Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yebamoth

Folio 56a

Beyond this, the act is no more than superficial contact and one is exonerated in regard to it'. He thus differs from Samuel.

WHETHER HE PASSED ONLY THE FIRST, OR ALSO THE FINAL STAGE OF CONTACT HE CONSTITUTES THEREBY A KINYAN. In what respect is kinyan constituted? — Rab replied: Kinyan is constituted in all respects;¹  and Samuel replied: Kinyan is constituted only in respect of the things specified in the section,²  viz., to inherit the estate of his brother³  and to exempt her⁴  from the levirate marriage.⁵  If [she⁶  became subject to the levir] after her marriage⁷  she may, according to the view of all,⁸  eat [terumah],⁹  since she has been eating it before.¹⁰  They differ only [where she became subject to the levir] after betrothal.⁷  Rab maintains that she may eat, since the All Merciful has included cohabitation in error, [giving it the same validity] as when done presumptuously. But Samuel maintains that the All Merciful has included it¹¹  in so far only as to put him¹²  in the same position as the husband,¹³  but not to confer upon him more power than upon the husband.¹⁴  And [in giving this ruling] Samuel is consistent with his own view, for R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel: wherever the husband entitles her to eat, the levir also entitles her to eat; and wherever the husband does not entitle her to eat the levir also¹⁵  does not entitle her to eat.

An objection was raised: 'If the daughter of an Israelite, capable of bearing, was betrothed to a priest capable of hearing, who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah].¹⁶  If he died¹⁷  and she became subject to a deaf levir, she may eat;¹⁸  and in this respect the power of the levir is superior to that of the husband'. Now, according to Rab, this statement is perfectly satisfactory.¹⁹  According to Samuel, however, a difficulty arises!²⁰  Samuel can answer you: Read thus … who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah]; if, however, he married her and then became deaf she may eat it; if he died and she became subject to a deaf levir, she may eat it'.²¹  'Then what is meant by 'in this respect'?²²  — While if the husband had been deaf before,²³  she would not have been entitled to eat, if the levir had been deaf before²³  she may eat.

Others say: If [she²⁴  became subject to the levir] after her betrothal²⁵  all²⁶  agree that she may not eat [terumah], since 'she was not allowed to eat it during the lifetime of her husband. They differ only [when she became subject to the levir] after her marriage.²⁵  Rab maintains that she may eat, since she has been eating before; but Samuel maintains that she may not eat, because the All Merciful has included cohabitation in error, [giving it the same force] as cohabitation in presumption, only in respect of the things that were enumerated in the section,²⁷  but not in all other respects. But surely R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel, 'Wherever the husband entitles her to eat the levir also entitles her to eat'!²⁸  — Read: Every cohabitation whereby a husband entitles her to eat also entitles her to eat if performed by the levir, and every cohab itation whereby the husband does not entitle her to eat, does not entitle her to eat if performed by the levir.

An objection was raised: 'If the daughter of an Israelite capable of hearing was betrothed to a priest capable of hearing, who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah].²⁹  If he died³⁰  and she became subject to a deaf levir she may eat;³¹  and in this respect the power of the levir is superior to that of the husband'. Now, according to Rab,³²  this³³  might well be explained as was explained above;³⁴  according to Samuel, however, a difficulty arises!³⁵  — This is indeed a difficulty.

Our Rabbis taught: If the daughter of an Israelite capable of hearing was betrothed to a priest capable of hearing, who became deaf before he had time to marry her, she may not eat [terumah].³⁶  If a son was born to her she may eat.³⁷  If the son died,³⁸  R. Nathan said, she may eat;³⁹  but the Sages said: She may not eat. What is R. Nathan's reason?⁴⁰  Rabbah replied: Because she was eating⁴¹  before. Said Abaye to him: What now? would the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a priest who subsequently died⁴²  be entitled to eat [terumah] because she was eating it before? But⁴³  [the fact is that] as soon as [her husband] died his sanctity is withdrawn from her; so here also as soon as [the son] died his sanctity is withdrawn from her!⁴⁴  — Rather, said R. Joseph, R. Nathan holds that marriage with a deaf [priest]⁴⁵  does entitle the woman to eat terumah,⁴⁶  and that no prohibition⁴⁷  is to be made in respect of the marriage of a deaf priest⁴⁸  as a preventive measure against the betrothal of a deaf priest.⁴⁹  Said Abaye to him: If so,⁵⁰  what need was there [to state] 'If a son was born to her'? — Because of the Rabbis.⁵¹  Then⁵²  R. Nathan should have expressed his disagreement with the Rabbis in the first clause!⁵³  — He allowed the Rabbis to finish their statement and then expressed his disagreement with them.⁵⁴  If so,⁵⁵  the statement should have read, 'If the son died she may not eat;⁵⁶  R. Nathan said: She may eat'?⁵⁷  — This is a difficulty.

SIMILARLY, IF A MAN HAD INTERCOURSE WITH ANY OF THE FORBIDDEN RELATIVES. R. Amram said: The following statement was made to us by R. Shesheth

1. The yebamah may even eat of terumah if the levir was a priest.
2. Deut. XXV, 5ff, which deals with the obligations and privileges of the levir and the yebamah.
3. Inferred from v. 6 in the section.
4. If he died without issue from her but had children from another wife, or if he divorced her.
5. The first stage having the same validity as actual marriage.
6. The sister-in-law upon whom one of the forms of kinyan, including cohabitation in error, spoken of in our Mishnah had been executed.
7. With her husband, the levir's deceased brother.
8. Rab and Samuel.
9. If the levir was a priest.
10. While she was still with her husband.
11. Cohabitation in error.
12. The levir.
13. He is entitled to confer upon his sister-in-law the same rights that had been conferred upon her by her husband. Hence, if she was married and entitled to eat terumah the levir also may confer upon her this privilege.
14. As her husband's priesthood did not entitle her to eat terumah during the period of their betrothal, since only actual marriage can confer this privilege, the levir also cannot now confer this privilege upon her.
15. If the kinyan was in one of the imperfect forms spoken of in our Mishnah.
16. Even after their marriage. The reason will be explained infra.
17. After the marriage.
18. After the levirate marriage. The cohabitation of a deaf levir is considered to be no less valid to constitute a kinyan than the imperfect forms of kinyan mentioned in our Mishnah which constitute kinyan in the case of any levir.
19. Because he regards an imperfect cohabitation which in ordinary cases constitutes no kinyan as valid in the case of the levir.
20. According to him, imperfect cohabitation confers no more rights through the levir than through the husband; and here it is stated that the levir entitles her to eat terumah though her husband could not confer this privilege upon her!
21. Because she was entitled to the same privilege during the lifetime of her husband,
22. If she is only entitled to the privilege she enjoyed during the lifetime of her husband, in what respect is 'the power of the levir superior to that of the husband'?
23. He married her.
24. V. supra p. 374, n. 6.
25. V. loc. cit., n. 7.
26. V. loc. cit., n. 8.
27. V. loc. cit., n. 2.
28. How then could Samuel maintain that 'she may not eat' even though she had enjoyed that privilege while her husband was alive?
29. V. supra p. 374, n. 16.
30. V. loc. cit., n. 17.
31. V. p. 375, n. 1.
32. Though he maintains (according to the second version) that the levir does not confer any privileges that were not previously conferred by the husband.
33. The statement just cited that she may eat terumah if the levir is deaf though she was not permitted to eat it while her husband was alive.
34. I.e., the explanation given supra, in reply to the objection raised against Samuel, may now be given as a reply to the objection against Rab, viz., that the clause, 'If however, he married her and then became deaf she may eat it', is to be inserted before 'If he died and she became subject to a deaf levir, she may eat', the last clause thus referring to a married woman that was permitted to eat terumah during the lifetime of her husband.
35. Since, in his opinion (according to the second version), the deaf levir (whose kinyan has the same validity as that effected through the imperfect forms mentioned in our Mishnah) does not confer the privilege of eating terumah even if the woman had enjoyed the privilege while her husband was alive.
36. V. supra p. 374. n. 16.
37. The terumah; by virtue of her son, as deduced from Lev. XXII, 11, infra 67a.
38. But was survived by his father.
39. By virtue of her husband.
40. Why may she eat now by virtue of her husband while in the previous case, where she never had a son, her husband could not confer that privilege upon her?
41. V. supra note 9.
42. Not being survived by any son.
43. Since the law is that she may not.
44. How, then, could R. Nathan allow her to continue to eat terumah?
45. Where the betrothal took place while he was still capable of hearing.
46. Because Pentateuchally the betrothal confers the privilege upon her. Its postponement until after the marriage is merely a preventive measure Rabbinically instituted (v. Keth. 57b). which is, of course, not applicable here where marriage with the deaf man had already taken place.
47. Against the woman's eating of terumah.
48. V. supra note 3.
49. There is no need to provide against the possibility of mistaking betrothal for marriage and for thus allowing a woman to eat terumah immediately after betrothal, since it is well known that the betrothal of a deaf man has no validity. The Rabbis who forbid the woman to eat terumah even after the marriage, it may be explained, provided against the possibility of mistaking such a marriage which followed a betrothal that took place while the priest was still capable of hearing (which Pentateuchally entitles the woman to the privilege) for one which followed a betrothal that took place when he was already deaf and which is Pentateuchally invalid.
50. If according to R. Nathan it is the marriage, even though there was no son, that entitles the woman to the terumah.
51. Who in such a case only agree with R. Nathan that the woman may eat terumah.
52. Since he maintains that after the marriage, though there was no son, the woman is entitled to the privilege.
53. Where the woman is prohibited to eat terumah even after the marriage.
54. With their views in both the first and the final clause.
55. That R. Nathan reserved his opinion until the Rabbis had finished their full statement.
56. Which would have concluded the statement of the Rabbis.
57. I.e., R. Nathan's view would thus have come at the very end. As, however, his opinion is inserted before 'she may not eat' which is the statement of the Rabbis, it cannot he maintained any more that he was waiting until they had concluded their full statement, and the original difficulty consequently arises again.

who enlightened us on the subject¹  from our Mishnah. 'An Israelite's wife who was outraged, though she is permitted to her husband, is disqualified from the priesthood;²  and so it was taught by our Tanna:³  SIMILARLY, IF A MAN HAD INTERCOURSE WITH ANY OF THE FORBIDDEN RELATIVES ENUMERATED IN THE TORAH, OR WITH ANY OF THOSE WHO ARE INELIGIBLE TO MARRY HIM; now, what is the purport of SIMILARLY? Does it not mean, WHETHER IN ERROR OR IN PRESUMPTION, WHETHER UNDER COMPULSION OR OF HIS OWN FREE WILL? And yet it was stated, HE HAS THEREBY RENDERED HER INELIGIBLE'.⁴  — No; SIMILARLY might refer⁵  to the FIRST STAGE.⁶  'To the first stage' with whom? If it be suggested, 'With one of the forbidden relatives', does this then imply [it might be retorted] that the case of the forbidden relatives is derived from that of the sister-in-law?⁷  On the contrary, the case of the sister-in-law was derived from the forbidden relatives, since the original prohibition of the first stage was written in connection with the forbidden relatives! — Rather, SIMILARLY refers⁸  to Unnatural intercourse with forbidden relatives.⁹  On the contrary; the original prohibition of the various forms of intercourse with a woman was written in connection with the forbidden relatives!¹⁰  — Rather, SIMILARLY refers⁸  to unnatural intercourse with those [cohabitation with whom is] subject to the penalty of negative precepts.¹¹

Rabbah¹²  stated: If the wife of a priest had been outraged, her husband suffers the penalty of flogging on her account¹³  for [cohabiting with] a harlot.¹⁴  Only for [cohabiting with] a harlot, but not for 'defilement'?¹⁵  — Read, 'Also for [cohabitation with] a harlot'.¹⁶

R. Zera raised an objection: And she be not seized,¹⁷  she is forbidden; if, however, she was seized¹⁸  she is permitted.¹⁹  But there is another woman who is forbidden¹⁹  even though she was seized.¹⁸  And who is that? The wife of a priest. Now, a negative precept²⁰  that is derived from a positive one²¹  has only the force of a positive precept!²²  — Rabbah replied: All²³  were included in the category of harlot.²⁴  When, therefore, Scripture specified in the case of the wife of an Israelite that only if she be not seized¹⁷  she is forbidden but if she was seized¹⁸  she is permitted, it may be inferred that the wife of a priest retains her forbidden status.²⁵

Others say: Rabbah stated, If the wife of a priest had been outraged, her husband suffers for her the penalty of flogging²⁶  on account of 'defilement'.²⁷  Only on account of 'defilement' but not for [connubial relationship with] a harlot. Thus it is obvious that [when the woman acted] under compulsion she is not to be regarded as a harlot. R. Zera raised an objection: 'And she be not seized,²⁸  she is forbidden; if, however, she was seized²⁹  she is permitted. But there is another woman who is forbidden³⁰  even though she was seized.²⁹  And who is that? The wife of a priest'. Now, a negative precept³¹  that is derived from a positive one³²  has only the force of a positive precept!³³  — Rabbah³⁴  replied: All³⁵  were included in [the prohibition to live with her] after that she is defiled.³⁶  When, therefore, Scripture specified in the case of the wife of an Israelite that only when she be not seized³⁷  she is forbidden, but if she was seized³⁸  she is permitted, it may be inferred that the wife of a priest retains her forbidden status.³⁹

MISHNAH. THE BETROTHAL OF A WIDOW TO A HIGH PRIEST AND OF A DIVORCED WOMAN OR A HALIZAH TO A COMMON PRIEST⁴⁰  DOES NOT CONFER UPON THEM THE RIGHT TO EAT TERUMAH.⁴¹  R. ELEAZAR AND R. SIMEON, HOWEVER, DECLARE THEM ELIGIBLE.⁴²  IF THEY BECAME WIDOWS OR WERE DIVORCED AFTER MARRIAGE THEY REMAIN INELIGIBLE;⁴³  IF AFTER BETROTHAL THEY BECOME ELIGIBLE.⁴⁴

GEMARA. It was taught: R. Meir said, [this⁴⁵  may be arrived at by an inference] a minori ad majus: If permissible betrothal⁴⁶  does not confer the right of eating terumah, how much less forbidden betrothal.⁴⁷  They, however, replied: No; if you have said it⁴⁸  in respect of permissible betrothal⁴⁶  where the man may never confer the right of eating,⁴⁹  would you also say it⁴⁸  in respect of sinful betrothal⁴⁷  where the [priest], in other circumstances,⁵⁰  is entitled to confer the right of eating?⁵¹

R. Eleazar stated in the name of R. Oshaia: In the case where a priest who was wounded in the stones⁵²  betrothed a daughter of an Israelite,⁵³  we have a difference of opinion between R. Meir and R. Eleazar and R. Simeon. According to R. Meir who holds that a woman awaiting a pentateuchally forbidden cohabitation⁵⁴  may not eat terumah, this woman also⁵⁵  may not eat; but according to R. Eleazar and R. Simeon who maintain that a woman awaiting a pentateuchally forbidden cohabitation⁵⁴  may eat

1. Lit., 'and lit up our eyes'.
2. Supra 35a. She may not marry a priest even after the death of her husband.
3. In our Mishnah [H] = our Tanna (Rashi). [H] = and our Tanna also taught so. Others render [H] 'confirmation: [H] = and the Tanna is (or provides) confirmation (v. Jast.). [Or, [H] 'The Tanna teaches', v. Epstein, Schwarz-Festschrift pp. 319ff].
4. To marry a priest. Since a married woman is subject to the same restrictions as the 'forbidden relatives', she being included in the penalty of incestuous unions in Lev. XVIII (v. verse 20), it follows that whatever renders the forbidden relatives in our Mishnah ineligible to marry a priest renders a married woman also ineligible. As 'outrage' or 'intercourse under compulsion' is included, our Mishnah must be in agreement with the ruling of R. Shesheth.
5. Lit., 'what'.
6. I.e., as in the previously mentioned cases so in the following, the first stage has the same force as consummation. The ineligibility of an outraged woman, therefore, does not at all come within the purview of our Mishnah.
7. Since the law in the latter is made to apply by comparison also to the former.
8. Lit., 'what'.
9. The meaning being that as with the sister-in-law so with the other forbidden relatives kinyan is constituted IRRESPECTIVE OF THE NATURE OF THE INTERCOURSE, even if it was unnatural. Cf. supra p. 378, n. 6 second clause.
10. The case of the sister-in-law is derived from them; not theirs from hers.
11. Cf. supra p. 378, n. 6 and supra n. 2 mutatis mutandis.
12. Cur. edd., 'Raba'.
13. If he has intercourse with her.
14. Who is forbidden to a priest (v. Lev. XXI, 7) whether her adultery was committed willingly or under compulsion. It is in the case of an Israelite only that a distinction is made between a woman's voluntary and compulsory adultery.
15. If to an Israelite she is forbidden on account of her defilement when her act was voluntary (v. supra 11b), she should be forbidden to a priest on the same account even when her act was under compulsion!
16. He suffers for both.
17. Num. V, 13. E.V., neither she be taken in the act.
18. I.e., if she acted under compulsion.
19. To her husband.
20. That a priest must not live with his outraged wife.
21. An Israelite only may live with such a wife.
22. It is not punishable by flogging. How then could Rabbah subject the husband to such a penalty?
23. Married women who played the harlot whether willingly or under compulsion.
24. Who is forbidden to her husband by a negative precept.
25. Her prohibition to the priest, even if she acted under compulsion, is consequently derived from the original negative precept, and not, as had been assumed, from the positive precept relating to an Israelite.
26. If he has intercourse with her.
27. V.supra p. 379, n. 8.
28. Num. V, 13. E.V., neither she be taken in the act.
29. I.e., if she acted under compulsion.
30. To her husband.
31. Cf. supra p. 379, n. 13 mutatis mutandis.
32. An Israelite only may live with such a wife.
33. V. supra p. 379, n. 15.
34. So BaH. Cur. edd., 'Raba'.
35. V. supra p. 379, n. 16.
36. Deut. XXIV, 4.
37. Num. V, 13, E.V., neither she be taken in the act.
38. I.e., if she acted under compulsion.
39. Cf. supra note 1.
40. Since such betrothal is unlawful.
41. If they were the daughters of Israelites. If they were the daughters of priests, their right to the eating of terumah which they enjoyed prior to their betrothal, ceases with the forbidden betrothal. (V. Rashi s.v. rjt iuak a.l.) According to Tosaf. (s.v. in a.l.) the Mishnah refers to the daughters of priests only. Cf. also [H] a.l.
42. During the period of betrothal, so long as actual marriage has not taken place.
43. Since, in the case of priests' daughters, marriage caused their permanent profanation, and in that of others the privilege had never been conferred upon them.
44. Even according to the first Tanna. Priests' daughters lose the privilege only during the period of betrothal. As soon as the betrothal period ends either through death or divorce they may again eat terumah; and in the case of widowhood they may also marry a common priest. Daughters of Israelites are entitled to the same privileges except that of eating of terumah to which, of course, they had never been entitled.
45. The ruling that the betrothals spoken of in our Mishnah do not confer upon the daughter of an Israelite the privilege of eating terumah (v. Rashi, second explanation).
46. When an Israelite betroths the daughter of an Israelite.
47. Of which our Mishnah speaks. [Var. lec.: 'If permissible betrothal renders her ineligible (a priest's daughter is not allowed to eat terumah after her betrothal to an Israelite), how much more forbidden betrothal'. This reading — a reading which it must be confessed appears more feasible — is adopted by Tosaf. in view of their interpretation (v. supra p. 380, n. 17) that the Mishnah refers only to daughters of priests].
48. That betrothal does not confer the privilege of eating terumah.
49. An Israelite is neither himself entitled to the eating of terumah nor can he confer the right upon others.
50. If he married a woman permitted to him.
51. Obviously not. Hence the ruling in our Mishnah that the betrothals confer the privilege.
52. One so incapacitated is not permitted to marry even the daughter of an Israelite, v. Deut. XXIII, 2.
53. [Var. lec.: 'a daughter of a priest'. A reading adopted by Tosaf. on their interpretation (cf. n. 6)].
54. I.e., if she was betrothed to a man whom she is forbidden to marry.
55. Who married the incapacitated priest.