Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Shabbath

Folio 91a

you might say, His intention has been cancelled;¹  hence we are informed that whenever one does anything, he does it with his original purpose.

Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: R. Meir maintained that one is culpable even if he carries out a single [grain of] wheat for sowing. But that is obvious, [for] we learnt, WHATEVER ITS SIZE? — You might say, WHATEVER ITS SIZE is to exclude [the standard of] the quantity of a dried fig, yet even so [one is not guilty unless there is as much as an olive: hence we are informed [otherwise]. R. Isaac son of Rab Judah demurred: If so,²  if one declares his intention of carrying out his whole house, is he really not culpable unless he carries out his whole house? — There his intention is null vis a vis that of all men.

BUT ALL OTHERS ARE NOT CULPABLE THEREFOR SAVE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS STANDARD. Our Mishnah does not agree with R. Simeon b. Eleazar. For it was taught: R. Simeon b. Eleazar stated a general rule: That which is not fit to put away, and such is not [generally] put away, yet it did become fit to a certain person,³  and he did put it away, and then another came and carried it out, the latter is rendered liable through the former's intention.

Raba said in R. Nahman's name: If one carries out as much as a dried fig for food, and then decides to [use it] for sowing, or the reverse, he is liable. But that is obvious: consider it from this point of view⁴  [and] there is the standard, and consider it from that point of view, [and] there is the standard? — You might say, [Both] removal and depositing⁵  must be done with the same intention, which is absent [here]: hence he informs us [otherwise].

Raba asked: What if one carries out half as much as a dried fig for sowing, but it swells⁶  and he decides [to use it] for food? Can you argue, only there⁷  is he culpable, because consider it from this point of view [and] there is the standard, and consider it from that point of view and there is the standard: whereas here, since it did not contain the standard of food when he carried it out, he is not culpable. Or perhaps, since he would be culpable for his intention of sowing if he were silent and did not intend it [for another purpose],⁸  he is still culpable now? Now, should you rule that since he would be culpable for his intention of sowing if he were silent and did not intend it for another purpose, he is still culpable now: what if one carries out as much as a dried fig for food and it shrivels up and he decides [to keep it] for sowing?⁹  Here it is certain that if he remained silent he would not be culpable on account of his original intention; or perhaps we regard¹⁰  the present [only]; hence he is culpable? Should you rule that we regard the present, hence he is culpable: what if one carries out as much as a dried fig for food, and it shrivels and then swells up again? Does [the principle of] disqualification operate with respect to the Sabbath or not?¹¹  The question stands over.

Raba asked R. Nahman: What if one throws terumah¹²  of the size of an olive into an unclean house? In respect of what [is the question]? If in respect of the Sabbath,¹³  we require the size of a dried fig? If in respect of defilement,¹⁴  we require food as much as an egg? — After all, it is in respect of the Sabbath, [the circumstances being] e.g., that there is food less than an egg in quantity¹⁵  and this makes it up to an egg in quantity.¹⁶  What then: since it combines in respect of defilement he is also culpable in respect to the Sabbath; or perhaps in all matters relating to the Sabbath we require the size of a dried fig? — Said he to him, We have learnt it: Abba Saul said: As for the two loaves of bread,¹⁷  and the shewbread,¹⁸  their standard is the size of a dried fig.¹⁹  But why so: let us say, since in respect of

1. Since he forgot it.
2. That according to the Mishnah culpability depends on one's intentions.
3. He found a use for it.
4. Lit., 'go here'.
5. v. p. I, n. 5.
6. To the size of a dried fig — i.e., before he deposited it, and he changes his mind likewise before depositing it.
7. In the preceding case.
8. Intention must be verbally expressed, and is not merely mental.
9. V. n. 4.
10. Lit., 'go after'.
11. The principle of disqualification (lit., 'rejection') is that once a thing or a person has been rendered unfit in respect to a certain matter, it or he remains so, even if circumstances change. Thus here, when it shrivels, it becomes unfit to cause liability, being less than the standard: does it remain so or not? (Of course, if one carries it out thus and deposits it on another occasion, he is certainly culpable. But here it became unfit in the course of one act, and the question is whether it can become fit again for the completion of this same act.)
12. v. Glos.
13. Whether his throwing is a culpable act.
14. Whether it becomes unclean.
15. Already in the house.
16. And it alights near the first, touching it, and so both become unclean.
17. V. Lev. XXIII, 17.
18. v. Ex. XXV, 30.
19. I.e., if one carries them out on the Sabbath, this is the minimum quantity involving culpability.

its going out,¹  [the standard is] the size of an olive, in respect of the Sabbath too it is the size of an olive?²  How compare! There, immediately one takes it without the wall of the Temple Court it becomes unfit as that which has gone out, whereas there is no culpability for the [violation of the] Sabbath until he carries it into public ground. But here the Sabbath and defilement come simultaneously.³

IF HE CARRIES IT BACK AGAIN, HE IS LIABLE ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS STANDARD. But that is obvious? Said Abaye: What case do we discuss here? E.g., if he throws it on to a store, but its place is [distinctly] recognizable.⁴  You, might argue, since Its place is recognizable, it stands in its original condition;⁵  he [the Tanna] therefore teaches us that by throwing it on to a store he indeed nullifies it⁶

MISHNAH. IF ONE CARRIES OUT FOOD AND PLACES IT ON THE THRESHOLD, WHETHER HE [HIMSELF] SUBSEQUENTLY CARRIES IT OUT [INTO THE STREET] OR ANOTHER DOES SO, HE IS NOT CULPABLE, BECAUSE THE [WHOLE] ACT WAS NOT PERFORMED AT ONCE. [IF ONE CARRIES OUT] A BASKET WHICH IS FULL OF PRODUCE AND PLACES IT ON THE OUTER THRESHOLD, THOUGH MOST OF THE PRODUCE IS WITHOUT,⁷  HE IS NOT CULPABLE UNLESS HE CARRIES OUT THE WHOLE BASKET.

GEMARA. What is this threshold? Shall we say, a threshold that is public ground? [How state then] 'HE IS NOT CULPABLE'! Surely he has carried out from private into public ground? Again, if it is a threshold that is private ground, [how state then] WHETHER HE [HIMSELF] SUBSEQUENTLY CARRIES IT OUT [INTO THE STREET] OR ANOTHER DOES SO, HE IS NOT CULPABLE'? Surely he carries out from private into public ground? Rather the threshold is a karmelith,⁸  and he [the Tanna] informs us this: The reason [that he is not culpable] is because it rested in the karmelith; but if it did not rest in the karmelith he would be liable,⁹  our Mishnah not agreeing with Ben 'Azzai. For it was taught: If one carries [an article] from a shop to an open place via a colonnade, he is liable; but Ben 'Azzai holds him not liable.¹⁰

A BASKET WHICH IS FULL OF PRODUCE. Hezekiah said: They learnt this only of a basket full of cucumbers and gourds;¹¹  but if it is full of mustard, he is culpable.¹²  This proves that the tie of the vessel is not regarded as a tie.¹³  But R. Johanan maintained: Even if it is full of mustard he is not culpable, which proves that he holds that the tie of the vessel is regarded as a tie. R. Zera observed: Our Mishnah implies that it is neither as Hezekiah nor as R. Johanan. 'It implies that it is not as Hezekiah', for it states: UNLESS HE CARRIES OUT THE WHOLE BASKET. Thus only the whole basket; but if all the produce [is without] he is not culpable, which shows that he holds that the tie of the vessel is regarded as a tie. 'It implies that it is not as R. Johanan', for it states: THOUGH MOST OF THE PRODUCE IS WITHOUT: thus only most of the produce, but if all the produce [is without], though the tie of the basket is within, he is liable, which shows that he holds that the tie of a vessel is not regarded as a tie. But in that case there is a difficulty?¹⁴ — Hezekiah reconciles it in accordance with his view, while R. Johanan reconciles it in accordance with his view. Hezekiah reconciles it in accordance with his view: UNLESS HE CARRIES OUT THE WHOLE BASKET. When is that? in the case of a basket full of cucumbers and gourds. But if it is full of mustard, it is treated as though HE CARRIED OUT THE WHOLE BASKET, and he is culpable' — While R. Johanan reconciles it according to his view. THOUGH MOST OF THE PRODUCE IS WITHOUT, and not only most of the produce, but even if all the produce [is without] he is not culpable, UNLESS HE CARRIES OUT THE WHOLE BASKET.

An objection is raised: If one carries out a spice pedlar's basket and places it on the outer threshold, though most of the kinds [of the spices] are without he is not culpable, unless he carries out the whole basket. Now this was assumed to refer to grains [of spices],¹⁵  which is a difficulty according to Hezekiah? Hezekiah answers you: The reference here is to prickly shrubs.¹⁶

R. Bibi b. Abaye raised an objection: If one steals a purse on the Sabbath, he is bound to make restitution, since his liability for theft arises before his desecrating of the Sabbath. But if he drags it out of the house he is exempt, since the interdict of theft and the interdict of the Sabbath come simultaneously.¹⁷  But if you think that the tie of a vessel is regarded as a tie,¹⁸  the interdict of theft precedes that of the Sabbath?¹⁹  — If he carries it out by way of its opening,²⁰  that indeed is so. Here we discuss the case where he carries it out by way of its bottom.²¹  But there is the place of its seams,

1. Beyond the walls of the Temple Court. — These must be consumed within the Temple precincts; if they are taken beyond that they become unfit for food, and the priest who eats then, violates a negative injunction.
2. And since we do not reason thus, we see that there is no connection between the standard of culpability for carrying out on the Sabbath and that required for other purposes.
3. As it comes to rest the action of throwing is completed. and simultaneously the standard for defilement is reached.
4. He did not actually state that he had changed his mind, but let it be inferred from the fact that he threw it on to a store of other grain.
5. As being destined for separate sowing.
6. I.e., it loses its separate identity. and becomes merely part of the store.
7. In the street.
8. Supra 6a.
9. Though it was carried out by way of a karmelith.
10. V. supra 5b.
11. These are long, and are still partly within.
12. Since some of it is entirely in the street.
13. We do not regard all the mustard as one because it is tied together, as it were, by the basket, and treat it the same as cucumbers and gourds. [The 'tie of a vessel' in connect on with Sabbath is a technical phrase denoting that side of the vessel in the direction of the domain whence it is carried out (Rashi)].
14. The Mishnah being self-contradictory.
15. E.g., it contained ground spices, which makes it similar to a basket of mustard.
16. [G], a kind of prickly shrub used for medicinal purposes and carried in long bundles (Jast.).
17. v. Sanh., Sonc. ed., p. 491, n. 1.
18. So that the vessel is still regarded as being within.
19. I.e., he violates the former before the latter. For as soon as part of the purse is outside, all the money within that part is regarded as stolen, since he can take it out through the mouth of the purse as it lies thus.
20. The mouth or opening preceding.
21. Through which he cannot remove the coins; hence he has not stolen them yet.