status'; if the husband knew of her [defect]6 she is entitled to a kethubah7 and if he did not know of her [defect] she is not entitled to a kethubah. 'A widows [has always the status of] a proper wife', for, whether her husband was aware of her [widowhood] or whether he was not aware of it, she is always entitled to a kethubah. Rab Judah, however, said: The one8 as well as the other9 [has sometimes the status of] a wife and [sometimes she has] no such status,4 for [in either case] if her husband was aware of her [condition or status] she is entitled to a kethubah and if he was not aware of it she is not entitled to a kethubah. An objection was raised: If [a High Priest] married on the presumption that [the woman] was in her widowhood10 and it was found that she had been in such a condition,10 she is entitled to her kethubah. Does not this imply that if11 there was no presumption12 she is not entitled to a kethubah?13 — Do not infer 'that11 if there was no such presumption' but infer [this:] If he married her on the presumption that she was not in her widowhood14 and it was found that she had been in such a condition,14 she is not entitled to a kethubah. What, however, [is the ruling where he married her] with no assumption? Is she entitled [to a kethubah]? Then instead of stating, 'On the presumption that [the woman] was in her widowhood14 and it was found that she had been in such a condition,14 she is entitled to her kethubah', should it not rather have been stated, 'With no assumption she is entitled to her kethubah'15 and [it would have been obvious that this16 applied] with even greater force to the former?17 Furthermore, it was explicitly taught: If he18 married her in the belief19 [that she was a widow] and it was found that his belief was justified,19 she is entitled to a kethubah, but if he married her with no assumption she is not entitled to a kethubah. [Does not this present] an 'objection against R. Huna? — It was our Mishnah that caused R. Huna to err. He thought that, since a distinction was drawn in the case of a woman incapable of procreation20 and no distinction was drawn in respect of a widow, it must be inferred that a widow is entitled [to a kethubah even if she was married] with no assumption of her status. [In fact, however] this is no [proper conclusion], for in stating the case of a widow the author intended to apply to it21 the distinction drawn in the case of the woman who was incapable of procreation.22
MISHNAH. IF A MAN MARRIED A WIFE AND SHE MADE AN ARRANGEMENT WITH HIM THAT HE SHOULD MAINTAIN HER DAUGHTER23 FOR FIVE YEARS, HE MUST MAINTAIN HER FOR FIVE YEARS. IF SHE WAS [SUBSEQUENTLY]24 MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN AND ARRANGED WITH HIM ALSO THAT HE SHOULD MAINTAIN HER DAUGHTER23 FOR FIVE YEARS, HE, TOO, MUST MAINTAIN HER FOR FIVE YEARS. THE FIRST HUSBAND IS NOT ENTITLED TO PLEAD, 'IF SHE WILL. COME TO ME I WILL MAINTAIN HER',25 BUT HE MUST FORWARD HER MAINTENANCE TO HER AT THE PLACE WHERE HER MOTHER [LIVES].26 SIMILARLY, THE TWO HUSBANDS CANNOT PLEAD, 'WE WILL MAINTAIN HER JOINTLY', BUT ONE MUST MAINTAIN HER AND THE OTHER ALLOW HER THE COST OF HER MAINTENANCE. IF SHE27 MARRIED24 HER HUSBAND MUST SUPPLY HER WITH MAINTENANCE AND THEY28 ALLOW HER THE COST OF HER MAINTENANCE. SHOULD THEY29 DIE, THEIR OWN DAUGHTERS ARE TO BE MAINTAINED OUT OF THEIR FREE ASSETS ONLY30 BUT SHE27 MUST BE MAINTAINED EVEN OUT OF ASSIGNED PROPERTY, BECAUSE SHE31 [HAS THE SAME LEGAL STATUS] AS A CREDITOR. PRUDENT MEN USED TO WRITE,32 'ON CONDITION THAT I SHALL MAINTAIN YOUR DAUGHTER FOR FIVE YEARS WHILE YOU [CONTINUE TO LIVE] WITH ME'.
GEMARA. It was stated: A man who said to his fellow, 'I owe you a maneh'33 is, R. Johanan ruled, liable; but Resh Lakish ruled: He is free. How is one to understand [this dispute]? If [it refers to a case] where the man said to them34 'You are my witnesses', what [it might be objected] is the reason of Resh Lakish who holds him to be free?35 If [it is a case] where he did not say to them,34 'You are my witnesses, what [it might equally be objected] can be the reason of R. Johanan who holds him liable?36 The fact is37 that [the dispute relates to a case] where he did not tell them, 'You are my witnesses', but here we are38 dealing [with the case of a person] who said to another, 'I owe you a maneh'33 by [handing to him]39 a note of indebtedness.40 R. Johanan ruled: He is liable, because the contents41 of a bond42 has the same force as if the man [who delivered it] said, 'You are my witnesses'; but Resh Lakish ruled: He is free, because the contents41 of a bond has no binding force.
We learned: IF A MAN MARRIED A WIFE AND SHE MADE AN AGREEMENT WITH HIM THAT HE SHALL MAINTAIN HER DAUGHTER FOR FIVE YEARS, HE MUST MAINTAIN HER FOR FIVE YEARS. Does not this refer to,43 a case like this?44
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