EPILOGUE
BY
THE VERY REV. THE CHIEF RABBI
ISRAEL BRODIE

With the appearance of the volumes of the Order Kodashim the great enterprise of the Soncino English translation of the Babylonian Talmud is at last completed and fulfilled. On the shelves of reference libraries in this country and in other lands now stands a monumental work of many volumes attractively set up and printed. Students of basic Rabbinic literature can now gratefully welcome an apparatus which takes an honorable place among the aids which are indispensable for the understanding and appreciation of the actual text of the Talmud. Fifteen years ago the appearance of the first eight volumes of the unabridged English translation was hailed with satisfaction by professional scholars and reviewers. They remarked on the general accuracy of the translation, the brief and valuable notes added to the text, as well as the indices of Biblical references and subject matter at the end of each Tractate. The pattern of the early volumes has been retained throughout the years and that despite technical difficulties and the hazards, interruptions and uncertainties of the war period. The indefatigable Mr. Jacob Davidson, Governing Director of the Soncino Press must be congratulated for his tenacity and determination to see the work through to its successful end. The erudite Editor, Rabbi Dr. I. Epstein, now Principal of Jews' College, and his goodly company of collaborators responsible for the translation and notes have demonstrated a high standard in scholarship which adds prestige to Anglo-Jewry.

My predecessor Joseph Herman Hertz [H] had the pleasure of writing an admirable and comprehensive Foreword to the whole work which is printed in the volume Baba Kamma, which began the series of translations. It now falls to my lot to write this Epilogue to the last volumes.

The Foreword and the introductions to the Orders and Tractates deal adequately with the structure of the Talmud, its contents, its redaction, its study and its identification with the life and fate of the people of Israel. My contribution will confine itself to an appraisal of the work as a whole in the light of the contemporary Jewish situation. Accessibility to the discipline of Torah-study has from the earliest times been the right and prerogative of every Jew. It is a continuous study to be pursued throughout life. It is a study, the neglect of which, neither the distractions of poverty or the surfeit of riches can excuse, nor the very building of the Holy Temple in Jerusalem, justify. Bible, Mishnah and Talmud have formed the three main basic categories of the Torah discipline. Whereas, however, most students might cope with Bible and Mishnah, the Talmud was reserved for the few — 'one in a thousand' — prepared to spend earnest laborious days and nights in its study and investigation. That has been the experience of the generations. It remains true today and painfully so. The last decades have witnessed the disappearance of the great centers of Rabbinic learning in Eastern Europe. Renowned teachers, famed for their piety and vast erudition were delivered to the slaughter, they and their hundreds of innocent and devoted disciples. Thousands of scrolls of the Law and precious Rabbinic works were desecrated and given over to
fire and destruction. The centers of Jewish Wissenschaft in Germany and Austria which had produced great giants of scientific scholarship, whose labors were devoted to historical, linguistic and archaeological problems of the Bible, Talmud and Jewish literature generally, have ceased. The population of European Jewry has been greatly reduced while Jewish learning in the traditional sense leads but a precarious existence. On the other hand, one must pay respect to the heroic efforts which, with some assistance from American and British Jewries, have enabled some Yeshivos to be opened and maintained in some of the surviving communities and Displaced Persons' camps. But to all intents and as far as one can interpret the trend of events, it is principally to the State of Israel and the Jewries in English-speaking countries that one has to turn to provide space for the roots of the 'Tree of Life' to be strongly and firmly planted. In other words, it has been decreed that the continuity and maintenance of Jewish spiritual values as expressed in Literature and Life shall become the responsibility and concern mainly of Israel and the hegemony of the English-speaking communities of the Golah. In Israel providentially the Torah has found safe and — we trust — permanent lodgment.

But it is equally the historic task and opportunity of the 'remnant' outside the Holy Land to encourage and increase the study of the Torah for 'its own sake', and for its practical bearing on our lives. The Sacred Scriptures as well as Rabbinic literature in Talmud and Midrash embody a civilization whose influence pervades and explains many of the phenomena of Jewish existence. The right understanding and interpretation of the fundamental sources must become the chief preoccupation of teachers and students everywhere. In this connection the English translation of the Talmud is particularly important. English is now the vernacular of more than half of the Jewish population of the world. Not everyone — not even one in a thousand — has access to the original — sometimes difficult and intractable — texts of our sources. Nor can a translation however perfect ever replace the original. Nevertheless the earnest Jewish cultured reader who is unfamiliar with the original can read and study a translation which introduces him to a world of thought, feeling and content which will repay the painstaking efforts and concentration demanded. On the other hand, the Talmud student who makes use of a reliable translation which has the crowning merit of general accuracy and important explanatory notes, will find much that will be helpful to him in his attempts to elucidate the texts. The Talmud, despite willful misunderstanding and vilification of prejudiced detractors, belongs to the few great works of world culture — its encyclopedic variety is now more broadly accessible to the non-Jewish scholar. — My last word to all those concerned with the Soncino Talmud is in the form of a blessing attributed to Moses when he beheld the completed tabernacle of the wilderness 'May it be the will of Heaven that the Divine Presence rest upon the work of your hands'.

ISRAEL BRODIE
INTRODUCTION TO SEDER KODASHIM

BY

THE EDITOR

GENERAL CHARACTER AND CONTENTS

The Hebrew term Kodashim means Holy Things. This term, in the Biblical context, applies to the sacrifices, the Temple and its appurtenances, as well as its officiating priests; and it is with these holy things, places and persons that the Seder Kodashim is mainly concerned. Its position between Nezikin (Torts) and Tohoroth (Cleannesses) is determined, according to Maimonides, by the sequence in which the laws dealt with in these three orders appear in the Bible. This Seder contains also the Tractate Hullin which, although it treats of non-holy things, is included because the rules it prescribes regarding the slaughter of animals and birds, and their ritual fitness for use, constitute an integral part of the law of Holiness of which, as will be seen, the sacrificial cult was designed as vehicle of the highest religious expression.

The 'Order' comprises eleven tractates arranged in the separate printed editions of the Mishnah in the following sequence:

ZEBAHIM (Animal-offerings): Regulates the procedure for the offering of animal-sacrifices through its various stages, and lays down the conditions which render them acceptable or otherwise. 14 Chapters.

MENAHOTH (Meal-offerings): Prescribes the rules regarding the preparation and presentation of meal and drink offerings; the bringing of the sheaf of barley (Lev. XXIII, 10); the two loaves (Lev. XXIII, 17); and the showbread (Lev. XXIV, 5). 13 Chapters.

HULLIN (Non-holy): Prescribes the rules for the slaughtering of animals and birds for normal consumption, and treats of the whole body of the dietary laws. 12 Chapters.

BEKOROTH (Firstlings): Deals with the laws concerning the firstborn of men, animals, laid down in Ex. XIII, 12-13, Num. XVIII, 15-17, and Deut. XV, 19-23, and the tithing of cattle (Lev. XXVII, 32-33). 9 Chapters.

'ARAKIN (Estimations): Gives the rules for determining the amount which must be paid in fulfillment of a vow to dedicate to the Temple the 'market-value' or 'worth' of a person or a thing according to Lev. XXVII, 2-27; and sets forth the laws relating to the jubilee year (Lev. XXV, 8ff). 9 Chapters.

TEMURAH (Substitution): Sets forth the rules governing the substitution of one offering for another in accordance with the law prescribed in Lev. XXVII, 10. 7 Chapters.

KERITHOTH (Excisions): Deals with offences which carry with them the penalty of Kareth (v. Gloss), if committed willfully, and of a sin-offering if committed in error; and discusses the cases in which an 'unconditional' or a 'suspensive guilt-offering' is due. 6 Chapters.

ME'ILAH (Trespass): Treats of the laws of Sacrilege or making unlawful use of consecrated things, in accordance with Lev. V, 15-16. 6 Chapters.

TAMID (the Continual [Offering]): Describes the Temple service, in connection with the
daily morning and evening sacrifice, prescribed in Ex. XXIX, 38-41, and Num. XXVIII, 2-8. 7 Chapters.

**Middoth (Dimensions):** Contains the measurements and descriptions of the Temple, its courts, gates and halls and the Altar, and includes an account of the service of the priestly watches in the Temple. 5 Chapters.

**Kinnim (Bird-nests):** Gives the regulations for the offering of birds prescribed in expiation of certain offences and certain conditions of uncleanness (see Lev. I, 14; V, 7 and XII, 8) and discusses the case in which birds belonging to different persons or to different offerings have become mixed up with one another. 3 Chapters.

This sequence is also followed in the six volume first edition of Seder Kodashim in which the tractates appear as follows:

- Vol. I Zebahim.
- Vol. II Menahoth.
- Vols. III and IV Hullin.
- Vol. V Bekoroth and 'Arakin.
- Vol. VI Temurah, Kerithoth, Me'ilah, Tamid, Middoth and Kinnim.

For the edition deluxe it was found necessary to publish the 'Order' in 9 volumes.

Of the eleven tractates that constitute the 'Order', all, except Middoth and Kinnim, have Gemara in the Babylonian version of the Talmud. No Gemara is extant in the Palestinian version. Maimonides, however, speaks of the existence of a Palestine Gemara to Kodashim. That this 'Order' was a subject of study in the Palestinian no less than in Babylonian schools is seen from the many statements contained in the Babylonian Gemara emanating from Palestinian Amoraim. There are indeed few pages in the Babylonian Gemara on Kodashim in which Palestinian Amoraim do not figure in discussions relevant to the 'Order'. The only conclusion to be arrived at is that there was once a Palestinian Gemara to Kodashim but that it has been lost to us as have many other literary products of the past.

The Gemara on the 'Order' Kodashim is a testimony to the strong interest which the teachers of the Palestinian and Babylonian schools continued to take in the sacrificial cult even after its cessation with the destruction of the Temple. This interest was more than merely historical and academic. It was based on strictly practical considerations. There were in fact two motives that kept alive the study of the Seder Kodashim even after its laws had fallen into disuse. One sprang from the unquenchable hope that the Temple would sooner or later be rebuilt, involving the restoration of the sacrificial cult, so that the knowledge of its laws would once again become essential. The other was the belief that the study of the sacrificial laws could serve as a surrogate for the Temple cult and was no less efficacious than the actual offering of the sacrifice itself. These motives lay behind the unceasing intellectual activity that centered round the Seder Kodashim throughout the intervening centuries to the present day, and which has crystallized itself in a mass of commentaries on the 'Order'; and in our own times the conviction that has seized many minds that we are witnessing the Athhalta di-Geulah ('beginning of the redemption') has led to the assiduous study of Seder Kodashim in many of the higher schools of learning in the Holy Land.

**THE CONCEPTION OF SACRIFICES IN RABBINIC TEACHING**

The sacrificial laws of the Torah, discussed and elaborated in this 'Order', are interspersed throughout the Pentateuch, but the main collection of them is to be found in the Book of Leviticus. The sacrifices set forth were varied in character. There were obligatory sacrifices, and there were voluntary sacrifices. There were collective
sacrifices brought in the name of the entire community: the early morning and afternoon sacrifices, and the additional sacrifices on Sabbaths, New Moons, Festivals, and the Day of Atonement; and there were besides individual sacrifices. Some sacrifices were honorific in character and were offered in worship or as an expression of homage to God; others were piacular and were brought in expiation of sin; others again were tributary and presented in recognition of God as bestower of the gifts of Nature. To the honorific belong the peace-offering (shelem, plur. shelamim), the thank-offering (todah), and the burnt-offering (’olah). The sin-offering (hattath) and guilt-offering (asham) belong to the piacular; and included in the tributary are the firstlings (bekoroth) and the cattle tithes (ma’aser behemah).

The sacrificial material was drawn from the animal and vegetable kingdoms. The animal sacrifice came from the herd or flock and in some cases from among birds. The vegetable offerings (minnah) consisted either of plain unbaked flour, baked cakes, or parched corn. There were in addition liquid offerings (nesakim) brought in conjunction with sacrifices, and there was also an incense-offering (ketoreth) compounded of several odoriferous vegetable products.

The sacrifices involved a series of acts of which the sprinkling of the blood was the most important in the case of animal sacrifices, and the burning of the handful (Komez) in the case of vegetable offerings.

The origin of sacrifices is wrapped in obscurity. Many widely differing theories have been propounded in explanation, but all are highly conjectural. All that can be said with certainty is that sacrifices are found to have formed a universal element of worship from the earliest times, and that there are traces among the precursors of Israel of sacrificial practices anterior to those instituted in the Torah. This admission does not detract from the claim of the sacrificial laws of the Torah to divine origin, any more than the fact that religious belief did not begin with the Sinaitic Revelation affects the validity of the Religion of Israel. On the contrary, the universality and antiquity of sacrifices only serve to testify to a deep-rooted sacrificial instinct in the human heart which seeks to respond to the claims of God upon man, and which like all other instincts needs correcting, purifying and directing.

The need for a reconciliation of man with the higher power on whom his welfare depends lies after all at the heart of all religion. Religious consciousness has been defined by William James as consisting in a sense (a) of uneasiness 'that there is something wrong about us as we naturally stand', and (b) of a solution for that uneasiness — of a sense 'that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers'.

In mythology and polytheism the gods are filled with envy, anger and hatred, and sacrifices are brought in order to effect reconciliation and re-establish connection with them. But the God of Israel can be angry only on account of injustice, and cannot be reconciled otherwise than by the doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly with Him. It was therefore essential to transform the crude ideas and desires concerning man's approach to God by filling them with a spiritual ethical content; and it was for securing this end that the sacrifices instituted in the Torah were designed as a most effective means.

How were the sacrifices prescribed in the Torah to serve this purpose? In considering the Jewish sacrificial system, we are impressed by two unique features which characterize it. First, sacrifices were ordained exclusively for ritual or religious sins, and not for social sins. Second, no sacrifice could be offered in expiation of the deliberate transgressions but only for such offences as had been committed in error or under constraint. These two reservations, which have no parallel in other sacrificial systems,
affect the whole quality of the sacrifices of the Torah. Not the needs of God are the sacrifices intended to satisfy, but the needs of man.\(^7\) They are no longer conceived as gifts to an offended Deity in appeasement of its anger, or in reparation for a wrong done to fellowman. Their aim is essentially man's spiritual regeneration and perfection. They are designed, in all their parts, to foster in the mind of the worshipper a sense of the awfulness of ritual sin,\(^8\) in that it creates an estrangement alike between man and God and between man and man.

The grave view which the Bible takes of ritual sins is bound up with the significance of the ritual law. It is almost a truism that the ritual law of the Torah has for its purpose the religious and moral perfection of man. Have not the sages of the Talmud already declared that the precepts have been given only to ennable mankind?\(^9\) This is true of the negative religious precepts no less than of the positive ones. Both sets of precepts have one common aim — the perfection of man. While the positive precepts have been ordained for the cultivation of virtue and for the promotion of those finer qualities which distinguish the truly religious and ethical being, the negative precepts are designed to combat vice and suppress other evil tendencies, and instincts that stand athwart man's strivings towards perfection.\(^10\)

Thus conceived, the ritual law is charged with a moral and religious dynamism capable of transforming the individual and, through the individual, the society of which he forms a unit. The disregard of a ritual precept is accordingly no longer a private affair; in so far as it lowers man's moral fiber and his power of resistance to evil, every ritual offence is in a sense a social offence. Viewed in this light, the insistence of the Torah on the need of sacrifices in expiation of ritual sin becomes readily intelligible. The purpose is twofold. They serve to bring home to the offender the seriousness of ritual sins even if committed unwillingly, and at the same time they guard him from lapsing through force of habit into willful transgression.

This appreciation of the sacrificial laws of the Torah has already been stressed by Maimonides in Book III, Chapter 46 of his Guide, which is devoted to the application of this idea to various offerings. 'Do not consider this', he writes, 'a weak argument, for it is the object of all these ceremonies to impress on the mind of every sinner and transgressor the necessity of continually remembering and mentioning his sin'. 'When this theory', he continues, 'has been well established in the minds of people they must certainly be led by it to consider disobedience to God as a disgraceful thing. Everyone will thus be careful that he should not sin'.\(^11\)

This explanation of sacrifices by Maimonides will appear contradictory to the view advanced by him in the thirty-second chapter of the same book where he regards the institution as a concession to a people still hankering after the idolatrous practices of their environment and age. 'It was in accordance with the wisdom and plan of God,' he declares, 'that He did not command us to discontinue all these manners of service; for to obey such a commandment would have been contrary to the nature of man who generally cleaves to that which he is used. It would in these days have made the same impression as a prophet would make at present if he called to the service of God and told us in His name that we should not pray to Him nor fast, nor seek His help in time of trouble, that we should serve Him in thought and not by any action.'\(^12\)

No part of Maimonides' Guide has aroused more controversy than his theory regarding sacrifices. Most outspoken and unsparing among his critics was Nahmanides, who prefers to see in sacrifices a moral symbolism founded on a psychological analysis of conduct.\(^13\) His staunchest defender is Abrabanel,\(^14\) who quotes a Midrash in support of the Maimonidean view. In reality,
both the critics and the defenders of Maimonides misconstrued his attitude to the problem. To obtain a full insight into Maimonides' interpretation of sacrifices, it is not sufficient to limit our study to one particular chapter in his Guide. We must of necessity extend our investigation to other parts of his work and include in our survey his great Halachic masterpiece, the Mishneh Torah, where he presents to us the independent Jewish view which his philosophic speculations and critical enquiries served to confirm and strengthen. Turning to the Mishneh Torah, we find Maimonides adopting an entirely different attitude. Sacrifices, he there declares, belong to the class of divine commandments designated as hukkim (statutes), for which no reason is ascertainable (Me'ilah, VIII, 8). This assertion, sufficiently categorical, appears in turn to be modified in his Guide, Book III, 26, where he distinguishes between the sacrificial institution in itself and its detailed rules: sacrifices in general have a reason, but no reason can be given for its details.

Thus, we see Maimonides adopting four distinct attitudes in regard to sacrifices which, summarized, are as follows:

1. Sacrifices have no reason (Mishneh Torah, Me'ilah VIII, 8).
2. Sacrifices are a concession to the idolatrous propensities of the early Israelites (Guide III, 3 2).
3. Sacrifices are designed as prevention of sin and as consequent safeguard of the ritual Law (Guide III, 46).
4. Sacrifices have a reason in general, but not as to their detailed rules (Guide, III, 26).

These apparent clashings and crossings of Maimonides' views have their explanation, it is here submitted, in the distinction which must be drawn between voluntary sacrifices and obligatory sacrifices.

Obligatory sacrifices have been ordained by God. They form accordingly an integral part of revealed religion. Their reason may be unknown. But the fact that God had commanded them imparts to them a spiritual and moral quality making for human perfection; and this may be after all the best explanation that can be given for them. Voluntary sacrifices on the other hand have not been enjoined by God. They cannot therefore lay claim to the elevating tendency inherent in divine commands; and in consequence would not have been included in the Torah, but for some definite purpose, which must be understandable and clear to the human mind.

This distinction between obligatory and voluntary sacrifices accounts for the difference of Maimonides' approach to the problem in the Mishneh Torah and his Guide, III, 32. A careful reading of that Chapter in his Guide, where he traces the root of sacrifices to idolatrous instincts makes it evident that Maimonides was concerned there only with voluntary sacrifices. Honorific in character, voluntary sacrifices would be brought only as tokens of worship and homage. As such they were under the best of circumstances inferior to prayer which is the 'service of the heart'. But that is not all. Through their idolatrous origin and by their very nature, voluntary sacrifices were not without lurking dangers. Unlimited in number, and unattended by confession and the repentance which are fundamental to expiatory offerings, or by the mental preparation that is inseparable from other obligatory offerings, voluntary sacrifices were liable to become a source of inner injury to righteous life. The reality of this danger was exemplified in later Jewish history; and it was against the abuse of this type of sacrifices that the prophets launched their scathing denunciations. Yet far from being suppressed by the Torah, they received, paradoxically enough, divine approval. The only feasible explanation, in the opinion of Maimonides, was that they were to be
considered in the light of a concession, because of their inestimable value as a road through which primitive Israel could travel, albeit slowly and gradually, from idolatrous superstition to the highest service of the one and only God.

But whatever perils voluntary sacrifices might involve, there were no such dangers lurking in obligatory sacrifices ordained by God. They could accordingly, irrespective of their reason, serve as means to righteous life. The difficulty, however, of finding a rational explanation for them gave them the character of statutory laws; and it is with reference to obligatory offerings therefore that Maimonides asserts in his Code that they belong to the hukkim of the Torah.

Obligatory offerings form also, as is to be seen from the context, the subject of discussion in the Guide, Book III, 46, where Maimonides ascribes to them a practical motive — the prevention of sin. This is not inconsistent with his classification in the Mishneh Torah of the obligatory sacrifices among the hukkim. Even hukkins, it is well to remember have, according to Maimonides, a cause and serve a practical purpose, though their reason is not so evident nor their object so generally clear as those of other precepts. There is therefore in Maimonides' attempts to present a rationale of obligatory offerings nothing incompatible with his assertion of their statutory character. While the modus operandi for the effectiveness of the sacrificial rites must elude natural explanation, it is still possible to detect in them certain aspects, the value of which is discernable by the human mind.

Actually, however, Maimonides' treatment of obligatory sacrifices in his Guide, III, 46, while accounting for the main outlines, leaves much of the detailed rules unexplained. This is in conformity with his insistence in III, 26, of the same work that details call for no explanation, as they have been ordained for no other purpose than as tests for man's obedience. Details, he argues, are a necessary part of the structure of anything 'which can receive different forms, but receives one of them'. 'Those who therefore trouble themselves to find a cause for any of these detailed rules are in my eyes void of sense.' 'You ask,' he continues by way of illustration, 'why must a lamb be sacrificed and not a ram, and the same question would be asked why a ram had been commanded instead of a lamb... the same is to be said as to the question why were seven lambs sacrificed and not eight; the same question might have been asked if they were eight, ten or twenty lambs, so long as some definite number of lambs were sacrificed. This does not mean to imply that the details are altogether arbitrary. They may be arbitrary as far as man is concerned. Having been given as tests of obedience one set of details could have served the same purpose as well as any other. But they are certainly not arbitrary as far as the divine law-giver is concerned. They have in the words of Maimonides been 'dictated by his will'. They have their source in the will of God and as such can admit nothing of the fortuitous or adventitious.

What Maimonides means to convey, in deprecating all attempts to discover a reason for the details, is that their value is derived not from their content but from the fact that they are grounded in the will of God. All that matters here is that they have been ordained by God, and this is sufficient to compel their observance. This may appear a blind, irrational attitude running counter to the whole trend of Maimonidean thought. The fact, rejoins Maimonides, is that in whatever we do in life we cannot avoid making our decision in favor of one of many possible forms without necessarily having to rationalize about our choice. As against the details, however, stand the commandments in themselves. These have their source, according to Maimonides, in the wisdom of God. As such they have a definite purpose. This purpose, as he conceives it, is primarily educative. Their aim is the highest perfection.
of man — intellectual and moral. They are designed to infuse right knowledge, inculcate truths and train man to righteous life and action. They cannot, however, produce these effects unless the ideals and principles they enshrine are properly understood. The explanation of them thus becomes an important religious need and duty; and in regard to sacrifices in particular the appreciation of their significances and meaning, as far as their general character is concerned, constitutes an integral part of their fulfillment.

Thus the varying interpretations of sacrifices given by Maimonides, far from conflicting with each other, supplement and complement each other. Voluntary sacrifices are a concession to the hankering after ancient idolatrous forms and practices of worship. Obligatory sacrifices belong to the hukkim, the reason for which though not so evident, it is proper for man to investigate. This, however, applies to the laws in their broad outline, but not to the details, for which no explanation need be sought, except that they were prescribed as mere tests of obedience.

This somewhat lengthy exposition of Maimonides' views on sacrifices may appear to be out of place in an Introduction to a Talmudic 'Order'. It is, however, included here because it presents the classical rabbinic tradition from which Maimonides, despite foreign guidance and system, never departed. Essentially rabbinic is the idea of the statutory character of obligatory sacrifices. 'The sacrificial institutions,' writes Moore 'were an integral part of revealed religion and had the obligation of statutory law. It was not for the interpreters of the law to narrow their scope or subtract from their authority. Nor was it of any practical concern to enquire why the divine law-giver had ordained thus and not otherwise or indeed ordained them at all. It was enough that he had enjoined upon Israel the observance of them.'

Likewise rabbinic in origin is the theory as to the idolatrous associations of voluntary sacrifices, being found in a Midrash which, as already mentioned, Abrabanel cites in his support. Commenting on the verse, What man soever there be of the house of Israel that killeth an ox … and hath not brought it unto the door of the Tent of Meeting… he hath shed blood (Lev. XVII, 3), R. Phinehas in the name of R. Levi says: The matter may be compared to the case of a king's son who thought he could do what he liked and habitually ate the flesh of nebeloth and terefoth. Said the king: 'I will have him always at my own table, and he will automatically be hedged round.' Similarly, because Israel were passionate followers after idolatry in Egypt and used to bring their sacrifices to the satyrs, the Holy One, blessed be He, said: 'Let them offer their sacrifice at all times in the Tent of Meeting and they will be separated from idolatry, etc.' The words, 'let them offer their sacrifices at all times' make it evident that the reference is to voluntary sacrifices since obligatory sacrifices were strictly circumscribed in point of time and circumstance. Nor is the practical motive of sacrifices advanced by Maimonides absent from rabbinic thought. 'What,' says the Midrash, is the meaning of the words 'he offered it up for a burnt-offering instead of his son' (Gen. XXII, 13)? At every sacrificial act Abraham performed with the ram, he prayed, 'May it be Thy will that this service be regarded as if I performed it with my son, as if he had been slaughtered, as if his blood had been sprinkled, and as if he had been made ashes.' Here we have a significance ascribed by the Rabbis to sacrifices which is but a vivid formulation of the practical motive given by Maimonides. It was also a Midrashic dictum to which Maimonides appealed in support of his view that the details of the sacrifices have been given to serve only as tests of obedience.

But whatever theory the Rabbis of the Talmud may have held as to the sacrificial cult, there is little doubt that they had an appreciation of its fundamentally educational value. This is shown by the designation Hokmah which they came to give to this
'Order'. Hokmah means wisdom; and wisdom in the Jewish conception was not theoretical but practical. It was not an intellectual pursuit, but essentially a religious ethic. Through this designation, the Talmudic conception of the sacrifices as educative becomes unmistakably clear. Their object was conceived of as being to instill in the heart of the devotee that wisdom whose mainspring and motive was the 'fear of the Lord', and to which the observance of the ritual law was designed as an aid.

The observance of the ritual law which the sacrificial cult inspired made it a vehicle of Holiness of the highest expression. Whatever its root meaning, Kodesh, the Hebrew term for Holiness, denotes both that which pertains to God and that which is recognized to be the character of God. This character has from the earliest days in Jewish teaching been associated with ideals of righteousness. The pursuit of Holiness involved for man a self-surrender to God accompanied by a resolve to make the divine pattern of righteousness his own. This is the Holiness which the sacrificial cult was divinely designed to foster. Its contribution to Holiness was both of a negative and positive character. On the negative side, by safeguarding the observance of the ritual law, the sacrifices served to strengthen what the Torah regarded as the only available defenses against the forces inimical to Holiness. On the positive side, through the confession and repentance which accompanied them, as well as the solemnity of their setting, the sacrifices helped to draw man near to God in close communion than which there is no greater power making for Holiness.

The view of the sacrifices outlined above has much bearing on the question of their restoration in the future — a restoration which Maimonides in his Mishneh Torah includes among the tenets of traditional Judaism. Here, too, the distinction may have to be drawn between voluntary offerings and obligatory offerings. In fact the prayers for the restoration of sacrifices that figure so largely in our Liturgy are specifically restricted to obligatory sacrifices. Granted that with the disappearance of the 'passion for idol worship' (yizra di abodah zarah) there could be little, if any, religious value in the restoration of voluntary offerings; it is otherwise with obligatory offerings. As a safeguard for the observance of the ritual law, the obligatory sacrifices have lost none of their validity. The sickness and distress of the modern world is derived in the last resort from the lack of correspondence between man's moral progress and his intellectual and scientific achievements. Indeed, the terrific power of evil at the command of man leads a modern writer, Lewis Mumford, to advocate a moral tightening by the introduction of all kinds of inhibitions and renunciations in order to train man in the habit of that inner check and self-restraint so essential to human survival. But surely no humanly contrived restrictions and restraints can take the place of those divinely ordained in the ritual law of the Torah. Thus do the grim and tragic experiences of our time only serve to confirm the attitude of traditional Judaism to the ritual law as an indispensable aid to moral law; and the restoration of the obligatory offerings in the days to come can only serve to strengthen and safeguard the ritual law for the regeneration and perfection of Israel and, through Israel, of the whole of humanity. Well, then, may the disciple of the Law in delving into the intricacies of the Seder Kodashim re-echo, in no narrow spirit, the words of that ancient prayer, 'May it be Thy will that the Temple be rebuilt speedily in our days and grant us our portion in Thy Law.'

**METHOD AND SCOPE**

**TEXT.** The Text used for this edition is in the main that of the Wilna Romm Edition. Note has, however, been taken of the most important variants of manuscript and printed editions some of which have been adopted in the main body of the translation, the reason
for such preference being generally explained or indicated in the Notes. All the censored passages appear either in the text or in the Notes.

**Translation.** The translation aims at reproducing in clear and lucid English the central meaning of the original text. It is true some translators will be found to have been less literal than others, but in checking and controlling every line of the work, the Editor has endeavored not to lose sight of the main aim of the translation. Words and passages not occurring in the original are placed in square brackets.

**Notes.** The main purpose of these is to elucidate the translation by making clear the course of the arguments, explaining allusions and technical expressions, thus providing a running commentary on the text. With this in view resort has been made to the standard Hebrew commentators, Rashi, the Tosafists, Asheri, Alfasi, Maimonides, Maharsha, the glosses of BaH, Rashal, Strashun, the Wilna Gaon, etc. Advantage has also been taken of the results of modern scholarship, such as represented by the names of Graetz, Bacher, Weiss, Halevy, Levy, Kohut, Jastrow, Obermeyer, and — happily still with us — Krauss, Buchler, Ginzberg, Klein and Herford among others, in dealing with matters of general cultural interest with which the Talmud teems — historical, geographical, archaeological, philological and social.

**Glossary and Indices.** Each Tractate is equipped with a Glossary wherein recurring technical terms are fully explained, thus obviating the necessity of explaining them afresh each time they appear in the text. To this have been added a Scriptural Index and a General Index of contents.

In the presentation of the tractates the following principles have also been adopted:

i. The Mishnah and the words of the Mishnah recurring and commented upon in the Gemara are printed in capitals.

ii. [H] introducing a Mishnah cited in the Gemara, is rendered we have learnt’.

iii. [H] introducing a Baraitha, is rendered 'it has been (or was) taught'.

iv. [H] introducing a Tannaitic teaching, is rendered 'Our Rabbis taught'.

v. Where an Amora cites a Tannaitic teaching the word 'learnt' is used, e.g., [H], 'R. Joseph learnt'.

vi. The word Tanna designating a teacher of the Amoraic period (v. Glos.) is written with a small 't'.

vii. A distinction is made between …: [H] referring to a Tannaitic ruling and …: [H] which refers to the ruling of an Amora, the former being rendered 'the halachah is …' and the latter, 'the law is …'

viii. R. stands either for Rabbi designating a Palestinian teacher or Rab designating a Babylonian teacher, except in the case of the frequently recurring Rab Judah where the title 'Rab' has been written in full to distinguish him from the Tanna of the same name.

ix. [H], lit., 'The Merciful One', has been rendered 'the Divine Law' in cases where the literal rendering may appear somewhat incongruous to the English ear.

x. Biblical verses appear in italics except for the emphasized word or words in the quotation which appear in Roman characters.

xi. No particular English version of the Bible is followed, as the Talmud has its own method of exegesis and its own way of understanding Biblical verses which it cites. Where, however, there is a radical departure from the English versions, the rendering of a recognized English version is indicated in the Notes. References to chapter and verse are those of the Massoretic Hebrew text.
xii. Any answer to a question is preceded by a dash (—), except where the question and the answer form part of one and the same argument.

xiii. Inverted commas are used sparingly, that is, where they are deemed essential or in dialogues.

xiv. The archaic second person 'thou', 'thee', etc. is employed only in Haggadic passages or where it is necessary to distinguish it from the plural 'you', 'yours', etc.

xv. The usual English spelling is retained in proper names in vogue like Simeon, Isaac, Akiba, as well as in words like halachah, Shechinah, shechitah, etc. which have almost passed into the English language. The transliteration employed for other Hebrew words is given at the end of each tractate.

xvi. It might also be pointed out for the benefit of the student that the recurring phrases 'Come and hear:' and 'An objection was raised:' or 'He objected:' introduce Tannaitic teachings, the two latter in contradiction, the former either in support or contradiction of a particular view expressed by an Amora.

CONCLUSION

For technical reasons this set of six volumes, comprising the fifth of the six 'Orders' of the Talmud, appears last, and with its publication the Soncino edition of the Babylonian Talmud is brought to completion. The moment has thus arrived for bidding farewell to a task which has absorbed the best energies of myself and a number of fellow-workers for over fifteen years. Surveying this monumental work, all those who had a share in its production may well, in no spirit of boastfulness, congratulate themselves on an achievement which promises to be of abiding value. This translation of the Talmud with its accompanying expository and cultural notes makes accessible for the first time to the English-reading student that part of the heritage of Israel to which more than to anything else, the Jewish people owes its preservation, and from which humanity as a whole has drawn no little sustenance for its religious and moral life. To bring the knowledge of this ancient treasure to many to whom it has hitherto been terra incognita, and thus enable it more and more to exert its potent and benign influence, has been the aim of this undertaking, the successful conclusion of which is itself the best reward for the faithful toil bestowed upon it. Those of us who have been associated with this publication from the beginning to the end cannot better express our gratitude for being privileged to witness this consummation than in the age-honored formula of thanksgiving:

[H] FINISHED AND COMPLETED: PRAISE TO THE CREATOR OF THE UNIVERSE

All who have taken part can thank God that to them has been granted the opportunity to apply their powers, whether great or small, to a work which should serve to communicate abroad the religious faith and worldly wisdom enshrined in the pages of the Talmud, for the inspiration and guidance of this generation and the generations to come.

This, too, is a fitting occasion for the Editor to pay the warmest of tributes to the several translators and other contributors for all the learning and industry they brought to bear on their work, as well as the skill with which they discharged the respective tasks committed to them. Where each one gave of his best, it would be invidious to single out names. Special mention must however be made of Mr. Maurice Simon, M.A. for his helpfulness in many directions, especially in the matter of style and diction, and to Mr. Eli Cashdan, M.A. for his careful attention to proofs and other valuable assistance. Thanks are also due to my wife for looking well after the ways of her household, and thus making it possible for me to engage in this work.
The driving force behind this gigantic work was of course Mr. J. Davidson, the Governing Director of the Soncino Press. His was the vision that inspired it, the energy that produced it, and the courage that enabled him to carry it through to the end, notwithstanding difficulties and obstacles that at times seemed insurmountable. Jewish learning has long been under a deep obligation to Mr. Davidson for his fine publications, but the debt owed to him for the splendid array of beautiful volumes that comprise the Soncino edition of the complete Babylonian Talmud in English passes all calculation.

And now to conclude on a more personal note, I tender my humble thanks to Almighty God for having granted me life and strength to perform this most exacting and strenuous task, and to witness its completion. May it be His will that these volumes should help to spread the knowledge of His Torah among an overgrowing circle of disciples, and to foster an appreciation of Jewish teachings in an ever-increasing measure in English-speaking Jewries and beyond.

With this prayer I take leave of my editorial task, a task which covered the whole of the Talmud, commonly known as Shass. It is a solemn occasion which, in accordance with Jewish custom, calls for a celebration. Such a celebration would be marked by the recital of what is called a Hadran, in which the hope is expressed that the ending of the study of the Talmud shall prove but the prelude to a new beginning. This is the note on which, I feel, all those who have contributed to the preparation of this version of the Babylonian Talmud would like this work to conclude. And so in response to their wishes and the promptings of my own heart, I say au revoir to this Talmudic work, to the accompaniment, in an abbreviated form, of the traditional Hadran:

[H] May it be Thy will, O Lord our God, that Thy Torah be our occupation in this world and be with us in the world to come …

Make pleasant, we beseech Thee, O Lord our God, the words of Thy Torah in our mouth and in the mouth of Thy people, so that we all with our offspring and the offspring of the offspring of Thy people, the House of Israel, may all know Thy Name and learn Thy Torah for its own sake …

We give thanks before Thee, O Lord our God, and the God of our ancestors, that Thou hast set our portion with those that sit in the House of Study and not with those (idlers) who sit at street-corners …

May it be Thy will, O Lord our God, even as Thou hast helped to complete Seder Kodashim and the whole of Six Sedarim of the Talmud, so to help us to begin other books and to complete them, to learn, to teach, to heed, to do and to fulfill in love all the words of instruction in Thy Torah … and may there be fulfilled in us (the promise): When thou walkest it shall lead thee; when thou liest down it shall watch over thee; and when thou awakest it shall talk with thee (Proverbs, VI, 2 2).

For by me thy days shall be multiplied, and thy years of life shall be increased (Proverbs, IX, 11). Length of days is in its right hand; in its left are riches and honors (Proverbs, III, 16). The Lord will give strength unto His people; the Lord will bless His people with peace. (Psalms, XXIX, 11).

Amen.

I. EPSTEIN
Jews’ College
13th Nisan. 5708
22nd April, 1948
Footnotes

1. Introduction to Seder Zera'im.
2. Nezikin has its basis in Exodus; Kodashim, in Leviticus I-X; Tohoroth, in Leviticus XI-XV. For another explanation, see Z. Frankel, Darke ha-Mishneh, p. 262.
3. For the place of the dietary laws in the Jewish scheme of Holiness, see I. Epstein, The Jewish Way of Life, pp. 161-164.
4. According to all editions of the Mishnah, with the exception of the Riva di Trento 1559 edition in which Hullin and Bekoroth appear in Tohoroth.
5. In the Naples 1492 edition Middoth is placed before Tamid.
6. In Tamid only chapters 1, 2, 4 have Gemara.
7. See Maimonides, loc. cit. Whether he had ever seen it, is very doubtful, since he is not known to have made citation of it anywhere.
8. The Palestine Gemara on Kodashim, claimed to have been discovered by Solomon Leb Friedlander and of which he published several tractates under the title Talmud Yerushalmi Seder Kodashim (Szinervaralja 1907-8), has been proved a forgery. See H. L. Strack, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash (English ed.), Philadelphia, 1931, pp. 68 and 266, n. 16.
9. See e.g. Men. 110a; Ta'an. 27b; Midrash Ex. Rab. XXXVIII; Midrash, Lev, Rab. IX.
10. The Paschal Lamb seems also to have belonged to the tributary, the lamb being offered vicariously by the household in recognition of God's deliverance of the houses of Israel in Egypt. See Ex. XII, 2]. It is not without significance that the Paschal Lamb is often bracketed with the firstlings and cattle tithe, and significance that the Paschal Lamb is often vicariously by the household in recognition of God's deliverance of the houses of Israel in Egypt. See Ex. XII, 2]. It is not without significance that the Paschal Lamb is often bracketed with the firstlings and cattle tithe, and to the tributary, the lamb being offered vicariously by the household in recognition of God's deliverance of the houses of Israel in Egypt. See Ex. XII, 2]. It is not without significance that the Paschal Lamb is often bracketed with the firstlings and cattle tithe, and that, except for what concerns their consumption, they are governed by the same sacrificial regulations. See Zeb. 56b.
12. The guilt-offering entailed by the social offences enumerated in Lev. V, 21ff, was required only if the offender had denied his guilt on oath, his offering being in expiation of his sin against God rather than his fellow. As for the sin he had committed against his fellow, 'even if he were to bring all the "rams of Nebaioth" (Isaiah, LX, 7) in the world, he would not be forgiven until he obtains pardon from his fellow' (B.K. 92a); see also Yoma 856.
13. The wrongs enumerated in Lev. V, 21ff (see previous note), for which even willful offenders were to bring a guilt-offering, contained in them a certain element of constraint which brought them into the category of unwillful offences. The man who, for example, denied that he had misappropriated the property of his fellow and, on being adjudged, takes a false oath, may have done so because he lacked the moral courage to admit his guilt after having once tried to conceal it; cf. Aaron ha-Levi, Sefer ha-Hinnuk, Precept 123, with reference to the 'oath of testimony', for which the offering prescribed (Lev. V, 1ff) applies to 'witting' as well as 'unwitting' cases. Otherwise for deliberate offences, unless the penalty is committed to an earthly tribunal, repentance secures divine forgiveness. See Yoma 86a, and Tosefta, Yom ha-Kippurim V (Zuckerman's ed.), p. 190.
15. The term 'ritual' is used throughout in a comprehensive sense, and denotes all the religious precepts of the Torah concerning the relations between man and God.
21. In the preface to his commentary on Leviticus; see infra, p. xxix.
22. Ta'an 2a; see also Midrash Tanhuma, Wa yera, 1.
23. Cf. also David Kimhi on Jer. VII, 2.; This is an important distinction which, strange to say, appears to have been overlooked by all those writers who deal with the attitude of the prophets to the sacrifices. Yet it is fundamental and must be taken into consideration before we can speak of an antagonism of the prophets to the sacrificial cult. In fact a reference to the prophetic utterances, cited by the critical school in support of their views on the problem, i.e. I Sam. XV, 22; Hosea VI, 6; Amos V, 21ff; Isaiah I, 11ff; Micah VI, 6ff; Jeremiah VII, 21ff, shows that they are all concerned with voluntary sacrifices. This is a subject which deserves to be treated at length, but space here forbids a full discussion. The literature on the problem of the attitude of the prophets to sacrifices is too extensive to be listed. Among the most recent, however, might be mentioned H. H. Rowley, The Rediscovery of the Old Testament (1946); and to go back earlier, J. Hoschander, The Priests and Prophets (1938).
24. All obligatory sacrifices, public and private (except the few tributary ones), were piacular or had at least in them a piacular element. See Sheb. 2a-b, and Tosefta Menahoth, X 12. See also G. F. Moore, Judaism, 1. p. 497 and 111, p. 151-2.
25. In support of his view that the sacrifices belong to the hukkim, Maimonides in his Code (loc. cit.) quotes a dictum 'By the merit of the sacrifices...
the world stands'. This dictum is but an
extension of the idea mentioned in Ta'an. 27a
where this is said in his reference to the
Ma'amadot, the attendances at the Daily
Offering which is the obligatory offering par
excellence.
27. Friedlinder, op. cit. pp. 311, 312.
28. This is how the difficult chapter in the Guide
(111, 26) is to be understood. While rejecting the
view of those theologians who, following the
Mohammedan Ashariyah (see Guide 111, 17),
hold that the commandments have no object at
all and that they had been dictated only by the
will of God, Maimonides accepts their position
as far as the detailed rules are concerned. His
assertion that the details have no ulterior object
can only mean that they have their source in the
will of God. A similar notion that the
commandments have no reason is found in Ber.
33b. See Maimonides Guide, 111, 48; and
I. Epstein, Judaism of Tradition, pp. 42-43.
29. See supra p. xxvii, n. 2.
31. See supra, p. xxiv.
32. V. Glos.
33. Midrash Lev. Rab. XXIII, 5. See D. Hoffmann,
Leviticus, p. 88, and W. Bacher, Die Aggada der
palastinensischen Amoraer, II, p. 316.
34. Midrash quoted by Bahya b. Asher in his
commentary on the Pentateuch, Lev. I, 9. For
the various versions of this Midrash, see M.
35. Guide, 111, 26. 'What difference does it make to
God whether a beast is killed by cutting the neck
in front or in the back? Surely the
commandments are only intended as a means of
trying man' (Midrash Gen. Rab. XLIV, 1). This
Midrashic dictum is generally understood in the
sense that the commandments are educative,
ennobling in character, see supra p. xxiii.
Maimonides evidently gave the Midrash a
different interpretation, and while not accepting
the illustration drawn from slaughtering, as the
rules of slaughtering have in his view a definite
educative value, he applies the Midrashic
principles to sacrifices.
36. Either (i) 'bright', or (ii) 'separation'; see N.H.
Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the Old
Testament, pp. 26ff.
37. See Maimonides, Yad, Melakim, XI, 1.
38. See Sanh. 64a.
40. The enormous legal difficulties involved in the
restoration of sacrifices within our present social
and political framework places the whole
question outside the realm of practical halachah.
Compare A. I. Kook, Mishpat Kohen, Responsa,
89ff.
CHAPTER I

**MISHNAH**

ALL SACRIFICES SLAUGHTERED NOT IN THEIR OWN NAME:1 ARE VALID;2 SAVE THAT THEY DO NOT FREE THEIR OWNERS OF THEIR OBLIGATION;3 WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PASSOVER-OFFERING AND THE SIN-OFFERING.4 [THUS HOLDS GOOD OF] A PASSOVER-OFFERING IN ITS PROPER TIME;5 AND A SIN-OFFERING AT ALL TIMES.


JOSE B. HONI SAID: [SACRIFICES] SLAUGHTERED IN THE NAME OF A PASSOVER-OFFERING OR A SIN-OFFERING ARE INVALID. SIMEON THE BROTHER OF ‘AZARIAH6 SAID: IF ONE SLAUGHTERED THEM UNDER A HIGHER DESIGNATION THAN THEIR OWN THEY ARE VALID; UNDER A LOWER DESIGNATION THAN THEIR OWN, THEY ARE INVALID. HOW SO? IF ONE SLAUGHTERED MOST SACRED SACRIFICES UNDER THE DESIGNATION OF LESSER SACRIFICES,7 THEY ARE INVALID; IF ONE SLAUGHTERED LESSER SACRIFICES UNDER THE DESIGNATION OF MOST SACRED SACRIFICES, THEY ARE VALID. IF ONE SLAUGHTERED A FIRSTLING OR TITHE IN THE NAME OF A PEACE-OFFERING,8 IT IS VALID; IF ONE SLAUGHTERED A PEACE-OFFERING IN THE NAME OF A FIRSTLING OR TITHE, IT IS INVALID.

**GEMARA.** Why must [the Tanna] teach, SAVE THAT THEY DO NOT FREE [THEIR OWNERS OF THEIR OBLIGATION]; let him teach, ‘and they do not free their owners of their obligation?’9 — He informs us this: they merely do not free their owners of their obligation. yet they retain their [original] sanctity, and no alteration therein is permitted, in accordance with Raba's dictum. For Raba said: If a burnt-offering was slaughtered under a different designation, its blood must not be sprinkled under a different designation.10 If you wish, I can say [this follows] from reason, and if you wish I can say, from Scripture. If you wish, I can say [this follows] from reason: because he made an alteration therein [once], is he to go on making alterations therein?11 And if you wish, I can say [it follows] from Scripture: That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt observe and do; according as thou hast vowed a freewill-offering unto the Lord thy God, etc.:12 is this a freewill-offering —

(1) I.e. under a different designation. E.g., a burnt-offering slaughtered as a peace-offering.
(2) They count as a sacrifice, and all their rites, such as sprinkling the blood, burning the emurim (v. Glos). and eating the flesh, must be performed.
(3) If the owner vowed e.g., a burnt-offering, this sacrifice does not free him of his obligation and he must bring another.
(4) These are altogether invalid; hence they must be burnt (not on the altar), and the usual rites may not be performed.
(5) Sc. from midday on the eve of Passover until nightfall.
(6) Sotah 21a.
(7) Sacrifices were divided into two categories: (i) Most sacred; these included the sin-offering, meal-offering, burnt-offering and guilt-offering; and (ii) Lesser sacrifices e.g., the peace-offering. Passover-offering and the thanks-offering.
(8) The sanctity of the former is lower, v. infra 89a.
(9) Which is more in keeping with the terse style of the Mishnah.
(10) But as the blood of a burnt-offering.
(11) Obviously not-one wrong does not authorize another!
(12) Deut. XXIII,24.
surely it is a vow? The meaning however is this: if you have acted in accordance with your vow; but if not, let it count as a freewill-offering. Now as a freewill-offering is it permitted to make a change in it? Rabina said to R. Papa: You were not with us in the evening within the Sabbath limit of Be Harmack, when Raba pointed out a contradiction in two important laws, and then reconciled them. What are these important laws?—

We learnt: ALL SACRIFICES SLAUGHTERED NOT IN THEIR OWN NAME, etc. Thus it is only when they are slaughtered for another purpose; but if no purpose is defined, they even acquit their owners of their obligation, which proves that an undefined purpose is the same as its own purpose [defined]. But the following contradicts it: ‘Every Get which was written not in the name of the woman [for whom it is intended] is invalid; and [in point of fact if it is written with] an undefined purpose it is also invalid? And he answered it: Sacrifices, where no purpose is defined, stand [to be slaughtered] for their own purpose whereas a woman, If nothing is defined, does not stand to be divorced. Now, how do we know that sacrifices slaughtered with undefined purpose are valid? Shall we say, because we learnt: ALL SACRIFICES SLAUGHTERED NOT IN THEIR OWN NAME, etc., while he [the Tanna] does not teach, ‘which were not slaughtered under their own designation’. But surely in the case of the Get too, he also teaches: Every Get which was written not in the name of the woman, is invalid, and does not teach, ‘which was not written in the name of the woman is invalid’! — Rather, it follows from what we learned: How is ‘in its own name and not in its own name’ meant? In the name of the Passover-offering and in the name of a peace-offering but, [if he slaughtered it] in the name of the Passover-offering and [sprinkled its blood] with undefined purpose, it is fit; which proves that with purpose undefined it is as in its own name! Perhaps it is different there, because one may argue: Whoever does anything, does it with the original [expressed] intention! — Rather, it follows from the second clause: [How is] ‘not in its own name and in its own name’ [meant]? In the name of a peace-offering [first] and [then] in the name of the Passover-offering. Thus it is [invalid] only because he stated, ‘In the name of a peace-offering and in the name of the Passover-offering’; but [if he slaughtered it] without a defined purpose [and sprinkled the blood] in the name of the Passover-offering, it is valid! Perhaps it is different there, because we say: the end illumines the beginning. Alternatively, [perhaps] because he teaches ‘in its own name and not in its own name’ [in the first clause], he also teaches ‘not in its own name and in its own name’ [in the second clause]! Rather, it follows from this: A sacrifice is slaughtered for the sake of six things: For the sake of the sacrifice, for the sake of the sacrificer, for the sake of the Divine Name, for the sake of fire-offerings, for the sake of a savor, for the sake of pleasing, and a sin-offering and a guilt-offering for the sake of sin. R. Jose said: Even if one did not have any of these purposes in his heart, it is valid, because it is a regulation of the Beth din. Thus the Beth din made a regulation that one should not state its purpose, lest he come to state a different purpose. Now if you think that an undefined purpose [renders] it invalid, would the Beth din arise and make a regulation which would invalidate it? Now how do we know in the case of a Get that an undefined purpose [renders] it invalid? Shall we say from what we learned: If one was passing through the street and heard the voice of scribes dictating: ‘So-and-so divorced So-and-so of such a place,’ whereupon he exclaimed, ‘That is my name and my wife’s name,’ it [the Get so written] is invalid for divorcing therewith! — Yet perhaps that is
[to be explained] as [did] R. Papa. For R. Papa said: We are discussing scribes engaged in practicing, So that it was not written for the purpose of divorcement at all! — Rather [it follows] from this:

(1) As thou hast vowed implies that we are treating of a vow; while a freewill-offering applies to a nedabah (a freewill-offering). When one vows, ‘Behold, I undertake to bring a sacrifice, ‘ it is technically called a vow; if one declares, ‘Behold, this animal be for a sacrifice,’ it is a freewill-offering. In the first case, if he subsequently dedicates an animal in pursuance of his vow, and it is lost before it is sacrificed, he must bring another. In the latter case, should the animal be lost or become unfit, his obligation is at an end.

(2) I.e., you have slaughtered it in the name of the sacrifice which you actually vowed.

(3) Additional to the vow originally made.

(4) Of course not. Hence, though it was slaughtered for a different purpose, its other rites must still be performed for the right purpose.

(5) To he able to visit us at the schoolhouse. — He was referring to the Sabbath. Be Harmack in the vicinity of Pumbeditha; Obermeyer, Die Landschaft Babylonian p. 124.

(6) Deed of Divorce.

(7) I.e. he slaughtered the paschal sacrifice in the name of a Passover-offering as required but sprinkled the blood in the name of a peace-offering. V. infra 13a.

(8) Git. 24a.

(9) Hence an undefined purpose is the same as a wrongful purpose.

(10) This may be assumed.

(11) I.e. he slaughtered the paschal sacrifice in the name of a Passover-offering as required but sprinkled the blood in the name of a peace-offering. V. infra 13a.

(12) Not necessarily, as mere wrongful intention is effective.

(13) Which proves that where the purpose is undefined the sacrifice is valid.

(14) Hence since the end (sprinkling) was in the name of the Passover-offering, we assume the beginning (the slaughtering) to have been likewise.

(15) For the sake of parallelism. Yet actually if he slaughters it without a defined purpose, it may be invalid.

(16) He who offers the sacrifice must have these in mind (or express them): (i) the particular sacrifice it is intended to be; (ii) the person for whom it is sacrificed; (iii) that it is sacrificed in honor of the Divine Name; (iv) with the intention of burning the emurim on the altar, not merely roasting it; (v) and (vi) with the intention that it shall provide a pleasing savor to God (v.e.g., Lev.III, 5 — nihoah, translated there ‘sweet’, is rendered ‘pleasing’).

(17) Lit., ‘stipulation’.

(18) That one should not define its purpose—the name of the sacrifice for which it is offered, infra 46b.

(19) Surely not. This then proves Raba’s first point.

(20) They were teaching pupils to write a Get, and had selected the names at random.

(21) Git. 24a.

(22) But if a scribe writes a Get for the purpose of divorce, selecting names at random, perhaps it is valid.

Even more; If he wrote [a Get] to divorce his wife and then changed his mind; then a fellow-citizen met him and said to him ‘My name is the same as yours, and my wife’s name is the same as yours, it [the Get] is invalid for divorcing therewith! — Yet perhaps it is different there, because it had been designated for that particular person’s divorce! — Rather, from the following: Even more: If he had two wives of the same name, and he wrote [a Get] to divorce the elder therewith, he cannot divorce the younger with it. — Perhaps it is different there, as it had been designated for that particular wife’s divorce! — Rather, from the following: Even more: If he said to the writer, ‘Write it and I will then divorce whichever I desire,’ it is invalid for divorcing therewith! — Perhaps it is different there, because selection is not retrospective!

Rather, from this: He who writes formulas of Gittin must leave blanks for the name of the husband, and the name of the wife, the names of the witnesses, and the date.5 Rab Judah said in Samuel’s name: He must also leave a blank for [the passage], ‘Behold, thou art permitted unto all men’. He [Raba] pointed out a further contradiction. Did then Rab Judah say in Rab’s name: if one slaughtered a sin-offering under the designation of a burnt-offering, it is invalid; if one slaughtered it] under the designation of hullin,6 is it valid?
This proves that its own kind destroys it, while a different kind does not destroy it. But the following contradicts it: ‘Every Get written not in the name of the woman [for whom, it is intended] is invalid,’8 and [in point of fact] even [if written] in the name of a Gentile woman it is still invalid.9 And he answered: In the case of a Get, disregard the Gentile woman altogether;10 [and] it is then [written] without defined purpose, which is invalid.11 But as for sacrifices, disregard the hullin,12 [and] it is [a sacrifice slaughtered] without defined purpose, which is valid.13 He pointed out another contradiction. Did then Rab Judah say in Rab's name: If one slaughtered a sin-offering under the designation of a burnt-offering, it is invalid; [if he slaughtered it] under the designation of hullin, it is valid? This proves that its own kind destroys it, while a different kind does not destroy it. But it was taught: [And every earthen vessel into] whose inside [any of them falleth, whatsoever is in it shall be unclean, and it ye shall break]14 but not the inside of the inside, and even a non-earthen vessel15 saves it.16 And he answered it: They [the Rabbis] treated hullin in respect to consecrated animals as a partition in respect to an oven. Just as a partition in respect to an oven has no effect at all, so hullin in respect to consecrated animals has no effect at all. For we learned: If an oven is partitioned with boards or curtains, and a reptile is found in one compartment, the whole is unclean. If a defective receptacle,17 which is stuffed with straw, is lowered into the air-space of an oven, and a reptile is in it, the oven becomes unclean; if a reptile is in the oven the foodstuffs in it [the receptacle] become unclean;18 while R. Eliezer declares it clean. Said R. Eliezer: It follows a fortiori: If it protects in the case of a corpse, which is stringent,19 shall it not protect it in the case of an earthen vessel20 which is less stringent? Not so, they replied:

(1) And for no other.
(2) Git. 24b.
(3) His subsequent intention has no retrospective validity in the sense that it is regarded as though he had intended it thus in the first place, and so it is still possible that he had first intended it for the other, and therefore it is invalid.
(4) Plural of Get. He writes them to have them ready whenever the occasion arises.
(5) Then he can fill them in as required. But he cannot fill them in in the first place, though writing them for the express purpose of divorce, and then find persons with the same name (Git. 26a). This proves that they must be written expressly for persons who are to use them.
(6) V. Glos — i.e., not as a sacrifice at all.
(7) A sin-offering and a burnt-offering are of the same kind — both are sacred, and by substituting the name of the latter for that of the former, he destroys its validity. But hullin, being non-sacred, is of a different kind, as it were, and does not harm it.
(8) Git. 24a.
(9) Now a Gentile woman belongs to a different category, in that the law of Get does not apply to her at all, and yet she destroys the validity of the Get.
(10) Regard the Get as though it had not been written for her.
(11) Since it must be written expressly for a particular woman.
(12) Viz., that it was slaughtered as hullin.
(13) V. supra 2b.
(14) Lev. XI, 33.
(15) Lit. ‘a vessel of rinsing.’ This is the technical designation of all non-earthen vessels, because they can be purified from ritual uncleanness in a ritual bath (mikweh).
(16) If a reptile (sherez) falls inside an earthen utensil containing eatables, even without touching them, they become unclean. On this the comment is made: only if it falls, inside, but not into the inside of the inside. Thus: if a utensil containing eatables is lying in an earthen oven (ancient ovens were open on top), with its mouth protruding above the top of the oven, and a reptile falls into the oven, the foodstuffs remain clean, as the inside of the utensil is regarded as the ‘inside of the inside,’ of an oven. This holds good not only when the inner utensil too is an earthen one, but even if it is non-earthen. The difference between the two is this: an earthen vessel is defiled only if the reptile falls inside, whereas a non-earthen vessel is defiled even if the reptile touches it on the outside. Now a non-earthen vessel is really of a different kind, since it differs in law, and yet it protects the foodstuffs in it from defilement, acting as interposition between the foodstuffs and the vessel in the oven. Thus a different kind too can ‘destroy’ the status of the food as being ‘inside’ the oven and gives it the status of being ‘inside the inside’.
(17) Lit. ‘a beehive (shaped receptacle)’.
Thus the receptacle, not being of the same kind as the oven, does not destroy the status of the food as being in the air-space of the oven. If the receptacle were whole it would protect the eatables, as above. Since it is not whole, however, it lacks the status of a utensil, and this is so even if it is stuffed with straw as a repair.

If this partition were in a room containing a corpse, it would suffice to protect the foodstuffs from defilement, though the contaminating powers of a corpse are far greater than those of a reptile in an oven.

As in the case of the oven.

ZEVOCHIM 3b

if it protects in the case of a corpse, which is stringent, that is because it is divided into tents;1 if it is divided into two rooms, 

Rab's reason is in accordance with R. Eleazar.7 For R. Eleazar said: What is Rab's reason? And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they set apart unto the Lord:8 holy things profane holy things, but hullin does not profane holy things.8 This proves that a Scriptural text comes and nullifies the argument a fortiori; then here too, let the text 'its inside' come and nullify the argument a fortiori?10 — This text, 'its inside', is required in respect of foodstuffs pasted round with clay and placed within the air-space of an oven. You might think, since they cannot be defiled by contact,11 they cannot be defiled through its air-space either. Hence [the deduction] informs us that It is not so.12 And the Rabbis? —

[They argue,] No text is necessary in respect of these [foodstuffs],13 R. Joseph b. Ammi pointed out a contradiction between change [of intention] in respect of sanctity and change [of intention] in respect of owners,14 and answered it. Did then Rab say: If one slaughters a sin-offering [for one offence] as a sin-offering [for another offence],15 it is fit; as a burnt-offering, it is unfit? This then proves that another kind destroys it, whereas its own kind does not destroy it. Yet surely Rab said: If a sin-offering is slaughtered on behalf of one who is liable to a sin-offering,16 it is unfit; on behalf of one who is liable to a burnt-offering, it is fit. This proves that a person of the same category as the offender destroys it, whereas one of a different category does not destroy it? And he answered: In the former case, the Divine Law states, And he shall kill it for a sin-offering,17 and lo, a sin-offering has been slaughtered as a sin-offering. But in the latter case it is written, and the priest shall make atonement for him,18 [which intimates,] ‘for him’, but not for his fellow, and ‘his fellow’ implies one like himself, who stands in need of atonement just as he does.19 R. Habibi showed a contradiction between the law of change [of intention] in respect of owners and that of the inside of the inside, and then answered it. Did then Rab say: If a sin-offering is slaughtered on behalf of one who is liable to a sin-offering, it is unfit; on behalf of one who is liable to a burnt-offering, it is fit? This then proves that its own kind destroys it, whereas a different kind does not destroy it. Yet surely it was taught: 'Its inside', but not the inside of its inside, and even a non-earthen vessel protects it?20 And he answered: ‘Its inside’ is written four times, ‘the inside [tok]’, ‘its inside [toko]; ‘the inside’ [tok], ‘its inside [toko]’;21 one is required for its essential law;22 another for a gezerah shawah;23 a third [intimates] the inside of this, but not the inside of another;24 and finally [to teach]: Its inside, but not the inside of its inside, and even a non-earthen vessel protects it.25

A single partition across a room is sufficient to divide it into two rooms, and if a corpse is in one, eatables or utensils in the other are not contaminated. Hence it is right that even a defective receptacle should have the same effect.

I.e., a partition placed in an earthen vessel (sc. an oven) does not divide it into separate compartments (here designated ‘tents’), as stated.
supra 3a: therefore a defective receptacle cannot do so either; so Tosaf. Rashi explains more simply: if it protects... into tents — i.e., it is quite usual to partition off a room into two, therefore a partition converts it into two separate tents. But it is not usual to partition an oven: hence the partition cannot affect its status. On this interpretation it appears that R. Eliezer holds that a partition does affect it, protecting the foodstuffs from contamination. In that case they differ not only in respect to a defective receptacle, but also in respect to the partitioning of an oven by a board or curtain.

(3) The view that the defective receptacle (or, a partition) does not protect agrees with Rab's statement that what is not of its own kind does not ‘destroy’ it.

(4) According to him a different kind too apparently ‘destroys’ it: is then Rab's ruling a matter of dispute between the Rabbis and R. Eliezer?

(5) Generally he agrees with Rab, but in this particular case he rules differently, because of his argument.

(6) When one kills a sin-offering as a burnt-offering, he is still killing it as something sacred, and yet you say it is unfit. How much more should it be unfit when he kills it as hulín, which is not sacred at all!

(7) Not because a different kind does not ‘destroy’ it, but because a Scriptural text teaches this law. Sh. M. emends: R. Elai.

(8) Lev. XXII, 15.

(9) Tosaf. suggests that ‘the holy things’ is superfluous, being understood from the context, and is therefore employed for this deduction.

(10) From this text, ‘its inside,’ it is deduced supra a, but not ‘the inside of the inside,’ which is explained as meaning the inside of a second vessel within the first. Now from this it is deduced a fortiori that a partition does not destroy the unity of an oven (v. supra a), for if it did, a text would surely not be necessary for teaching that another vessel within the first protects its contents.

(11) For a ‘creeping thing’ cannot touch them.

(12) The food is defiled. This is learnt from the deduction, its ‘inside,’ but not ‘the inside of its ‘inside,’ whence it follows that a partition does not protect; and it is in respect of a partition of this nature, viz., clay pasted round food, that this conclusion is drawn.

(13) For they are obviously ‘inside’ of the oven.

(14) I.e. between wrongful intention in respect of the sacrifice and that in respect of the owner thereof; e.g., he offered the sacrifice under the name of one who was not its owner.

(15) Its owner had incurred the liability on account of a particular offence, whereas in slaughtering it he (or the priest) intended it as a sin-offering for some other offence.

(16) But who is not the owner of this particular sacrifice.

(17) Lev. IV, 33.

(18) Ibid. 26, 31, 35.

(19) For otherwise he cannot be called ‘his fellow’ in this respect. Hence the exclusion of his fellow applies only to such a case.

(20) Cf. supra a p. 7. n. 1.

(21) V. Lev. XI, 33, where toko (lit, ‘its inside’) is repeated twice, though in each case tok (‘inside’) would suffice. Each tok (which could have been written) is interpreted; further, each addition, ‘toko,’ is likewise interpreted, which gives four in all.

(22) Viz., that any food or drink within it is defiled through the reptile (sherez) entering its air-space.

(23) V. Glos. Teaching that the dead reptile defiles the utensil too, through entering its air-space, even without touching it; v. Hul. 24b.

(24) Only an earthen vessel thus becomes unclean through its air-space without actual contact, but not a non-earthen vessel.

(25) Hence this is a specially decreed law and stands by itself; therefore its principle cannot be applied to sacrifices.

Zevachim 4a

How do we know that the slaughtering must be in its own name? Because Scripture says, And if his offering be a zebah slaughtering of peace-offerings:1 [this teaches] that its slaughtering must be in the name of a peace-offering. But perhaps that is their name?2 —

Since it is written, He that offereth the blood of the peace-offerings3 and [he] that dasheth the blood of the peace-offerings [against the altar],4 and zebah’ is not written,5 whereas here ‘zebah’ is written, you may infer from it that the slaughtering must be in the name of a peace-offering. We have thus learned [it of] slaughtering, how do we know [it of] the other [sacrificial] services?6 And if you say, let us learn then, from slaughtering [by analogy], then it may be objected, as for slaughtering, the reason is because it disqualifies in the case of a Passover-sacrifice [if done] on behalf of those who cannot eat it.7 —
Rather Scripture says, He that offereth the blood of the peace-offerings which teaches that the reception [of its blood] must be in the name of peace-offerings. Then let the Divine Law state it of the reception [of the blood], whence the slaughtering [too] could be derived? —

[That is not done] because [the analogy] can be refuted. As for the reception [of the blood], the reason is because it is unfit [if done] by a lay-Israelite or a woman. We have thus learned [it of] slaughtering and receiving; how do we know [it of] sprinkling? And if you answer, let us learn it from the former [by analogy, then it may be argued]: As for the former, the reason is because they require the north, and are practiced in the case of the inner sin-offerings! —

Rather, Scripture says, ‘He that dasheth the blood of the peace-offerings!’ [which teaches] that the sprinkling [dashing] must be in the name of peace-offerings. Then let the Divine Law write it in respect to sprinkling, whence the others could be derived? [That is impossible] because [the analogy] can be refuted: as for sprinkling, that is because a lay-Israelite is liable to death on its account.

We have thus found it of all [rites]; whence do we know [it] of carrying? And if you say, let us learn it from all the others, [then it may be argued]: As for all the others, that is because they are rites which cannot be dispensed with; will you say the same of carrying, which can be dispensed with?

—

Rather, Scripture says, And the priest shall bring near the whole... to the altar, and a Master said: This refers to the carrying of the limbs to the [altar] ascent; while it was also taught, [And Aaron's sons...] shall present [the blood]; this refers to the receiving of the blood. Now, Scripture expresses this by a term denoting carrying in order to teach that carrying cannot be excluded from the scope of receiving. Now we have thus found [it] of change [of intention] in respect of sanctity; whence do we know it of change [of intention] in respect of owner? —

Said R. Phinehas the son of R. Ammi: Scripture says, And the flesh of the slaughtering of his peace-offerings for thanksgiving, etc., [which teaches] that the slaughtering must be in the name of a thank-offering; now since this is superfluous for change in respect of sanctity, for that is deduced from the other text, transfer its teaching to change in respect of owners. But is that the purpose of this verse? Surely it is required for what was taught. [Viz.,] ‘And the flesh of the zebah [slaughtering] of his peace-offerings for thanksgiving’: Abba Hanin said on R. Eliezer's authority: This comes to teach that if a thanks-offering is slaughtered in the name of a peace-offering, it is valid; if a peace-offering is slaughtered in the name of a thanks-offering, it is invalid. What is the difference between these two cases? —

A thanks-offering is designated a peace-offering, but a peace-offering is not designated a thank-offering! We state [our deduction] from the word ‘slaughtering’. Yet it is still needed [thus]: How do we know [it of] a sin-offering and a guilt-offering? From the word ‘slaughtering’.

If so, let Scripture write, And the flesh of his peace-offerings for thanksgiving slaughtering shall be eaten, etc. Why state, the slaughtering [of his peace-offerings for thanksgiving]? So that both laws may be inferred from it. We have thus found [it of] slaughtering; whence do we know [it of] other services? And if you say, Let us learn [them] from slaughtering, [then it may be objected]: as for slaughtering, the reason is because it disqualifies in the case of a Passover-offering, [when it is done] for the sake of those who cannot eat it! —

‘Slaughtering’ is stated in reference to change [of intention] in respect of sanctity, and
‘slaughtering’ is stated in reference to change of intention in respect of owner; as in the case of the slaughtering stated in reference to change in respect of sanctity, you do not differentiate between slaughtering and other services, so also in the case of the slaughtering which stated in reference to change of owners, you must not differentiate between slaughtering and other rites. This can be refuted: as for change in respect of sanctity, that is because its disqualification is intrinsic and it is [operative] in respect of the four services and it is [operative] after death and it is [operative] in the case of the community as in the case of an individual.

(2) Perhaps the Heb. zebah simply means “sacrifice”, as E.V the name of the offering being the sacrifice of peace-offerings, and thus it has no bearing on the question of slaughtering.
(3) Lev. VII, 33.
(4) Ibid. 14.
(5) It does not say, ‘He that offereth the blood of the zebah of the peace-offerings.’
(6) Receiving the blood, carrying it to the part of the altar where it is to be sprinkled, and the actual sprinkling, count as separate services.
(7) E.g. on behalf of aged and infirm, who cannot eat. But if the blood is sprinkled on their behalf, the offering is not unfit; and similarly in the case of any other of the services performed on their behalf.
(8) The Rabbis refer this to the receiving of the blood.
(9) It must be done by a priest. The slaughtering however may be done by a lay-Israelite too, and therefore, but for the text which teaches otherwise, I might think that it need not be done specifically in the name of that particular sacrifice.
(10) They must both be done at the north side of the altar.
(11) If he performs it. But the slaughtering may be done by a non priest; while the receiving and carrying, though forbidden to a non priest, do not involve death. By ‘death’ is meant death at the hands of heaven, not capital punishment.
(12) If the animal is killed at the very spot where the blood is to be sprinkled.
(13) We-hikrib; E.V. ‘offer’.
(15) Ibid. 5.
(16) The same Heb. word, hikrib here explained to mean the receiving of the blood, is interpreted as carrying (the limbs) in the other verse.
(17) I.e., receiving includes carrying, and the law of one applies to the other.
(18) I.e., that a particular sacrifice must not be offered in the name of a different sacrifice.
(19) Ibid. VII, 15.
(20) This is a principle of Talmudic exegesis: where a verse is superfluous in respect of the subject upon which it directly bears, its teaching is to be transferred to another, analogous subject.
(21) ‘Valid’ and ‘invalid’ mean that the bringer has discharged or not discharged his obligations respectively.
(22) ‘Peace-offering’ is a wider term, which includes but is not included in the term ‘thanks-offering’. — Thus the verse is required for a different purpose.
(23) Whereas the other teaching is deduced from the phrase ‘his peace-offerings for thanksgiving’.
(24) That their flesh too may be eaten only on the day when they are sacrificed and the following night, as that text is interpreted is respect of thanksgiving.
(25) Which term includes other sacrifices.
(26) If that is the only teaching of that verse.
(27) Thus ‘zebah’ would be written immediately in connection with eating.
(28) Bringing ‘slaughtering’ into connection with the sacrifice rather than with the eating.
(29) Sc. that they must not be performed in the name of any but their true owner.
(30) I.e., on illegitimate intention is expressed in respect to the sacrifice itself.
(31) An illegitimate intention in respect of any service disqualifies it (according to the terms of the Mishnah). But change in respect of owner is a disqualification only for sprinkling, which constitutes the principal rite of atonement, either at that rite itself, or by expressing an intention at the slaughtering or any other service that the sprinkling shall be for a different owner.
(32) If the owner dies, his son must bring it, and if he slaughters it for a different purpose it is invalid.
(33) A public sacrifice, just like a private sacrifice, is disqualified if offered for another purpose.

Now although two [of these refutations] are not exact, two at all events are! (For how is change in respect of owner different, that it is not an intrinsic disqualification? [Surely] because it is a mere intention!2 Then change in respect of sanctity too is a mere intention! But what you must say is that since he intended it [for a wrongful purpose], he disqualified it; then here too, since he

Zevachim 4b
intended it [for a different owner], he disqualified it. Furthermore, according to R. Phinehas the son of R. Mari who maintained: Change in respect of owner does operate after death, on two points at least you can refute it.) —

Rather, said R. Ashi, Scripture says, And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him, but not for his fellow. But does it come for this purpose? Surely it is required for what was taught: And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him: R. Simeon said: Where [the sacrifice] is [a liability] upon him, he is responsible for its loss; where it is not [a liability] upon, him, he is not responsible for its loss, and R. Isaac b. Abdini said: What is the reason? Since he declared, 'I take [upon myself to bring an offering],' it is as though he carried it on his shoulder! —

R. Ashi makes his deduction from ‘and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement,’ We have now learned [it of] slaughtering and sprinkling: how do we know [of the receiving of the blood]? And if you say, let us learn it from slaughtering and sprinkling, [it can be objected]: as for slaughtering and sprinkling, the reason is because [each is] a service which involves culpability [if performed] without [the Temple court]. — Rather said R. Ashi: It is deduced from the Nazirites ram. For it is written, And he shall offer the ram for a slaughtering of peace-offerings, [which teaches] that it must be offered specifically as a peace-offering. Now since this teaching is superfluous regarding change in respect of sanctity, as that is deduced from the other text, apply its teaching to change in respect of owner. R. Aha b. Abba said to Raba: Let us say, ‘he shall offer’ is a general proposition: ‘slaughtering’ is a particularization: now [where we have] a general proposition followed by a particularization, [the rule is] the general proposition includes only what is contained in the particularization; hence slaughtering is so, but every other service is not so? —

If [Scripture] wrote, ‘He shall offer a peace-offering as a slaughtering,’ it would be as you say. Since however it writes, ‘he shall offer for a slaughtering of peace offerings,’ It is an incomplete general proposition, and an incomplete general proposition is not treated as a case of a general proposition followed by a particularization. Rabina said: In truth we do treat it as such, but ‘unto the Lord’ is another general proposition. R. Aha of Difti said to Rabina: But the first generalization is dissimilar from the last generalization, for the first includes [sacrificial] acts but nothing more, whereas the last one implies everything that is ‘unto the Lord’, even the pouring out of the residue [of the blood] and the burning of the emurim? Behold the Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael even in the case of a general proposition and particularization of this nature applies the rule that in a general proposition followed by a particularization and followed again by a general proposition you must be guided by the particularization: just as that is explicitly a [sacrificial] service, and we require rightful intention, so in the case of every [sacrificial] service we require rightful intention. If so, [you may argue:] just as the particularization is explicitly a service which involves culpability [if it is performed] without [its legitimate boundaries], so is every service [included] which involves culpability [if performed] without; hence slaughtering and sprinkling are indeed included, but not receiving and carrying? or [you may argue]: as the particularization is explicitly something that must be done at the north [side of the altar] and is operative in the case of the inner sin-offerings, so all [services] which must be done at the north and are operative in the case of the inner sin-offerings [are included]; hence slaughtering and receiving are indeed included, but not sprinkling? —

You can argue in this way or in that way; they are equally balanced, and so both
[arguments] are admissible.21 (Another version: Each argument stands.) Alternatively, I can say, sprinkling follows from R. Ashi’s deduction.22 We have thus found [it true of] the Nazirites ram; how do we know [it of] the other peace-offerings? And if you say, Let us learn them from the Nazirites ram, [it can be argued:] As for the Nazirites ram, the reason is because other sacrifices accompany it.24 —

If so, Scripture should write, [And he shall offer the ram for. . .’] his peace-offerings;26 why state, [for] peace-offerings? — In order to include all peace-offerings. We have thus found [it true of] peace-offerings; how do we know [it of] other sacrifices? And if you say, Let us learn them from peace-offerings, [it can be argued:] As for peace-offerings, the reason is because they require laying [of hands], libations, and the waving of the breast and shoulder!27 Rather, Scripture says, This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings;28 thus Scripture assimilates them to peace-offerings. Just as we require peace-offerings [to be offered] for their own sake, [thus forbidding] both change in respect of sanctity and change in respect of owner, so do we require all [sacrifices to be offered] for their own sake, [thus forbidding] both change in respect of sanctity and change in respect of owner. Let us say that if one slaughtered them in a different name they are invalid? —

Scripture says, That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt observe and do,’ as thou has vowed a nedabah [freewill-offering], etc.:29 is this a freewill-offering — surely it is a vow? The meaning however is this: if you acted in accordance with your vow, let it be [the fulfillment of your] vow; but if not, let it count as a freewill-offering.30 Now [both texts viz. .] ‘that which is gone out of thy lips’ and ‘this is the law’, etc., are required.31 For if the Divine Law wrote, ‘that which is gone out of thy lips’ [only], I would say,

(1) As it proceeds to explain.  
(2) Nothing wrong is actually done to the sacrifice.  
(3) Viz., in respect of wrongful ownership.  
(4) Thus both can be regarded as intrinsic or non-intrinsic disqualifications.  
(5) As a disqualification. The bracketed passage explains the two points in which they are not really different.  
(7) This proves that the ‘sprinkling’ which effects the atonement must be performed in the name of its owner.  
(8) If a man declares, ‘I vow an animal for a sacrifice,’ he thereby undertakes a liability. If he subsequently sets aside an animal and it dies or is lost before it is sacrificed, he must replace it. But if he declared, ‘I vow this animal for a sacrifice,’ he accepted no liability beyond that animal, and if it dies his obligations ceases. R. Simeon deduces it from the verse quoted, which he renders and interprets thus: And it shall be accepted for him. When is it accepted for him? When its effect is to make atonement in which case he does not bring another. Hence if it did not make atonement, he must bring another. And when must he bring another in order to make atonement (i.e. to be quit of his obligation)? When he declared it a liability upon him’ (E.V. for him). Sh. M.  
(9) As though he had it in his care all the time, and until it is actually sacrificed his vow is not fulfilled. Thus the verse is required for a different purpose.  
(10) Which implies: it must be ‘for him to make atonement ‘but not for another to make atonement. Whereas R. Simeon’s deduction is from ‘upon him’ as stated in end of n. 9, p. 14.  
(11) But there is no culpability if the other two services (receiving and carrying of the blood) are done outside their legitimate boundaries.  
(12) Num. VI, 17.  
(13) ‘He shall offer’ obviously requires the completion of ‘peace-offerings’ before we know to what it refers at all; ‘slaughtering’ however interposes, and therefore it is only an incomplete generalization.  
(14) The continuation of this verse.  
(15) For it implies any service performed ‘unto the Lord.’ Thus we have a general proposition followed by a particularization and followed again by a general proposition. The exegetical rule then is that the general proposition includes all things similar to the particularization, and thus the other services are included.
ZEVOCHIM - 2a-27b

(18) Whereas only the four services under discussion are sacrificial acts.
(19) Who formulated thirteen rules of exegesis, including this one.
(20) Sc. slaughtering.
(21) Since one approach includes slaughtering and sprinkling, and the other includes slaughtering and receiving, you must admit both, since neither is stronger than the other. Carrying too is then included, for it is really ‘a part of the act of receiving.
(22) Supra, from the verse ‘and it shall be accepted for him, etc.; hence the present deduction must be in respect of receiving.
(23) Lit., ‘blood’,
(24) And it is natural that one cannot be sacrificed in the name of one person and a second in the name of another, when all are for the same person. The other sacrifices are the sin-offering and the burnt-offering.
(25) If the deduction of the verse were intended to be confined to this particular sacrifice.
(26) V. marginal gloss.
(27) But no other sacrifices require all these, and consequently they may be offered under another designation either in respect of sanctity or of ownership.
(29) Deut. XXIII, 24.
(30) V. supra. Since it counts as a freewill-offering, it is obviously valid.
(31) One might argue that the text, ‘that which... lips’, etc., itself proves that a sacrifice must in the first place at least be offered for its own sake. Hence the Talmud proceeds to show that that is not so.

R. ELIEZER SAYS, ALSO THE GUILT-OFFERING [IS INVALID].13 Thereupon he exclaimed: Is this he who is spoken of as a great man? I speak to you of an explicit Mishnah, and you answer me with R. Eleizer's view!14 Rather, said Resh Lakish: I will find a solution myself: ‘That which is gone out of thy lips etc:’ is this a freewill-offering — surely it is a vow,15, etc. as above.16 R. Zera and R. Isaac b. Abba were sitting, and Abaye sat with them. They sat and debated: Resh Lakish had a difficulty about the guilt-offering, which does not come after death, and he adduced an exegesis on ‘that which goeth out of thy lips’. Yet say, That which may come as a vow or as a freewill-offering must be brought17 but do not propitiate,18 but a guilt-offering is not to be brought at all?19 Said Abaye to them: Resh Lakish solved [the difficulty] from the following text: And he shall kill it for a sin-offering:20 only it [when slaughtered] in its own name is valid and [when slaughtered] not it its own name is invalid;21 but other sacrifices [slaughtered] not in their own name are valid. You might think then that they are ‘accepted’. Therefore it states, ‘that which goeth out of thy lips’.22 Then say, That which comes as a vow or as a freewill-offering must be brought but is not ‘accepted’, whereas a guilt-offering is even ‘accepted’ too?23 —

Said Abaye: You cannot maintain that a guilt-offering is [in such circumstances] accepted, [as the reverse follows] from a burnt-offering, a fortiori: if a burnt-offering, whose purpose is not to make atonement, is not ‘accepted’,24 then how much more is a guilt-offering, whose purpose is to make

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Zevachim 5a

I do not know to what this refers,1 therefore the Divine Law wrote ‘this is the law’, etc. While if the Divine Law wrote ‘this is the law’ [only], I would say that they become invalid;2 therefore the Divine Law wrote, ‘that which is gone out of thy lips’, etc. Resh Lakish lay face downwards in the Beth Hamidrash, and raised a difficulty: If they are valid, let them be accepted;3 while if they are not accepted,4 for what purpose do they come?5 —

Said R. Eleazar to him: We find that those [sacrifices] which come after the death [of their owners] are valid, yet they are not accepted.6 For we learnt: If a woman brought her sin-offering [after childbirth] and then died, her heirs must bring her burnt-offering; [if she brought] her burnt-offering, her heirs do not bring her sin-offering.8 I agree in the case of a burnt-offering,9 he replied, since it comes after death;10 but in the case of a guilt-offering which does not come after death,11 whence do we know [that it is valid]?12 — He replied, Lo, [support to] your contention is [available] close at hand:

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atonement, not ‘accepted’. As for a burnt-offering [you might argue] ‘the reason [that it is not ‘accepted’] is because it is altogether burnt! Then let peace-offerings prove it.\textsuperscript{25} As for peace-offerings, [you might argue] [they are not ‘accepted’] because they require libations and the waving of the breast and shoulder, Then let a burnt-offering prove it.\textsuperscript{26} And thus the argument revolves: the characteristic of the former is not that of the latter and the characteristic of the latter is not that of the former. The factor common to both is that they are holy [sacrifices] ‘and if slaughtered not in their own names they are valid, yet not ‘accepted’, so also do I adduce the guilt-offering which is holy, hence if one slaughters it not in its name it is valid and not accepted. [No:] The factor common to both [it may be argued] is that they are [also] brought as public offerings!\textsuperscript{27} — Then let the thanksgiving-offering prove it.\textsuperscript{28} 

\textsuperscript{(1)} I would not know that Scripture refers at all to the offering of a sacrifice for a purpose other than its own.
\textsuperscript{(2)} If not offered for their own sake.
\textsuperscript{(3)} Lit. ‘on his stomach.’ He was very stout, v. Git. 47a.
\textsuperscript{(4)} I.e., let their owners be regarded as having fulfilled their obligations.
\textsuperscript{(5)} If they do not acquit their owners.
\textsuperscript{(6)} Why are they valid? At this stage he did not know that their validity is deduced from Scripture.
\textsuperscript{(7)} I.e., they do not propitiate.
\textsuperscript{(8)} Because in the latter case, it is a sin-offering whose owner died (the passage treats of the case where she dedicated both animals before her death) before it was offered, and it is a traditional law that such is not sacrificed but left to die. — Yet the burnt-offering is offered, though no propitiation is required on behalf of a dead woman. The present case is similar.
\textsuperscript{(9)} That even if it is killed for a different purpose, it must still be offered (i.e., the remaining rites must be carried out).
\textsuperscript{(10)} The same therefore applies to peace-offerings and other sacrifices which come after death.
\textsuperscript{(11)} A guilt-offering is not brought after the death of the owner, but is left to pasture.
\textsuperscript{(12)} Since the Tanna of the Mishnah mentions as exceptions only the paschal-offering and sin-offering.
\textsuperscript{(13)} Sc. it is invalid presumably because it does not come after death.

(14) My difficulty concerns the law stated anonymously in the Mishnah, which presumably is authoritative, and it is not enough to answer me that according to R. Eliezer there is no difficulty.
(15) Resh Lakish had not known of this when he raised the difficulty, and arrived at this exegesis independently.
(16) Supra p. 2.
(17) I.e. if slaughtered not in its own name, the other sacrificial rites in, connection with it must be performed.
(18) I.e., the vow is not thereby fulfilled, since it was not brought in its proper name.
(19) The sacrifice in such circumstances being considered invalid.
(20) Lev. IV, 33.
(21) Altogether, and therefore we cannot proceed with the remaining rites.
(22) Teaching that it does not propitiate as the offering for which it was originally intended.
(23) So that another sacrifice is not required.
(24) If slaughtered not under its own name.
(25) Which are not altogether burnt, yet are not ‘accepted’.
(26) Which does not require these.
(27) The daily burnt-offering and the lambs of peace-offerings offered on Pentecost were public offerings. But no guilt-offering was ever a public offering.
(28) Which was likewise never a public offering, yet conformed to the same law as the others.

As for the thanksgiving-offering [it is not ‘accepted’) because it requires loaves [as an accompaniment]!\textsuperscript{1} Then let the burnt-offering and peace-offerings prove it. And thus the argument revolves: the characteristic of the one is not that of the other, and that of the other is not that of the first. The factor common to all is that they are holy [sacrifices], and if one slaughters them not in their own name, they are valid and are not accepted; so also do I adduce the guilt-offering which is holy, and hence if one slaughters it not in its name it is valid and is not accepted. [No] the factor common to them all [it may be asked] is that they come as a vow or as a freewill-offering! —

Rather said Raba: [Scripture saith,] ‘This is the law, etc.,’ thus Scripture assimilated it [the guilt-offering] to peace-offerings. As the
peace-offerings are holy [sacrifices], and if slaughtered not in their own name are valid and are not accepted, so do I adduce the guilt-offering too which is holy, etc. What reason do you see to assimilate it to peace-offerings: assimilate it to the sin-offering?2 — Surely the Divine Law expressed a limitation [in the word] ‘it’.3

[Mnemonic: Hagesh Basar]4

R. Huna and R. Nahman were sitting, and R. Shesheth sat with them. They sat and said: Now Resh Lakish had experienced a difficulty, what about the guilt-offering which does not come after death?5 But R. Eleazar could have answered him that the guilt-offering too comes after death?6 — Said R. Shesheth to them: In what way is a guilt-offering brought? As a remainder? Then the remainder of a sin-offering too is indeed offered.8 [This, however, is no argument:] in the case of a sin-offering though the remainder thereof is offered, yet the Divine Law expressed a limitation in the word ‘it’ [hu]?9 — But in connection with the guilt-offering too hu [it] is written?10 — That is written after the burning of the emurim, as it was taught: But in the case of a guilt-offering, ‘it is’ [hu] is stated only after the burning of the emurim, and in fact if the emurim are not burnt at all it [the offering] is valid.11 Then what is the purpose of ‘it’? —

For R. Huna’s teaching in Rab’s name. For R. Huna said in the name of Rab: If a guilt-offering was transferred to pasture and one then slaughtered it without a defined purpose, it is valid.12 Thus, if it was transferred, it is so, but if it was not transferred, it is not so. What is the reason? Scripture says, ‘it is’, intimating, it must be in its essential form.13

R. Nahman and R. Shesheth sat, and R. Adda b. Mattenah sat with them. Now they sat and debated: Now as to what R. Eleazar said: ‘We find in the case of sacrifices that come after the death [of their owners] that they are valid, yet are not accepted’, let Resh Lakish say to him, Let these too come and be accepted?14 — Said R. Adda b. Mattenah to them: As for [the offering of] a woman after confinement, if she gave birth, did her children give birth?15 To this R. Assi demurred: Yet who is to say if she had been guilty of [the neglect of] many affirmative precepts she would not be atoned for?16 And since she would be forgiven if she had been guilty of neglecting affirmative precepts, then her heirs too may thus be atoned for!17 — Are we then to say that they [the heirs] acquire it?18 But surely R. Johanan said: If one leaves a meal-offering to his two sons and dies, it is offered, and the law of partnership does not apply to it.19 If however you think that they acquire a title to it, surely the Divine Law saith, And when a soul [bringeth a meal-offering]?20 Will you then say that they do not acquire it? Surely R. Johanan said: If one leaves an animal [dedicated for a sacrifice] to his two sons, and dies, it is offered, but they cannot effect substitution with it.21 Now it is well if you say that they acquire it; for that reason they cannot effect substitution with it, because they become partners,

(1) V. Lev., VII, 12.
(2) Which is mentioned in the same verse.
(3) As supra a.
(4) The object of this mnemonic, which means ‘bring near flesh’ is not clear. D.S. emends into Hanesh Nashad, consisting of key letters of the names of the Amoraim in the two paragraphs that follow.
(5) Supra 5a.
(6) For when its owner dies, it is left to graze until it contracts a blemish, whereupon it is sold and the money spent on a sacrifice, viz., a burnt-offering.
(7) As explained in preceding note.
(8) E.g., if a man sets aside two animals for his sin-offering, in case one is lost the other should be available. When the first is subsequently offered, the second is treated as a guilt-offering whose owner died. Thus a sin-offering too may be brought after death, and yet if it is sacrificed for a different purpose it is invalid; then a guilt-offering too should be invalid, and this justifies Resh Lakish’s difficulty.
(9) Lev. IV, 24 (referring to the sin-offering, brought ‘when a ruler sinneth’): And he shall... kill it... before The Lord; it is a sin-offering. This
emphatic hu (‘it is’) implies that it must be brought as such, and if offered as a different sacrifice, it is invalid.

(10) Lev. VII, 5: And the priest shall make them smoke on the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord: it is (hu) a guilt-offering.

(11) I.e., we cannot say that it teaches that if the emurim are burnt in the name of a different sacrifice this offering is invalid, since the sacrifice is fit even if the emurim are not burnt at all.

(12) If it was slaughtered (in the Temple court) before it became blemished it is valid as a burnt-offering, since that would eventually have been brought from its proceeds (v. note 2). The flesh is then burnt on the altar, while the hide belongs to the priest.

(13) Hence unless it was formally transferred to grazing on the instructions of the Beth din, it is not valid as a burnt-offering if it was slaughtered without a defined purpose.

(14) For the heirs.

(15) They do not need the sacrifice.

(16) Through the burnt-offering necessitated by childbirth. Burnt-offerings make atonement for the violation of positive precepts and negative precepts which are technically regarded as having been transformed into positive precepts. I.e. where the violation of a negative precept necessitates the performance of a positive one: e.g., the violation of ‘Thou shalt not rob’ (Lev. XIX, 13) necessitates the performance of the positive precept, ‘he shall restore that which he took by robbery’ (ib. V, 23) — Thus this burnt-offering would serve another purpose too.

(17) If they were guilty of the same.

(18) And it becomes their own, so that it can make atonement for them.

(19) All sacrifices may be brought in partnership, except a meal-offering. Here this does not apply.

(20) Lev. II, 1. — So literally; E.V. and when any one. From this word ‘a soul’ the Talmud deduces that it can be brought by one person only. But if heirs acquire a title to their father’s sacrifices, this meal-offering has now two owners.

(21) When a person dedicates an animal for a sacrifice, he must not propose another as a substitute; if he does, both are sacred (Lev. XXVII, 33). This is called effecting substitution. Here this does not apply, so that if they declare a substitute for it, it does not become sacred.

The question was asked: Do they make atonement in respect of the purpose for which they came, or do they not make atonement? Said R. Shisha the son of R. Idi: Reason asserts that it does not make atonement; for if you think that it does, what is the purpose of a second [sacrifice]? What then: [do you maintain]; it does not make atonement? Why then is it offered? — Said R. Ashi: This is the difficulty felt by R. Shisha the son of R. Idi: It is well if you say that it does not make atonement; for though slaughtered for a different purpose, yet it comes in virtue of [having been dedicated for] its true purpose, while the second [sacrifice] comes to make atonement. But if you say that it has made atonement, what is the purpose of the second? The question was asked: Does it [a burnt-offering] make atonement for [the violation of] a positive precept [committed] after the separation [of the animal], or not? Do we say, it is analogous to a sin-offering: just as a sin-offering [makes atonement] only for [the sins committed] before separation, but not for [those committed] after

and partners cannot effect substitution. But if you say that they do not acquire it, let them indeed even effect substitution? — There it is different, because Scripture saith, ‘And if he change it at all,’ which is to include the heir; and [the same verse teaches,] one can change, but not two. To this R. Jacob of Nehar Pekod demurred: If so, when it is written, And if a man will redeem ought in connection with tithe, which is also to include the heir, will you say there too, One can redeem, but not two? — Tithe is different, because as far as their father too is concerned it [redemption] can be done in partnership. R. Assi said to R. Ashi: Now from this itself [you may argue]: It is well if you agree that they acquire it, for that reason one [heir] at least can effect substitution. But if you say that they do not acquire it, how can he effect substitution? Surely R. Abbahu said in R. Johanan’s name: He who sanctifies [the animal] must add the fifth, whilst only he for whom atonement is made can effect substitution; and he who gives terumah of his own for another man’s produce, the goodwill is his! — It does not effect a fixed [absolute] atonement, but it does make a floating atonement.

Zevachim 6a
separation, so here too [it makes atonement] only for [the sins committed] before separation, but not for [those committed] after separation. Or, perhaps, it is unlike a sin-offering, for a separate sin-offering is incurred for each sin, whereas here, since it makes atonement if he had been guilty of [violating] many positive precepts, it may also make atonement for positive precepts [neglected] after separation? —

Come and hear: And he shall lay [his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering]; and it shall be accepted [for him to make atonement for him]; does then the laying [of hands] make atonement? Surely atonement can be made only with the blood, as it says, For it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life! What then is taught by the verse, And he shall lay. . . and it shall be accepted. . . to make atonement? — [To teach] that if he treated [the laying of hands] as the residue of the precept, Scripture regards him as though he did not make atonement, and yet he did make atonement. Now what is meant by ‘he did not make atonement’ and ‘he did make atonement’? Surely, ‘he did make atonement’ [means] in respect of positive precepts [neglected] before the separation [of the animal], while ‘he did not make atonement’ in respect of the positive precept of laying [of hands], because it is a positive precept [neglected] after separation? —

Said Raba: You speak of the precept of laying [the hand]? There it is different, because as long as he has not yet slaughtered, he is subject to the injunction ‘Arise and lay [hands]’; when then is it a [neglected] positive precept? After the slaughtering; and in respect of [a precept neglected] after the slaughtering no question arises. R. Huna b. Judah said to Raba: Perhaps it means, ‘It did make atonement’ — for the person,

(1) The emphatic ‘at all’ is expressed in Hebrew by the doubling of the verb, and this doubling is interpreted as an extension including the heir.
(2) Since it is couched in the singular.
(3) Lev. XXVII, 31.

(4) If the produce belonged to partners in the first place, they could tithe and redeem the tithe in partnership. Hence the same applies to a man’s heirs.
(5) If he is the only heir.
(6) If A dedicates an animal for B’s sacrifice, and it subsequently receives a blemish and must be redeemed, then if A, who sanctified it, redeems it himself, he must add a fifth to its value, but not if B redeems it (this is deduced from Lev. XXVII, 15). Again, only B effects substitution, but not A. Since then the heir does effect substitution, he is obviously regarded as in the place of B, hence its owner.
(7) I.e., he (so the man who gives it) can give it to any priest he desires. If money is offered for the terumah to be given to a particular priest, that money belongs to him.
(8) I.e., it does not make an absolute atonement for the heir as though he were its absolute owner; therefore in the case of a meal-offering, though there are two heirs, they still offer it. But the heir has, as it were, a light floating right of atonement in it (i.e., he has some slight rights of ownership in it), and therefore he can effect substitution.
(9) When a sacrifice is killed for a purpose other than its own, its owner has not fulfilled his obligation. Nevertheless the question arises where this was brought in order to make atonement for a certain sin, whether the owner can regard it as having made that atonement, or not. It makes no practical difference, save that the owner may feel himself forgiven even before he offers the second sacrifice.
(10) Why do we proceed with the sacrificial rites e.g. sprinkling, if it does not make atonement in any case?
(11) Originally it was dedicated for its rightful purpose. This hallows it, and so even when it is killed for a different purpose it retains its sanctity, and therefore the other sacrificial rites must be proceeded with.
(12) On the atoning effect of a burnt-offering V. supra p. 22, n. 3.
(13) One burnt-offering makes atonement for all.
(15) Lev. XVII, 11.
(16) I.e., as something unimportant, and so neglected it altogether.
(17) Which solves the question propounded.
(18) Hence before he slaughtered he cannot be said to have violated it.
(19) It certainly does not make atonement for such (though further on R. Jeremiah asks even in respect of such too), and the question is only in respect of precepts neglected after the separation of the animal, but before it is slaughtered.
ZEVOCHIM 6b

‘and it did not make atonement’ before Heaven? Did we not learn: And the rest of the oil that is in the priest’s hand he shall put upon the head of him that is to be cleansed; and the priest shall make atonement for him before the Lord;2 if he put [it], he made atonement; while if he did not put [it], he did not make atonement — this is the view of R. Akiba. R. Johanan b. Nuri said: It is but the residue of a precept,3 therefore whether he did put [it on his head] or he did not, he made atonement, yet we regard him as though he did not make atonement. What is meant by ‘as though he did not make atonement’? Shall we say, that he must bring another sacrifice? But you say, ‘Whether he did put or he did not put, he made atonement’! Hence it must mean, ‘It made atonement’ — for the person, ‘yet it did not make atonement’ — before Heaven. Then here too [it may mean that] ‘it did make atonement etc’! — [No:] there too It means that ‘he made atonement’ — in respect of putting it on the thumbs,4 but ‘he did not make atonement’ — in respect of the putting it on the head.5

Come and hear: R. Simeon said: For what purpose are the [sacrificial] lambs of Pentecost brought?6 [Surely] the lambs of Pentecost are peace-offerings!7 Rather the question is: For what purpose are the two he-goats of Pentecost brought?8 — [To make atonement] for the defilement of the Temple and its holy things.9 Now once the blood of the first has been sprinkled, for what purpose is the second offered?10 [To make atonement] for uncleanness which [may have] occurred in the interval between the two. From this it follows that Israel should have been perpetually11 engaged in offering their sacrifices,12 but that Scripture spared them.13 Now in this case it is a positive command [violated] after the separation [of the animals],14 yet it makes atonement! — [No:] If they were separated at the same time, that indeed would be so;15 but the circumstances are that they were separated one after the other.16 Are we then to arise and assert that the written law of Scripture [that two are brought] holds good only [when they are separated] one after the other?17 —

Said R. Papa: Do you speak of public sacrifices? Public sacrifices are different, because the Beth din tacitly stipulates concerning them,18 in accordance with Rab Judah's diction in Samuel's name. For Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: The knife draws them to their legitimate purpose.19 Said R. Joseph the son of R. Samuel to R. Papa: Does then R. Simeon accept the thesis that the Beth din makes a tacit stipulation? Surely R. Idi b. Abin said in the name of R. ‘Amram in the name of R. Isaac in the name of R. Johanan: Daily burnt-offerings which are not required for the community.20

(1) I.e., it has technically made atonement, the laying of the hands not being absolutely indispensable, yet not satisfactorily, in the proper way. On this interpretation it has nothing to do with the question when these precepts were violated.
(2) Lev. XIV, 18.
(3) Since Scripture refers to this oil as ‘the rest’; hence it is not indispensable.
(4) V. Lev. XIV, 14.
(5) Therefore more oil must be brought for that purpose. But whereas R. Johanan b. Nuri holds that it is sufficient now for the oil to be put on his head, R. Akiba rules that it must also be put again on his thumbs.
(6) Lev. XXXIII, 18; Num. XXVIII, 27.
(7) Whose purpose is to permit the use of the new wheat for meal-offerings and first-fruits.
(8) V. Lev. XXXIII, 19 and Num. XXVIII, 30.
(9) I.e., for the sin of entering the Temple or eating the flesh of sacrifices whilst unclean.
(10) Seeing that atonement has already been made with the first. The essence of atonement was the sprinkling of the blood.
(11) Lit., ‘at every time and every moment’.
(12) For this possibility is always before us; thus, immediately the blood of the second has been sprinkled, a third ought to be brought, and so on.
(13) For the strain and obligation would be too great.
(14) They were separated the previous day. The injunction against entering the Sanctuary lies in the passage: Command the children of Israel, that they put out of the camp... whosoever is unclean by
the dead (Num. V, 2). Since this is expressed affirmatively, it ranks as a positive command.

(15) The second would not make atonement for anything not atoned for by the first, and so it would have no purpose.

(16) And the second makes atonement for the defilement which occurred in the interval on the eve of the Festival between the separations.

(17) That is hardly feasible!

(18) That no matter when they are actually separated, the last is to be regarded as though separated immediately prior to its being offered, and therefore it makes atonement up to that very moment.

(19) If an animal is slaughtered as a public sacrifice, yet for a purpose other than for which they had been originally intended the knife, as it were, automatically dedicates it to a legitimate purpose, and the sacrifice is valid. The reason is that Beth din is regarded as tacitly stipulating their purpose (v. Shebu. 12b), and so the same holds good here too.

(20) ‘Not required’ means here not fit as such. There was an annual levy of one shekel for the public sacrifices, which was to be paid not later than the first of Nisan. From that date the statutory public sacrifices had to be purchased from the new funds, and not from the old. If animals however were purchased with the old funds, they were offered as extra public sacrifices (if it happened at any time that there was a paucity of private sacrifices), but not as the statutory public sacrifices, such as the daily burnt-offering.

Zevachim 7a

cannot be redeemed, according to R. Simeon’s view, as long as they are unblemished, while on the view of the Sages they can be redeemed while unblemished. Moreover surely R. Jeremiah asked R. Zera: If the blood of the Pentecostal he-goats was received in two basins and the blood of one was sprinkled, what is the purpose of the second? [To which he replied:] On account of defilement that occurred between the sprinkling [of the blood] of the one and that of the other. Thus he is in doubt only in respect of [the violation of] a positive command after the slaughtering, but he does not ask in respect of [the violation of] a positive command after the separating [of the animal]!

[No:] Perhaps his question is hypothetical.

It was taught: If one slaughtered a thanksgiving in the name of his fellow’s thanksgiving, — Rabbah ruled: It is valid; a while R. Hisda said: It is invalid. Rabbah ruled, ‘It is valid’, [because] a thanks-offering has been slaughtered as a thanks-offering. R. Hisda said, ‘It is invalid’, because it must be slaughtered in the name of his peace-offering. Rabbah said: Whence do I know it? Because it was taught: And the flesh of his peace-offerings for thanksgiving shall be eaten on the day of his offering: Abba Hanin said on R. Eliezer’s authority: This comes to teach that if a thanks-offering is slaughtered in the name of a peace-offering, it is valid; if a peace-offering is slaughtered in the name of a thanks-offering, it is invalid. What is the difference between these two cases? A thanks-offering is designated a peace-offering, but a peace-offering is not designated a thanksgiving.

Thus a peace-offering [slaughtered] as a thanks-offering is invalid, whence it follows that a thanksgiving [slaughtered] as a different thanksgiving is valid. Surely that means, [even in the name] of his fellow’s [thanks-offering]. No: only [when brought in the name of] his own. But what if it is [in the name of] his fellow’s: it is invalid? Then instead of teaching, ‘if a peace-offering is slaughtered in the name of a thanks-offering, it is invalid’, let him teach, ‘if a thanks-offering [is slaughtered in the name of] a thanks-offering [of a different class, it is invalid], and how much more so a peace-offering in the name of a thanks-offering? —

He wishes to teach of a peace-offering [slaughtered] in the name of his own thanksgiving. You might argue, Since a thanks-offering is designated a peace-offering, a peace-offering too is designated a thanks-offering, and when he kills it [the former] in the name of the thanks-offering, it should be valid. Therefore he informs us [that it is not so]. Raba said: If one slaughters a sin-offering [for one offence] as a sin-offering [for another offence], it is valid; as a burnt-
offering, it is invalid. What is the reason? The Divine Law saith, And he shall kill it for a sin-offering, and lo, a sin-offering has been slaughtered for a sin-offering; while from the same verse we learn that if it is slaughtered for a burnt-offering, it is invalid.

Raba also said: If one slaughters a sin-offering on behalf of another person who is liable to a sin-offering, it is invalid; on behalf of one who is liable to a burnt-offering, it is valid. What is the reason? — [And the priest] shall make atonement for him, but not for his fellow, and 'his fellow' implies one like himself, being in need of atonement as he is.

Raba also said: If one slaughters a sin-offering on behalf of a person who is not liable in respect of anything at all, it is invalid, because there is not a single Israelite who is not liable in respect of an affirmative precept; and Raba said: A sin-offering makes atonement for those who are liable in respect of an affirmative precept, a fortiori: seeing that it makes atonement for those who are liable to kareth, how much the more for those who are liable in respect of an affirmative precept! Shall we then say that it belongs to the same category? But surely Raba said: If one slaughters a sin-offering on behalf of another person who is liable to a sin-offering, it is invalid; on behalf of a person who is liable to a burnt-offering, it is valid?

(1) For we assume a tacit stipulation of the Beth din that it be permitted to redeem them even while unblemished (normally this is forbidden) and thus, becoming hullin, they can be purchased with the new shekels and then be offered as daily burnt-offerings. R. Simeon however rejects this assumption, and therefore holds that they cannot be redeemed but must be offered as extra public sacrifices.
(2) Even assuming that the Biblical text itself might be explained as referring to the case where the two goats were separated one after the other.
(3) They were both killed at the same time.
(4) According to R. Simeon, since no defilement could occur in the interval, as they were killed simultaneously.

— It [a sin-offering] does not make a fixed atonement but it does make a floating atonement. Raba also said: If a burnt-offering was killed for a different purpose, its blood must not be sprinkled for a different purpose. This follows either from Scripture or by reason. If you will, it is [deduced from] a text: That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt observe, etc.

Alternatively, it is logical:
because he has made an alteration therein, etc. as stated at the beginning of this chapter.3

Raba also said: If a burnt-offering is brought after [the] death [of its owner], and is slaughtered under a changed sanctity,4 it is invalid;5 but [if it is slaughtered] with a change in respect of ownership,6 it is valid, for there is no ownership after death. But R. Phinehas the son of R. Ammi maintained: There is ownership after death.7 R. Ashi asked R. Phinehas the son of R. Ammi: Do you particularly maintain that there is ownership after death, and so he [the heir] must bring another burnt-offering;8 or perhaps, if he [the heir] has violated many affirmative precepts, it makes atonement for him?9 I maintain it particularly, he answered him.

Raba said further: A burnt-offering is a votive gift.10 For how is it possible?11 If there is no repentance, then the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination!12 While if there is repentance, surely it was taught: If one violated an affirmative precept and repented, he does not stir thence until he is forgiven.13 Hence it follows that it is a votive gift.14

(Mnemonic: For whom does a sin-offering atone? A burnt-offering after a votive gift.)14

It was taught likewise. R. Simeon said: For what purpose does a sin-offering come? — [You ask,] ‘for what purpose does a sin-offering come?’ Surely in order to make atonement! — Rather, [the question is:] Why does it come before the burnt-offering?15 [Because it is] like an intercessor who enters [to appease the King]: When the intercessor has appeased [him], the gift follows.16

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PASSOVER-OFFERING AND THE SIN-OFFERING. How do we know it of the Passover-offering? — Because it is written, Observe the month of Abib, and prepare the Passover-offering;17 [this intimation] that all its preparations must be in the name of the Passover-offering. We have thus found [that] change in respect of sanctity [disqualifies it]; how do we know [the same of] change in respect of owner? — Because it says, Then ye shall say: It is the slaughtering of the Lord’s Passover,18 [which teaches] that the ‘slaughtering’ must be done in the name of the Passover-offering. Now since this teaching is redundant in respect of change in respect of sanctity,19 apply the teaching to change in respect of owner. We have thus found it as a regulation;20 how do we know that it is indispensable?21 —

Scripture saith, And thou shalt sacrifice the Passover-offering unto the Lord thy God.22 To this R. Safra demurred: Does this [passage], ‘And thou shalt sacrifice, etc.’ come for this purpose: Surely it is required for R. Nahman’s dictum? For R. Nahman said in Rabbah b. Abbuha’s name: How do we know that the leftover of a Passover-offering is brought as a peace-offering?23 Because it is said, ‘And thou shalt sacrifice the Passover-offering unto the Lord thy God, of the flock and of the herd.’ Now surely the Passover-offering comes only from lambs or from goats?24 Hence we learn that the leftover of the Passover-offering is to be [utilized] for something which comes from the flock and from the herd; and what is it? A peace-offering. — Rather, said R. Safra: ‘And thou shalt sacrifice the Passover-offering’ [is required] for R. Nahman’s dictum; ‘Observe the month of Abib’ [is required] for the regulation in respect of changed sanctity; ‘Then ye shall say: [It is] the slaughtering of the Lord’s Passover’ [is required] for the regulation relating to change in respect of owner; ‘it is’25 teaches that it is indispensable, both in the former and in the latter cases.26 Now we have thus found [it in the case of] slaughtering: how do we know [it of] the other services? —

Since it was revealed [in the one], it was [also] revealed [in the others].27 R. Ashi said: We do not argue, ‘Since it was revealed, it was
revealed’. How then do we know it of [the other] services? — Because it is written, This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the consecration-offering, and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings]. Now it was taught: In the day that He commanded the children of Israel to present their offerings refers to the firstling, tithe, and Passover-offering. Thus Scripture assimilates it [the Passover-offering] to the peace-offering: as [in the case of the] peace-offering we require as a regulation [that there shall not be] either change in respect of sanctity or change in respect of owner, so in the case of all [these] do we require as a regulation [that there shall not be] either change in respect of sanctity or change in respect of owner. Again, it is like the peace-offering [in this respect]: As you do not differentiate in the peace-offering between slaughtering and the other services in respect of the regulation, so must you not differentiate in the case of the Passover-sacrifice between slaughtering and the other services in respect of indispensability. Then in that case, what is the purpose of ‘it is’? —

For what was taught: As for the Passover-offering, ‘it is’ is stated there to teach indispensability as far as slaughtering is concerned; whereas in the case of a guilt-offering ‘it is’ is stated only after the burning of the emurim, and in fact if the emurim are not burnt at all, it [the offering] is valid. How do we know it of the sin-offering? — Because it is written, And he shall kill it for a sin-offering. which intimates that it must be killed for the sake of a sin-offering. We have thus found [it of] slaughtering; how do we know [it of] receiving [the blood]? — Because it is written,

(1) Cf. supra 6a. A sin-offering does not make atonement for the omission of positive precepts when it is directly dedicated for that purpose only, but only when it is dedicated for sins which entail a sin-offering, but whose owner has also been guilty of sins of omission. Since it does not atone for sins of omission standing by themselves, one who is in need of a burnt-offering (on account of sins of omission) is not ‘his fellow’ similar to ‘himself’, and therefore if a sin-offering is slaughtered on behalf of such, it is valid, provided that one had already vowed a burnt-offering, which covers all his sins of omission, so that a sin-offering is quite superfluous as far as he is concerned. But if he had not vowed a burnt-offering, a sin-offering has a certain relation to him in so far that if he was liable to a sin-offering too, this would make atonement for the sins of omission also. Hence he is sufficiently similar to his fellow to invalidate his fellow’s sin-offering slaughtered on his behalf.

(2) Deut. XXIII, 24.
(3) Supra 2a.
(4) I.e. as a different sacrifice, e.g. a peace-offering.
(5) And another must be brought before the deceased is deemed to have fulfilled his vow.
(6) For a different person.
(7) V. Supra 4b.
(8) As in n. 6.
(9) For the heir is the owner,
(10) It does not actually atone for sins of omission, but after one has repented this comes as a gift of appeasement, as it were.
(11) For it to make atonement in actuality.
(12) Prov. XXI, 27.
(13) I.e., he is undoubtedly forgiven even without a sacrifice.
(14) A string of words so arranged as to facilitate the remembering of the subjects discussed hereunder.
(15) When one has to bring both, the sin-offering takes precedence; infra 89b.
(16) Thus the sin-offering is the intercessor and the burnt-offering follows as a gift.
(17) Deut. XVI, 1.
(18) Ex. XII, 27.
(19) As that has been derived from Deut. XVI, 1.
(20) I.e., these verses teach that the Passover-offering must be sacrificed specifically as such and for its registered owner.
(21) In the sense that it is otherwise disqualified.
(22) Deut. XVI, 2. This too has the same teaching as XVI, 1. Since however it is superfluous in that case, it must intimate that this regulation is indispensable.
(23) E.g., if an animal dedicated for a Passover-sacrifice was lost, whereupon its owners registered for another animal, and then the first was found after the second was sacrificed. Or again, if a sum of money was dedicated to buy a paschal lamb, but it was not all expended; then too the surplus must be used for a peace-offering.
(24) But not from the herd, which means the larger cattle.
And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin-offering,1 which intimates that receiving must be for the sake of a sin-offering. We have thus found [it of] slaughtering and receiving: How do we know it of sprinkling? — Because Scripture saith, And the priest shall make atonement for him through his sin-offering,2 [which teaches] that atonement must be [made] for the sake of the sin-offering.3 We have thus found [the law relating to] change in respect of Sanctity; how do we know it of change in respect of owner?—Scripture saith: [And the priest shall make atonement] for him, implying for him, but not for his fellow. We have thus found it as a regulation: how do we know that it is indispensable? —

As R. Huna the son of R. Joshua said [elsewhere; Scripture saith,] ‘his sin-offering’, [where] ‘sin-offering’ [alone would suffice]: so here too’ [Scripture saith,] his sin-offering [where] sin-offering [alone would suffice].4 We have thus found the regulation relating to change in respect of sanctity, and [a prohibition of] change in respect of owner at the sprinkling, this being both a regulation and indispensable. How do we know that it is indispensable [in the case of all services] as far as change in respect of sanctity is concerned; and that [the prohibition of] change in respect of ownership at the other services is both a regulation and indispensable? —

Said R. Jonah: It is inferred from a Nazirites sin-offering, for it is written, And the priest shall bring them before the Lord, and shall prepare his burnt-offering, and his meal-offering,5 [this intimates] that all its preparations [sc. the services] must be for the sake of a sin-offering. We have thus found it regarding change in respect of sanctity; how do we know change in respect of owner? —

Said R. Huna son of R. Joshua: [Scripture saith,] ‘his sin-offering’, [where] ‘sin-offering’ [alone would suffice]. To this Rabina demurred: If so, how do you interpret [the apparently superfluous] ‘his burnt-offering’ [where] ‘burnt-offering’ [alone would suffice]? (But according to Rabina, how does he interpret [the apparently superfluous] ‘his meal-offering’, ‘his drink-offering’, where ‘meal-offering’, ‘drink-offering’ [alone would suffice]?) — He requires those [for the following deduction]: Their meal-offering and their drink-offering [intimates] at night; their meal-offering and their drink-offering, even on the next day.)6 But how do you interpret [the apparently superfluous] his burnt-offering [where] burnt-offering [alone would suffice]? Furthermore, can they7 be learnt from each other? The sin-offering of forbidden fat8 cannot be learnt from a Nazirites sin-offering, since the latter is accompanied by another sacrifice.9 On the other hand] a Nazirites sin-offering cannot be learnt from the sin-offering of forbidden fat, since the latter is a case of kareth!10 —

Rather, said Raba: We infer it from a leper’s sin-offering, for it is written, And the priest shall prepare the sin-offering,11 which teaches that all its preparations [services] must be for the sake of a sin-offering. Thus we have found [the law relating to] change in respect of sanctity; how does he know it of change in respect of owner? — Scripture saith, And [he shall] make atonement for him that is to be
cleansed: this intimates, for this [man] who is to be cleansed, but not for his fellow who is to be cleansed. Yet [the question] still [remains]: Can they be learnt from each other? The sin-offering of forbidden fat cannot be learnt from the leper's sin-offering, since the latter is accompanied by another sacrifice. [On the other hand] a leper's sin-offering cannot be learnt from the sin-offering of forbidden fat, since the latter is a case of kareth! —

One cannot be learnt from one, but one can be learnt from two. But in the case of which should it not be written? [Shall we say,] Let the Divine law not write it in the case of the sin-offering of forbidden fat, and let it be deduced from these others? [Then I can argue that] the reason in the case of these others is that another sacrifice accompanies them! [If we say,] Let the Divine law not write it in the case of the Nazirites sin-offering and let it be deduced from these others: [I can argue that] the reason in the case of these others is that no absolution [revocation] is possible! If I say,] Let the Divine law not write it in the case of the leper's sin-offering, and let it be deduced from these others: [then I can argue that] the reason in the case of these others is that they do not come in poverty! —

Rather, Scripture saith, This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering [and of the sacrifice of peace-offerings]: thus the Writ assimilated it [the sin-offering] to the peace-offering. As in the case of peace-offerings both change in respect of sanctity and change in respect of name [are prohibited, for] we require [that the services be performed] for their own [sc. that of the peace-offerings'] sake, this being a regulation; so in the case of the sin-offering both change in respect of sanctity and change in respect of name [are prohibited, for] we require [that the services be performed] for their own sake, this being a regulation. Therefore the regulation is deduced from a peace-offering, while these other verses teach that it is indispensable. Again, we have found [this of] the sin-offering of forbidden fat, where ‘for a sin-offering’ is written:

(1) Ibid, 34.
(2) Ibid. 35. This is apparently the Talmudic rendering of the verse.
(3) Atonement consists in essence of the sprinkling. — Carrying the blood to the side of the Altar where it is sprinkled is included in receiving (Rashi).
(4) The emphasis implicit in ‘his’ intimates indispensability.
(5) Sh. M. deletes bracketed words.
(6) Num. VI, 16.
(7) A passage follows here in the original which the commentaries delete.
(8) ‘His meal-offering’ and ‘his drink-offering’ (or rather ‘their’) occur quite frequently; why does Rabina ask only about ‘his burnt-offering’ and not about these?
(9) V. infra 84a.
(10) Sc. different kinds of sin-offerings.
(11) This is the technical designation of all sin-offerings brought on account of actual sin, in contrast e.g., to a Nazirites sin-offering, which is not really brought through sin at all.
(12) Lit., ‘other blood’.
(13) A sin-offering is brought for the unwitting transgression of an injunction which, if deliberately violated, entails kareth (v. Glos).
(14) E.V. ‘offer’.
(15) Lev. XIV, 19.
(16) For Scripture need not have intimated the teaching in the case of all those. — This answer implies that one intimation at least is superfluous.
(17) A Nazirite can be absolved of his vow altogether, and then his sacrificial obligations automatically expire. But in no circumstances can the other two be freed of their obligations.
(18) If a leper is too poor he can bring a bird instead of an animal for a sin-offering (V. Lev. XIV, 21-22). But this leniency is not permitted in the case of the other two.
(20) But not, however, indispensable to the extent that a peace-offering is invalid if offered as a different sacrifice.
(21) Quoted above, teaching that change of name and of sanctity are forbidden, which are now superfluous.
(22) In Lev. IV, 33. The passage deals with an offering brought for sins other than those which the Talmud proceeds to enumerate.
how do we know [it of] the sin-offerings of idolatry, hearing a voice, swearing clearly with the lips and the defilement of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, where [‘for a sin-offering’] is not written? — The sin-offering of idolatry is inferred from the sin-offering of forbidden fat, since it entails kareth, just as the latter does. While all the others are inferred [by analogy] through a common characteristic. 

Our Rabbis taught: The Passover-offering, in its season, [if slaughtered] in its own name, is valid; if not [slaughtered] in its own name, it is invalid. During the rest of the year, [if slaughtered] in its own name, it is invalid; if not [slaughtered] in its own name, it is valid.

( Mnemonic: Shalew Kab'AYZan, Memaher, Beza, BA. )

Whence do we know it? — Said Samuel's father: Scripture saith, And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace-offerings unto the Lord be of the flock: [this teaches that] whatever comes of the flock is to be for a sacrifice of peace-offerings. Then say, [if sacrificed as] a peace-offering, it is [valid]; but [if sacrificed as] anything else, it is not valid? Said R. Ela in R. Johanan's name: ‘For a sacrifice’ includes every sacrifice. Then say, For whatever purpose it is slaughtered, let it be such?

If it were written, ‘for peace-offering and a sacrifice’, [it would be] as you say; since however it is written, ‘for a sacrifice of peace-offerings’, [its implication is,] for whatever purpose it is slaughtered, let it be a peace-offering. Yet say, ‘for a sacrifice’ is a generalization, while ‘of peace-offerings’ is a particularization; how [in the case of] a generalization and a particularization, the generalization includes only what is contained in the particularization; [hence if it is sacrificed as] a peace-offering, it is [valid], but [if it is offered as] anything else, it is not [valid]? ‘Unto the Lord’ is again a generalization.

To this R. Jacob of Nehar Pekod demurred: But the last generalization is dissimilar from the first, [for] the first generalization includes sacrifices but nothing else, whereas the last generalization, ‘unto the Lord’, implies whatever is the Lord's, even [if he slaughtered it] for fowl — [offerings], and even for meal-offerings? — This is in accordance with the Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael who applies the rule to a generalization and a particularization of this nature, [and maintains that even in such a case, where you have] a generalization, a particularization and a generalization [in this sequence,] you must be guided by the particularization: as the particularization is explicitly something that is not in its own name, and it is valid, so whatever that is not in its own name is valid. Then [say:] as the particularization is explicitly something which can come as a vow or a freewill-offering, so everything which can come as a vow or as a freewill-offering [is included]; [hence, if he slaughters the Passover-offering out of its season as] a burnt-offering or as a peace-offering it is [valid], [but if he slaughters it then as] a sin-offering or a guilt-offering, it is not [valid]! — Rather, ‘For a sacrifice’ is an extension. Then say, for whatever it is slaughtered, let it be such!

— Said Rabin:

(1) The sin-offering of idolatry: And when ye shall err, and not observe all these commandments, etc.; and if one person sin through error, etc. (Num. XV, 22, 27). The Talmud relates this to idolatry in ignorance. The text: And if any one sin, in that he heareth the voice of adjuration, etc. . . . or if any one touch an unclean thing (and then, according to the Rabbinic interpretation, enters the Sanctuary or eats sacred food). . . . or if any one swears clearly with his lips, etc. (Lev. V, 1-4).

(2) They are inferred by analogy through the feature common to the sin-offering of forbidden fat, that of a Nazirite, and that of a leper. The only feature they have in common is that they are sin-offerings, and both change in respect of sanctity and change in respect of owner disqualify them. Therefore the others here enumerated, which have the same feature, viz., that they are sin-offerings,
are likewise disqualified by change of sanctity or change of owner.
(3) The time for killing it is from midday on the fourteenth of Nisan until nightfall.
(4) This refers to an animal dedicated for a Passover-offering which was lost when it was required and found later. It is then to be sacrificed as a peace-offering.
(6) Since a Passover-offering comes of the flock it is included in this deduction. Further, that can only mean after its season, for it has already been deduced supra that if it is offered for anything but itself in its season it is invalid.
(7) Whereas it is simply stated, ‘if not slaughtered in its own name, it is valid’, which implies that it is valid if sacrificed as any offering.
(8) For these words (one word in the original) are superfluous, hence they are interpreted as an extension.
(9) E.g., if it is slaughtered as a burnt-offering, it is a burnt-offering. — Actually it is a peace-offering under all circumstances.
(10) In such cases the generalization includes everything that is similar to the particularization; hence, anything that comes of the flock.
(11) I.e., if he slaughtered it as the sin-offering of a bird.
(12) As explained above,
(13) Both are votive offerings. A vow is technically where one vows to bring a sacrifice, without specifying the animal at the time; a freewill-offering is a vow to bring a particular animal for an offering.
(14) Rashi: it is not interpreted under the rule of generalization, etc., but as an extension, in which case even cases not similar to itself are included. The rule of generalization, etc., is applied only where the natural sense of the passage yields a generalization and a particularization, without anything in the text being superfluous. Here, however, ‘for a sacrifice of peace-offerings’ is regarded as altogether superfluous, and therefore it is held to be an extension.
(15) As above.

Zevachim 9a

We transfer sacrifices which are eaten to sacrifices which are eaten, but do not transfer sacrifices which are eaten to sacrifices which are not eaten.1 Are then a sin-offering and a guilt-offering not eaten? —

[Say] rather, we transfer sacrifices which are eaten by all to sacrifices which are eaten by all, but do not transfer sacrifices which are eaten by all.2 R. Jose son of R. Abin said: We transfer sacrifices of lesser sanctity to sacrifices of lesser sanctity, but do not transfer sacrifices of lesser sanctity to sacrifices of higher sanctity.3 To this R. Isaac son of R. Sabarin demurred: Then say that if one slaughtered it as tithe, let it be tithe;4 and in respect of what law would that be? That it should not require a drink-offering; and that the penalty of flagellation should be incurred by one who violates the injunction, It shall not be redeemed?

Scripture saith, The tenth shall be holy,6 [which implies,] this one [the tenth] can be tithe, but no other can be tithe. [Again,] say that if one slaughtered it as a firstling, let it be as a firstling: in respect of which law? That it should not require a drink-offering; or that it should be given to the priests? — As for a firstling too, similarity of law with tithe is deduced from the fact that ‘passing’ is written in both cases.7 Say that if one slaughtered it as a substitute, let it be a substitute: in respect of which law? To be flagellated on its account;9 or alternatively, that in respect thereof we should be guilty of, ‘it shall not be redeemed’?

Said Mar Zutra the son of R. Nahman: Scripture saith, Then both it and that for which it is changed shall be [holy], [which implies;] This is a substitute but no other is a substitute.11 And say that if one slaughters as a thanks-offering, let it be a thanks-offering: in respect of what law? That it may require [the addition of] loaves.12 — Can there be a case where the Passover-offering itself does not require loaves, yet its remainder does require loaves! If so, then now too [you may argue:] Can there be a case where the Passover-offering itself does not require a drink-offering [to accompany it], yet its remainder requires a drink-offering?
This is our argument: Can there be a case where the remainder of the thanks-offering itself requires no loaves, yet the remainder of that which was converted into a thank-offering shall require loaves! To this R. Yemar the son of R. Hillel demurred: And whence [does it follow] that it is written in reference to the remainder of a Passover-offering; perhaps it is written of the remainder of a guilt-offering?

Said Raba, Scripture saith: ‘And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace-offerings be of the flock’, which implies that it refers to that for which the whole flock is equally fit. To this R. Abin b. Hyya-others say, R. Abin b. Kahana-demurred: Everywhere else you say that ‘of’ is a limitation, yet here ‘of’ is an extension?

Said R. Mani: Here too ‘of’ is a limitation, [teaching] that it cannot be two years old nor a female. R. Hana of Baghdad demurred: Can you say that this text is written in reference to the Passover-remainder; surely since it states, If [he bring] a lamb [for his offering]... And if [his offering be] a goat, it follows that it does not refer to a Passover remainder? — That is required for what was taught: ‘[If he bring] a lamb’: this is to include the Passover-offering, in respect of its fat tail.

When it is stated, ‘If [he bring] a lamb’, it is to include a Passover-offering more than a year old, and a peace-offering which comes in virtue of a Passover-offering in respect of all the regulations of peace-offerings, [viz.], that they require laying on [of the hands], drink-offerings, and the waving of the breast and shoulder. [Again,] when it states, ‘and if [his offering be] a goat’, it breaks across the subject [and] teaches that a goat does not require [the burning of the] fat tail [on the altar]. But is that deducted from this? Surely it is deduced from [the verse quoted by] Samuel's father? For Samuel's father said: And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace-offerings unto the Lord be of the flock [teaches that] whatever comes of the flock must be for a sacrifice of peace-offerings.

But still, this is deduced from [the verse quoted by] R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuah. For R. Nahman said in Rabbah b. Abbuha's name: How do we know that a Passover remainder is brought as a peace-offering? Because it says, And thou shalt sacrifice the Passover-offering unto the Lord thy God, of the flock and of the herd. Yet surely the Passover-offering comes only from lambs or from goats? From this [we learn] that the Passover-remainder must be [utilized] for something which comes from the flock and from the herd; and what is it? A peace-offering.

In fact, however, three texts are written:

1. The animal dedicated for a Passover-offering was in the first place consecrated as a sacrifice which is eaten. Now that it cannot be offered for what it was originally intended, it is transferred to a peace-offering, which is eaten, and not to a burnt-offering, which cannot be eaten.
2. The Passover-offering and peace-offering are eaten by all, whereas the sin-offering and the guilt-offering are eaten by male priests only.
3. These are fully discussed in Ch. V.
4. For that too is a sacrifice of lesser sanctity.
5. Lev. XXVII, 33. The Talmud (Bek. 32b) interprets this to mean that it may not be sold; hence if one does sell it, he is liable to flagellation, which is the penalty for the violation of a negative command.
6. Ibid. 32.
7. Tithe: Whatsoever passeth under the rod (ibid); Firstling: All that openeth the womb thou shalt cause to pass (E.V. Set apart-the same root is used in both texts) to the Lord (Ex. XIII, 12). The employment of the same word in both cases teaches that they are similar in law. Therefore since this Passover-offering cannot be transferred to tithe, it cannot be transferred to a firstling either.
8. Lev. XXVII, 33: Neither shall he change it; and if he change it at all, then both it and that for which it is changed shall be holy; it shall not be redeemed. From this it is learnt that if one consecrates an animal to substitute another consecrated animal, both are holy, the second having the same sanctity as the first.
9. For having violated the injunction, Neither shall he change it.
10. Sh. M. deletes.
(11) I.e., only if one consecrates a non-sacred animal (hullin, v. Glos) as a substitute does the law apply, but not when one consecrates as a substitute an animal which had already been consecrated earlier, as is the case of this lost Passover-offering.
(12) V. Lev. VII, 12 seq.
(13) Lit., ‘the remainder of that which comes thereto (sc. the thanks-offering) from the world.’ — Thus here we are treating of the remainder of a Passover-offering which it is proposed shall rank as a thanks-offering if slaughtered as such.
(14) Sc. the interpretation of the verse Lev. III, 6 quoted supra 8b, q.v.
(15) Since a guilt-offering too was a ram without blemish from the flock, and might not come from the herd.
(17) I.e., sheep and goats too, whereas the guilt-offering must be a ram.
(18) If you interpret of the flock as intimating that all animals included in the term ‘flock’ are meant.
(19) By relating the verse to a Passover-offering remainder you exclude a two years old animal and a female. (V. Ex. XII, 5).
(20) Lev. III, 7, 12.
(21) This verse must simply refer to an ordinary peace-offering; for if it referred to a Passover remainder, it is obviously a lamb or a goat (V. Ex. XII, 5), and it need not be stated.
(22) The fat tail of all other sacrifices is explicitly counted in the emurim (q.v. Glos) which are burnt on the altar (V. Lev. III, 9, VII, 3). The burning of the emurim is not mentioned at all in connection with the Passover, however, but deduced from elsewhere; consequently a verse is required to teach that the fat tail too is included.
(23) I.e., dedicated as a Passover-offering, and consequently unfit for its purpose (V. Ex. XII, 5).
(24) E.g., the substitute of a Passover-offering; or where the owner of a Passover-offering registered for a different animal, so that the first is a Passover remainder: both are sacrificed as peace-offerings.
(25) V. Lev. III, 2.
(26) Ibid, 12.
(27) ‘And if’ is regarded as a disjunctive, teaching that the provisions that apply to a lamb do not apply to a goat, unless expressly stated. The fat tail is mentioned in connection with the former (V. 9) but not the latter.
(28) Sc. that a Passover-offering more than a year old, which is therefore a Passover remainder, is sacrificed as a peace-offering.
(30) Supra 8b, q.v.
(31) Deut. XVI, 2.
(32) Supra 7b. Hence if you object that the law under discussion is deducted in accordance with the teaching of Samuel's father, it can be counter-objected that it follows from the verse last quoted.

Zevachim 9b

One refers to [an animal] whose time [for slaughtering] is over-passed and whose year has passed; another [is required] for [an animal] whose time [for slaughtering] is over-passed but whose year is not passed; and the third is required for an animal neither whose time [for slaughtering] nor whose year is passed. Now [all three texts] are necessary. For if the Divine Law wrote one text [only], I would say that it applies only [to an animal] whose year is passed and also its time [for slaughtering], since it is completely disqualified from a Passover-offering. But if its time [for slaughtering] is passed but not its year, I would say that it is not [valid, if slaughtered as a peace-offering], because they have been disqualified from their own purpose. But if neither its time [for slaughtering] nor its year has passed, so that it is eligible for the second Passover. While if the Divine Law stated these two, [I would argue that they are valid if slaughtered as a peace-offering] because they have been disqualified from their own purpose. But if neither its time [for slaughtering] nor its year has passed, so that it is eligible for the second Passover, I would say that it is not so. Hence [all three texts] are necessary. Rab said in Mabog's name: If one slaughtered a sin-offering as the sin-offering of Nahshon it is valid, for Scripture saith, This is the law of the sin-offering, Raba sat and reported this discussion, whereupon R. Mesharshia raised an objection to Raba: R. Simeon said: All meal-offerings whose fistfuls were taken under a different designation are valid and acquit their owners of their obligation, because meal-offerings are dissimilar from [blood] sacrifices. For when one takes a fistful of a griddle [meal-offering] in the name of a stewing-pan [meal-offering], its preparation proves that it is a griddle [meal-offering]. If one takes a fistful of a dry meal-offering in the name of a meal-offering mingled [with oil], its preparation proves that it is a dry [meal-offering]. But in
the case of [animal] sacrifices it is not so, for there is the same slaughtering for all, the same receiving for all, [and] the same sprinkling for all.12 Thus it is only because its preparation proves its nature; hence if its preparation did not prove its nature, this would not be so. Yet why? let us say [that] This is the law of the meal-offering13 [intimates that] there is one law for all meal-offerings? —

Rather if stated, it was thus stated: Rab said in Mabog's name: If one slaughtered a sin-offering in order that Nahshon might be forgiven through it, it is valid, [for] no atonement [is required] for the dead.14 Then, let him speak of any dead person? — He informs us this: The reason [that it is valid] is that he [Nahshon] is dead. Hence [if one slaughtered it] for a living person similar to Nahshon, it is invalid. And who are meant? [Those who are liable to] a Nazirites sin-offering or a leper's sin-offering.15 But these are [as] burnt-offerings?16 —

Rather if stated, it was thus stated: Rab said in Mabog's name: If one slaughtered a sin-offering for a [wrong] person who is liable to a sin-offering for blood or a sin-offering for idolatry, it is invalid; [but if he slaughtered it] on behalf of a person who is liable to a Nazirites sin-offering or a leper's sin-offering, it is valid. And as for the question, this is what Raba asked: If one slaughters a sin-offering of forbidden fat on behalf of a person who is liable to a sin-offering on account of the defilement of the Sanctuary and its sacred flesh, what is the law? Do we say, [the latter entails] kareth;21 just as the former;22 or perhaps the latter is not fixed like itself?23 R. Aha son of Raba recited all these cases as invalid. What is the reason? — And he shall kill it for a sin-offering24 [intimates that it must be killed] for the sake of that sin-offering.25 Said R. Ashi to R. Aha the son of Raba: How then do you recite Raba's question?26 —

We recite it in reference to change in respect of owner, he answered him, and we recite it thus: Raba said: If one slaughters a sin-offering of forbidden fat on behalf of a [wrong] person who is liable to a sin-offering for blood or a sin-offering for idolatry, it is invalid; [but if he slaughtered it] on behalf of a person who is liable to a Nazirites sin-offering or a leper's sin-offering, it is valid. And as for the question, this is what Raba asked: If one slaughters a sin-offering of forbidden fat on behalf of a person who is liable to a sin-offering on account of the defilement of the sanctuary and its sacred flesh, what is the law? Do we say, [the latter entails] kareth like itself;27 or perhaps the latter is not fixed like itself?28 The question stands over. It was stated: If one slaughtered it for its own sake with the intention of sprinkling its blood for the sake of something else,29 R. Johanan said: It is invalid; while Resh Lakish said: It is valid. R. Johanan said [that] it is invalid [because] an [effective] intention can be expressed at one service in respect to another service,30 and we learn [by analogy] from the intention of Piggul.31 While Resh Lakish said [that] it is valid, [because] an [effective] intention cannot be expressed at one service in respect to another, and we do not learn from the intention of Piggul. Now they are consistent with their views. For it was stated:

(1) I.e., it was lost until it was too late for slaughtering as a Passover-offering, and is also more than a year old.
(2) I.e., if it is slaughtered before Passover as a peace-offering it is valid, though it was eligible for a Passover-offering.
(3) V. Num. IX, 9 seq.
(4) Which was to be slaughtered at the first Passover.
(5) Which Nahshon, the prince of the tribe of Judah, brought at the dedication of the altar; V. Num. VII, 12 seq.
(6) Lev. VI, 18.
(7) They all stand in the same category. Hence although Nahshon's sin-offering was not on account of sin at all, yet by slaughtering an ordinary sin-offering as such one is not deemed to have changed its purpose, and therefore it is valid.
(8) V. Lev. II, 2. The priest, in taking the fistful, declared that he took it for the sake of a different type of meal-offering.
(9) His declaration is manifestly untrue and of no account, since one can see what meal-offering it is. — For the various types of meal-offerings mentioned here V. Lev. II, 4 seq.
(10) Which is brought on account of sin, v. Lev. V, 11f.
(11) Which was not brought on account of sin, v. Lev. II, 1 seq.
(12) In these acts there is nothing to indicate the nature of the sacrifice. Consequently a false declaration is effective to invalidate them.
(13) Lev. VI, 7.
(14) A sin-offering slaughtered for a wrong person is invalid, provided that he is likewise liable to a sin-offering. This condition is obviously unfulfilled here: hence the sacrifice is valid.
(15) Which are not brought on account of sin at all, just as Nahshon's sin-offering was not on account of sin.
(16) Rashi: A Nazirites sin-offering is the same as a burnt-offering, since it is not brought on account of sin, and it is stated supra 7a that if one slaughters a sin-offering in the name of a different person who is liable to a burnt-offering, it is valid. Sh. M. cites a reverse interpretation: These are as burnt-offerings; hence his action is tantamount to slaughtering a sin-offering as a burnt-offering, which is obviously invalid. What then does Rab inform us?
(17) Since that is in fact what he means to imply by ‘Nahshon's sin-offering’.
(18) Nahshon was the first to bring a sin-offering which was not for sin. Hence his is mentioned as an example of all sin-offerings of that nature (Sh. M.).
(19) So amended in margin and Sh. M.; cur, edd. Rab.
(20) As above. But in the first clause the others too are on account of sin.
(21) V. Glos.
(22) Hence it is valid.
(23) For if the transgressor is too poor he can bring two birds instead of an animal, which is not permitted in the case of the former.
(24) Lev. IV, 33.
(25) Not in the name of any other.
(26) When is Raba in doubt?
(27) Hence it is invalid.
(28) Hence it is valid.
(29) Declaring this intention at the time of slaughtering.
(30) It is effective to render the animal unfit.
(31) V. Glos. There this is certainly the case; v. infra 27b.

If one slaughters an animal with the express intention of sprinkling its blood or burning its fat to an idol, — R. Johanan said: It is forbidden [for any use];1 [for] an [effective] intention can be expressed at one service in respect to another service, and we learn ‘without’ from ‘within’.2 Resh Lakish rules that it is permitted,3 for an [effective] intention cannot be expressed at one service in respect of another service, and we do not learn ‘without’ from ‘within’. [Now these are both necessary.] For if we were informed [of their views] in the latter case, I might argue that Resh Lakish rules [thus only] in this instance, yet he agrees with R. Johanan [that] ‘within’ [is learnt] from ‘within’.4 While if we were informed [of their views] in the former instance, I might argue that R. Johanan rules [thus only] there, yet he agrees with Resh Lakish in the present case.5 Thus both are required. When R. Dimi came,6 he said: R. Jeremiah raised an objection in support of R. Johanan, while R. Ela [did so] in support of Resh Lakish. R. Jeremiah in support of R. Johanan: If it is valid where one says, ‘Behold, I slaughter after its time [for slaughtering],’7 yet it is invalid if one slaughters it with the intention of sprinkling the blood after time; then seeing that it is invalid if he declares, ‘Behold, I slaughter for the sake of something else,’ is it not logical that it is invalid if one slaughters it with the intention of sprinkling the blood for the sake of something else? To this Raba b. Ahilai demurred: As for [intending to sprinkle its blood] after time, the reason [that this invalidates it even at the slaughtering] is that it entails kareth!8 Rather said Raba b. Ahilai,
This is his argument: If it is valid where one says, ‘Behold, I slaughter [this sacrifice] without its precincts,’ yet it is invalid when one slaughters it with the intention of sprinkling its blood without its precincts; then seeing that it is invalid when he declares, ‘Behold, I slaughter for the sake of something else,’ is it not logical that it is invalid if one slaughters it with the intention of sprinkling the blood for the sake of something else? To this R. Ashi demurred: As for [its unfitness when one intends sprinkling the blood] without its precincts, the reason is because it operates [as a disqualification] in the case of all sacrifices. Will you say that the same applies in the case of an intention for the sake of a different sacrifice, which does not operate [thus] save in the case of a Passover-offering and a sin-offering?

Rather said R. Ashi, This is how he argues: If it is valid where one says, ‘Behold, I slaughter [this sacrifice] in the name of so-and-so,’ yet it is invalid [if one declares his intention] to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so; then seeing that when he declares, ‘Behold, I slaughter [it] for the sake of something else,’ it is invalid, is it not logical that it is invalid if he slaughters it with the intention of sprinkling the blood for the sake of something else?

R. Ela [raised an objection] in support of Resh Lakish: Let it not be stated in the case of sprinkling! and it could be inferred a minori from slaughtering and receiving; then for what purpose did the Divine Law state [it]? To teach that you cannot express an intention in respect of one service at a [previous] service. To this R. Papa demurred: Yet perhaps [its purpose is on the contrary to intimate] that you can express an intention in respect of one service at a [previous] service. — If so, let Scripture be silent about it, and infer it by R. Ashi’s a minori argument. And the other? — Refute [the argument] thus: as for those [slaughtering and receiving], the reason may be that they require the north and are present at the inner sin-offerings. And the other? — Now, at all events, we are discussing peace-offerings. It was stated: If one slaughters it in its own name with the intention of sprinkling its blood for the sake of something else, — R. Nahman says: It is invalid; Rabbah says: It is valid. But Rabbah retracted on account of R. Ashi’s a minori argument.

R. ELIEZER SAID: THE GUILT-OFFERING TOO. It was taught: R. Eliezer said: A sin-offering comes on account of sin, and a guilt-offering comes on account of sin: just as a sin-offering [slaughtered] under a different designation is invalid, so is a guilt-offering invalid [if slaughtered] under a different designation. Said R. Joshua to him: That is not so. If you say [thus] of the sin-offering, [the reason is] because its blood is [sprinkled] above [the scarlet line]. Said R. Eliezer to him: Let the Passover-offering prove it: though its blood is [sprinkled] below, yet if one slaughters it for the sake of something else it is invalid. As for the Passover-offering, replied R. Joshua, the reason is that it has a fixed time. Said R. Eliezer to him: Then let the sin-offering prove it. R. Joshua replied:

(1) Even it he did not eventually sprinkle it thus,
(2) Idolatrous sprinkling of the blood, etc. is naturally done without the Temple, while the illegitimate action of Piggul is done within the Temple.
(3) It he did not eventually sprinkle it idolatrously.
(4) Sc. if one slaughters a sacrifice with the intention of sprinkling its blood in the name of a different sacrifice, his illegitimate intention is in respect of something that is done within, and therefore we learn by analogy from Piggul that his intention is effective.
(5) By reversing the argument.
(6) From Palestine to Babylon. R. Dimi and Rabin were two Palestinian Amoraim who travelled between the Palestinian and the Babylonian academies to transmit the teachings of one to the other.
(7) Since whenever he slaughters it, that is the time,
(8) This illegitimate intention renders the flesh Piggul immediately, so that if one eats it even within the permitted time he is liable to kareth.
Since it is so strict, it is natural that an illegitimate intention in respect of one service expressed at an earlier service is effective.

(9) For his declaration cannot negative the fact that he is slaughtering it within its precincts.
(10) For change of name is a disqualification at the sprinkling, but not at the slaughtering.
(11) Viz., in the case of a Passover-offering and a sin-offering.
(12) That an intention for a different sacrifice disqualifies it.
(13) It slaughtering for the sake of a different sacrifice disqualifies, though it is valid when done by a zar (lay-Israelite), how much the more sprinkling, which may not be performed by a zar. And if you answer that slaughtering may be more stringent because a Passover-offering slaughtered for others than those enrolled for it is invalid; then let receiving prove it, where this disqualification does not operate.
(14) I.e., the illegitimate intention in respect of sprinkling must be expressed at the sprinkling.
(15) R. Johanan: How does he rebut this argument?
(16) They are performed at the north side of the altar.
(17) Resh Lakish: how does he rebut this argument?
(18) Which are not slaughtered at the north nor on the inner altar. Hence the argument does not apply.
(19) The blood of some sacrifices was sprinkled on the upper half of the altar, and the blood of other sacrifices was sprinkled on the lower half; a scarlet line on the altar demarcated them. — The fact that the blood of the sin-offering was sprinkled above that line may be the reason for greater stringency.

The Master said: ‘R. Joshua said to him: I am moving in a circle.’ Yet let the argument revolve and the inference be made from the feature common to both.9 — [That argument is not employed] because it can be refuted: the feature common to both is that there is an aspect of kareth in them.10

The Master said:11 ‘R. Joshua said to him: That is not so. If you say [thus] of the sin-offering, [the reason is] because its blood [is sprinkled] above [the scarlet line].’ Yet let him [rather] say to him: That is not so. If you say [thus] of the sin-offering, [the reason is] because its blood enters the innermost shrine?12 — We are discussing the outer sin-offerings.13 [Yet let him say: The reason is] because if its blood enters the innermost shrine it is invalid? —

R. Eliezer holds that the guilt-offering too [is invalid in that case]. [Let him say to him: The reason is] because it makes atonement for those who are liable to kareth? — [R. Eliezer draws his analogy] from the sin-offering incurred through hearing a voice.14 [Let him say to him: The reason is] because it [the blood] requires four applications? —

[R. Eliezer holds] as R. Ishmael, who maintains: All blood requires four
applications. [Yet let him say: The reason is because the blood requires four applications] on the four horns [of the altar]?16 — Now according to your reasoning, surely there are [the distinctions of] the finger, the horn, and the point?17 Rather [the fact is that] he [R. Joshua] mentions [but] one of two or three reasons [distinctions].

The Master said: ‘Said R. Joshua to him: That is not so. If you say’, etc. Let R. Eliezer answer him: The blood of a guilt-offering too is [sprinkled] above [the scarlet line]?18 — Said Abaye: You cannot say that the blood of a guilt-offering is [sprinkled] above, [as the reverse may be inferred] from a burnt-offering, a fortiori: if the blood of a burnt-offering, which is completely burnt, is [sprinkled] below, how much the more [is this true of] a guilt-offering, which is not completely burnt. As for a burnt-offering, the reason is because it does not make atonement! Let the bird sin-offering prove it.19 As for a bird sin-offering, the reason is because it is not a species that is slaughtered!20 Then let a burnt-offering prove it. Thus the peculiarity of the one is not the peculiarity of the other, and that of the other is not the same as the peculiarity of the first: the feature common to both is that they are sacrifices of the higher sanctity,21 and their blood is [sprinkled] below: so will I adduce a guilt-offering too, that [since] it is of the higher sanctity, its blood is [sprinkled] below. Raba of Parzakia22 said to R. Ashi: But let him refute [it thus]: The feature common to both is that [their value] is unfixed; will you then say [the same of] a guilt-offering, which has a fixed [value]?23 Rather this is R. Eliezer’s reason,24 viz., because Scripture saith, The priest that offereth it for a sin-offering:25 ‘it’ requires its blood [to be sprinkled] above, but the blood of no other [sacrifice] is [sprinkled] above. If so, let us say with respect to [the slaughtering of] the sin-offering too, [only] it is valid [when slaughtered] in its own name but invalid when not [slaughtered] in its own name, whereas other sacrifices are valid whether in their own name or not in their own name?26 — That ‘it’ is not meant particularly, since it disregards the Passover-offering.27 Then here too it is not meant particularly, since it disregards the bird burnt-offering?28 —

At all events nothing which is slaughtered is omitted.29 Alternatively, this agrees with R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, who maintained: [The blood of] the one is [sprinkled] in a separate place, and [that of] the other is [sprinkled] in a separate place.30 For it was taught: The lower blood is applied below the scarlet line, while the upper [blood is applied] above the scarlet line,31 Said R. Simeon b. Eleazar: This holds good only of the bird burnt-offering; but in the case of the animal sin-offering its [blood] is applied essentially on the very horn [of the altar].32 We learnt elsewhere:33 For R. Akiba maintained: All blood which entered the Hekal34 to make atonement is unfit; but the Sages rule: The sin-offering alone [is unfit].35 R. Eliezer said: The guilt-offering too [is thus], for it says, As is the sin-offering, so is the guilt-offering,36 As for R. Eliezer, it is well, his reason being as stated. But what is the reason of the Rabbis? —

Said Raba: [They argue that] you cannot say that if the blood of the guilt-offering enters within it is unfit, [for the reverse follows] from the burnt-offering, a fortiori. If

(1) This way of arguing leads nowhere.
(2) Lev. IV, 24.
(3) It is implies emphasis: it must be slaughtered as a sin-offering and nothing else.
(4) Ex. XII, 27.
(6) Likewise the slaughtering.
(7) Obviously then ‘it is’ cannot have the same implication here. V. supra 5b.
(9) Lit. from ‘what is the side’ (which they have in common)? V. Supra a bottom; the feature common to both the sin-offering and the Passover-offering is that they may be eaten one night only. The guilt-offering shares this feature, and therefore it also, like the other two, should be invalid if slaughtered for a different purpose.
(10) The sin-offering is brought on account of an unwitting offence which if willful is punishable by kareth. The neglect to bring the Passover-offering by one who is not unclean or on a distant journey is likewise punishable by kareth (Num. IX, 13).

(11) Emended text (Sh. M.).

(12) In the case of the sin-offering of the Day of Atonement.

(13) Those which do not enter the innermost shrine — i.e., all save that of the Day of Atonement,

(14) V. Lev, V, 1ff. This does not involve kareth.

(15) The blood of all sacrifices,

(16) Whereas even R. Ishmael admits that the blood of the guilt-offering is not sprinkled on the four horns, but only on two.

(17) The blood of the sin-offering must be applied with the finger on the point (i.e., the top) of the horn, whereas the blood of other sacrifices is not applied actually on the top. — The point is: If one is seeking distinctions, there are many other than that drawn by R. Joshua.

(18) For R. Eliezer likens the guilt-offering to the sin-offering.

(19) Its blood is sprinkled below, though it does make atonement.

(20) The bird-offering was not slaughtered, its neck being wrung (Lev. I, 15).

(21) V. Supra 2a p. 1, n. 7.

(22) Farausag, in the vicinity of Be Dura, one of the four districts in the middle of which Baghdad was built; v. Obermeyer, Landschaft, pp. 268-9.

(23) V. Lev. V, 15 seq.

(24) For holding that the blood of a guilt-offering is sprinkled below.

(25) Lev. VI, 19. The Heb. חָטַה is understood to mean he who sprinkles its blood in accordance with its law as a sin-offering, viz., above the scarlet line.

(26) Since the unfitness of a sin-offering when not killed for its own sake is deduced from, and he shall kill it for a sin-offering (Lev. IV, 33). Then R. Eliezer should regard the ‘it’ here too as a limitation and not apply the same law to the guilt-offering.

(27) To which the same law applies, as was shown supra 7b.

(28) Whose blood too is sprinkled above; infra 65a.

(29) The limitation of ‘it’ applies to all slaughtered sacrifices.

(30) Though the blood of both the sin-offering and the bird burnt-offering is sprinkled above the scarlet line, yet each has a different place. Therefore the limitation of ‘it’ in respect to the sprinkling of the blood has no exception at all.

(31) At any point above it. — ‘Lower’ and ‘upper’ mean that which is applied below and that which is applied above respectively.

(32) And not merely anywhere above the line.

(33) Infra 81b.

(34) The hall containing the golden altar, etc., contrad. to the Holy of Holies (Jast.).

(35) When Moses rebuked Aaron for not eating the flesh of the sin-offering on the day of his consecration, he said to him: Behold, the blood of it was not brought into the sanctuary within; ye should certainly have eaten it (Lev. X, 18; v. also ib. VI, 23). This proves that if it had been brought ‘within’ Aaron would have been right, for the sacrifice would have thereby become unfit. Now the passage actually refers to a sin-offering: R. Akiba holds that its implication extends to all other sacrifices too, while the Rabbis confine it to the sin-offering.


the burnt-offering is fit when its blood enters within, though it is entirely burnt, how much the more is the guilt-offering [fit], seeing that it is not entirely burnt. [But it may be asked:] As for the burnt-offering, [the reason is] because it does not make atonement? — Let a sinner’s meal-offering prove it. Yet he should rather say: Let the sin-offering of a bird prove it. As for a sinner’s meal-offering ‘a [the reason is] because it is not of the species that is slaughtered? Let the burnt-offering prove it. And thus the argument revolves, the peculiarity of the one not being that of the other, while the peculiarity of the latter is not that of the former: the feature common to both is that they are sacrifices of the higher sanctity, and when their blood enters within they are fit; so too will I adduce the guilt-offering which is a sacrifice of the higher sanctity, and if its blood enters within it is fit. Raba of Barnesh says to R. Ashi: Yet let him refute [it thus]: The feature common to both is that they have no fixed [value]; will you say [the same of] the guilt-offering, which has a fixed [value]? Rather this is the Rabbis’ reason, viz., because Scripture saith, [And no sin-offering whereof any of] its blood [is brought into the tent of meeting... shall be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire]:7 [this intimates] the blood of this [sacrifice], but not the blood of another [sacrifice]. And the
other? — ‘Its blood’ [implies,] but not its flesh.9
And the other?10 —

[Scripture writes,] ‘its blood’ [where] ‘blood’ [would suffice].11 And the other? — He does not interpret ‘blood’, ‘its blood’ [as having a particular significance]. It is well according to the Rabbis who maintain that if one slaughters a guilt-offering under a different designation it is valid: for that reason a meal-offering is likened to a sin-offering and to a guilt-offering. For it was taught, R. Simeon said: [It is written,] ‘its blood’ [where ‘blood’ would suffice].11 A sinner’s meal-offering is like a sin-offering, therefore if its fistful [of flour] is taken under a different designation, it is invalid;13 a votive meal-offering is like a guilt-offering, therefore if he [the priest] takes its fistful under a different designation, it is valid. But according to R. Eliezer, in respect of which law is a guilt-offering likened to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering? — In respect of the other [ruling] of R. Simeon. For it was taught: [If the fistful was carried to the altar] not in a service-vessel,14 it is invalid; but R. Simeon declares it valid.15 Now Rab Judah son of R. Hiyya said, What is R. Simeon’s reason? —

Scripture saith, ‘It is most holy, as the sin-offering, and as the guilt-offering’: [this teaches:] If he [the priest] comes to perform its service with his hand, he does so with his right hand, as in the case of the sin-offering; if he comes to perform the service with a vessel, he may do so with his left hand, as in the case of the guilt-offering.16 Now R. Simeon utilizes this verse for both purposes?17 —

The essential purpose of the text is to teach the dictum of Rab Judah the son of R. Hiyya, while that a sinner’s meal-offering is invalid when [the priest does] not [take its fistful] for its own sake is [based] on a different reason. [Thus:] what is the reason of a sin-offering?18 Because ‘it is’ is written in connection therewith; then In connection with a sinner’s meal-offering too ‘it is’ is written. Now according to the Rabbis, in respect of which law is a guilt-offering likened to a sin-offering? — To teach you: as a sin-offering requires laying on [of hands], so does a guilt-offering require laying on [of hands].

JOSEPH b. HONI SAID: SACRIFICES SLAUGHTERED [IN THE NAME OF A PASSOVER-OFFERING OR A SIN-OFFERING ARE INVALID]. R. Johanan said: Joseph b. Honi and R. Eliezer said the same thing.19 Rabbah said: They disagree in respect of others slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering. For it was taught: A paschal lamb which has passed its year,20 and he [its owner] slaughtered it in its season,21 for its own purpose;22 and similarly, when a man slaughters other [sacrifices] as a Passover-offering in its season, — R. Eliezer disqualifies them;23 while R. Joshua declares them valid. Said R. Joshua: If during the rest of the year, when it is not valid [if slaughtered] in its own name, yet others [slaughtered] in its name are valid;24 then is it not logical that in its season, when it is valid [if slaughtered] in its own name, others [slaughtered] in its name are valid? Said R. Eliezer to him: Yet perhaps the argument is to be reversed? If it is valid [when slaughtered] during the rest of the year in the name of another sacrifice,25 though it is not valid [if slaughtered then] in its own name; is it not logical that it should be valid [when slaughtered] in its season in the name of another sacrifice, seeing that it is valid [if slaughtered then] in its own name; and thus a Passover-offering [slaughtered] on the fourteenth [of Nisan] under a different designation should be valid.26 Now, would you say thus? [But in point of fact your a minori argument can be refuted thus:] As for others being valid during the rest of the year [when slaughtered] in its [sc. The Passover-offering’s] name, that is because it is valid [when slaughtered then] in the name of other [sacrifices]; should then others [slaughtered]
in its season\(^27\) in its name be valid, seeing that it [the Passover-offering] is invalid [if slaughtered then] in the name of others?\(^28\) Said R. Joshua to him: If so, you lessen the strength of the Passover-offering and increase the strength of the peace-offering?\(^29\) Subsequently R. Eliezer proposed a different argument: We find that a Passover remainder\(^30\) comes as a peace-offering, whereas a peace-offering remainder does not come as a Passover-offering. Now if the Passover-offering, whose remainder comes as a peace-offering, is [nevertheless] unfit if one slaughters it in its season as a peace-offering; is it not logical that the peace-offering is unfit if slaughtered in the name of a Passover-offering in its season, seeing that its remainder does not come as a Passover-offering?

(1) This makes atonement, yet if it enters within it remains fit, for the disqualification is stated in reference to the entering of blood only.
(2) This would provide a better analogy, as it is a blood-sacrifice just as the other sacrifices under consideration.
(3) Whether it is unfit when its blood enters within (infra 92b). The objection and answer are parenthetical, and now the Talmud returns to its discussion.
(4) Emended text (Bah); omitting, ‘and let him refute’, of cur. edd.
(5) It is not a blood-sacrifice.
(6) A town in the vicinity of Matha Mehasia, a suburb of Sura (Obermeyer, op. cit. pp. 296-7).
(7) Lev. VI, 23.
(8) R. Eliezer: how does he explain ‘its blood’?
(9) It its flesh is taken ‘into the tent of meeting’, into the inner sanctuary, it is not disqualified.
(10) The Rabbis: how do they know this?
(11) Hence ‘its’ excludes that of other sacrifices, while ‘blood’ excludes the flesh of the same sacrifice.
(12) Lev, VI, 10. This refers to the meal-offering, and since it is likened to two other sacrifices, R. Simeon deduces that one kind of meal-offering is like a sin-offering, while another is like a guilt-offering, as explained in the text.
(13) The taking of the fistful of the meal-offering and its burning on the altar are the equivalent of the sprinkling of the blood of an animal sacrifice.
(14) A service-vessel is one that has been sanctified for use in the Temple in connection with the sacrificial service.
(15) If the priest carried it in his hand to the altar,
weaken and strengthen the necessity for (or, the insistence on) slaughtering these sacrifices for naught but their own sake.

(30) If an animal was dedicated for a Passover-offering, lost and refound after Passover.

Said R. Joshua to him: We find that a sin-offering remainder comes as a burnt-offering, but a burnt-offering remainder does not come as a sin-offering. Now if the sin-offering is unfit when slaughtered as a burnt-offering, though its remainder comes as a burnt-offering; is it not logical that a burnt-offering slaughtered as a sin-offering is unfit, seeing that its remainder does not come as a sin-offering? 2 Not so, replied R. Eliezer to him. If you speak of a sin-offering, the reason [that a burnt-offering slaughtered in its name is fit] is because it [the sin-offering] is fit [when slaughtered] in its own name throughout the year. Will you say the same of a Passover-offering which is fit [when slaughtered] in its own name only in its season? Since then that itself is unfit [when slaughtered] in its own name [during the rest of the year], it is logical that others slaughtered in its name [during the rest of the year] are unfit.

SIMEON THE BROTHER OF AZARIAH SAID, etc. R. Ashi recited the following in R. Johannas name, and R. Aha son of Raba recited it in R. Jannai’s name: What is the reason of Simeon the brother of Azariah? Because Scripture saith, And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they shall exalt unto the Lord:3 [this teaches that] they are not profaned [rendered unfit] through what is superior [higher] than themselves, but they are profaned through what is inferior to themselves.4 But does this text come for this purpose? Surely it is required for Samuel’s dictum! For Samuel said: Whence do we know that he who eats tebel is liable to death? From the verse, And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they shall exalt unto the Lord: the Writ refers to that which is yet to be exalted.6 —

If so,7 Scripture should write, ‘which were exalted [offered]’: why state, ‘which they shall exalt’? Hence infer both from this.8 R. Zera asked: Are they valid yet do not propitiate, and so he disagrees in one only; or are they valid and propitiate, and he disagrees in both?9 — Said Abaye — others maintain, R. Zerika-

Come and hear: IF ONE SLAUGHTERED A FIRSTLING OR TITHE IN THE NAME OF A PEACE-OFFERING, IT IS VALID; IF ONE SLAUGHTERED A PEACE-OFFERING AS A FIRSTLING OR TITHE, IT IS INVALID. Now if you think that [he means that] they are valid and propitiate, is propitiation applicable to a firstling?10 Hence they are valid and do not propitiate, and since the second clause [means that] they are valid and do not propitiate, [in] the first clause too they are valid and do not propitiate. But what argument is this? The one is according to its nature, and the other is according to its nature.11 Then what does he inform us?12 [The principle governing] a higher and lower sanctity!13

Surely we learnt it: HOW SO? IF ONE SLAUGHTERED MOST SACRED SACRIFICES UNDER THE DESIGNATION OF LESSER SACRIFICES, etc. — You might say, Only in the most sacred sacrifices and the lesser sacrifices is there higher and lower, but not where both are lesser sacrifices. [Hence we are informed that it is not so.] But we learnt this too: The peace-offering takes precedence over the firstling, because the former requires four [blood-] sprinklings, laying on [of hands], drink-offerings, and the waving of the breast and the shoulder?14 — The present passage15 is the main source, while in the other it is taught incidentally.16

MISHNAH. IF ONE SLAUGHTERS THE PASSOVER-OFFERING ON THE MORNING

GEMARA. R. Eleazar said in R. Oshaia's name: Ben Bathya declared fit a Passover-offering which one slaughtered in its own name on the morning of the fourteenth, because [he holds that] the whole day is its season.23 Then what does AS IF [etc.] mean?24 Because R. Joshua states AS IF,25 he too says, AS IF. If so, instead of disputing where it is [slaughtered] under a different designation, let them dispute where it is [slaughtered] in its own name?26 — If they differed where it is [slaughtered] in its own name, I would say that R. Joshua agrees with Ben Bathya [that it is invalid] when [slaughtered] under a different designation, since part of it [the day] is fit [eligible]. Hence he informs us [that it is not so]. But surely it is written, At dusk?27 —

Said ‘Ulla the son of R. Ila’i: [That means,] Between two evenings.28 Then [will you say] that the whole day is fit for the daily offering too, seeing that at dusk29 is written in connection therewith? — There, since it is written, ‘The one lamb thou shalt offer in the morning’, it follows that ‘at dusk’ is meant literally. Yet say, One [must be offered] in the morning, while the other [may be offered] the whole day?— [Scripture prescribes] one for the morning and not two for the morning. Again, will you say that the whole day is fit for [the lighting of] the lamps, since ‘at dusk’ is written in connection therewith?30 — There it is different, because it is written, [to burn] from evening to morning,31 and it was taught: ‘From evening to morning’: Furnish it with its [requisite] measure, so that it may burn from evening to morning. Another interpretation: You have no other [service] valid from evening to morning save this alone. Now [will you say] in the case of incense too, where ‘at dusk’ is written,32 that the whole day is fit [for the burning thereof]? — incense is different,

(1) Tem. 23b.
(2) Yet in fact it is not unfit, which shows that an ad majus argument from the law of a remainder is inadmissible. As R. Eleazar does not answer that in his view it is indeed unfit, Rabbah deduces that he admits that other sacrifices slaughtered as sin-offerings are fit.
(3) Lev. XXII, 15.
(4) Rendering: they shall not profane the holy things (sc. the sacrifices) when they exalt them, i.e., when they offer them as a sacrifice whose sanctity is higher than their own.
(5) V. Glos.
(6) I.e., offered. The verb יְהַבְּדוּ is imperfect (which they shall exalt) and hence refers to ‘holy things’, which includes terumah (q.v. Glos.), which are yet to be separated from the produce, so that it is all tebel. — For the liability to death (at the hands of Heaven) v. Sanh. 83a.
(7) That the text teaches the former dictum of Simeon the brother of Azariah only.
(8) The root word ‘exalt’ teaches the former, and the future tense teaches the latter.
(9) Does Simeon the brother of Azariah mean that when slaughtered in the name of a higher sacrifice they are fit, yet do not propitiate, i.e., they do not acquit their owner of their obligation; but if slaughtered in the name of a lower sacrifice they are completely unfit? In that case he agrees with the first Tanna as far as the former instance is concerned, and disagrees only in respect of the latter. Or does he mean in the former instance that they also propitiate? If so, he disagrees with the first Tanna in respect of the former too, the first Tanna holding that they do not propitiate.
(10) Surely not!
(11) Where there is no question of propitiation it means that they are valid but do not propitiate. But where propitiation does apply (sc. in the first clause) they may propitiate too.
(12) By the second clause.
(13) Is that the only purpose of this second clause dealing with the firstling, etc.?
(14) V. Infra 89a. It takes precedence because its sanctity is higher.
(15) Sc. our Mishnah.
(16) Is that the only purpose of this second clause dealing with the firstling, etc.?
(17) V. Mishnah 2a.
(18) The Gemara discusses infra why the text uses the singular.
(19) Emended text.
(20) As its head. V. Ber. 27b.
(21) This excludes the burnt-offering.
(22) As being unfit.
(23) And not the afternoon only. For that very reason he declares it invalid when not slaughtered for its own sake.
(24) Seeing that if the whole day is the season, there is no point in saying AS IF IT HAD BEEN SLAUGHTERED IN THE AFTERNOON.
(25) On his view it is pertinent, since he holds that only the afternoon is its season.
(26) According to Ben Bathyra it is valid, while in R. Joshua's view it is invalid.
(27) Ex. XII, 6. How then can R. Oshaia maintain that the whole day is the proper time?
(28) This being the literal meaning of the Hebrew בין הערבים I.e., between the evening of the fourteenth (which he counts as until dawn) and the evening of the fifteenth, hence the whole day of the fourteenth.
(29) Ibid. XXIX, 39.
(30) Ibid, XXX, 8.
(32) Ibid. XXX, 8, — the same text as that quoted for the lamps.

Because it is likened to lamps.1 But there too it is written, There thou shalt sacrifice the Passover-offering at even [ba-'ereb]?2 — That comes to teach deferment. For it was taught: Let that in connection with which ba-’ereb [at even] and ben ha-’arbayim [between the evenings] are said be deferred after that in connection with which ben ha-’arbayim alone is said.4 Now can there be a case where if he slaughtered it in the morning you say that it is its proper time, yet when afternoon arrives you say that it should be deferred?5 — Yes, for surely R. Johanan said: The halachah is that one must recite the minhah [afternoon] service and then recite the additional service.6 Now, what is the purpose of ‘ben ha-‘arbayim’ [at dusk] written in connection with incense and lamps?7 Furthermore, [it was taught:]8 Rabbi rebutted the words of R. Joshua on Ben Bathyra's view: That is not so,9 If you speak of the thirteenth, where no part of it is fit, will you speak [thus] of the fourteenth, where part of it is fit? Now if this is correct,10 then the whole of it is fit!11 —

Rather said R. Johanan: Ben Bathyra declared unfit a Passover-offering which one slaughtered in the morning of the fourteenth, whether in its own or in a different name, since part of it is fit [for the slaughtering].12 R. Abbahu sneered at this view: If so, how is it possible on Ben Bathyra's ruling for a Passover-offering to be fit?13 If one separates it now, it is rejected ab initio; while if one separated it yesterday, it was eligible and rejected!14 —

Rather said R. Abbahu: It must be [that he separated it] after midday.15 Abaye said: You may even say [that one separates it] in the morning, [because the disqualification of] prematurity does not apply to the same day.16 R. Papa said: You may even say [that one separates it] the [previous] evening:17 prematurity does not apply to the night. For R. Ishmael taught: On the night of the eighth day it enters the fold to be tithed.18 And [this is] in accordance with R. Aftoriki. For R. Aftoriki pointed out a contradiction, It is written, Then it shall be seven days under its dam;19 hence on the [following] night it is eligible. Yet it is written, But from the eighth day and thenceforth it may be accepted [for an offering],19 whence it follows that it was not eligible the [previous] evening. How is this [to be reconciled]? The night for sanctification and the day for acceptance.20
R. Zera asked R. Abbahu: Must we say that R. Johanan holds that live animals can be [permanently] rejected? 21 — Even so, replied he. For R. Johanan said: [With regard to] an animal belonging to two partners; if one [of them] dedicates half, and then purchases [the other] half and dedicates it, it is holy, yet cannot be offered up; 22 and it establishes [the sanctity of] a substitute, 23 and the substitute is as itself. 24 This proves three things: that live animals may be rendered permanently rejected; 25 that which is rejected ab initio is rejected; 26 and

(1) Since ‘at dusk’ refers to both, as stated in the preceding note.
(2) Deut. XVI, 6.
(3) E.V. at dusk.
(4) In connection with the Passover-offering both expressions are used (Ex. XII, 6; Deut. XVI, 6), while in connection with the daily-offering one only is stated (Num. XXVIII, 4). Hence the former is sacrificed after the latter.
(5) Until after the afternoon daily offering.
(6) On the Sabbath, festivals and New Moon there are three services, the morning service, the additional service and the afternoon service in that order (beside the evening service, which is recited the previous evening). The additional service must commence before the time of the afternoon service, which is from half an hour after noon until dusk. If one had not recited it by then, he must give precedence to the afternoon service. This is exactly analogous to our own case.
(7) Since its meaning must be elucidated through another text (supra 11b).
(8) In objection to R. Oshaia.
(9) Sc. that it is as though it was slaughtered on the thirteenth.
(10) That Ben Bathyra holds that the whole of the fourteenth is the proper time.
(11) And not only part!
(12) If slaughtered in its own name, it is invalid because the proper time is the afternoon. If not in its own name, it is invalid because part of that day is the proper time for it, and hence the law on 2a applies.
(13) Even if it is slaughtered at the proper time (in the afternoon of the fourteenth) and in its own name.
(14) If one separates the animal for a Passover-offering on the morning of the fourteenth, it is fit for nothing at all then, neither for a Passover-offering nor for a peace-offering. Thus from the very beginning it is ineligible (technically ‘rejected’), and R. Johanan holds infra that in such circumstances it can never be eligible again, even if conditions subsequently alter. Again, if one separated it the previous day, it was then eligible for a peace-offering, but on the following morning it was ‘rejected’ (became ineligible), and in the view of all Rabbis it then remains permanently rejected.
(15) When it is actually eligible. — The answer is obvious, and R. Abbahu's objection is probably only rhetorical, as a means of expressing the opinion that according to Ben Bathyra as interpreted by R. Johanan the animal cannot be separated for the Passover-offering until the afternoon.
(16) Where an animal becomes eligible for a particular purpose during the day, the earlier part of the same day is not regarded as premature, in the sense discussed here.
(17) Which is also the fourteenth of Nisan.
(18) An animal cannot be sacrificed before it is eight days old, and for the same reason when animals are to be tithed it does not enter the fold for the purpose. Yet if the tithing is taking place on the night of the eight day (it will be eight days old the next day) it does enter. This proves that prematurity does not apply to the night.
(19) Lev. XXII, 27.
(20) It can be sanctified on the night of the eighth but not ‘accepted’. i.e., sacrificed, until the following day.
(21) V. following notes. For otherwise you need not answer that one separates it after midday.
(22) Since it was not fit for offering originally, as the half belonging to the other partner was as yet secular. Hence it must now be sold, and an animal purchased with the money and sacrificed.
(23) The reference is to Lev. XXVII, 33: neither shall he change it (a consecrated animal): and if he change it, then both it and the change thereof shall be holy. Thus here, if one substitutes another animal for this one, the substitute too is holy.
(24) It may not be sacrificed, but must be sold.
(25) As here: the animal having been tendered ineligible when dedicated, since half remained secular, it remains so even when the other half too is dedicated. There is an opposing view that only a dead animal can become permanently ineligible, V. Yoma 64a.
(26) This animal was not eligible for dedication by a single partner from the very outset.

Zevachim 12b

that rejection applies to monetary sanctity. 1 
‘Ulla said in R. Johanan's name: If one ate heleb 2 and set aside a sacrifice, 3 then apostatized, yet subsequently retracted, since
it was [once] rejected, it remains rejected. It was stated likewise: R. Jeremiah said in R. Abbahu's name in R. Johanan's name: If a man ate heleb, set aside an offering, became insane and then regained his sanity, since it [the offering] was [once] rejected, it remains so. Now both rulings are necessary. For had he informed us of the first only, [you might have said that] the reason is that he made himself ineligible [to offer a sacrifice] with his own hands; but in the latter case where he was involuntarily disqualified, he is [merely] as one who fell asleep. Again, had he informed us the latter case only, you might argue that the reason is because his recovery is not dependent on himself; but in the former case [apostasy] it is not so, since it lies with him to retract — Thus both are required. R. Jeremiah asked: If one ate heleb, set aside a sacrifice, then the Beth din ruled that heleb is permitted, yet subsequently they retracted, what is the law? Does this constitute [permanent] rejection or does it not constitute [permanent] rejection? Said a certain old man to him: When R. Johanan commenced [his rulings] on rejected sacrifices, he commenced with this very case. What is the reason? There the person was disqualified, but the sacrifice was not rejected; whereas here the sacrifice too became rejected.

SAID SIMEON THE SON OF' AZZAI: I HAVE A TRADITION FROM THE MOUTH OF SEVENTY-TWO ELDER[S], etc. Why does he state, SEVENTY-TWO ELDER[S]? — Because they all held this view unanimously.

BEN AZZAI ADDED ONLY THE BURNT-OFFERING. R. Huna said: What is Ben 'Azzai's reason? — It is a burnt-offering, an offering made by fire, of a sweet savor unto the Lord: ‘it is’ implies that [when it is slaughtered] in its own name it is valid; when not in its own name, it is invalid. But ‘it is’ is written in the case of the guilt-offering too? — That is written after the burning of the emurim. But in this case too it is written after the burning of the emurim? — ‘It is’ is written twice [in connection with the burnt-offering]. Yet ‘it is’ is written twice in the case of the guilt-offering too? — Rather, Ben 'Azzai infers it a fortiori: If a sin-offering is invalid when one slaughters it under a different designation, though it is not entirely burnt, how much the more is a burnt-offering [invalid in such circumstances], seeing that it is entirely burnt — As for the sin-offering, [it may be argued] the reason is that it makes atonement! Then let the Passover-offering prove it. As for the Passover-offering, the reason is because its time [for slaughtering] is fixed! Then let the sin-offering prove it. And thus the argument revolves: the feature peculiar to the one is not that peculiar to the other, and the feature peculiar to the other is not that peculiar to the first. Their common characteristic is that they are sacred sacrifices, and if one slaughters them under a different designation they are invalid; so will I adduce the burnt-offering too, which is a sacred sacrifice, and if one slaughters it for a different purpose, it is invalid. [No:] their common feature is that an aspect of kareth is involved in them!

(1) This animal was sanctified from the very outset only for its value. i.e., that the money for which it would be sold should be expended for a sacrifice; nevertheless it becomes permanently ineligible for the altar. This excludes the possible view that only an animal that was fit in the first place to be dedicated to the altar can be rendered permanently ineligible.
(2) Forbidden fat. V. Glos.
(4) For sacrifices are not accepted from apostates, cf. Hal. 5b.
(5) An insane person cannot offer.
(6) When he had to sacrifice. This gap in his intelligent consciousness does not of course permanently disqualify him.
(7) V. Glos.
(8) For when they ruled that heleb is permitted, the sacrifice became rejected, since a sin-offering can be brought only when one is liable.
(9) Teaching that it is permanently rejected.
(10) In the cases of apostasy and insanity.
(11) The animal separated still belonged to the category of sin-offerings, save that its owner was not fit to bring it.
(12) Hence it follows a minori that it remains rejected.
(13) In the singular.
(14) Sh. M. emends: they were all present at the same sitting (when they stated this). This apparently is Rashi’s reading too.
(16) V. supra, 5b for notes.
(17) The one already quoted, and the other in Ex. XXIX, 18. Though there too it is after the burning of the emurim, yet since its teaching is unnecessary in that respect, as one text is sufficient for that, you must apply its teaching as intimating that when not slaughtered in its own name it is unfit.
(19) V. supra 10b p 49. n. 2.

**Zevachim 13a**

does not admit the refutation of kareth. Then let him adduce the guilt-offering too? — The feature common to both is that they apply to the whole community as to an individual. Alternatively he does admit the refutation of kareth, but Ben Azzai had a tradition. And when R. Huna said [that he inferred it] a fortiori, he said this only in order to sharpen his disciples.

**Mishnah.** If one slaughtered the Passover-offering or the Sin-offering not in their own name, [and] he received [the blood], went [with it], and sprinkled [it] not in their own name, or in their own name and not in their own name, or not in their own name and in their own name, they are disqualified. How is ‘in their own name and not in their own name’ meant? — in the name of the Passover-sacrifice [first] and then [in] the name of a peace-offering. ‘Not in their own name and in their own name’ [means] in the name of a peace-offering [first] and [then] in the name of the Passover-offering.

For a sacrifice can be disqualified at [any one of] the four services: slaughtering, receiving, carrying and sprinkling. R. Simeon declares it valid in the carrying, because he argued: [the sacrifice] is impossible without slaughtering, without receiving and without sprinkling, but it is possible without carrying. [How so?] One slaughters it at the side of the altar and sprinkles forthwith. R. Eliezer said: If one goes where he needs to go, an illegitimate intention disqualifies it; where he need not go, an illegitimate intention does not disqualify it.

**Gemara.** Does then receiving disqualify? Surely it was taught: And they shall present: this refers to the receiving of the blood. You say, This refers to the receiving of the blood: yet perhaps it is not so, but rather it means the sprinkling? When it says, And they shall dash [the blood], lo, sprinkling is stated, hence to what can I apply, ‘And they shall present’? It must refer to the receiving of the blood. Aaron’s sons, the priests teach that [these services] must be performed by a legitimate priest robed in priestly vestments. Said R. Akiba: How do we know that receiving must be performed by none but a legitimate priest robed in priestly vestments? ‘Aaron’s sons’ is stated here, while elsewhere it says, These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests that were anointed: as there it refers to legitimate priests [robed] in priestly vestments, so here too it means by a legitimate priest robed in priestly vestments. R. Tarfon observed: May I lose my sons if I have not heard a distinction made between receiving and sprinkling, yet I cannot explain what it is! Said R. Akiba: I will explain it. In the case of receiving intention was not made tantamount to action, whereas in the case of sprinkling intention was made tantamount to action. Again if one received [the blood] without its proper precincts, he is not liable to kareth, whereas if one sprinkles [it] without, he is punished with kareth. If unfit men received it, they are not liable on its account, if unfit men sprinkled it, they are
liable on its account. Said R. Tarfon to him, By the [Temple] service! You have[not] deviated to the right or the left!17 I heard [it] yet could not explain it, whereas you investigate it and agree with [my] tradition. In these words he addressed him: ‘Akiba! whoever departs from thee is as though he departed from life!’ —

Said Raba: There is no difficulty: the one refers to an intention of piggul,18 while the other [our Mishnah] refers to an intention for the sake of something else. This too may be proved, because it teaches, FOR A SACRIFICE CAN BE DISQUALIFIED, but it does not teach, ‘For a sacrifice becomes Piggul’. This proves it.

Now, does not an intention of Piggul disqualify it [the sacrifice] at the receiving? Surely it was taught: You might think that an intention [of Piggul] is effective only at the sprinkling; whence do we know to include slaughtering and receiving? From the text, And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted. . . it shall be an abhorred thing [Piggul];19 Scripture treats of the services which lead to eating.20 You might think that I also include the pouring out of the residue [of the blood] and the burning of the emurim; therefore it states,... on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed unto him that offereth it.21 Now sprinkling was included in the general statement,22 and why was it singled out? That an analogy therewith might be drawn , intimating: as sprinkling is a service and is indispensable for atonement, so every [act which is a] service and is indispensable for atonement [is included]; thus the pouring out of the residue and the burning of the emurim are excluded, since these are not indispensable for atonement!23—

(1) Because it does not feature in the same way in both of them. For the sin-offering is brought for a sin of commission which involves kareth, whereas it is the omission to bring the Passover-offering that entails kareth.

(2) That it is invalid when slaughtered under a different designation, by the same analogy. V. supra 10b, where the analogy is proposed but rejected because kareth is not involved in the guilt-offering. Since, however, Ben Azzai does not admit that this is a refutation, the analogy stands.

(3) A sin-offering may be incurred by the whole community, just as by an individual. v. Lev. IV. The Passover-offering too, though brought by individuals, is a communal (public) sacrifice, since the whole community must bring one (Yoma 51a). But a guilt-offering is never brought by the whole community.

(4) In respect of the burnt-offering, as stated in the Mishnah. Hence he does not infer it a fortiori at all.

(5) Challenging them, as it were, to find the fallacy in his statement.

(6) I.e., one of the services was for its own sake and another was for a different purpose, in the order stated.

(7) Where it is straightway sprinkled. Since then the blood may not be carried at all, the sacrifice cannot be disqualified if it is carried for a different purpose.

(8) The Gemara discusses this.

(9) Lev. I, 5.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Which excludes one of profaned birth, e.g., the issue of a divorced woman, and one suffering from a physical blemish or defect; v. Lev. XXI, 7, 17.

(12) Lit., ‘service vessels’ (here, robes). ‘The priests’ implies that they must be vested as priests.

(13) Num. 111,3.

(14) Legitimate, since Nadab and Abihu, Eleazar and Ithamar, Aaron's sons, are enumerated (v. 2). ‘Robed in priestly vestments’ is deduced from the end of the verse: whom he consecrated to minister in the priest’s office; cf. Lev. XXI, 10: and that is consecrated to put on the garments.

(15) The reference is to illegitimate intention and action. An illegitimate intention is now assumed to mean an intention to receive the blood in the name of a different sacrifice or to eat of its flesh after the permitted time, which would render it Piggul (q.v. Glos.). Thus an illegitimate intention at the receiving of the blood does not disqualify, which contradicts the view in the Mishnah. — The difficulty is answered at the end of the discussion.

(16) E.g., lay Israelites or intoxicated priests.

(17) You have stated exactly what I heard, but had forgotten.

(18) Such an intention does not disqualify at the receiving.


(20) I.e. which permit the consumption of the flesh; these include receiving.
(21) ‘Accepted’ is understood to refer to the sprinkling, which makes the sacrifice acceptable.
(22) I.e., as one of the services which ‘lead to eating’.
(23) Hence the intention of Piggul at the reception of the blood does disqualify it.

There is no difficulty:1 In the one case it means that he declared, ‘Lo, I slaughter [this sacrifice] with the intention of receiving its blood to-morrow while in the other case it means that he declared, ‘Lo, I receive the blood with the intention of pouring out its residue to-morrow’.2

One of the Rabbis said to Raba: Now does not intention disqualify at the pouring out of the residue and the burning of the emurim? Yet surely it was taught: You might think that intention is effective only in connection with the eating of the flesh. Whence do we know to include the pouring out of the residue and the burning of the emurim? From the text, And if [any of the flesh. . .] be at all eaten [on the third day... it shall be an abhorred thing]:3 Scripture refers to two eatings, viz., eating by man and eating by the altar.4 There is no difficulty:’ In the one case he declares, ‘Lo, I sprinkle [the blood] with the intention of pouring out the residue to-morrow’;5 in the other he declares, ‘Lo, I pour out the residue with the intention of burning the emurim to-morrow’.6

R. Judah the son of R. Hiyya said: I have heard that the dipping of the finger [in the blood]7 renders [a sacrifice] Piggul in the case of an inner sin-offering.8 Ilfa heard this and reported it before Bar Padda. Said he: Do we learn Piggul from ought else but from the peace-offering? Then as the dipping of the finger does not render the peace-offering Piggul, so in the case of the sin-offering too, the dipping of the finger does not render it Piggul. But do we then really learn everything from the peace-offering? If so, [then reason thus:] as [a service] in the name of a different sacrifice does not free a peace-offering from piggul, so [a service] in the name of a different sacrifice does not free a sin-offering from Piggul? —

Said R. Jose b. Hanina: Yes, indeed, we really learn everything from the peace-offering: since [the intention to consume it] without its precincts disqualifies a peace-offering, while [performing a service] for the sake of something else disqualifies a sin-offering, then as [the intention to consume it] without its precincts, which disqualifies the peace-offering, frees it from Piggul, so [performing a service] for the sake of something else, which disqualifies the sin-offering, frees it from Piggul. R. Jeremiah observed: The refutation [of this analogy] is at its side.14 As for [the intention of consuming it] without its precincts, which disqualifies a peace-offering, [it frees it from Piggul] because it operates [as a disqualification] in all sacrifices; will you say [the same of performing a service] for the sake of something else, which operates in the case of the Passover-offering and the sin-offering only? Rather, what must you say?15 That that which disqualifies it [a peace-offering] frees it from Piggul, while that which is indispensable for it renders it piggul;16 so here too that which disqualifies it
[the sin-offering] frees it from Piggul, while that which is indispensable to it renders it piggul.18

R. Mari said, We too have learned likewise: This is the general principle: Whoever takes the fistful [of the meal-offering], places it in the utensil, carries it [to the altar] or burns it [thereon] [renders it Piggul].19 Now as for taking the fistful, it is well [that this effects Piggul, as] it corresponds to slaughtering; carrying [the fistful] corresponds to carrying [the blood]; burning [it] corresponds to sprinkling. But to what does putting [the fistful] into a utensil correspond? Shall we say that it is similar to receiving: is it then similar? There it is automatic,20 whereas here he takes it himself and places it [in the utensil]. But since you cannot dispense with placing it [in the utensil],21 you must say that it is an important service;22 so here too, since one cannot dispense with it,23 you must say that it is [part of] carrying [the blood to the altar]! — No: in truth it is similar to receiving, and as to your objection: There it is automatic, whereas here he takes it himself and places it [in the utensil, the answer is:] since both are [instances of] placing in a utensil, what does it matter whether it is automatic or whether he personally takes and places it [there]? Shall we say that it is a controversy of Tannaim?24 For one [Baraita] taught: The dipping of the finger renders a sin-offering Piggul; while another taught: It does not affect Piggul, nor does it become piggul.25 Surely then it is a controversy of Tannaim! — No: one agrees with our Rabbis and the other agrees with R. Simeon.26 If R. Simeon, why particularly the dipping of the finger? Surely he said,

(1) So Rashi. Cur. edd.: ‘Rather (answer thus)’.
(2) Both may be styled intentions of Piggul at the receiving of the blood, yet they are obviously different intentions; the former does not disqualify the sacrifice, whereas the latter does.
(3) The emphatic ‘be at all eaten’ is expressed in the original by doubling the verb, which in Talmudic exegesis denotes extension.
(4) Sprinkling the blood and pouring out its residue at the foot of the altar are regarded as the eating of the altar. Thus in connection with these too, an illegitimate intention renders the sacrifice Piggul, which contradicts the previous statement.
(5) Then the sacrifice becomes Piggul, since it was his intention to give the altar its food on the morrow, which is after its appointed time.
(6) This does not render it Piggul, since the wrongful intention was not at one of the four services.
(7) V. Lev., IV, 6: And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood, etc.
(8) One sacrificed at the inner altar. If he dipped his finger in the blood with the intention of burning the emurim the next day, the sacrifice becomes Piggul.
(9) The law of Piggul is expressly written only in connection with the peace-offering, whence we extend the law to other sacrifices.
(10) Since there is no dipping of the finger in the case of a peace-offering, the blood being dashed on the altar direct from the utensil. Since it is not a statutory service, it cannot render the sacrifice Piggul even if it is done.
(11) It is stated infra 28b that if a sacrifice is slaughtered with the intention of consuming it after its prescribed period, which renders it Piggul, it remains Piggul only if the subsequent services (receiving, carrying and sprinkling), which are technically designated the mattirin (q.v. Glos) are performed without any other intention which would disqualify it in any case. Now if one slaughtered a peace-offering with the intention of consuming it after its prescribed period, thus rendering it Piggul, and then performed the subsequent services in the name of a different sacrifice, it remains Piggul, since this change of name does not disqualify a peace-offering. A sin-offering in like circumstances ceases to be Piggul, since change of name does disqualify it, (Though the flesh of course remains forbidden, it is not forbidden as Piggul, so that eating it does not render one liable to kareth.) But if Piggul of other sacrifices were completely analogous to Piggul of a peace-offering, as Bar Padda's objection implies, then the sin-offering too should not be free from Piggul.
(12) The extension of Piggul to other sacrifices is effected not by analogy with the peace-offering, but from extending particles in the text; hence the conditions of freeing it from Piggul need not be the same. By the same reasoning the conditions for making it Piggul need not be the same.
(13) Hence though there is no Piggul at the dipping of the finger in the case of the peace-offering, there is in the case of the sin-offering.
(14) Obvious and inherent.
(15) If you insist on retaining a complete analogy with the sin-offering.
(16) If performed with a Piggul intention.
(17) Which excludes the dipping of the finger.
(18) Thus the analogy is complete in its principles, though the detailed application of these principles varies according to the individual laws of the various sacrifices.
(19) If he performs one of these services with the intention of consuming the rest or burning the fistful on the morrow. — The burning of the fistful corresponds to the sprinkling of the blood of an animal sacrifice.
(20) It naturally drops into the basin.
(21) I.e., it is a necessary part of the service.
(22) It is a definite service in that an illegitimate intention thereof affects Piggul.
(23) Sc. the dipping of the finger.
(24) Whether it is analogous to receiving the blood or to carrying the blood.
(25) It does not affect Piggul, if the priest dipped his finger with the intention of burning the emurim the next day; and it does not become Piggul, if he slaughtered or received the blood with the intention of dipping the finger on the morrow.
(26) All agree that it is part of carrying, but the ruling that it does not render it Piggul is in accordance with R. Simeon in our Mishnah that there can be no Piggul at the carrying.

Zevachim 14a

Whatever is not [offered] on the outer altar, like the peace-offering, is not subject to piggul? — Rather, both agree with the Rabbis yet there is no difficulty: the one refers to outer sin-offerings, while the other refers to the inner sin-offerings. As for the outer sin-offerings, it is obvious, since ‘and he shall dip’ is not written in connection therewith? — It is necessary [to teach it]: One might argue, since ‘and he shall take’ is written, and if an ape came and placed [the blood] thereon [his finger], he [the priest] must take it again, it is as though ‘and he shall dip’ were written. Therefore he informs us that for that very reason ‘and he shall dip’ is not written, so that it may imply the one and imply the other.

R. SIMEON DECLARES IT FIT IN THE CARRYING. R. Simeon b. Lakish said: R. Simeon agrees that an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies at the carrying of the blood of the inner sin-offerings, because it is a service which cannot be omitted. But R. Simeon said: Whatever is not [offered] on the outer altar, like the peace-offering, does not entail liability on account of piggul?

Said R. Joseph son of R. Hanina: He agrees that it disqualifies it a minori: If [offering] for the sake of something else disqualifies a sin-offering, though it is valid in the case of a peace-offering; is it not logical that [the intention of consuming it] after time disqualifies a sin-offering, Seeing that it disqualifies in the case of a peace-offering? We have thus found [that the intention of consuming it] after time [disqualifies it]. How do we know that [the intention to eat it] without its precincts [disqualifies]? If you would learn it from after time [by analogy], you may refute it: as for after time, that is because [it involves] kareth. If from [sacrificing] for the sake of something else, that is because it operates at the bamah? —

Where does [sacrificing] for the sake of something else operate [as a disqualification]? [You must say] in the case of the Passover-offering and the sin-offering; and the Passover-offering and the sin-offering were not sacrificed at the bamah! Alternatively, It is a Scriptural analogy, [for And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be at all eaten] on the third [day] refers to [the disqualification of] after time, while it shall be an abhorred thing [Piggul] refers to the intention of eating it] without its precincts.

Raba said: If you will say that R. Simeon agrees with his son, who maintained, Between the ulam and the altar is north, [R. Simeon will then hold that] an [illegitimate] intention is effective in the case of the carrying of the blood of inner sin-offerings only from within the entrance of the ulam. And if you will say that [R. Simeon] agrees with R. Judah who maintained: The [whole of the] inner part of the Temple court is sanctified; [he will then hold that] an [illegitimate] intention is effective during the passage of the removal of the incense dishes only from the entrance of the altar.
the hekal and without.20 Again, if you will say that he holds that the sanctity of the hekal and that of the ulam is one, [then] an [illegitimate] intention is effective only from the entrance of the ulam and without.21 And if you will say that within the entrance is as within [the hekal]; then an [illegitimate] intention is not effective even for one step save within the stretching out of his [one's] hand.22 But if you will say that he holds that carrying without [using] the foot is not called carrying, then an [illegitimate] intention is not effective at all.

Abaye said to R. Hisda's amora:23 Ask R. Hisda, what of carrying by a lay-Israelite [zar]? — It is valid, he replied, and a Scriptural text supports me: And they killed the Passover lamb, and the priests dashed [the blood, which they received] of their hand, and the Levites flayed them.24 R. Shesheth objected: A zar, an onen,25

(1) While we are now discussing the inner sin-offerings.
(2) Who maintain that there is Piggul at the carrying of the blood.
(3) In the former case the dipping of the finger does not affect Piggul, because Scripture does not say that the priest must dip his finger in the blood, but merely that he must take of the blood with his finger, which taking means the receiving of the blood (cf. infra 48a).
(4) Lev. IV, 30.
(5) Since we interpret ‘he shall take’ in the sense that he must personally take the blood from the utensil, which is impossible without dipping his finger into it.
(6) By not saying ‘and he shall dip’ Scripture intimates that the dipping is not a service on a par with the other services, and so it is not subject to Piggul. At the same time ‘and he shall take’ definitely implies that the priest personally must do this, which is in fact dipping.
(7) Because it is unusual to slaughter it in the hekal (the inner sanctuary). Hence it is slaughtered in the Temple court and the blood carried to the horns of the inner altar in the hekal. Consequently R. Simeon's argument in the Mishnah does not apply here.
(8) For eating its flesh,
(9) Though one does not incur kareth, which is the penalty for eating Piggul.
(10) It will disqualify both the outer and the inner sin-offerings.
(11) In the case of the inner sin-offerings.
(12) V. p. 71, n. 9.
(13) V. Glos. Slaughtering for a different purpose is a disqualification of a sacrifice offered on a private bamah, when such was permitted. But slaughtering it without its precincts did not disqualify.
(14) For only votive sacrifices were offered at the bamah, which excludes these two. Hence the refutation falls to the ground.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Scripture, by including them both in the same verse, assimilates them to each other and makes the same law apply to both. In such a case the analogy cannot be rebutted even when there is a point of dissimilarity.
(19) A sin-offering must be slaughtered in the north (infra Ch. V.). Now it is possible for R. Simeon to agree with his son (infra 20a) that the northern part of the Temple court (‘azarah) between the ulam and the altar, though actually to the west of the altar, and therefore one cannot apply to it the Scriptural injunction, And he shall kill it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord (Lev. 1, 11), is nevertheless ‘north’ in respect of sacrifices of the higher sanctity. The reason for his view in the Mishnah on 13a is that he holds an illegitimate intention expressed during the passage of the blood from the place of slaughtering to the ulam is disregarded, since this passage could altogether have been avoided by slaughtering at the entrance of the ulam. But if he agreed with R. Jose that the sacrifice must be slaughtered actually between the northern side of the altar and the northern wall of the Temple court, the passage of the blood would be an indispensable service, and therefore an illegitimate intention during that passage would disqualify it.
(20) The hekal is the ‘Holy’, the hall containing the golden altar, etc., contrad. to the Holy of Holies (Jast.). The reference is to the burning of the showbread incense, in virtue of which the showbread was permitted to be eaten, in the same way as the sprinkling of the blood permits the flesh of the sacrifice; consequently it is on a par therewith and the same law applies to both, Now, if R. Simeon holds that the whole of the inner part of the Temple court is sanctified, so that the incense can be burnt there and not necessarily at the altar only, it follows that its carriage to the altar is not an essential act, and therefore an illegitimate intention does not render the showbread Piggul.
ZEVOCHIM - 2a-27b

(21) I.e., only at the five cubits of the thickness of the wall of the ulam. For the intention is not effective within the ulam itself. Since that is as the inner part, nor is it effective without the entrance, since the showbread incense can be burnt there.

(22) He stands at the entrance of the ulam and stretches out his hand to the pavement; an illegitimate intention during that action is effective.

(23) V. Glos.

(24) If Chron. XXXV, 11. Thus the priests were only required for the sprinkling, but the blood was brought to them (which is the carrying) by those who slaughtered the sacrifice, these being zarim.

(25) V. Glos.

Zevachim 14b

one who is intoxicated and one who is [physically] blemished are unfit to receive [the blood], carry [it] and sprinkle [it], and the same applies to one who is sitting and to [the performance of these by] 'the left hand. This is indeed a refutation! But R. Hisda quotes a text? — It means that he [the zar] served as a [mere] post.1

Rabbah and R. Joseph both maintained: Carriage by a zar is a [subject of] controversy between R. Simeon and the Rabbis. [According to] R. Simeon who says that a [Temple] service which can be dispensed with is not a service, [carriage] by a zar is valid. But according to the Rabbis it is invalid. Said Abaye to them: But slaughtering is a service which cannot be dispensed with, and yet it is valid [when done] by a zar? — Slaughtering is not a service, he replied.2 Is it not? Surely R. Zera said in Rab's name: The slaughtering of the [red] heifer by a zar is invalid; and R. Papa3 observed thereon: [The reason is because] 'Eleazar' and 'Statute' are written in connection with it.4 — The [red] heifer is different, because it is of the holy things of the Temple repair.5 But does it not follow a fortiori: it is a service in the case of the holy objects of the Temple repair, yet it is not a service in the case of holy objects dedicated to the altar?6 — Said R. Shisha the son of R. Idi: Let it be analogous to the inspection of [leprous] plagues, which is not a service, and yet requires the priesthood.7 Yet the carrying of the limbs to the ascent is a service which can be dispensed with,8 and yet it is invalid [when done] by a zar, for it is written, And the priest shall offer [bring near] the whole, and make it smoke [burn it] upon the altar,9 and a Master said: This refers to the carrying of the limbs to the ascent? — Where [Scripture] has revealed [that a priest is required], it has revealed [it], but where [Scripture] has not revealed [it], it has not.10 But does not [the reverse] follow a fortiori: if the carrying of the limbs to the ascent requires the priesthood, though it is not indispensable to atonement,11 how much the more [does] the carrying of the blood [require a priest], seeing that it is indispensable to atonement!12 It was stated likewise: ‘Ulla said in R. Eleazar's name: Carriage by a zar is invalid even according to R. Simeon. It was asked: Is carriage without [moving] the foot13 called carriage15 or not? —

Come and hear: And the same applies to one who is sitting and to [the performance of these by] 'the left hand, [which renders it] invalid. Hence standing similar to sitting16 is valid! — [No:] perhaps sitting means that he drags himself along, [and then] standing similar to sitting means that he moves slightly.

Come and hear: A [lay-] Israelite slaughtered [the Passover-offering] and a priest received [the blood]; he handed it to his colleague, and his colleague to his colleague!17 — There too it means that they [the priests] moved slightly. Then what does he [the Tanna] inform us?18 — That in the multitude of people is the king's glory.

Come and hear: If a fit person received [the blood] and handed it to an unfit one, the latter must return it to the fit one!20 — Say, the fit person must go round and take it.21 It was stated: ‘Ulla said in R. Johanan's name: Carriage without [moving] the foot is not called carriage.22
(1) On which the blood was placed. A priest received the blood and gave it to the zar, who held it until another priest took it from him and carried it to the altar. Thus the zar did not carry it himself but was completely passive.

(2) Rashi: Since it may be done by all who are otherwise unfit to perform the sacrificial service.

(3) Emended text (Bah).

(4) Num. XIX, 2 seq.: This is the statute of the law which the Lord hath commanded, saying: Speak unto the children of Israel, that they bring thee a red heifer... and ye shall give her unto Eleazar the priest... and he shall slaughter her (this is the literal translation, not as E.V.) before his face. Thus the text specifies that Eleazar, viz., a priest, must slaughter, and by referring to it as a ‘statute’ intimates that this is indispensable. This proves that slaughtering is a service.

(5) This is the technical term for all objects dedicated to the Temple which cannot be sacrificed.

(6) Surely if it is a service in the former case it is all the more so in the latter.

(7) And likewise with the red heifer, being of the holy things of the Temple repair, the slaughtering thereof is not deemed in the category of Temple services, and the requirement of a priest is a special feature of the ritual connected therewith.

(8) The inclined ascent leading to the altar. — These limbs were carried there for burning.

(9) By slaughtering the sacrifice near the altar, and burning the limbs on the spot.


(11) Hence according to R. Simeon the carrying of the blood to the altar may not require a priest, notwithstanding that the carrying of the limbs does,

(12) Even it the limbs are not burnt at all the purpose of the sacrifice is achieved.

(13) Var. lec. add: this is indeed a difficulty.

(14) When the blood is merely transferred by hand.

(15) So that an illegitimate intention will disqualify the sacrifice, on the view of the Rabbis; and likewise if it is performed by a zar.

(16) Viz., standing without moving.

(17) This is a description of the sacrifice of the Passover. The priests stood in rows, passing the blood from one to another, until it reached the altar for sprinkling. Thus the blood was carried without the priests moving their feet.

(18) In stating that the priests were drawn up in rows.

(19) Prov. XIV, 28.

(20) Hence carrying without using the feet does not count at all. For otherwise the unfit might simply be regarded as a post on which the fit person had placed the blood, and it would not be necessary for the former to return it to the latter, but simply for another fit person to come and take it.

(21) He must go to the other side of the unfit and take it from him. In that case his first carriage definitely counts.

[Now the question arises:] Can this be repaired or can it not be repaired?

Come and hear: If a fit person received [the blood] and handed it to an unfit one, the latter must return it to the fit one. Now, granted that the fit person receives it back, yet if you think that it cannot be repaired, it has [already] been made invalid. [This does not prove anything:] do you think that the lay-Israelite stood within? No: it means that the lay-Israelite stood without.3 It was stated: ‘Ulla said in R. Johanan's name: Carriage without [moving] the foot is invalid. This proves that it cannot be repaired. R. Nahman raised an objection to ‘Ulla: If [the blood] was spilled from the vessel on to the pavement, and one [a priest] collected it, it is valid?4 — The circumstances here are that [the blood] had run outward.5 Would it run without [only] and not enter within?6 — [It fell] on sloping ground.7 Alternatively, [it fell] into a depression.8 Another alternative is that it [the blood] was thick.9 But does the Tanna trouble to teach us all these!10 Moreover, instead of teaching in another chapter, ‘If it was spilt on to the ground11 and [the priest] collected it, it is unfit’12 ; let him [the Tanna] draw a distinction in that very case,13 thus: When does this hold good? [Only] if [the blood] ran without; but if it entered within, it is unfit? This is indeed a refutation.

It was stated: Carriage without moving the foot is [the subject of] a controversy between R. Simeon and the Rabbis.14 In the case of a long carriage all agree that it is unfit; they disagree only in respect of a short carriage.15 This was ridiculed in the West [Eretz Israel]16: if so, as for [the law that] an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies a sin-offering of a bird, how is this possible according to R.
Simeon? if [the priest] expressed this intention before the blood issued, it is nothing; if after the blood has issued, then surely the precept has already been performed?

What difficulty is this? perhaps [the priest expressed his intention] between the issuing [of the blood] and its reaching the altar? For surely R, Jeremiah asked R. Zera: What if one was sprinkling, and the sprinkler’s hand was cut off before the blood reached the altar air-space? And he answered him, It is invalid. What is the reason? Because it is essential that ‘he shall sprinkle’ and ‘he shall put’ [of the blood upon the horns of the altar].

When R. Papa and R. Huna the son of R. Joshua came from [the academy] they stated: This was the [point of their] derision: Do they not differ about a long passage? Surely they differ precisely in respect of a long passage? Rather, all agree that it is not invalid in the case of a short passage; they differ in the case of a long passage. If a zar carried [the blood], whereupon a priest returned it and then carried it [himself], — the sons of R. Hyya and R. Jannai disagree. One maintains that it is valid, while the other holds that it is invalid; the former holding that it can be repaired, while the latter holds that it cannot be repaired. If a priest carried [the blood] but returned it and then a zar carried it [to the altar] again, said R. Simi b. Ashi: He who declares it valid [in the previous case], holds [here] that it is invalid; while he who declares it invalid [there], holds [here] that it is valid. Raba said: Even he who declares it invalid [in the previous case], holds that it is invalid [here too]. What is the reason?—Because he is bound

(1) Do we regard the carriage as simply having been omitted, in which case the blood can be taken back and the carriage performed; or do we regard the carriage as having been performed improperly, thus disqualifying the blood permanently, so that it cannot be repaired, and the sacrifice is consequently invalid?

(2) The unfit person.

(3) Further away from the altar, not nearer to it. Hence the blood had been handed backward, and that certainly does not constitute carriage at all, and it can be repaired. The question under discussion, however, is whether a wrongly performed service can be repaired.

(4) Since it had been originally received in a vessel. Now, he assumed that the blood had run down toward the altar, so that we have a form of carriage without the foot, yet this can be repaired by collecting it.

(5) Away from the altar.

(6) Nearer the altar. Surely the blood would run in all directions!

(7) Sloping away from the altar.

(8) Where it could not run at all in any direction.

(9) Semi-solid, and so could not run.

(10) Would he state a law that holds good in such exceptional circumstances only?

(11) Directly from the animal’s throat.

(12) Infra 25a.

(13) I.e., where it was spilt from the vessel,

(14) R. Simeon does not regard carriage as a service at all (v. Mishnah 13a); hence however it is done it cannot disqualify the sacrifice. The Rabbis, however, do regard it as a service, and therefore if done improperly the sacrifice is disqualified.

(15) I.e., when the animal is slaughtered so near the altar that the priest merely stretches out his’ hand and sprinkles the blood without walking at all.

(16) V. Sanh. 17b.

(17) At the sprinkling.

(18) For the bird is killed near the altar and its blood made to spurt against the altar direct from the bird. This act of making it spurt constitutes a short carriage, during which, on the present hypothesis, there can be no disqualification, according to R. Simeon,

(19) This assumes that immediately the blood spurs from the neck, even before it reaches the altar, the precept has been performed.

(20) Cf. Lev. IV, 6-7. The priest must both ‘sprinkle’ the blood and ‘put’ it on the altar, i.e., see that it actually reaches the altar; consequently, until it actually reaches the altar the service is still being performed, and therefore if the priest’s hand is cut off just then, we have a service performed by a priest with a physical blemish, which is invalid (v. Lev. XXI, 17 seq.). By the same reasoning, an illegitimate intention during the passage of the blood to the altar may disqualify it. — This argument is unrefuted, and therefore the view that the controversy refers to a short passage may be correct.

(21) Since R. Simeon states that it is possible without walking (12a), he obviously refers to a case where walking is, in fact, done.

(22) Var. lec., that it is invalid (Bah).
(23) Actually walking in doing so.
(24) Sc. the invalidity of the star’s action.
(25) For the former makes the status of the last person who carries it the determining factor, while the latter reverses it.

Zevachim 15b

to bring it up.1 R. Jeremiah2 said to R. Ashi, This is what R. Jeremiah of Difti3 said: [The validity of the argument,] ‘Surely he is bound to bring it up’, is disputed by R. Eliezer and the Rabbis.

For we learned: R. ELIEZER SAID: IF ONE GOES WHERE HE NEEDS TO GO, AN [ILLEGITIMATE] INTENTION DISQUALIFIES IT; [IF HE GOES] WHERE HE NEED NOT GO, AN [ILLEGITIMATE] INTENTION DOES NOT DISQUALIFY IT. Whereon Raba commented: All agree that if [the priest] received [the blood] without and carried it within,4 that is a necessary walk. If he received [it] within and carried it without, it is an unnecessary walk.5 They disagree only where he brought it within and then carried it without again: One Master holds, But he must surely bring it up [to the altar;]6 while the other Master holds: This is not the same as a carriage required for the service.7 Abaye refuted him: R. Eliezer said: If one goes where he must go, an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies it. How so? If he received it without and brought it within, it is a necessary walk. If he received it within and carried it without ‘ it is an unnecessary walk.8 Whence,9 if he carried it within again, it is a necessary walk? — Said he [Raba] to him: If it was taught, it was taught.9

CHAPTER II

MISHNAH. ALL SACRIFICES WHOSE BLOOD WAS CAUGHT BY A ZAR, AN ONEN, A TEBUL YOM,10 ONE LACKING SACRIFICIAL ATONEMENT,11 ONE LACKING [PRIESTLY] VESTMENTS, ONE WHO HAD NOT WASHED HIS HANDS AND FEET,12 AN UNCIRCUMCISED [PRIEST]. AN UNCLEAN [PRIEST]. ONE WHO WAS SITTING, ONE STANDING ON UTENSILS13 OR ON AN ANIMAL OR ON HIS FELLOW’S FEET, ARE DISQUALIFIED. IF [THE PRIEST] CAUGHT [THE BLOOD] WITH HIS LEFT HAND, IT IS DISQUALIFIED. R. SIMEON DECLARES IT VALID.14

GEMARA. How do we know [that] a zar [disqualifies the sacrifice if he receives the blood]? — Because Levi taught: [Scripture says,] Speak unto Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the holy things of the children of Israel, etc.15 What does ‘the children [sons] of Israel’ exclude? Shall we say that it excludes [the sacrifice of] women? Can women’s sacrifice be offered in uncleanness?16 Again, is it to exclude [the sacrifices of] heathens? seeing that [even] the head-plate does not propitiate, for a Master said: But in the case of [the sacrifices of] heathens, whether [done]17 in ignorance or deliberately, propitiation is not effected,18 can these [actually] be offered in uncleanness! Hence this is what [Scripture] means: that they separate themselves from the holy things of the children of Israel, and that they [the children of Israel] profane not [My holy name].19

The School of R. Ishmael taught: [That a zar disqualifies the sacrifice] is inferred a minori from [a priest] with a blemish: if [a priest] with a blemish, who may eat [of the sacrifice], profanes [it] when he officiates,20

(1) Since in fact the blood was taken away from the altar, it must be brought back. This becomes a service, and is therefore disqualified by a zar.
(2) Sh. M. reads: Rabina.
(3) Obermeyer, op. cit. p. 197 conjectures that this is identical with Dibtha, in the neighborhood of Wasit, north of Harpania.
(4) I.e., he received it at some distance from the altar and brought it up to the altar.
(5) During the course of which an illegitimate intention does not disqualify the sacrifice, on all views.
(6) Hence an illegitimate intention even during this second passage to the altar disqualifies it.
(7) Since there was no need in the first place to take it away from the altar. Hence an illegitimate
intention during that passage does not disqualify it.
(8) Sh. M. deletes.
(9) I must accept it.
(10) V. Glos. for these terms.
(11) A priest who became unclean through the dead was sprinkled with the ashes of the red heifer mixed with water; then he took a ritual bath; and on the eighth day of his uncleanness he offered a sacrifice, which made atonement for him. Similarly, a leper and a zab (q.v. Glos.) took a ritual bath on becoming clean, and offered a sacrifice the following day. In all these cases they are regarded as ‘lacking atonement’ after their ritual bath and before they offer their sacrifice.
(12) At the laver; v. Ex. XXX, 18 seq.
(13) I.e., not directly on the pavement.
(14) In the law concerning the last case.
(15) Lev. XXII, 2. This prohibits the priest from officiating whilst unclean (see following verses). Hence the phrase ‘the children’ (or, ‘sons’, which may be the meaning of the Heb. בני) apparently implies a limitation: only from the sacrifices of ‘the children of Israel’ must they hold aloof when they are unclean, but not from other sacrifices.
(16) Surely not.
(17) I.e., offered in an unclean state.
(18) V. infra 45b.
(19) Since ‘the children of Israel’ cannot be a limitation, it is interpreted as an additional subject of ‘separate’: the children of Israel (i.e., zarim) too must separate themselves from the sacrifices, as otherwise they profane God’s name, by disqualifying the sacrifice.
(20) V. Lev. XXI, 22f.

Zevachim 16a

is it not logical that a zar, who may not eat,1 profanes [the sacrifice] by officiating? [No:] as for [a priest] with a blemish, the reason may be because in his case the man who offers [officiates] is treated on a par with what is offered?2 Then let an unclean [priest] prove it.3 As for an unclean [priest], the reason is that he defiles [the flesh of the sacrifice]! Then let one with a blemish prove it. And thus the argument revolves, the distinguishing feature of one not being that of the other, and the distinguishing feature of the other not being that of the first. The feature common to both is that they are admonished [not to officiate], and if they do officiate, they profane [the sacrifice]; so will I also adduce a zar, who is [likewise] admonished, that if he officiates, he profanes. How do we know that he is admonished? If from, ‘that they separate themselves’,4 surely profanation is written in its very context!5 — Rather, from [the text] But a common man [zar] shall not draw nigh unto you.6 But the [argument] can be refuted: the feature common to both is that they were not permitted at the high places?7 Do not say. ‘Let an unclean [priest] prove it’, but say. ‘Let an onen prove it’ As for an onen, [the reason is] because he is forbidden [to partake of] the Second tithe! Then let a [priest] with a blemish prove it.10 And thus the argument revolves, the distinguishing feature of one is not that of the other [and vice versa]; the feature common to both is that they are forbidden, etc. But here too let us refute [the argument]: the feature common to both is that they were not permitted at the high places? To this R. Sama the son of Raba demurred: And who is to tell us that an onen was forbidden at the high places; perhaps he was permitted at the high places?11

R. Mesharshia said: It is inferred a minori from [a priest who] sits. If one who is sitting profanes [the sacrifice] if he officiates, though he may eat [thereof when sitting]; is it not logical that a zar, who may not eat, profanes [it] if he officiates? As for one who is sitting, the reason may be because he is unfit to testify!12 — [The inference is] from a scholar who is sitting.13 [Then refute it thus:] As for the general interdict14 of one who sits the reason may be because such is unfit to testify!15 — One does not refute by a general interdict.16 And should you say that you can refute [thus], [then say that] it is inferred from one who sits and one of these others.17 And how do we know that one who is sitting is fit at the high place?18 —

Scripture saith, To stand before the Lord, to minister to Him:19 before the Lord [one must stand], but not at the high place.20 ONEN. How do we know it? — Because it is written, Neither shall he go out of the Sanctuary, and he shall not profane [the Sanctuary of his
God]: 21 hence if another [priest, when an onen,] does not go out, he does profane [it]. R. Eleazar said, [it is inferred] from this verse: Behold, have they offered [their sin-offering and burnt-offering this day before the Lord]? 22 It was I who offered. Hence it follows that had ‘they’ offered, it would rightly have been burnt. 23 Now, why does not R. Eleazar draw [the inference] from [the text] ‘Neither shall he go out of the Sanctuary’? — He can answer you: Is it then written, but if another goes out, he does profane it? 24 And the other; why does he not draw [the inference] from [the text] ‘Behold, have they offered’? — He holds that it was burnt on account of uncleanness.

The school of R. Ishmael taught: It is inferred a minori from a [priest] with a blemish. If

(1) The flesh of the most sacred sacrifices, such as a sin-offering.
(2) A blemish disqualifies a priest from offering the sacrifice, just as it disqualifies an animal from being sacrificed.
(3) He may not officiate; but an animal cannot become unclean while alive, to render it unfit for a sacrifice. He too disqualifies a sacrifice by officiating.
(4) As on 15b.
(5) Why infer it a minori?
(6) Num. XVIII, 4.
(7) Before the Temple was built sacrifices were offered at the bamoth or high places (v. infra 112a). A priest with a blemish and an unclean priest might not officiate, as in the Temple. but a zar could do so.
(8) He could officiate at the high places, yet if he officiated in the Temple he disqualified the sacrifice.
(9) V. Deut. XXVI, 14.
(10) Who is not so forbidden.
(11) This objection is left unanswered. Hence the argument by inference from a priest with a blemish cannot be sustained.
(12) A witness may not sit when giving his testimony. Of course, this has nothing to do with sacrifices, but in order to refute an argument based on an inference a minori it is sufficient to show that the premise is subject to a particular restriction from which the other is free.
(13) He was permitted to testify sitting.
(14) Lit. ‘name’.
(15) I.e., we find that sitting disqualifies one (though not all) from testifying, but we never find a zar disqualified from testifying.
(16) In the abstract, but rather from the actual person. Since then the argument is based on a scholar who sits, it remains unfreted.
(17) An onen, an unclean priest, or a priest with a blemish.
(18) For otherwise this inference too can be refuted as above.
(20) ‘Before the Lord’ is understood to mean in the Temple.
(21) Lev. XXI, 12. This refers to a High Priest when an onen: he must remain in the sanctuary (for sacrificing). and is assured that he will not profane, i.e., disqualify the sacrifices at which he officiates.
(22) Ibid. X, 19.
(23) A he-goat was sacrificed as a sin-offering on the eighth day of Aaron's consecration (v. Lev. VIII, 33-IX, 3) On that same day Aaron’s sons, Nadab and Abihu, died (Ibid. X, 1-2). and the he-goat, instead of being eaten, was burnt. Moses was angry, and enquired whether the reason was that Aaron’s other sons, Eleazar and Ithamar, had officiated in their bereavement, to which Aaron replied as in the text. R. Eleazar's interpretation of the text as a rhetorical question does not agree with E.V., which makes it a positive statement. His reason is because if it were a positive statement it is superfluous, as Aaron should simply have answered, ‘Behold, there have befallen one such things as these this day,’ as he goes on to say, and which was the real cause of the burning of the sacrifice.
(24) Surely not. Possibly an ordinary priest too does not disqualify the sacrifice, yet Scripture specifically states that a High Priest does not disqualify it, lest it be thought that precisely because his sanctity is greater he does disqualify it.
(25) V. infra 101a. Hence the passage has nothing to do with bereavement.

**Zevachim 16b**

a [priest] with a blemish, who does eat [thereof], profanes [it] if he officiates, it is surely logical that an onen, who may not eat thereof, profanes it by his officiating. In the case of a [priest] with a blemish, the reason may be because they who sacrifice are regarded the same as those which are sacrificed! Then let a zar prove it. As for a zar, the reason may be because there is no remedy for him! Then let a [priest] with a
blemish prove it. And thus the argument revolves: the feature peculiar to one is not that of the other, and the feature which characterizes the other is not that of the first. The feature common to both is that they are admonished [not to officiate], and if they do officiate, they profane it. So do I adduce an onen too who is admonished, and if he officiates, he profanes it. Now, where is he admonished? Shall we say, in the text, ‘Neither shall he go out of the Sanctuary’? Surely profanation is written in that very context! — Rather, [it is inferred] from [the text]. ‘Behold, have they offered’, and he [the school of R. Ishmael] holds that it was burnt on account of bereavement. This argument may be refuted: As for the feature common to both, it is that there is no exception to the general interdict! Then let an unclean [priest] prove it. As for an unclean [priest], the reason is that he defiles [the flesh]? Then let the others prove it. And thus the argument revolves, etc. The feature common to both is that they are admonished, etc. Yet let us refute it [thus]: As for their common feature, it is that there is no exception to the general [interdict] in favor of a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice? —

The interdicts of uncleanness is nevertheless raised. R. Mesharshia said: It is inferred a minori from [a priest] who sits: if a priest, who eats sitting, profanes [the sacrifice] if he officiates whilst sitting, it is surely logical that an onen, who may not eat [thereof], profanes [the sacrifice] by his officiating. As for one who sits, the reason may be because he is unfit to testify? —

[The argument is] from a scholar who sits. [Then refute it thus:] As for the interdict of sitting, that may be because such is unfit to testify? — One does not refute from the [general] interdict of sitting. And should you say that you can refute thus, [say that] it is inferred from one who sits and one of these others.

[All SACRIFICES WHOSE BLOOD WAS CAUGHT BY...] AN ONEN... ARE DISQUALIFIED. Rabbah said: They learned this only of a private sacrifice, but in the case of a public sacrifice it is accepted. [this being inferred] from uncleanness, a minori: if the general interdict of uncleanness was not raised in favor of a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice, yet it was permitted to an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice; then bereavement, whose general interdict was raised in favor of a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice, is necessarily permitted to an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice. To this Raba b. Aihai demurred: Let [the interdict of] bereavement not be raised in favor of a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice, a minori: if [the interdict of] uncleanness was not raised in favor of a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice, though it was raised for an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice; is it not logical that [the interdict of] bereavement, which was not raised for an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice, shall not be raised for a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice? [Or. argue thus:] Let uncleanness be permitted to a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice, a minori: if bereavement, which is not permitted to an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice, is permitted to a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice; is it not logical that [the interdict of] bereavement, which was not permitted to an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice, shall not be raised for a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice? [Or. argue thus:] Let uncleanness be permitted to a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice, a minori: if bereavement, which is not permitted to an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice, is permitted to a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice; is it not logical that [the interdict of] bereavement, which is not permitted to an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice, shall not be raised for a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice? Again. [argue thus:] let uncleanness be permitted to an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice, a minori: If bereavement is not permitted to an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice, a minori: If bereavement is not permitted to an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice, though it is permitted to a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice; then uncleanness which is not permitted to a High Priest in the case of a private sacrifice, is surely not permitted to an ordinary priest in the case of a public sacrifice?
Mnemonic: 15 Let it not be permitted; let it not be permitted; bereavement and uncleanness, private sacrifice; private sacrifice; public sacrifice.]

(1) V. supra a, p. 81 4 n.6.
(2) Under no circumstances can he become fit to officiate. An onen however, will be fit on the next day.
(3) He may become whole again.
(4) If it is so interpreted as to make it bear upon an ordinary priest, there is no need for the inference a minori.
(5) Nevertheless the text itself does not prove that if an onen officiates the sacrifice is disqualified. Moses may have meant: Perhaps you transgressed the law by sacrificing it in bereavement, and having done so, you mistakenly thought that it is now disqualified (Rashi, as elaborated by Tosaf.).
(6) Lit., ‘it was not permitted out of its general rule’. There is no exception to the general law that a zar and a blemished priest may not officiate; but a High Priest is excepted from the law interdicting an onen to officiate.
(7) There is an exception in his case, for if the majority of the people are unclean on the eve of Passover, they offer the Paschal lamb in their unclean state.
(8) As opposed to a communal sacrifice. The Passover-offering is accounted as the latter, since the whole nation had to offer one.
(9) Lit., ‘name’.
(10) There is an exception to the general interdict of uncleanness, viz. 3 in the case of the Paschal offering.
(11) Cf. supra a for notes.
(12) Text as emended by Sh. M. Cur. edd. Raba.
(13) One offered on behalf of the whole community.
(14) This is the technical term to denote that it is made valid (generally, in virtue of the head-plate worn by the High Priest).
(15) For the various arguments just adduced.
(16) The point of all these objections is this: if the Scriptural law can be qualified by logical arguments, these can easily be reversed and precisely the opposite conclusions drawn.

Zevachim 17a

But you can refute it thus, and you can refute it thus; 1 therefore let each one remain in its place. 2

TEBUL YOM. Whence do we know it? — For it was taught, R. Simai said: Where is the allusion that if a tebul yom officiates he profanes [the sacrifice]? In the text, They [the priests] shall be holy . and not profane: 3 since this cannot refer to an unclean [priest], for [his prohibition] is deduced from, That they separate themselves, 4 apply it to a tebul yom. 5 Say, apply it to the making of a baldness and the shaving off of the corners of the beard? 6 — Since a tebul yom is liable to death for officiating (and how do we know that? because we deduce [similarity of law] from the use of ‘profanation’ here and in the case of terumah. 7 [it follows that] he who is unfit [to partake of] terumah profanes the service [of sacrifice], whereas he who is not unfit [to partake of] terumah does not profane the service. Rabbah said: Why must the Divine Law enumerate an unclean priest, a tebul yom, and one who lacks atonement? 8 — They are all necessary. For had the Divine Law written [the law for] an unclean priest [only, I would say that he disqualifies the sacrifice] because he defiles. 9 [If the law were written] with reference to a tebul yom, one who lacks atonement could not be derived from it, seeing that [the former] is disqualified [to partake of terumah. 10 If it were written] with reference to one who lacks atonement, a tebul yom could not be learnt from it, seeing that [the former] lacks a [positive] act .11 Now [one cannot be derived from one [other], [but] let one be derived from two? 12 — In which should the Divine Law not write [this ruling]? Should it not write [it] with respect to one who lacks atonement, a tebul yom could not be learnt from it, seeing that [the former] lacks a [positive] act? 13 Rather, let not the Divine Law write it of a tebul yom, which could be inferred from the others. For how will you refute [the analogy]: as for these others, [the reason is that] they are wanting in a [positive] act? 13 [This would be no refutation] for after all, its 14 uncleanness is but slight! 15

(1) You can argue either way.
(2) Assume each law to be without exceptions. Thus, when Scripture permits bereavement to a High Priest, it applies to both private and public sacrifices, while it is forbidden to an ordinary priest likewise in the case of both. Again, when uncleanness is forbidden in the case of a private sacrifice, the interdict applies to the High Priest also; on the other hand, when it is permitted in the case of public sacrifices, that applies to an ordinary priest too.

(3) Lev. XXI, 6. The passage treats of defilement, among other things.

(4) Ibid. XXII, 2; that verse forbids an unclean priest to officiate.

(5) As intimating that he too must not officiate, and if he does, he ‘profanes’, i.e., disqualifies the sacrifice.

(6) Which is mentioned in the preceding verse, ibid. XXI, 5. Perhaps Scripture teaches that a priest who transgresses these interdicts ‘profanes’ (disqualifies) a sacrifice if he officiates.

(7) V. Glos. The allusion is to Lev. XXII,9: They shall therefore keep My charge. (this refers to terumah, as the whole passage shows) lest they bear sin for it, and die therein, if they profane it. Since ‘profanation’ (i.e., defilement) is punishable by death there, the same holds good here. It also follows conversely that the present passage can apply only to such as ‘profane’ terumah. — By ‘death’ is meant death at the hands of heaven, not actually capital punishment by man.

(8) These are similar to one another, and therefore only one need be mentioned, and the others would follow by analogy.

(9) Either the flesh of the sacrifice, or another person by contact.

(10) Which the latter is not.

(11) Viz., the offering of a sacrifice. But a tebul yom merely has to wait for sunset.

(12) Let Scripture write the law with reference to two of these, and the third could be derived by analogy.

(13) The unclean priest must take a ritual bath.

(14) Reading as Rashi, which is preferable to cur. edd. ‘their’.

(15) The uncleanness of one who lacks atonement is slighter than that of a tebul yom, since the latter must still wait for sunset, but not the former. Hence the question remains, why must Scripture indicate the law for all three?

— He holds that a zab lacking atonement is as a zab.1 Now, whether a zab lacking atonement is as a zab, is dependent on Tannaim. For it was taught: If an onen or one lacking atonement burns it,2 it is fit.3 Joseph the Babylonian said: If an onen [burns it], it is fit, [but] if one who lacks atonement burns it, it is unfit. Now surely they disagree in this: one Master holds that a zab lacking atonement is as a zab,4 while the other Master holds that he is not as a zab!5 — No. All agree that he is as a zab, but here they disagree in the following: For it is written, And the clean person shall sprinkle upon the unclean,6 whence it follows that he is unclean, thus teaching that a tebul yom is fit [to officiate] at the [red] heifer.7 Now, one Master holds: This applies to every form of uncleanness mentioned in the Torah;3 while the other Master holds that it applies to the uncleanness dealt with in this chapter only.8 Therefore an onen and a tebul yom rendered [originally] unclean through a [dead] reptile,9 who are less stringent, are derived a minori from a tebul yom rendered [originally] unclean through a dead body. But a zab who lacks atonement is not [thus derived], since he is more stringent, as his uncleanness proceeds from his own body.

ONE LACKING THE [PRIESTLY] VESTMENTS. Whence do we know it? — Said R. Abbahu in R. Johanan's name, and some derive ultimately [the teaching] from R. Eleazar the son of R. Simeon: Because Scripture saith, And thou shalt gird them with girdles, Aaron and his sons, and bind head-tires on them; and they shall have the priesthood by a perpetual statute:10 When wearing their [appointed] garments, they are invested with their priesthood; when not wearing their garments, they are not invested with their priesthood. Now, is this derived from the verse quoted? Surely it is derived from elsewhere? For it was taught: How do we know that if one who had drank wine officiates, he profanes [the sacrifices]? Because it is written, Drink no wine nor strong wine....that ye may put difference between the holy and the profane.12 How do we know [the same of] one who lacks [priestly] vestments and [of] one who had not washed his hands and feet?
(1) Until he brings his sacrifice, not only must he not partake of the flesh of sacrifices, but he even incurs kareth for doing so just as a zab who has not had his ritual bath at all. Similarly, he defiles the flesh just as a zab does. (Rashi. Tosaf explains it differently.) Hence his uncleanness is not less at all. — Though a zab is mentioned, the same applies to a leper too.

(2) Sc. the red heifer, v. Num. XIX.

(3) Because the red heifer does not possess the sanctity of a sacrifice, but only of anything which is dedicated for general Temple use, technically called 'the sacred objects of the Temple repair'. An onen and one lacking atonement are disqualified to officiate at real sacrifices only.

(4) Hence his service is unfit, because Scripture specifies ‘a man that is clean’ (v. 9).

(5) Hence he is clean.

(6) Ibid. 19.

(7) ‘The clean person’ is superfluous, as the preceding verse states ‘and a clean person shall take hyssop’, etc. The repetition is understood to indicate that even if his cleanness is not absolute, but relative only, he is fit, and we do find in Lev. XIV, 8 that a tebul yom is designated ‘clean’: And he shall bath himself in water and be clean.

(8) Including a tebul yom who had been a zab. He still lacks atonement, and thus Scripture teaches that although such is unfit elsewhere, an exception is made in the case of the red heifer.

(9) Viz., that caused by contact with a dead body.

(10) Bah. emends omitting onen: therefore a tebul yom rendered (originally) unclean through a sherez or through carrion.

(11) Ex. XXIX, 9.

(12) Lev. X, 9f. This is interpreted as meaning that the officiating of such profanes, i.e., invalidates the sacrifice.

Because ‘statute’ is written in connection with each, to serve as a gezerah shawah!1 — If [it were derived] from that verse, I would argue that it applies [only] to a service for which a zar is liable to death; but as for a service for which a zar is not liable to death, I would say that it is not so, hence we are informed [that it is not so]. We have thus found [it in the case of] one who lacks [priestly] vestments; how do we know it of one who has drunk wine?2 - We deduce it from the word ‘statute’ [written here and] in the case of one who lacks vestments. But the Tanna deduces it from the text, That ye may put a difference, etc.? — That is before he has established the gezerah shawah. But the Tanna learns [the law for] one who lacks vestments from that of one who drank wine?’4 — This is what he means: How do we know that no distinction is drawn between one who lacks vestments and one who drank wine or who did not wash his hands and feet? Because ‘statute’ is written in respect of each, to serve as a gezerah shawah.5 Then what is the need of ‘that ye may put difference’, etc.?6 — To teach the practice of Rab. For Rab would not appoint an interpreter from one Festival day to the next, on account of drinking.7 But still, is it deduced from this text? Surely it is deduced from elsewhere. viz., And the sons of Aaron the priest shall put [fire upon the altar].a [which implies,] in his priestly state;b this teaches that if a High Priest donned the vestments of an ordinary priest and officiated, his service is unfit? —

If [we made the deduction] from the earlier text, I would argue that it applies only to a service which is essential for atonement, but not to a service which is not essential for atonement.10 But still, is it deduced from this text? Surely it is deduced from elsewhere, viz., And Aaron's sons, the priests, shall lay the pieces, etc.11 [which intimates,] ‘the priests’ in their priestly state, whence we learn that if an ordinary priest donned the vestments of a High Priest and officiated, his service is unfit? —

Our Rabbis taught: If [the priestly vestments] trailed [on the floor], or did not reach [the floor] or were threadbare, and [the priest] officiated [in them], his service is valid. But if he put on two pairs of breeches, two girdles, or if one [garment] was wanting, or if there
was one too many, or if he had a plaster on a
wound in his flesh, or if [his garments] were

(1) V. Glos. — In the present context: it shall be a
statute for ever; the verse for one lacking
atonement has been quoted in the text; the
washing of the hands and feet: And it shall be a
statute for ever to them (Ex. XXX, 21). — The use
of the same word in connection with all three
teaches that the same law applies to all.
(2) Scripture says, Drink no wine . . when ye go
into the tent of meetings, that ye die not. The
Talmud interprets this as referring to a service
which if performed by those unfit to do so involves
death, viz., sprinkling the blood, burning the fats,
and making the libations of water or wine. Now,
the conditions of the various disqualifications,
such as officiating without priestly vestments or
without having washed the hands and feet, are
deduced from those of a zar: where a zar incurs a
penalty, officiating without vestments, etc. incurs a
penalty. Hence as far as the present verse is
concerned, since death is mentioned, I would think
that the sacrifice is disqualified only where the
death penalty is incurred.
(3) That he disqualifies the sacrifice even by
officiating in a service for which he does not incur
the death penalty.
(4) Not vice versa, as here.
(5) But in fact the law of one who has drunk wine
is learned from that of one who lacks vestments.
(6) Since we learn by a gezerah shawah that one
who drank wine ‘profanes’ (disqualifies) the
sacrifice, this text adds nothing.
(7) The Rabbis gave their public addresses, in the
course of which they taught the law, through the
medium of an interpreter. Now, once Rab had
ushered in the festival and had partaken of the
meal, eating and drinking, he would not appoint
an interpreter, i.e., he would not give such an
address, until the following day, when the effect of
the wine would have worn off. He learnt this from
the present verse, ‘that ye may put a difference
between the holy and the profane’, which he
interpreted to mean that one must not drink
before he comes to teach the law, whereby the
difference between the holy and the profane is
taught.
(8) Lev. I,7
(9) Wearing the priestly vestments.
(10) Such as putting the fire upon the altar. Hence
‘the priest’ teaches that even for this service he
must be in his priestly state. — Though the
difficulty was apparently why the former verse
was required, the answer shows that the real
difficulty was why Scripture added ‘the priest’ in
the verse now quoted.

(12) E.g., if a High Priest wears the vestments of an
ordinary priest.

besmeared or torn, and he officiated, his
service is invalid. Rab Judah said in Samuel’s
name: Trailing [garments] are fit; [garments
which] do not reach [the pavement] are unfit.
But it was taught, If they do not reach [the
ground] they are fit? —

Said Rami b. Hama, There is no difficulty:
The latter means where he hitches them up
by the girdle;1 the former, where from the
very outset they are not long enough.2 Rab
said: Either [garments] are invalid. R. Huna
visited Argiza.3 His host’s son put a difficulty
to him: Did then Samuel say, Trailing
[garments] are fit, while those which do not reach [the
ground] are unfit? but it was
taught, If they do not reach [the ground] they
are fit? — Said he to him, Disregard that, for
Rami b. Hama has answered it. But the
difficulty is according to Rab. And should you
answer, What is meant by ‘trailing’? Those
which are hitched up by the girdle, for the
girdle cuts off [the length],4 but then there is a
difficulty about garments which do not reach? —

Said R. Zera, Rab learns [both clauses as
one]: Trailing [garments] which are hitched
up by a girdle are fit. R. Jeremiah of Difti
said: As to trailing [garments] which he did
not lift up, there is a controversy of Tannaim.
For it was taught: [Thou shalt make thee
twisted cords] upon the four corners of thy
covering:5 ‘four’ [intimates,] but not three.6
Yet perhaps that is not so, but rather, ‘four’
[intimates,] but not five?7 When it says,
Wherewith thou coverest thyself a five-
cornered [garment] is alluded to.8 Hence, how
can I interpret ‘four’? as intimating four but
not three. Yet perhaps that is not so, but rather, ‘four’
[intimates,] but not five? When it says,
Wherewith thou coverest thyself a five-
cornered [garment] is alluded to. Hence, how
can I interpret ‘four’? as intimating four but
not three. Now, why do you include a five-
cornered garment and exclude a three
cornered one? I include a five-cornered one,
because five includes four, and I exclude a
three-cornered one, because three does not
include four. Now, another [Baraitha] taught: ‘Upon the four corners of thy covering’: four but not three, four but not five. Surely, they disagree in this: one Master holds: The additional [corner] is counted as existent. While the other Master holds: It is as non-existent? — No: all agree that it is as existent, but here it is different, because Scripture includes [a five-cornered garment in the phrase] ‘Wherewith thou coverest thyself’. And the other? how does he utilize this phrase. ‘Wherewith thou coverest thyself’? — He requires it for what was taught: ‘That ye may look upon it’; this excludes night attire. Yet perhaps that is not so, but rather it excludes a blind man's garment? When it says, ‘wherewith thou coverest thyself’, lo, a blind man’s garment is alluded to. Hence, how can I interpret, ‘that ye may look upon it’? As excluding night attire. Now, why do you include a blind man’s garment and exclude a night garment? I include a blind man’s garment because it can be seen by others, while I exclude night attire, because it is not seen by others. And the other? — He deduces it from ‘wherewith’. And the other?—He does not interpret ‘wherewith’ [as having a separate significance].

Our Rabbis taught: [And the priest shall put on his garment of] bad: this teaches that they [his garments] must be of linen; ‘bad’ implies that they must be new; ‘bad’ implies that they must be of twisted thread; ‘bad’ implies that the thread must be six-fold; ‘bad’ implies that secular garments must not be worn with them. Abaye said to R. Joseph: As for saying, "bad" implies that they must be of linen,’ it is well, for he informs us this: only of linen, but not of anything else. But when he says, "bad" implies that they must be new,’ [does it mean] only new but not threadbare? Surely it was taught : Threadbare [garments] are fit! — Said he to him: And according to your reasoning, [when he says] "bad" implies that the thread must be six-fold,’ [yet surely] ‘bad’ implies each [thread] separately? Rather, this is what he means: the garments which it is stated are to be ‘bad’, must be of linen, new, of twisted thread, and of six-fold thread: Some of these [provisions] are recommendations [only], while others are indispensable. How do you know that ‘bad’ means flax [linen]? —

Said R. Joseph son of R. Hanina: [It connotes] that which comes up from the ground in separate stalks. Say that it means wool? — Wool splits. But flax too splits? — It splits through beating. Rabina said, [It is deduced] from the following: They shall have linen tires upon their heads, and shall have linen breeches upon their loins; they shall not gird themselves with [anything that causes] sweat [bayaza]. Said R. Ashi to Rabina: Then how did we know this before Ezekiel came? — Then according to your reasoning, when R. Hisda said: We did not learn this from the Torah of Moses our Teacher, but we learnt it from Ezekiel the son of Buzi: No alien, uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh [shall enter into My sanctuary]; whence did we know it until Ezekiel came? But indeed it was a tradition, and Ezekiel came and gave it a support in Scripture; so this too was a tradition, etc. What does ‘they shall not gird themselves with [anything that causes] sweat’ mean? — Said Abaye: They shall not gird themselves in the place where they sweat. As it was taught: When they gird themselves, they must do so neither below their loins nor above their elbows, but

(1) But they are long enough to reach the ground.
(2) Lit., ‘they are not present at all’.
(3) Obermeyer op. cit. p. 144 conjectures that this was a place in the district of Be Ketil by the ‘Jewish Canal’ which branched out of the left bank of the Tigris and ran parallel to it. He suggests however in note 1 a.l. that Ṭ考える is an error here for Ṭ תיקנה Hira in the south of Babylon, which fell within R. Huna’s jurisdiction, whereas Argiza was in the distant north, and he had no connection with same.
(4) Only then does the Tanna of the Baraitha rule that they are fit, but not if they are actually trailing on the ground.
(5) Deut. XXII, 12.
(6) A garment of three corners only, the fourth being rounded, so that it is not a corner, is exempt.
(7) E.g., if one corner is cut away, leaving two in its stead.
(8) Ibid.
(9) For this is really superfluous and therefore interpreted as an extension, to include garments with more than four corners.
(10) Hence it is not four-cornered, and therefore exempt.
(11) And the same principle would apply to priestly garments that trail: one holds that the superfluous length is as non-existent, and so they are fit; while the other maintains that they are as existent, and therefore unfit.
(12) Num. XV, 39. This refers to a fringed garment.
(13) Which is not looked upon.
(14) Who utilizes ‘wherewith thou coverest thyself’ to include a five-cornered garment: whence does he learn the present law?
(15) Which he regards as an extension.
(16) E.V. ‘linen. Lev. VI,3 et passim.
(17) Bad is derived from badad, to be alone, separate.
(18) Where two stalks do not come out of one root.
(19) For each thread grows separately on the sheep’s back.
(20) On the animal the threads split up.
(21) Before it is woven into linen.
(22) But not naturally of its own accord.
(23) Ezek. XLIV. 18.
(24) That an uncircumcised priest disqualifies the service, infra 22b.
(25) Ibid.9
(26) The Heb. bayaza is connected with ze’ah, (sweat), but its exact meaning in this verse is not clear.
(27) Where flesh folds over flesh and causes perspiration.
(28) As these hung naturally down.

Zevachim 19a

[No:] a small belt is different, because it is of [some] account.14 Another version states it thus: R. Judah the son of R. Hiiya said: They learnt this only of a reed, but a small belt constitutes an excess garment.8 But R. Johanan said: They ruled [that] excess garments [disqualify] only [when they are worn] where garments are worn; but if not where garments are worn, they are not an excess. Yet deduce [that it disqualifies] on account of an interposition? — It is on his left hand,10 or even on the right, but not in the place of service.11 Now this disagrees with Raba, for Raba said in R. Hisda’s name: In the place of garments even a single thread interposes; but [what is] not in the place of garments, if three [fingerbreadths] square, it interposes; if less than this, it does not interpose. Now he certainly disagrees with R. Johanan;12 but are we to say that he disagrees with R. Judah the son of R. Hiiya?13 —

[No, for] a small belt is different, since it is of [some] account. Now according to R. Johanan, why particularly [specify] a reed? let him mention a small belt? — He informs us en passant that a reed heals.

Raba asked: What if a wind entered through his garment?15 Do we require [the garment to be] on his flesh, which [condition] is now absent ; or perhaps, this is the normal mode of wearing? Further, is vermin an
interposition? There is no question where it is dead, for it certainly interposes. But what if it is alive? Do we say. Since it moves to and fro, it is natural, and does not interpose; or perhaps it does interpose, since he objects to it? Does earth interpose? —

Earth certainly interposes!16 — Rather [the question is] what about dust of earth? Does [the space between the sleeves and] the armpit interpose?17 do we require [it to be] on his flesh, which [condition] is absent; or perhaps this is the normal mode of wearing? What if he thrust his hand into his bosom? does his body18 interpose or not? Does a thread interpose? — A thread certainly interposes — Rather [the question is] what about a hanging thread.19 Mar the son of R. Ashi asked: What if one's hair entered beneath his garment?20 is his hair as [part of] his body, or is it not as his body? R. Zera asked: Do the tefillin21 interpose? There is no question on the view that night is not the time for tefillin,22 for since they interpose at night,23 they interpose by day too. The question is raised only on the view that night is the time for tefillin. What then? Does a precept which is incumbent upon the body interpose or not? Now this question travelled about until it reached R. Ammi. Said he to him [the questioner]: We have an explicit teaching that tefillin interpose. An objection is raised: Priests engaged in their [sacrificial] service, Levites on their dais and Israelites during their ma'amad are exempt from prayer and tefillin. Surely that means that if they do put them on, they do not interpose? —

No: [it means that] if they do put them on, they do interpose. If so, [can you say,] they are exempt? Surely he should state, they are forbidden [to don them]? — Since there are the Levites and the Israelites, of whom he cannot teach, ‘they are forbidden,’27 he therefore teaches, They are exempt. But it was taught: If he put them on, they do not interpose? —

There is no difficulty; one refers to [the tefillin of] the hand,28 the other to that of the head. Wherein does that of the hand differ? because it is written, [And the priest shall put on his linen garment, and his linen breeches] shall he put upon his flesh,29 which implies that nothing may interpose between it and his flesh; then with respect to that of the head too it is written, And thou shalt set the miter upon his head?30 —

It was taught: His hair was visible between the head-plate and the miter.

(1) Where these naturally touch the body.
(2) Or, Yezdyird, a Persian king.
(3) Ex. XIX, 6. Hence you must wear your girdle like priests, and not so high.
(4) Isa. XLIX, 23.
(5) This is a technical designation for all places outside the Temple. — The reference is to the Sabbath, when the Rabbis forbade healing. Nevertheless they permitted this in the Temple when the priest is officiating at the sacrifice, as it is indecorous for his wound to be exposed then.
(6) The act constitutes making a wound, which is forbidden.
(7) Used as a bandage.
(8) Which is forbidden, supra 18a.
(9) Nothing may interpose between the priest’s hand and the sacrifice, when he has to handle it.
(10) Which he does not use for the purpose.
(11) Not on the part of the hand which he needs for service.
(12) For R. Johanan holds that it never interposes save in the place of garments.
(13) For he rules that a small belt is an interposition, and this is less than three fingerbreadths square.
(14) A rag less than that size is of no account, whereas a belt, being made up into an article, is of some account.
(15) And blew it away from immediate contact with his body.
(16) Surely there cannot be a question about this.
(17) If the garment is loosely cut with broad sleeves.
(18) I.e., the hand, which now comes between the body and the garment.
(19) Hanging from the garment itself.
(20) If the hair of the head grew so long that it fell within the garment.
(21) V. Glos.
(22) I.e., that there is no obligation to wear these at night. The reference is to Deut. VI, 8 and it is
disputed in ‘Erub. 96a whether this applies to night as well as to daytime.
(23) As there is no need to wear them then, they are definitely superfluous and so constitute an interposition.
(24) Engaged in singing the Temple hymns.
(25) A body of Israelites, representing the people, stood (ma’amad — ‘amad standing) in the Temple court during the sacrificing of the daily burnt-offering (v. Ta’an. 26a).
(26) The ‘Eighteen Benedictions’ which were recited daily, and which constituted the Prayer par excellence.
(27) For they are certainly permitted to put them on, since they do not officiate at the actual sacrificing.
(28) That interposes.
(29) Lev. VI, 3.
(30) Ex. XXIX, 6.

ZEVOCHIM - 2a-27b

and there he laid the tefillin.1

ONE LACKING IN SACRIFICIAL ATONEMENT. Whence do we know it? — Said R. Huna, Scripture saith, And the priest shall make atonement for her, and she shall be clean:2 ‘She shall be clean’ proves that she is unclean [before atonement is made for her].3

AND ONE WHO HAD NOT WASHED HIS HANDS OR HIS FEET. [The implication of] ‘statute’ is derived from ‘statute’ written in connection with one who lacked his priestly vestments.4

Our Rabbis taught: If a High Priest did not perform immersion or did not sanctify [himself] between the changing of robes and between the services,5 and he officiated, his service is valid. But the service of both a High Priest or an ordinary priest who officiated without the matutinal sanctification of their hands and feet is invalid. Said R. Assi to R. Johanan: Consider: The five immersions and the ten sanctifications are scriptural, and ‘statute’ is written in connection with them; then let them be indispensable?6 — Said he to him: Scripture saith, And put them on:7 the putting on [of the priestly vestments] is

indispensable, but nothing else is indispensable.10 [At that] his face lit up.11 Said he to him: I have written you a waw on a tree-trunk:12 [for] if that is so, [the sanctifications] of the morning too [should not be indispensable]:13 —

Said Hezekiah, Scripture saith, And it shall be a statute for ever to them, even to him and to his seed throughout their generations:14 that which is indispensable for ‘his seed’ is indispensable for himself, and that which is not indispensable for ‘his seed’ is not indispensable for himself.15 R. Jonathan said, He deduced it from this: That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash their hands and their feet thereat:16 that which is indispensable in the case of his sons is indispensable in his own case; while that which is not indispensable in the case of his sons is not indispensable in his own case. Why does R. Jonathan not deduce it from the text quoted by Hezekiah? — He can answer you: That is written [to show that the law holds good] for all generations.17 And the other? why did he not deduce it from this text? — He requires it for R. Jose son of R. Hanina’s [ruling]. For R. Jose son of R. Hanina said: You may not wash in a laver which does not contain sufficient [water] for the sanctifications of four priests, for it says. That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash their hands and their feet thereat.18

Our Rabbis taught: How is the precept of ‘sanctification’ fulfilled? [The priest] places his right hand on his right foot and his left hand on his left foot, and sanctifies them.19 R. Jose son of Judah said: He places his both hands on each other and on his two feet lying on each other, and sanctifies them. Said they to him: You have made it too hard, for it is impossible to do it thus. Surely they speak rightly to him? — Said R. Joseph: His colleague assists him.20 Wherein do they differ? —

Said Abaye: They disagree in respect of standing by being supported.21 Said R. Sima
the son of R. Ashi to Rabina: And let him indeed sit and perform his sanctifications? — Scripture saith, [And thou shalt anoint Aaron and his sons, and sanctify them,] that they my minister,22 and the ministration must be done standing.23

Our Rabbis taught: if [the priest] sanctified his hands and feet by day, he need not sanctify [them] at night; [if he sanctified them] at night, he must sanctify [them] by day. This is Rabbi's view, for Rabbi maintained: The passing of the night is effective in respect of the sanctification of hands and feet.24 R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon said: The passing of the night is not effective in respect of the sanctification of hands and feet. Another [Baraita] taught: If [a priest] was standing and offering [the fats] on the altar throughout the night, at dawn he needs sanctification of hands and feet.25 Now, both are necessary. For if we were informed of the first [Baraita], [I would argue that] Rabbi ruled thus only there, [the circumstances being] that there had been an interval between one service and another;26 but here that there was no interval, I would say that Rabbi agrees with R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon. While if we were informed of the latter [Baraita], I would argue that here only does R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon rule thus, but in the former he agrees with Rabbi. Hence they are both necessary. What is Rabbi's reason? — Because it is written, When they approach [the altar to minister].27 What is R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon's reason? — Because it is written, When they enter [into the tent of meeting, they shall wash with water].28 And the other too? surely it is written, When they enter! — If 'when they enter' were written and not 'when they approach'. I would say that [they must wash] even for a mere entrance.29 'For a mere entrance'! surely it is written, 'to minister'? — Rather, 'when they approach' is required for R. Aha son of Jacob's [ruling]. For R. Aha son of Jacob said: All agree with respect to the second ‘sanctification,’ that [the priest] performs this sanctification when he is clothed,30 for Scripture saith, ‘or when they approach’: he who lacks nothing but the approach [washes his hands and feet]; hence he who has yet to clothe himself and then approach is excluded. What is the purpose of, to cause an offering made by fire to smoke?31 —

(1) Thus the tefillin did not actually interpose.
(2) Lev. XII, 8.
(3) Although she had already performed her ritual ablutions. Thus Scripture designates even such as unclean, and he is disqualified in the same way as an unclean priest is disqualified.
(4) V. supra 17b, 18a.
(5) This is the technical designation for washing the hands and feet at the laver.
(6) On the Day of Atonement the High Priest performed five services, in the course of which he changed his robes several times. Each change was to be preceded by tebillah (immersion) and sanctification; v. Yoma 32a.
(7) Five for the hand and five for the feet.
(8) So that the service should be invalid.
(9) Lev. XVI, 4.
(10) The verse reads: He shall pull on the holy linen tunic, and he shall have the linen breeches... and shall be girded with the linen girdle, and with the linen miter shall he be attired... and he shall bathe his flesh in water, and put them on. Thus ‘put them on’ is emphasized by being repeated in the verse, to teach that that only is indispensable, but the other thing mentioned, viz bathing, is not indispensable.
(11) R. Assi was very pleased with the answer.
(12) On which, owing to its rough lined surface the letter is not visible. This is an idiom for idle talk.
(13) On the Day of Atonement.
(14) Ex. XXX, 21.
(15) ‘His seed’ denotes an ordinary priest, while ‘statute’ implies indispensability, as stated above. Hence the sanctification of the morning which is normally indispensable for an ordinary priest is indispensable for a High Priest on
the Day of Atonement. 
(16) Ex. XL, 31.
(17) But not to provide an analogy.
(18) ‘His sons’ implies at least two; hence it must be big enough for four.
(19) So that he washes his hands and feet simultaneously, by pouring water on each pair with his fore hand.
(20) So that he does not fall.
(21) Lit., ‘a standing from the side’. The priest must stand when performing these ablutions, and if R. Jose b. R. Judah’s method is adopted, he can stand only by being supported. He holds that that is sufficient, while the first Tanna holds that that is not called standing.
(22) Ex. XXX, 30.
(23) ‘Sanctify them’ is interpreted as in the present discussion. Thus the ablutions are made analogous to ministrations, and as the latter must be done standing, the former too must be done standing.
(24) As soon as one night passes, the previous sanctification ceases to count.
(25) As long as he is continuously engaged thus.
(26) For in the first Baraitha it is not stated that the priest was actually engaged in officiating all night.
(27) Ex. XXX, 20. Each time the priest ‘approaches’ the altar he must wash his hands. At daybreak there is a new approach since the altar has to be freshly arranged with new wood; therefore he must wash his hands again.
(28) Ibid. As long as he is engaged on the sacrifices there is no new entry.
(29) Even in the same day.
(30) Without officiating.
(31) The changing of the garments by the High Priest on the Day of Atonement was preceded by immersion, and the immersion was preceded and followed by ‘sanctification’. All agree that the second ‘sanctification’ is done after the priest has donned the robes into which he was to change. v. Yoma 32b.
(32) Ibid. That too is enumerated as one of the purposes for which the priest must wash. But it is surely obvious, as it is included in the clause, ‘when they approach the altar to minister’.

When R. Dimi came, he said in R. Johanan’s name: Ilfa asked: On the view that the passing of the night is of no effect in respect of the sanctification of hands and feet, does the water of the laver become unfit? Do we say: For what purpose is this [water]? for the sanctification of hands and feet; but the sanctification of hands and feet itself is not nullified by the passing of the night. Or perhaps, since [the water] is sanctified in a service vessel, it becomes unfit? When Rabin came, he said in R. Jeremiah’s name, who reported R. Ammi’s statement in R. Johanan’s name: Ilfa subsequently resolved [this problem]: there is the same controversy about the one as about the other. Said R. Isaac b. Bisma to him:4 Rabbi, do you say thus? Thus did R. Ammi say, reporting R. Johanan in Ilfa’s name: If the laver was not lowered [into the well] in the evening,6 [the priest] performs his sanctifications in it for the service of the night,7 but on the morrow he does not perform his ablutions. Now we questioned this: ‘on the morrow he does not perform his ablutions’ because he does not need [further] sanctification; or perhaps [the water] has become unfit through the passing of the night?8 Now, we could not resolve this, and yet to the Master it is clear? —

Come and hear: Ben Kattin made twelve spouts for the laver; he also made wheels [pulleys] for the laver, so that its water should not become unfit through the passing of the night.9 Surely this is [even] according to R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon?10 — No: it represents Rabbi’s view. Yet surely, since the first clause is according to R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, the second clause too is according to R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon. For the first clauses teaches: [The High Priest then] came to his bullock,11 which bullock stood between the ulam [porch]12 and the altar, its head toward the south and its face toward the west,13 while the priest stood in the east and faced west. Now, whom do you know to maintain that between the ulam and the altar was north?14 R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon. For it was taught: What is the north? From

Zevachim 20a

You might say: This [sanctification] is required only for a service which is indispensable to atonement, but not for a service which is not indispensable to atonement; hence [this clause] informs us otherwise.
the northern wall of the altar to the northern wall of the Temple court and the whole of the space opposite the altar is north: that is R. Jose son of R. Judah's view. R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon added the space between the ulam and the altar.\textsuperscript{15} Rabbi adds the place where the priests and lay-Israelites tread. But all agree that the place on the inside of the knives chamber\textsuperscript{16} is unfit!\textsuperscript{17} —

Now, is it reasonable that [the first Baraitha] represents R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon's view and not Rabbi's? Seeing that Rabbi goes further than R. Jose son of R. Judah, does he not go further than R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon's [definition]?\textsuperscript{18} — This is what we mean: If you think that it agrees with Rabbi, let him station it in the place where the feet of the priests and the lay-Israelites tread! — What then? it is according to R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon? Then let him station it [in the space] from the northern wall of the altar to the northern wall of the Temple court? What then must you answer? [that it was placed in the position indicated] on account of the High Priest's fatigue;\textsuperscript{19} so on this view too,\textsuperscript{20} it was on account of the High Priest's weakness. R. Johanan said: If [the priest] sanctified his hands and feet for the removal of the ashes,\textsuperscript{21} he need not sanctify [them again] on the morrow,\textsuperscript{22} because he has already done so at the beginning of the service. According to whom? if according to Rabbi, surely he said that the passing of the night renders it null! if according to R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, surely he said, He need not sanctify himself [again] even for ten days! —

Said Abaye: In truth it is according to Rabbi, and [the nullifying effect of] the passing of the night is [merely] Rabbinical, and he admits that the passing of the night does not nullify from cock-crow until morning. Raba said: in truth it agrees with R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, but R. Johanan accepted his view [only] in respect of the beginning of the service, but not in respect of the end of the service.\textsuperscript{23} An objection is raised: When his brother priests saw him descend,\textsuperscript{24} they quickly ran and sanctified their hands and feet at the laver.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{(1)} For ‘to cause an offering made by fire to smoke’ refers to the burning of the limbs on the altar, and that is not really essential to the efficacy or validity of the sacrifice.
\textsuperscript{(2)} V. p. 46, n. 1.
\textsuperscript{(3)} After the passing of the night.
\textsuperscript{(4)} To R. Jeremiah.
\textsuperscript{(5)} Var. lec. R. Assi.
\textsuperscript{(6)} Thereby leaving its water unchanged.
\textsuperscript{(7)} Such as the burning of the fats and the other parts of animals sacrificed during the day.
\textsuperscript{(8)} So that he may not perform his ablutions thereat.
\textsuperscript{(9)} He attached it to pulleys whereby it was lowered into the well in the evening and drawn up in the morning, which made the water fresh, being now accounted as part of the well water.
\textsuperscript{(10)} Which shows that the water is unfit even though the priest would not require further ‘sanctification’.
\textsuperscript{(11)} To make confession of sins over it. — This was on the Day of Atonement.
\textsuperscript{(12)} The hall leading to the interior of the Temple.
\textsuperscript{(13)} It stood between north and south, and the face was made to turn toward the west.
\textsuperscript{(14)} Of the Temple. For immediately after making confession he sacrificed the animal on the spot, and that had to be done in the north.
\textsuperscript{(15)} This agrees with the first clause of the Baraitha now being discussed, whence it is deduced that the Baraitha is according to R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon.
\textsuperscript{(16)} Where the knives were kept.
\textsuperscript{(17)} V. Yoma (Sonc. ed.) 35b, and notes.
\textsuperscript{(18)} Surely he does; hence the first Baraitha describing the bullock's position may well be according to him.
\textsuperscript{(19)} Owing to his heavy duties on this day we spare him as much labor as possible. Therefore the bullock was stationed near the Hekal (the inner court), to save him carrying the blood a long way.
\textsuperscript{(20)} That it agrees with Rabbi.
\textsuperscript{(21)} The day's service commenced at cockcrow (before dawn) with the removal of a shovelful of ashes from the altar, which was placed at the east side of the slope leading to the altar.
\textsuperscript{(22)} i.e., at daybreak. the earlier period still belonging to night.
\textsuperscript{(23)} Here the sanctification was performed at the beginning of the day's service, in such a case R. Johanan rules as R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon. But if it is performed in the evening for the burning of the fats, which is the end of the previous day’s service, he needs fresh ‘sanctification’ on the morrow.
\textsuperscript{(24)} With the shovelful of ash.
(25) In order to remove the ash and make room for the fresh pile of wood (the first priest removed only one shovelful).

Zevachim 20b

Now it is well according to Abaye who interprets it [R. Johanan's ruling] as agreeing with Rabbi, for Rabbi admits that the passing of the night does not nullify [in the interval between] cockcrow and morning; for this will then be according to Rabbi. But according to Raba, who interprets it as agreeing with R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon [only], but in Rabbi's opinion the passing of the night nullifies [even] from cockcrow until morning, with whom does this agree? If with Rabbi, then the passing of the night nullifies it; if with R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, surely he said that he does not need sanctification even for ten days? — In truth, it agrees with R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, the reference being to fresh priests.1 It was asked: Is going out [of the Temple court] effective [to invalidate] sanctification of hands and feet?2 If you say that the passing of the night does not invalidate [it], that is because [the priest] did not cease [officiating], but since he ceases when he goes out, he turns his mind away from it;3 or perhaps since it rests with him to go back, he does not turn his mind away from it? —

Come and hear: If he sanctified his hands and feet and they were defiled,4 he immerses them,5 but he need not sanctify [them],6 If they [his hands and feet] went out [from the Temple court],7 they retain their sanctity! — If [only] his hands went out we are not in doubt; our doubt is where his whole body went out; what [is the law then]? —

Come and hear: He whose hands or feet are unwashed must sanctify them at a service vessel within.8 If he sanctified [them] in a service vessel without, or in an unconsecrated vessel within; or if he immersed in the water of a pit,9 and officiated, his service is invalid.10 Thus it is only because he sanctified [his hands] from a service vessel without; but if he sanctified [them] within and then went out, his [subsequent] service is valid!11 — [No:] Perhaps what is meant by ‘he sanctified [them] in a service vessel without’? That e.g. he stretched his hands without and sanctified them;12 but if his whole body went out, you may [certainly] be in doubt. Said R. Zebid to R. Papa. Come and hear: If [the priest] went without the barrier of the wall of the Temple court, if [it was his intention] to tarry there, he needs immersion; if for a short while, he needs sanctification of hands and feet! — Said he to him: That means where he went out to ease himself at nature's call. But that is explicitly taught: He who eases himself needs immersion, and he who answers nature's call requires sanctification of hands and feet? — He [first] teaches [the general law] and then defines it.13

Come and hear: [For the services in connection with the red] heifer, R. Hiyya b. Joseph said: [The priest] must sanctify [himself] from a service vessel within and then go out;14 whereas R. Johanan maintained: [He can sanctify himself] even without [the Temple], even in a profane vessel, even in a fire pot! — Said R. Papa. The [red] heifer is different; since all its services are without, going out does not disqualify it. If so, why must he sanctify [himself at all]? — We want it to be done like the services within. It was asked: Is uncleanness effective in respect of sanctification of hands and feet?15 If you say that going out does not invalidate [sanctification], that may be because the person remains fit; but here that the person is no longer fit [for service] he turns his mind from it.16 Or perhaps, since he will be fit again, he is careful and does not turn his mind away from it? —

Come and hear: If [the priest] sanctified his hands and his feet and they became unclean, he must immerse them, but need not [re-sanctify them]! — Where his hands [only] became unclean, we do not ask; our question
is where his whole body was defiled. ‘His whole body’! surely I may deduce that he will turn his mind away from it, since he must wait for the setting of the sun? — The question arises where e.g. he became unclean just before sunset? Come and hear: [For the service in connection with the red] heifer, R. Hiyya b. Joseph said: [The Priest] must sanctify [himself] from a service vessel within and then go out; whereas R. Johanan maintained: [He can sanctify himself] even without the Temple, even in a profane vessel, even in a firepot.

(1) Who had not been ministering earlier in the night.
(2) To make it necessary to repeat it.
(3) Therefore he must repeat his lustrations when he returns.
(4) With an uncleanness which defiles them only, but not the whole body.
(5) Immersion in a ritual bath (מקוה).
(6) In the laver.
(7) The priest stood at the entrance and thrust his hands and feet without.
(8) Sanctification might be done either at the laver or from any service vessel v. infra; ‘within’ means within the Temple court.
(9) Though normally this cleanses.
(10) Immersion, even of the whole body, does not count as sanctification.
(11) For if that too were invalid, this law is superfluous, since he is standing without at the very moment of lustrations.
(12) Whilst standing within. Only then is it necessary to state this law.
(13) The Tanna first states the law about going out, and then defines the cases to which this law applies.
(14) The burning of the red heifer and the gathering of its ashes and mixing it with water, which are the services here referred to, were done outside Jerusalem.
(15) It is now assumed that the question is: if the priest’s hands became unclean, without the rest of his body, must he re-sanctify them?
(16) Which nullifies sanctification.
(17) He does not become clean even after immersion until sunset.

Said R. Nahman son of Isaac, Come and hear: Or if he immersed in the water of a pit and officiates, his service is invalid. Hence [if he used] the water of the laver in a similar way to the water of a pit and officiated, his service is valid? — No: it is particularly necessary for him [the Tanna] to teach about the water of a pit. lest you say: If he can bathe his whole body therein, how much the more his hands and feet.

R. Hiyya son of Joseph said: The water of the laver becomes unfit for the mattirin, as the mattirin [themselves], and for the [burning of the] limbs, as the limbs [themselves]. R. Hisda maintained: Even for the mattirin they become unfit only at dawn, as the limbs.s

While R. Johanan maintained: Once the laver is sunk, it may not be drawn up again. Does this mean that it is not even fit for a day service? Surely R. Assi said, reporting R. Johanan in Ilfa's name: If the laver was not sunk [into the pit] before evening, the priest may sanctify [himself] theretfor a night service, but he may not sanctify [himself] theretor the morrow? — What is meant by “it may not be drawn up”? for a day service; but it is indeed fit for a night service. If so, this is identical with R. Hiyya b. Joseph ['s view']?

(1 V. Sanh. (Sonc. ed.) p. 353, n. 2.
(2) i.e., by priests upon whom the sun had set after their immersion, as in the case of the sacrificial service in general. The Rabbis however held that immediately
after immersion (when he is called a tebul yom v. Glos) a priest was fit for
the burning of the red heifer. V. Parah III, 7.
(3) Sc. the sanctification.
(4) By actually putting his hands and feet into it.
(6) I.e., putting his hands and feet in the laver.
(7) If unclean, and such bathing constitutes valid immersion and makes him clean.
(8) But it is still possible that if he used the water of the laver in the same way, putting his hands and feet into it, his sanctification is invalid.
(9) The mattirin (q.v. Glos) are the sprinkling of the blood of animal sacrifices, and the burning of the fistful of meal of the meal-offerings; they are so called because they enable the sacrifices to be eaten or make them fit for the altar, and they must be done before sunset of the day on which the sacrifices are brought. Now the laver was sunk every day in a pit (v. supra 20a); if this laver was not sunk into it before sunset, its water is unfit on the morrow for ‘sanctification’ where the priest wishes to perform a mattir, just as the blood and the fistful of meal themselves become unfit for their purpose at sunset. Again, the limbs of the sacrifice must be burned before dawn of the day following its offering; if the laver is not sunk into the pit before dawn, its water is unfit for ‘sanctification’ on the following day for the service of burning the limbs. That is R. Hiyya b. Joseph’s view. R. Hisda maintains that for the sprinkling of the blood too the water is unfit only if the laver was not sunk in the pit by dawn.
(10) Into the pit at sunset.
(11) Until dawn. It is now assumed that he means that even if a priest wishes to burn limbs during the night the laver cannot be drawn up, as this would render its water unfit.
(12) Viz., burning the limbs.

Zevachim 21b

— They disagree as to a preventive measure in respect of sinking [the laver].1 But surely R. Johanan said: If [the priest] sanctified his hands for the removal of the ashes, he need not sanctify [them again] on the morrow, because he has already sanctified [them] at the beginning of the service.2 According to Raba who explains that this agrees with R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon, it is well: this [the present ruling] agrees with Rabbi.3 But according to Abaye who explains that it agrees with Rabbi, Rabbi is self-contradictory, [for] why must he lower it there,4 whereas here he must not lower it? —

It means that he raises its and then lowers it again.6 If so, ‘on the morrow he does not sanctify’ — why so?7 [The meaning is] that he need not sanctify, a which is to say that [the previous sanctification] is indeed fit for the mattirin. Then it is the same as R. Hisda[‘s ruling]?9 — They disagree in respect of the regulation of lowering.10 An objection is raised: They neither saw him nor heard him until they heard the sound of the wood of the machine which Ben Kattin made for the laver, and then they exclaimed. ‘It is time to sanctify hands and feet at the laver’11 Surely it means that he raised it,12 and which proves that it was sunk [earlier]? — No: it means that he lowered it [now].13 If he lowered it, would the sound be heard?14 — He lowered it by the wheel.15 Another version: He lowered it by means of its stone,16 in order that the sound of it should be heard, so that they [the priests] might hear it and come. But there was Gebini the crier?17 — They made two alarms; some heard the one and came, whilst others heard the other and came. The [above] text [stated]: ‘R. Jose son of R. Hanina said: You may not wash in a laver which does not contain sufficient [water] for the sanctification of four priests. for it says. That Moses and Aaron and his sons wash their hands and their feet thereat’.18 An objection is raised: All vessels sanctify.19 whether they contain a rebi’ith20

(1) When R. Johanan rules that the laver must not be brought up for a service the following day, it is not because its water is unfit if it is not in the pit during any part of the night, but as a preventive measure, lest it is not lowered again before dawn, which would disqualify it. Hence R. Johanan does not say that the water is unfit, but merely that the laver must not be brought up.
(2) V. supra 20a. Thus the laver is drawn up before dawn, and R. Johanan does not add that it must be lowered again immediately before dawn.
(3) Who maintains that the passing of the night nullifies the previous sanctification, and all the more will it disqualify the water of the laver itself.
(4) I.e., why does he fear there that if he brings it up he will not lower it again.
(5) In the morning for the removal of the ashes.
(6) Although R. Johanan does not mention it, that is merely because he is discussing the sanctification of hands and not the regulations of the laver.
(7) Now that you explain that according to R. Johanan the night does not disqualify, why cannot he sanctify his hands on the morrow?
(8) Because he has already sanctified his hands for the night service. Thus he informs us that the passing of the night does not nullify the sanctification, this being in agreement with R. Eleazar.
(9) Now that you say that he does not bring it up because dawn is a disqualification, but that the night itself does not disqualify. R. Johanan's view is identical with R. Hisda's.
(10) In R. Johanan's opinion it must be done in the evening, so that when the priest comes to clean the ashes in the morning he will find it so, and thus remember to lower it again immediately before dawn. But R. Hisda holds that this is unnecessary, and it is sufficient to lower it just before dawn.
(11) When the priest who was to remove the ashes entered the Temple court to sanctify his hands and feet, he did not carry a light with him, but walked by the light of the altar fire. His fellow-priests in the adjoining chamber therefore neither saw nor heard him, until they heard the sound of the machine drawing up the laver from the pit, and then they knew that they themselves must prepare for the next service.
(12) From the pit. Hence until then it was in the pit, which contradicts R. Hisda's view that it was not lowered until dawn.
(13) They heard the sound of it being lowered.
(14) The wheel was unnecessary for this, as one could simply unfasten the rope by which it was held up, whereupon it would fall automatically.
(15) Though it was unnecessary, precisely in order that he might be heard.
(16) A stone used as a wheel or pulley.
(17) Who apprised the priests and others every morning when it was time for them to get up; v. Yoma 19b.
(18) V. supra 19b.
(19) The water placed in them, so that this water can be used by the priests for sanctifying their hands and feet.
(20) V. Glos.

or they do not contain a rebi’ith,1 provided they are service vessels? — Said R. Adda b. Aha:2 This means where one bales out from it.3 But the Divine Law saith, ‘Theret’?4 — They should wash is to include any service vessel.5 If so, then a profane vessel too [should be fit]? — Said Abaye: You cannot say [that] a profane vessel [is fit], this being deduced from its base, a fortiori: If its base, which was anointed together with it [the laver], does not sanctify [the water poured into it],7 is it not logical that a profane vessel, which was not anointed with it, does not sanctify? And how do we know [that] its base [does not sanctify]? Because it was taught: R. Judah said: You might think that the base sanctifies, just as the laver sanctifies; therefore it says. Thou shalt also make a laver of brass, and the base thereof of brass.8 I have made it alike in respect of brass , but not in respect of anything else. Mar Zutra the son of R. Mari said to Rabina: As for its base, [it does not sanctify] because it is not made for its inside [to be used]; will you say [the same of] a profane vessel, which is made for its inside?9 Rather, ‘theret’ excludes a profane vessel. If so, [it excludes] a service vessel too? — Surely the Divine Law included [it by writing] ‘they should wash’. And what [reason] do you see [for this choice]?10 — The one [a service vessel] needs anointing like itself [the laver], while the other does not need anointing like itself. Resh Lakish said: Whatever can make up [the prescribed quantity of] the water of a mikweh,11 makes up the water of the laver;12 but it does not make up to a rebi’ith.13 What does this exclude? Shall we say, it excludes miry [liquid] clay?14 then how is it meant? If a cow would bend and drink thereof,15 it is [fit] even for a rebi’ith too;16 while if a cow would not bend and drink thereof, it cannot make up even [the quantity of] a mikweh too! Again, if it is to exclude red insects,17 [these are permitted] even in the mass,18 for surely it was taught: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said: You may perform immersion in whatever originates in the water; while R. Isaac b. Abdini said: You may perform immersion in the eye of a fish!19 —

Said R. Papa: It excludes the case where one added a se'ah and took out a se'ah. For we learnt: If a mikweh had exactly forty se'ah and one added a se'ah and took out a se'ah, it is fit. And Rab Judah b. Shila said in R. Assi’s
name in R. Johanan's name: Up to the greater part thereof.20 R. Papa said: If one cut out a rebi'ith therein, one may bathe needles and hooks,21 since it is derived from a valid mikweh.22

R. Jeremiah said in the name of Resh Lakish: The water of a mikweh is fit for the water of the laver.23 Are we to say that it [the water of the laver] need not be ‘living’ water? Surely it was taught: [But its inwards and its legs shall he wash] with water,24 but not with wine; ‘with water,’ but not with a mixture:25 ‘with water’ includes any water,26 and all the more [does it include] the water of the laver. Now what does ‘and all the more the water of the laver’ imply? Surely that it is ‘living’ water?27 — No: it means, which is holy.28 Is then its holiness an advantage? Surely the school of Samuel taught: [Only] water which has no special name [is fit],29

(1) In that case it is certainly insufficient for four priests.
(2) Sh. M. emends: Ahabah.
(3) Tosaf.: the priest takes up water from the laver with a small vessel. This need not contain a rebi’ith, but the laver must contain the larger quantity. Rashi translates and explains differently.
(4) Rashi: which implies that one must wash from the laver only. Tosaf.: which implies that any other vessel used must be of the same size as the laver.
(5) Ex. XL, 32.
(6) ‘They should wash’ is superfluous, and is therefore regarded as an extension.
(7) To be used for this purpose. — This implies that the base itself could hold water.
(8) Ibid. XXX, 18.
(9) Surely not.
(10) For excluding the one and including the other; why not reverse it?
(11) V. Glos. A mikweh must contain not less than forty se’ahs water. Yet if it is short of this quantity, it can be made up with other liquids, as enumerated in Mik. VII, 1 q.v.
(12) If it contains insufficient for the lustrations of four priests.
(13) Which is required for the ordinary washing of the hands before eating food.
(14) Reading narok, as in Suk. 19b et passim. Edd. have here nadok, which Rashi translates, thin clay, such that can be poured from one vessel into another.
(15) If it is so loose that its presence in water would not deter a cow from drinking it.
(16) If the rebi’ith is partly made up of such miry clay, it is sufficient and valid for the ritual washing of the hands.
(17) Which originate in the water.
(18) Even if the whole mikweh consists of these, it is fit, whereas Resh Lakish permits them only to make up the prescribed quantity.
(19) A huge fish whose eye had dissolved in its socket.
(20) Any liquid other than water can sometimes make up the quantity and sometimes not. Thus: if the mikweh contains thirty nine se’ahs and another is added of a different liquid, it is not valid. But if it contains forty, and then a different liquid is added and a se’ah of water is removed, it remains fit. For it was fit without the added se’ah, and this se’ah becomes null (loses its identity) in the rest, and so the mikweh remains fit. Rab Judah says that it remains fit even if in this way one removes up to (but not including) the greater part of the water. But if one has a rebi’ith of water, adds a little of another liquid, and then removes the same quantity, it is not fit, because a rebi’ith is too little for the other liquid to lose its identity in it.
(21) If one cuts out a little hollow in the side of a full-sized mikweh and the water flows into it, you may purify these small objects in it, even though it is not freely joined to the larger mikweh.
(22) Lit., ‘Since it comes from the fitness of a mikweh’.
(23) Though the former is not ‘living’ (i.e. running) water, it may be drawn into the laver.
(25) Two parts water and one part wine.
(26) Even non-running.
(27) For that is apparently its only superiority, and so the passage does not refer to the actual water of the laver, but means any living water.
(28) I.e. all the more is the water of the laver (actual) fit, seeing that it is holy.
(29) For the washing of the sacrificial parts.

Zevachim 22b

which excludes the water of the laver, which has a special name.1 Hence it surely means such as is fit for the water of the laver,2 which proves that it must be ‘living’ water? — It is a controversy of Tannaim. For R. Johanan said: As for the laver, — R. Ishmael said: It is the water of a spring;3 While the Sages maintain: It may be ordinary water.
AN UNCIRCUMCISED [PRIEST]. Whence do we know it? — Said R. Hisda: We did not learn this from the Torah of Moses our Teacher, but from the words of Ezekiel the son of Buzi: No alien, uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh, shall enter into My sanctuary.4 And how do we know that they profane the service? — Because it is written, In that ye have brought in aliens, uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh, to be in My sanctuary, to profane it, even My house, [when ye offer My bread, the fat and the blood].6

Our Rabbis taught: [It says.] Alien: you might think that this means literally an alien; therefore Scripture teaches, uncircumcised in heart. If so, why does Scripture call him ‘alien’? Because his actions are alien to his Father in Heaven.7 Now, I know only [that] the ‘uncircumcised in heart’ [invalidates the sacrifice]; how do I know that the uncircumcised in flesh [does likewise]? Because the text states, ‘and uncircumcised in flesh.’ And they are both necessary. For if the Divine Law wrote [that] one uncircumcised in heart is not repulsive, and so he is not disqualified. And if we were informed about an ‘uncircumcised in heart’, I would say that the reason is because he is repulsive; but an uncircumcised in heart is not repulsive, and so he is not disqualified. And if we were informed about an ‘uncircumcised in heart’, I would say that the reason is because he is repulsive; but an uncircumcised in heart is not repulsive, and so he is not disqualified. But it is written, If any man of you... shall be unclean [by reason of a dead

propitiates [in the case of] one unclean through a corpse, who must be besprinkled on the third and on the seventh [days of his defilement],11 surely [it] propitiates [in the case of] one unclean through a reptile, who need not be besprinkled on the third and on the seventh [days]? — The Elders of the South hold that those who make atonement [the priests] are like those for whom atonement is made [the people]: as in the case of those for whom atonement is made, if they are unclean through a corpse [the head-plate] does [propitiate], but if they are unclean through a reptile [it does] not,12 so are those who make atonement: one unclean through a corpse is [included in the propitiatory effect of the head-plate], whereas one unclean through a reptile is not [included]. What do they [these Elders] hold? If they hold, you may not slaughter [the Passover] and sprinkle [its blood] on behalf of one who is unclean through a reptile,13 why may the community not sacrifice in uncleanness: surely [it is a principle that] wherever an individual is relegated [to the second Passover], the community celebrates it in uncleanness? Rather, they hold that you do slaughter and sprinkle on behalf of him who is unclean through a reptile.

‘Ulla said: Resh Lakish14 criticized the southern scholars: Now, whose power is greater, the power of those who make atonement, or the power of those for whom atonement is made? Surely the power of those for whom atonement is made?15 Then if a priest who was unclean through a reptile cannot propitiate [ officiate], though where the owners were defiled by a reptile they can send their sacrifices [to the Temple]; is it not logical that a priest who was defiled by a corpse should not be able to propitiate, seeing that if the owners were defiled by a corpse they cannot send their sacrifices?16 —

The Elders of the south hold: One who is unclean through a corpse can also send his sacrifices.17 But it is written, If any man of you... shall be unclean [by reason of a dead
body]... yet he shall keep the Passover [unto the Lord] in the second month [on the fourteenth day at dusk they shall keep it]?18 — That is a recommendation.19 But it is written, According to every man's

(1) It is not called simply water, but the water of the laver.
(2) But not the actual water of the laver.
(3) I.e., running water.
(4) Ezek. XLIV, 9.
(5) I.e., make the sacrifice unfit.
(6) Ibid. 6.
(7) They estrange him from God.
(8) An apostate.
(9) For this is understood to refer to one whose brothers died through circumcision, so that he fears the operation, but would otherwise have it performed.
(10) V. Ex. XXVIII, 36-38: And thou shalt make a pale of pure gold... and it shall be upon Aaron's forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity committed in the holy things... and it shall always be upon his forehead, that they may be accepted before the Lord. According to the Rabbis, this means that in virtue of the head-plate a public sacrifice is ‘accepted’, i.e., valid, even if the whole congregation or all the officiating priests are unclean, and indeed must be offered at the very outset in such conditions, as the public sacrifice may not be postponed. This is technically called propitiating (making acceptable). The matter is further explained in the text.
(11) V. Num. XIX, 19.
(12) I.e., only when the whole or the majority of the nation is unclean through a corpse must the public sacrifice be brought.
(13) If an individual is unclean through a reptile and has not performed tebillah (q.v. Glos.), though he can do so and be clean in the evening, nevertheless the Passover may not be slaughtered on his behalf, and he must postpone his sacrifice for the second Passover. There is an opposing view in Pes. 90b.
(14) The original is ה"ד and it is not clear what it stands for. Bah. suggests. Resh Galutha, the Head of the Exile.
(15) As the text proceeds to show: the owner of a sacrifice can send it to the Temple even when he is unclean through a reptile, whereas a priest cannot officiate in like circumstances.
(16) Because they will be unfit to partake of it in the evening. — Though sacrifices in general are mentioned, much of the present discussion refers more particularly to the Passover.
(17) E.g., he was registered for a particular Passover-offering (this could be sacrificed only on behalf of people specially registered for it) and became unclean through a corpse: if he sent the sacrifice and had it slaughtered, he does not celebrate the second Passover a month later, though he cannot partake of the first.
(18) Num. IX, 10f. Thus he is relegated to the second month.
(19) Scripture orders him to be relegated. Yet if he does have it slaughtered at the first, he has fulfilled his obligation.

Zevachim 23a

eating?1 — That [too] is [only] a recommendation. Yet is it not indispensable?2 Surely it was taught: [Then shall he and his neighbor next unto him take one] according to the number of [be-miksath] the souls:3 this teaches that the Paschal lamb is not slaughtered save for those who are registered [numbered] for it. You might think that if he slaughtered it for those who were not registered for it, he should be as one who violates the precept, yet it is fit. Therefore it is stated, Yé shall make your count [takosu]:4 it is reiterated ‘to teach that it is indispensable; and eaters are assimilated to registered [persons].5 Yet even if they do not assimilate [them], there is still the same refutation: If a priest who was defiled by a reptile cannot propitiate, though if the owners were defiled by a reptile they can send their sacrifices at the very outset; is it not logical that a priest who was defiled through a corpse should not be able to propitiate, seeing that if the owners were defiled through a corpse they cannot send their sacrifices at the very outset?6

An objection is raised: [If the blood of a Passover-offering is sprinkled, and then it became known that it was unclean, the head-plate propitiates; if the person became unclean, the head-plate does not propitiate:] because they [the Sages] ruled: [In the case of] a Nazirite one who sacrifices the Passover-offering, the head-plate propitiates for the uncleanness of the blood, but the head-plate does not propitiate for the uncleanness of the person. With what [was the person defiled]?
Shall we say, With the uncleanness of a reptile? surely you maintain [that] you may slaughter [the Passover-offering] and sprinkle [its blood] on behalf of one who is unclean through a reptile! Hence it must refer to defilement by a corpse, yet it teaches, ‘The head-plate does not propitiate’, which proves that if the owners were defiled, they cannot send their sacrifices? — No: if the owners were defiled through a corpse, that would indeed be so. But the meaning here is that the priest was defiled by a reptile. If so, consider the last clause: If he was defiled with the ‘uncleanness of the deep’, the head-plate propitiates. But surely R. Hiyya taught: They [the Sages] spoke of the ‘uncleanness of the deep’ in respect of a corpse alone. What does this exclude? Surely it excludes the ‘uncleanness of the deep’ caused by a reptile? — No: it excludes the ‘uncleanness of the deep’ of gonorrhoea. Again, as to what Rami b. Hama asked: As to the priest who propitiates with their sacrifices, is the ‘uncleanness of the deep permitted to him, or is the ‘uncleanness of the deep’ not permitted to him? You may solve that the ‘uncleanness of the deep’ is permitted to him, for here we are treating of the priest? — Rami b. Hama certainly disagrees [with the Elders of the south].

Come and hear: And Aaron shall bear the iniquity of the holy things: now, what iniquity does he bear?

(1) Ex. XII, 4. This implies that he must be fit to partake thereof.
(2) In the sense that the sacrifice offered in contravention of this law does not count at all, and the man must bring the second Passover.
(3) Ibid. 4.
(4) Just as the sacrifice is unfit if slaughtered for those who are not registered for it, so is it unfit if slaughtered on behalf of men who cannot partake of it, for the eaters are coupled with the registered persons in the same verse.
(5) Since only ‘number’ is repeated, but not ‘eating’.
(6) For the Elders of the south merely maintain that if they sent their sacrifices and had them slaughtered, they do not bring a second Passover. But they must of course admit that they must not send them in the first place. — The objection remains unanswered.
(7) In the sense that even if they do, they must still bring the second Passover.
(8) The head-plate would propitiate.
(9) This is a technical term denoting the hidden uncleanness of a corpse which is now discovered for the first time. E.g., if he was in a house and it is subsequently learned that a corpse had been there; v. Pesahim 80b.
(10) And he is not liable to a second offering. This is a traditional law.
(11) A zab (gonorrhoeist) is unclean seven days, and the Passover-offering may not be offered on his behalf. Now, if the eve of Passover marks the seventh day of his uncleanness, he is in a state of doubt: if he does not discharge on that day, he will be clean in the evening; if he does discharge, he becomes unclean for a further seven days. Thus he too is unclean with the ‘uncleanness of the deep’, and R. Hiyya teaches that the head-plate does not propitiate in his case.
(12) If the priest who offers the Passover sacrifice or the sacrifices of a Nazirite on behalf of their owners was defiled with the ‘uncleanness of the deep’, does the head-plate propitiate, so that the sacrifices are valid, or not?
(13) On the interpretation of the Elders of the south.
(14) He must interpret the Mishnah as referring to the uncleanness of the owners.
(15) This is a refutation of Rami b. Hama.
(16) Ex. XXVIII, 38. ‘Shall bear’ means shall make atonement for, i.e., shall make a sacrifice valid in spite of certain irregularities.

If the iniquity of pigglul, surely it is already said, it shall not be accepted? If the iniquity of nothar, surely it is already said, neither shall it be imputed [unto him that offereth it]? Hence he bears naught but the iniquity of defilement, which is inoperative, in opposition to its general rule, in the case of a community. Now which uncleanness [is meant]? if we say, the uncleanness of a reptile, where has that been waived? Hence it must mean uncleanness through a corpse, which proves that if the owners become unclean through a corpse they send their sacrifices. And of whom [is this said]? If of a Nazirite, the Divine Law saith, And if any man die very suddenly beside him, etc! Hence it can only refer to one who is offering...
the Paschal lamb! — In truth it refers to [the uncleanness of] a reptile, yet uncleanness elsewhere [was waived].

Others make this deduction: [The head-plate makes atonement] only for the iniquity of the holy things, but not for the iniquity of those who hallow them.

Which uncleanness [is meant]? If we say, the uncleanness of a reptile? Is then that inoperative in the case of a community? Hence it must surely be the uncleanness of a corpse, and yet only the iniquity of the holy things [is atoned for], but not the iniquity of those who hallow them? — No: in truth it means uncleanness through a reptile, yet uncleanness elsewhere [is waived].

[A PRIEST] SITTING. Whence do we know it? — Said Raba in R. Nahman's name: Scripture saith, [For the Lord thy God hath chosen him — the priest — out of all thy tribes,] to stand to minister [in the name of the Lord]: I have chosen him to stand, but not to sit. Our Rabbis taught: ‘To stand to minister’ is a recommendation; when it says [further], who stand [there before the Lord], the Writ has repeated it, to make [standing] indispensable. Raba said to R. Nahman: Consider: one sitting is as a zar, and profanes the service; then let us say: just as a zar is liable to death, so is one who sits liable to death. Why then was it taught: But an uncircumcised [priest], an onen, and one sitting are not liable to death but are merely under an injunction [not to officiate]? — Because [a priest] lacking the [priestly] vestments and one whose hands and feet are not washed are two laws which come as one, and two laws that come as one do not illumine [other cases].

ONE STANDING ON UTENSILS OR ON AN ANIMAL OR ON HIS FELLOW'S FEET, [THE SACRIFICES] ARE INVALID. Whence do we know it? — For the school of R. Ishmael taught: Since the pavement sanctifies and the service vessels sanctify; just as with the service vessels nothing may interpose between him [the priest] and the service vessels; so with the pavement nothing must interpose between him and the pavement. Now they are all necessary. For if we were informed about vessels, I would...
argue that [standing on them disqualifies] because they are not flesh, but in the case of an animal, which is flesh, [standing on it does] not [disqualify]. And if we were informed about an animal, [the reason is] because it is not human, but as for his fellow, who is human, I would say [that standing on his feet does] not [disqualify]. Hence [they are all] necessary. It was taught: R. Eliezer said: If one foot is on the utensil and the other on the pavement, one foot on the stone and the other on the pavement, we consider: wherever if the stone or the utensil be removed, he can stand on the other foot, his service is valid; if not, his service is invalid.

R. Ammi asked: What if a [paving] stone become loosened and he stood on it? If it is not his intention to fit it [in the pavement] there is no question, for it certainly interposes; the question arises where it is his intention to fit it in: what then? Since it is his intention to fit it in, it is as though [already] fitted; or perhaps [we say], Now at all events it is separate? Rabbah Zuti stated the question thus: R. Ammi asked: What if the stone became uprooted, and he stood in its place? What is the question? [This:] When David sanctified [it], did he sanctify the upper pavement [only], or perhaps he sanctified [it] right to the nethermost soil? Then let him ask about the whole of the Temple court? In truth, he is certain that he sanctified it to the nethermost soil, but this is his question: Is then a natural way of service, or is it not a natural way of service? The question stands.

IF [THE PRIEST] RECEIVED [THE BLOOD] IN HIS LEFT HAND, IT IS DISQUALIFIED; R. SIMEON DECLARES IT FIT. Our Rabbis taught: [And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin-offering with his finger, and put it upon the horns of the altar]: ‘with his finger he shall put’ teaches that the application must be with the right; [and] since ‘hand’ is not stated in connection with receiving, if he received [it] with his left [hand], it is fit. Now as for R. Simeon, what will you? if he admits the gezerah shawah, what does it matter if ‘hand’ is not written in connection with receiving? While if he does not admit the gezerah shawah, what if ‘hand’ were written in connection with receiving? —

Said Rab Judah: in truth, he does not admit the gezerah shawah, and this is what he means: Is then ‘right hand’ stated in connection with receiving? Since then ‘right hand’ is not stated in connection with receiving, if he received [it] with the left hand, [the service] is fit. Said Rabbah to him: If so, [the same applies] even to the application [of the blood on the altar] too? Moreover, does not R. Simeon accept the gezerah shawah? Surely it was taught. R. Simeon said: Wherever ‘hand’ is stated, it refers to the right only; [wherever] ‘finger’ [is stated], it refers to the right only? — Rather said Raba: In truth he admits the gezerah shawah, and this is what he says: is then ‘hand’ stated in connection with receiving? Since not ‘hand’ but ‘finger’ is written, and [the blood] cannot be received with the finger, therefore if he received it with the left [hand], it is fit.

Said R. Sama the son of R. Ashi to Rabina: But it is possible to make a handle at the edge of the bowl and receive [the blood]? — Rather said Abaye:

(1) For otherwise only one should be mentioned, and by analogy the other as well as all analogous cases, would be included.
(2) The priest, in that he may sacrifice there only, and not elsewhere. But v. next note.
(3) The blood that is caught in them. This is the reading of cur. edd. Sh. M. offers an alternative reading, which is preferable: since the pavement is sanctified, and the service vessels are sanctified.
(4) When he takes one for receiving the blood, nothing must be on his hands, e.g., gloves.
(5) The enumeration of vessels, an animal, and his fellow’s feet.
So that it moves about. 
It is not accounted part of the pavement. 
Entirely leaving the earth beneath it exposed. 
What if the pavement is removed and the priests stand on the earth beneath? 
To stand on the earth beneath the paving stone. 
Lev. IV, 25. 
‘Finger’ stands between ‘take’ and ‘put’ in the text, and so the Rabbis apply it to both; and it is stated below that ‘finger’ always means that of the right hand. 
It is now assumed that R. Simeon agrees that ‘hand’ means the right, but not ‘finger’. 
Whereby it is deduced that ‘hand’ in connection with sacrifices means the right. The gezerah shawah is from a leper, where both ‘hand’ and ‘finger’ are written. 
‘Finger’ is however written both here and in connection with a leper; and there it is definitely the right. 
Since right hand is not stated there either. 
The receiving vessel cannot be held by a finger only. Hence ‘finger’, which denotes the right one, must refer to the applying of the blood, but not to the receiving. 
In which the blood is caught. 
Holding it with the finger only.

**Zevachim 24b**

They disagree [on the question] whether a text is to be interpreted with what precedes and with what follows it.  

Abaye said: The following [teaching] of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon disagrees with his father’s and with the Rabbis. For it was taught, R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon said: Wherever ‘finger’ is stated in connection with receiving, if [the priest] varied the reception [of the blood] it is unfit; if the application, it is fit. And wherever ‘finger’ is stated in connection with the application, if he varied the application, it is unfit; if the reception, it is fit. And where is ‘finger’ stated in connection with the application? — For it is written, And thou shalt take of the blood of the bullock, and put it upon the horns of the altar with thy finger; and he holds: A text is interpreted with its precedent, but not with its ante-precedent, nor with what follows it.

Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in R. Johanan’s name: Wherever ‘finger’ and ‘priesthood’ are stated, they refer to the right only. It was assumed that we require both, as it is written. And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin-offering with his finger; and it is learnt from a leper, where it is written, And the priest shall dip his right finger. But surely ‘priesthood’ alone is written in connection with the taking of the fistful [of flour] yet we learnt: If [the priest] took the handful with his left [hand], is it unfit? —  

Said Raba: [He meant] either ‘finger’ or ‘priesthood’. Said Abaye to him: Yet ‘priesthood’ is written in connection with the carrying of the limbs to the [altar] ascent, as it is written, And the priest shall offer the whole, and make it smoke on the altar, and he holds: A text is interpreted with its precedent, but not with what follows it.  

But surely ‘priesthood’ alone is written in connection with sprinkling, yet we learnt: [The priest carries] the right foot [of the sacrifice] in his left hand with the inside of the skin outward? — When do we say [that] either ‘finger’ or ‘priesthood’ [implies the right], only in respect of [a service] which is indispensable to atonement, as in the case of a leper. But priesthood is written in connection with receiving, which is indispensable to atonement, yet we learnt: If he received [the blood] with his left hand, it is unfit; but R. Simeon declares it fit? — R. Simeon requires both. Does then R. Simeon require both? Surely it was taught. R. Simeon said: Wherever ‘hand’ is stated, it refers to the right only; wherever ‘finger’ [is stated], it refers to the right only? — [Where] ‘finger’ [is stated] he does not require ‘priesthood’, [but] where ‘priesthood’ [is stated], he does require ‘finger’. Then what is the purpose of ‘priesthood’? To teach that they must be in their priestly state.

But ‘priesthood’ alone is written in connection with sprinkling, yet we learnt: If he sprinkled with his left hand, it is unfit, and R. Simeon does not disagree? —
Said Abaye: He does disagree in a Baraita, for it was taught: If [the priest] received with his left hand, it is unfit; but R. Simeon declares it fit. If he sprinkled with his left hand, it is unfit; but R. Simeon declares it fit. Then as to what Raba said:[We draw an analogy of] hand’ ‘hand’ in respect of taking the fistful; ‘foot’, ‘foot’, in respect of halizah; ear’ ‘ear’ in respect of boring [the ear].13 — Why is this necessary [in respect of the fistful], seeing that it can be deduced from Rabbah b. Bar Hanah's [exegesis]? — One [is required] for the taking of the fistful, and the other for the sanctification of the fistful.14

MISHNAH. IF THE BLOOD WAS POURED OUT ON TO THE PAVEMENT5 AND [THE PRIEST] COLLECTED IT, IT IS FIT.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: And the anointed priest shall take of the blood of the bullock:6 [this means,] of the life blood, but not of the blood of the skin or of the draining blood;7 ‘of the blood of the bullock’ [implies,] he is to receive the blood [direct] from the bullock.8 For if you think that ‘of the blood of the bullock’ [is meant literally] as it is written, [viz.,] of the blood [indicating] even a portion of the blood [only], Surely Rab said: He who slaughters [the sacrifice] must receive all the blood of the bullock, for it says, And all the remaining blood of the bullock shall he pour out.9 Hence ‘from the blood of the bullock’ means, he is to receive the blood [direct] from the bullock; for [the author of
this exegesis] holds: You subtract, add, and interpret.10 The [above] text [stated]: Rab said: He who slaughters [the sacrifice] must receive all the blood of the bullock, for it says, ‘And all the remaining blood of the bullock shall he pour out’. But surely this is written of the remainder [of the blood]?11 — Since it is inapplicable to the remainder, for all the blood is not available [at the time],12 apply it to receiving.

Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: He who slaughters must raise the knife upwards.13 for it is said, ‘And he shall take of the blood of the bullock,’ but not of the blood of the bullock plus something else. And with what does he wipe the knife? — Said Abaye: With the edge of the bowl,14 as it is written, Wipers [cleaners] of gold.15

R. Hisda said in the name of R. Jeremiah b. Abba: He who slaughters must let

(1) For it is no worse than sprinkling, and in fact corresponds to it.
(2) Lev. VI, 10.
(3) V. supra 11a.
(4) A sinner's meal-offering has no oil or incense, and R. Simeon states the reason because it is unfitting that a sinner's offering should be given the same adornment as another sacrifice.
(5) Straight from the animal's neck.
(6) Lev. IV, 5.
(7) The life blood is the first blood that gushes out; the draining blood is that which follows.
(8) And not permit it to pour on to the pavement first; if he does, it is unfit.
(9) Ibid. 7.
(10) You may subtract a letter from one word and add it to another, where the context warrants it, and then interpret the text in accordance with this alteration. Thus here the partitive מ (‘of’ or ‘from’) is removed from מדם blood, and added to הפר the bullock, so that it reads: and he shall take the (not, of the) blood from the bullock.
(11) It refers to the pouring out of the remainder, and not to receiving at all.
(12) As some of it has already been sprinkled on the horns of the altar.
(13) So that none of the blood on the knife runs into the bowl.
(14) Taking care that the blood does not flow into it.
(15) Ezra 1, 10; E.V. bowls of gold. Abaye connects the Heb. before with kapper, to wipe away (whence its general meaning of to atone or forgive).

Zevachim 25b

[the blood of] the jugular veins1 run [straight] into the vessel. It was stated likewise: R. Assi said in R. Johanan's name: The jugular veins must see the air-space of the vessel.2 R. Assi asked R. Johanan: What if one was receiving, and the bottom of the bowl split before the blood reached the air-space? is [an object in] the air, where it will not eventually come to rest, regarded as at rest, or not?3 — Said he to him, We have learnt it: If a barrel lies beneath a spout, the water inside it and outside it is unfit; if one joined its mouth to the spout, the water inside it is fit, and the water outside it is unfit.4 How now! He asked him about [an object in] the air, where it will not eventually come to rest, and he answered him about [an object in] the air where it will eventually come to rest?5 —

He asked him two [questions]: should you say that [an object in] the air where it will not eventually come to rest is not regarded as at rest, how about [an object in] the air where it will eventually come to rest?6 That is how R. Joseph recited it. R. Kahana recited it that he asked him about a barrel,7 and he answered him about a barrel. Rabbah recited it that he asked him about a barrel, and he solved [it] for him [from the case of] a bowl; [arguing thus,] do you not agree that in the case of the bowl, sprinkling [of blood] is unavoidable?8 We learnt elsewhere: If one places [there] one's hand or foot or vegetables leaves, in order that the water should flow into the barrel, it [the water] is unfit.9 [If one placed there] leaves of canes or leaves of nuts, it is fit. This is the general rule: [If the water is conducted into the barrel by means of] anything which can become unclean, it is unfit; [by means of] anything which cannot become unclean, it is fit.10 How do we know it? —
Because R. Johanan said on the authority of R. Jose b. Abba: Scripture saith, Nevertheless a fountain or a cistern wherein is a gathering of water shall be clean:11 its existence must be [effected] through purity.12 R. Hiyya said in R. Johanan's name: This proves that the air-space of a vessel is as the vessel [itself].13 Said R. Zera to R. Hiyya b. Abba: But perhaps It refers to a direct run [into the barrel]? — Fool! replied he: we learnt, 'So that the water shall flow into the barrel.'14 R. Hiyya b. Abba also said in R. Johanan's name: This Mishnah was taught on the testimony of R. Zadok. For we learnt: R. Zadok testified15 that running water which is assembled by means of nut leaves is fit. There was such a case in Ahaliya,16 which was referred to the Sages in the Chamber of Hewn Stone,17 and they declared it fit. R. Zera said in the name of Rab:18 If [the priest] slits the [sacrificial] bullock's ear and then receives its blood,19 it is unfit, for it is said: And [the anointed priest] shall take of the blood of the bullock:20 [this implies:] the bullock as it was before.21 We have thus found [this law true of] sacrifices of higher sanctity;22 how do we know [it of] sacrifices of lower sanctity? —

Said Raba, it was taught: Your lamb shall be without blemish, a male of the first year:23 [this teaches] that it must be without a blemish and a year old when it is slaughtered. How do we know [that it must be likewise] at the receiving [of the blood], the carrying, and the sprinkling? Because it says, ‘it shall be’, [teaching that] at all its stages [as a sacrifice] it must be without blemish and a year old. Abaye raised an objection to him: R. Joshua said: [In the case of] all sacrifices prescribed in the Torah whereof as much as an olive of flesh or fat remained,24 [the priest] sprinkles the blood? — Relate this to [the provision that it must be] a year old.25 Yet is it possible for it to be a year old at the slaughtering, yet two years old26 at the carrying and sprinkling? — Said Raba: This proves that [even] hours disqualify in the case of sacrifices.27 R. Ammi said in R. Eleazar's name: [In the case of the animal] being within [the Temple court] while its legs were without, if he cut off its legs and then slaughtered it, it is fit;28

(1) Lit. ‘must place the jugular veins’.
(2) I.e., they must be directly over the receiving vessel, so that the blood pours straight into it.
(3) Here the blood is over the air-space of the receiving vessel. Yet it will not remain in the vessel when it falls into it. Do we nevertheless regard that blood as though it had actually been caught in the vessel and then spilled, in which case it can be collected and is fit, or as though it had poured from the animal’s throat on to the ground, so that it is unfit?
(4) This treats of the water which was mixed with the ashes of the red heifer for lustration: this had to be ‘living’ (i.e., running) water; v. Num. XIX, 17: And for the unclean they shall take of the ashes of the burning of the purification from sin, and running (lit., ‘living’) water shall be put thereto in a vessel. In the present case water is running down a spout or channel, and below that spout, and at some distance from it, lies a barrel, which was not placed there in order to receive the water. If one now takes a vessel and holds it within the air-space of the barrel, or above the mouth of the barrel (‘outside’) and catches that water, it is unfit. Because had it been permitted to come to rest in the barrel it would have ceased to be running water; and so now too it lacks that status. Again, if the mouth of the barrel is flush with the spout, and one holds the vessel inside its air-space, the water thus gathered is unfit. If however one holds the vessel immediately beneath the spout, the water thus collected is fit, because it never entered the air-space within the barrel. (In general, in order for the water to be fit it must be collected directly as it runs in a service vessel specially placed there for that purpose.) — From this passage we see that once an object enters the air-space it is regarded as at rest.
(5) The water would normally enter the barrel and remain there.
(6) And he solved for him the latter question.
(7) Viz., this very law that has just been stated, of which he was ignorant.
(8) Some of the blood must spout through the air into the bowl. Now if an object in the air is not regarded as already at rest, then the blood has entered the bowl and not directly from the animal’s throat but from the air, and should be unfit.
(9) Water was running down from a hillside, and one placed his hand, etc. in order to direct it into a barrel, which had been placed there for the purpose of collecting the water. The water so collected is unfit for lustration; v. Parah VI, 4.
(10) A person's hand can become unclean; similarly vegetable leaves, if they are edible.
(11) Lev. XI, 36.
(12) Water must be collected for ritual cleansing purposes through an object which is itself clean, i.e., which cannot become unclean.
(13) When the water flows over the hand, it does not fall directly into the barrel but first spreads out over the air-space above it. If that airspace were not as the barrel itself, the water would be regarded as falling from the air into the barrel, not from the hand, and so would be fit.
(14) The Hebrew’ does not imply to fall directly into it.
(15) V. ‘Ed. Sonc. ed. pp. IX and XI.
(16) Horowitz, Palestine, p. 22, identifies it with Bait Ilu, near Jerusalem.
(17) In the inner court of the Temple, where the great Sanhedrim sat. V. also J.E. XII, 576.
(19) From the throat, in the usual way. He slit the ear immediately after slaughtering it, so that between the slaughtering and the reception of the blood it was a blemished animal.
(20) Lev. IV, 5.
(21) It must be in the same state when the priest receives the blood as it was before, viz unblemished.
(22) Such as the sin-offering, to which this text refers.
(23) Ex. XII, 5. This refers to the Passover-offering, which was a sacrifice of lower sanctity.
(24) By the time of sprinkling, the rest having been lost or defiled. There can be no greater blemish than this.
(25) At all its stages as a sacrifice it must be a year old, but it need not be without a blemish at all its stages.
(26) I.e., more than a year old.
(27) The age of a sacrifice is calculated exactly from the moment of birth, and even the least excess (‘hours’ means any short period, even minutes) disqualifies the animal. Thus it may reach the age limit at the moment of slaughtering and exceed it a moment afterwards.
(28) If the blood of a sacrifice passes without the Temple court before it is sprinkled, it is unfit. In this case, if one cut off the legs first, the blood that passed out (sc. that contained in the legs) did not mingle with that which remained within.

Zevachim 26a

if he slaughtered and then cut off [the legs], it is unfit.1 ‘If he cut off [the legs] and then slaughtered [it], it is fit’? Surely he offers a blemished animal! — Say rather: if he cut off [the legs] and then received [the blood], it is fit; if he received [the blood] and then cut off [the legs] it is unfit. ‘If he cut off [the legs] and then received [the blood] it is fit’? Surely R. Zera said: if one slits the ear of a firstling and then receives its blood, it is unfit, because it says. ‘And he shall take of the blood of the bullock’, [implying,] the bullock as it was originally! — Said R. Hisda in Abimi’s name: He cuts the limb as far as the bone.3 ‘If he received [the blood] and then cut, it is unfit’: from this you may infer that the blood which is absorbed in the limbs is blood?4 — [No:] perhaps [the unfitness is] on account of the fattiness.5 Then you may infer from this that if the flesh of sacrifices of lower sanctity passes out [from the Temple court] before the sprinkling of the blood, it is unfit?6 — [No:] perhaps [R. Ammi in R. Eleazar’s name] referred to sacrifices of higher sanctity. Our Rabbis taught: Sacrifices of higher sanctity are slaughtered on the north [side of the Temple court], and their blood is received on the north in service vessels. If he stood in the south, stretched out his hand to the north and slaughtered, his slaughtering is valid; if he [thus] received [the blood], his reception is invalid. If he projected his head and the greater part of his body [into the north].7 it is as though he had entered [the north] entirely. If [the animal] struggled and passed over into the south and then returned, it is fit.8 Sacrifices of lower sanctity are slaughtered [anywhere] within [the Temple court], and their blood is received in a service vessel within. If he stood without and stretched his hand within and slaughtered, his slaughtering is valid; if he received [the blood thus], his reception is invalid. If he projected his head and the greater part of his body within, he is not regarded as having entered. If it struggled and went without and returned, it is unfit. This proves that sacrifices of lower sanctity whose flesh went without before the sprinkling of the blood are unfit! — [No:] perhaps this refers to the fattail, the lobe above the liver, and the two kidneys.10
Samuel's father asked Samuel: What if it [the animal] is within, while its feet are without? — It is written, Even that they may bring them unto the Lord, he replied, [which intimates] that the whole of it must be within. What if one suspended [the animal] and slaughtered it? It is valid, he replied. You have erred, he observed, for the slaughtering must be ‘on the side’ [of the altar], which provision is unfulfilled. What if one suspended and slaughtered [thus]? — It is invalid, he replied. You have erred, he asserted, for the slaughtering must be ‘on the side’ but the slaughterer need not be ‘on the side’. What if he suspended himself and received [the blood]? It is valid, he answered. You have erred, he retorted: slaughtering must be ‘on the side’, but receiving need not be ‘on the side’.

Abaye said: In the case of sacrifices of higher sanctity they are all invalid, except where he suspended himself and slaughtered. In the case of sacrifices of lower sanctity, they are all valid, except where he suspended himself and received [the blood]. Said Raba: Why do you say that if he suspended [the animal] and received the blood it is valid in the case of sacrifices of lower sanctity? [Presumably] because the air-space of within is as within! Then in the case of sacrifices of higher sanctity too, the air-space of the north is as the north? —

Rather said Raba: In the case of sacrifices of both higher and lower sanctity they are [all] valid, except in the case of sacrifices of higher sanctity, where he suspended [the animal] and slaughtered it, and in the cases of sacrifices of both higher and lower sanctity, where he suspended himself and received [the blood].

R. Jeremiah asked R. Zera: What if he [the priest] is within and his locks [of hair] are without? — Said he to him, Have you not said that ‘even that they may bring them unto the Lord’ intimates that the whole of it [the animal] must come within? So here too, when they go in unto the tent of meeting intimates, that the whole of him must enter the tent of meeting.


(1) Because immediately it is slaughtered the blood of the legs is unfit (v. preceding note), and this is naturally mingled with the rest of the blood.
(2) Which was offered as a sacrifice. On 25b the text has ‘bullock’ instead of ‘firstling’.
(3) This does not constitute a blemish, and at the same time the cut prevents the blood below it, which is without the Temple court, from ascending and mingling with the blood above, which is within.
(4) So that kareth (q.v. Glos.) is incurred for its consumption. For if it did not rank as blood whilst absorbed in the limb (cf. Hul. 113a), it could not disqualify the other blood which is received and sprinkled.
(5) Which is absorbed in the blood. This fattiness counts as flesh, and it ascends and mingles with the blood which pours out from the neck and thus disqualifies it.
(6) Though it would certainly be carried out after the sprinkling, since it may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem.
(7) He was standing almost in the middle of the court, on its south side, but so near to the line dividing north and south that he could easily stretch over to the other side.
(8) After being slaughtered.
(9) Because the disqualification of going out applies only to going out of the Temple.
(10) These were burnt on the altar, and therefore although part of sacrifices of lower sanctity they ranked as sacrifices of higher sanctity.
(11) May it be slaughtered thus at the outset?
(12) Lev. XVII, 5.
(13) In the air-space of the Temple court.
(14) Ibid. I, 11.
(15) ‘On the side’ implies on the ground.
(16) The animal being on the ground.
(17) Thinking that the two were analogous.
(18) Again thinking it analogous to the former.
(19) But slaughtering is not really part of the (priestly) service, since it may be performed by a zar.
(20) After having slaughtered it.
(21) In connection with which ‘on the side’ is stated.
(22) Because ‘on the side’ is written of the animal, but not of the slaughterer. Again, the blood must be received in the north, and he holds that the air-space of the north is not the north itself. Hence if he suspended himself and received the blood it is invalid.
(23) Here neither ‘north’ nor ‘on the side’ is mentioned. Therefore only the exception is invalid, because that is not the way of service.
(24) For the reason stated above.
(25) Ex. XXVIII, 43.
(26) Leading to the altar, instead of on the altar.
(27) The blood was to be sprinkled over against the base of the altar, which means on a side provided with a foundation. This excludes the south-east corner, which had no base (infra 53a).
(28) A scarlet line ran round the sides of the altar: some blood was to be applied above, and some below.
(29) ‘Within’ means on the inner altar; ‘without’, on the outer altar.
(30) For the eating of its flesh.

**Zevachim 26b**

**GEMARA.** Samuel said: It is the flesh that is unfit, but its owners are forgiven:1 What is the reason? — Because Scripture saith, And I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement:2 once the blood has reached the altar, the owners are forgiven. If so, the flesh too [should be fit]? — Scripture saith, ‘to make atonement’: I have given it for atonement, but not for any other purpose.3 Now this proves that he holds that [when blood is] not [applied] In its [proper] place, it is as [though applied] in its [proper] place.4 Now we learned in another chapter: If [the priest] applied it [the blood] on the ascent, [or on the altar, but] not over against its base; if he applied [the blood] which should be applied below [the scarlet line] above [it], or that which should be applied above, below; or that which should be applied within [he applied] without, or what should be applied without [he applied] within: then if lifebloods is still available, a fit [priest] must receive [it] a second time.6 Now if you maintain that [when blood is] not [applied] in its [proper place], it is as though [applied] in its [proper] place, why must a fit [priest] receive [it] again? And should you answer, In order to permit the flesh for consumption; is there a sprinkling which makes no atonement yet permits the consumption of the flesh?7 — Had a fit [priest] applied it [in the first place], that would indeed be so:8 the circumstances here are that an unfit [priest] applied it [in the first place].9 But let it constitute [complete] rejection.10 For we learnt: But if any of these11 received [the blood, intending to consume the flesh] after time or without bounds, and the life blood is [still] available, a fit [priest] must receive [it] a second time.12 Thus, only if they received [the blood with that intention], but not if they sprinkled [it thus];13 what is the reason? is it not because this effects [complete] rejection? — No: the reason is because it became unfit through an [illegitimate] intention. If so [the same should apply to] receiving? Moreover, does an [illegitimate] intention14 disqualify it? Surely Raba said: An [illegitimate] intention is without effect save [when purposed] by one who is fit for the service and in connection with that which is fit for the service,15 and in a place fit for the service!16 — Do not say, but not if they sprinkled it [thus]; ‘say rather, but not if they slaughtered it [thus]?17 What does he inform us? that an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies? But we have learnt it: Therefore they18 invalidate [the sacrifice] by an [illegitimate] intention [purposed at slaughtering]?19 — This is what we are informed,20 viz., that from receiving and onwards intention [on the part of an unfit priest] does not invalidate. What is the reason? As [that stated] by Raba. An objection is raised: If [the priest] intends applying [the blood] which should be applied above [the line] below [it], or what should be
applied] below, above, immediately. 21 It is valid. 22 If he subsequently intended
(1) They have fulfilled their obligation, and do not bring another offering.  
(2) Lev. XVII, 11.  
(3) Only in respect of atonement does Scripture intimate that the application of the blood on any part of the altar (since ‘altar’ is not further localized) is efficacious. But the fitness of the flesh is governed by its own peculiar laws.  
(4) As far as the fitness of the flesh for consumption is concerned.  
(5) The first blood which gushes out as the animal is slaughtered.  
(6) For re-sprinkling, v. infra 32a.  
(7) For this second sprinkling does not make atonement, since that was already effected by the first.  
(8) No further application would be necessary.  
(9) Hence the second application is needed even for making atonement.  
(10) Since blood not applied in its proper place is as though applied in its proper place, which it is now assumed definitely invalidates the sacrifice, and it cannot be repaired.  
(11) Sc. all who are unfit for any reason.  
(12) Infra 32a.  
(13) In which case there would be no remedy.  
(14) On the part of an unfit priest.  
(15) E.g., a meal-offering of wheat. This excludes the meal-offering of barley brought in connection with the ‘omer (q.v. Glos.), since barley was unfit for other meal-offerings.  
(16) This excludes the case where the altar itself was mutilated.  
(17) Because since even unfit priests are fit to slaughter (as are lay-Israelites too), their illegitimate intention disqualifies.  
(18) Persons unfit to slaughter.  
(19) Infra 31b.  
(20) By stating ‘if any of these received the blood, etc.’  
(21) He intended applying it thus in the wrong place on the day of slaughtering, which is the proper time.  
(22) If he eventually sprinkled the blood in the right place, for this illegitimate intention does not disqualify, v. Mishnah infra 36a.

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[to consume it] without bounds, it is invalid, but does not involve kareth;  
[if he intended consuming it] after time, it is invalid, and entails kareth. [If he intended sprinkling the blood in the wrong place] on the morrow, it is invalid; if he subsequently intended [to consume it] without bounds or after time, it is invalid, and does not involve kareth.  
2 Now if you say that [blood] not [applied] in its [proper] place [on the altar] is as [though applied] in its [proper] place, is this [merely] invalid? Surely it is piggul! 3 —

Said Mar Zutra: Sprinkling which permits the consumption of the flesh can render it Piggul; sprinkling which does not permit the consumption of the flesh does not render it piggul.  
5 R. Ashi said to Mar Zutra: Whence do you know this? [Assuredly] because it is written, And if any of the flesh of his peace-offerings be at all eaten on the third day... it shall be Piggul [an abhorred thing, and the soul that eateth of it shall bear his iniquity]:  
6 [thus kareth is incurred] only where Piggul causes [the prohibition of the flesh], which excludes this case, 7 where not Piggul causes it but a different interdict is the cause. If so, 8 it should not be disqualified either? —

Said R. Nahman b. Isaac: It is analogous to the intention of leaving [the blood] until the morrow, this being in accordance with R. Judah.  
9

Resh Lakish said: In truth, [the Mishnah means] UNFIT literally.  
10 and [blood] not [applied] in its [proper] place is as [though applied in] its [proper] place, 11 yet there is no difficulty:  
12 in one case he applied it in silence; in the other he applied it with an expressed intention.  
13 We learnt: If he intended applying above [the line] what should be applied below [it], or below what should be applied above [etc.] as far as ‘It is analogous to the intention of leaving [the blood] until the morrow, this being in accordance with R. Judah.  
14

R. Johanan said: Both cases 15 are where he sprinkles it in silence, and the wrong place is not as the right place; but the one is where
life-blood is [still] available, while the other is where life-blood is not available.

We learnt: IT IS UNFIT, BUT DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH. As for Resh Lakish, it is well: he rightly teaches.

IT IS UNFIT, BUT DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH. Now as for R. Johanan, why teach that it DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH? This is a difficulty. And according to Samuel, what is meant by IT DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH? — This is what [the Tanna] means: If he sprinkled [it thus] with an [illegitimate] intention, IT IS UNFIT, BUT DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH. Now as for R. Johanan, if the wrong place [on the altar] is not as the right place, let it be as though [the blood] had been spilt from the [service] vessel on to the pavement, and so let him collect it? — He agrees with the view that it must not be gathered. For R. Isaac b. Joseph said in R. Johanan's name: All agree, if [the priest] sprinkled the blood above which should be sprinkled above, or below which should be sprinkled below, but not in accordance with the regulations. That he must not re-gather it: He must re-gather it; while R. Simeon maintains, He must re-gather it;

(1) For eating it.
(2) Since it was already invalid through the first, a second illegitimate intention does not render it Piggul.
(3) How can you say that if he intended applying it in the wrong place on the morrow it is only invalid? On the present hypothesis it is the same as though he had intended applying it in the right place on the morrow, and that should render it Piggul. For the sprinkling of the blood on the altar constitutes, as it were, the altar’s consumption, and just as an intention to consume the flesh after time makes it Piggul, so should a similar intention to sprinkle the blood make it Piggul!
(4) Where the blood is not sprinkled in its proper place.
(5) And, as Samuel stated, if the blood is not sprinkled on the proper place on the altar the flesh may not be eaten, though the sacrifice has made atonement.
(6) Lev. VII, 18; ‘shall bear his iniquity’ implies kareth.
(7) Sc. where the blood is not sprinkled in the proper place.
(8) That it does not constitute sprinkling in respect of an illegitimate intention.
(9) Who holds that the sacrifice then becomes invalid (infra 36a). In intending to sprinkle the blood in the wrong place on the morrow, he has also tacitly expressed his intention of leaving the blood until the morrow.
(10) Not only is the flesh unfit, but the whole sacrifice is invalid. He thus disagrees with Samuel.
(11) In this he agrees with Samuel.
(12) Caused by the text quoted by Samuel.
(13) The text adduced by Samuel, which intimates that the owners are forgiven, holds good where the priest sprinkled the blood in the wrong place, with no unlawful intention attending the sprinkling. While the Mishnah which states UNFIT, implying that the owners are not forgiven either, holds good where in addition to sprinkling it in the wrong place he intended consuming the flesh after time; and the Mishnah thus teaches that in such a case the sacrifice is unfit, but not Piggul, since the sprinkling which was not in its proper place did not permit the consumption of the flesh.
(14) All the objections raised against Samuel are raised against Resh Lakish, since he too holds that the wrong place is as the right place.
(15) Our Mishnah which simply states that it is unfit, and the Mishnah in the next chapter, quoted supra 26b, which teaches that the blood must be re-sprinkled.
(16) He explains the Mishnah as referring to one who expressed an illegitimate intention. Therefore the Tanna must teach that kareth is not incurred in spite of this illegitimate intention.
(17) It is obvious that he does not incur kareth simply for sprinkling the blood in a wrong place.
(18) For he too explains the Mishnah as referring to where the priest is silent.
(19) So that it does not count as sprinkling at all.
(20) And re-sprinkle.
(21) E.g., with his left hand or with an illegitimate intention.
(22) For re-sprinkling. For since it was sprinkled in the proper place, there can be no further sprinkling

Zevachim 27b

and our Mishnah agrees with the view that he must not re-gather it: But R. Hisda said in
Abimi’s name: All agree, if he sprinkled below what should be sprinkled above, that he does not re-gather it, and all the more if he sprinkled above what should be sprinkled below, since the blood above runs down below.1 They disagree only where he sprinkled without what should be sprinkled within, or within what should be sprinkled without.2 R. Jose holds, He must not re-gather it, and R. Simeon rules: He must re-gather it.

R. Nahman b. Isaac said: We have also learnt to the same effect. R. Judah said: [This is the law of the burnt-offering:] it is that which goeth up [on its firewood upon the altar all night unto the morning];3 here you have three limitations: It excludes [an animal] slaughtered at night; it excludes [an animal] whose blood was spilt; and it excludes [an animal] whose blood was carried out beyond the hangings: if any one [of these] ascended [the altar], it descends.4

R. Simeon said: ‘Burnt-offering’: I only know [this] of a fit burnt-offering;5 whence do I know to include one which was slaughtered at night, or whose blood was spilt, or whose blood passed without the hangings, or who[se flesh] spent the night [away from the altar], or who[se flesh] went out, or the unclean, or which was slaughtered [with the intention of burning its flesh] after time or without bounds, or whose blood was received and sprinkled by unfit [priests]; or whose blood was applied below [the scarlet line] when it should have been applied above, or above when it should have been applied below, or without when it should have been applied within, or within when it should have been applied without; or a Passover-offering or a sin-offering which one slaughtered for a different purpose,6 — whence do we know [to include all these]? From the phrase, ‘the law of the burnt-offering,’ which intimates one law for all burnt-offerings, [viz.,:] that if they ascended, they do not descend. You might think that I include also a roba’ and a nirba’, ‘7 one set aside [for an idolatrous sacrifice] or worshipped; a [harlot's] hire or the price [of a dog].8 or a hybrid, or a trefah, or an animal calved through the cesarean section? The text however states ‘it is that’.9 And why do you include the former and exclude the latter? I include the former, because their disqualification arose in the sanctuary, while I exclude the latter whose disqualification did not arise In the sanctuary. At all events, he teaches [the cases where] one sprinkled below what should be sprinkled above, or above what should be sprinkled below, and R. Judah does not disagree. What is the reason? Is it not because the altar has received it?10 which proves that one cannot re-gather it.

R. Eleazar said: The inner altar sanctifies the unfit.11 What does he inform us: We have learnt it: ‘that which should be applied within’, etc.? — If [I drew my information] from there [only], I would say that it applies only to blood, which is eligible for it;12 but [if one threw] the fistful [of flour on the inner altar], which is not eligible for it at all,13 I would say that it is not so. Hence he informs us [otherwise].14 An objection is raised: If strange incense15 ascended the altar, it must descend, because only the outer altar sanctifies the unfit, in the case of such as are [otherwise] eligible for it.16 Thus, only the outer one, but not the inner one? — Answer it thus: If strange incense ascended the altar, it must descend, for the outer altar does not sanctify the unfit save in the case of what is [otherwise] eligible for it.16 Thus, only the outer one, but not the inner one? — Answer it thus: If strange incense ascended the altar, it must descend, for the outer altar does not sanctify the unfit save in the case of what is [otherwise] eligible for it; but the inner [altar sanctifies] both what is eligible and what is not eligible for it. What is the reason? One [the outer altar] is [but as the] pavement,17 while the other [the inner altar] is a service vessel.18

MISHNAH. IF ONE SLAUGHTERS THE SACRIFICE [INTENDING] TO SPRINKLE ITS BLOOD WITHOUT, OR PART OF ITS BLOOD WITHOUT; TO BURN ITS EMURIM19 OR PART OF ITS EMURIM WITHOUT; TO EAT ITS FLESH OR AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE OF ITS FLESH WITHOUT, OR TO EAT AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE OF THE SKIN OF THE FAT-
TAIL WITHOUT. IT IS UNFIT, AND DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH. [IF HE SLAUGHTERS IT, INTENDING] TO SPRINKLE ITS BLOOD OR PART OF ITS BLOOD ON THE MORROW, TO BURN ITS EMURIM OR PART OF ITS EMURIM ON THE MORROW, TO EAT ITS FLESH OR AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE OF ITS FLESH ON THE MORROW, OR TO EAT AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE OF THE SKIN OF ITS FAT-TAIL ON THE MORROW, IT IS PIGGUL, AND INVOLVES KARETH.

GEMARA. Now it was thought that the skin of the fat-tail

(1) In any case; hence it is almost as though he sprinkled it below.
(2) ‘Within’ and ‘without’ means on the inner and the outer altars respectively.
(3) Lev. VI, 2.
(4) From the passage, ‘which goeth up on its firewood upon the altar all night’ the Rabbis deduce that once it ascends the altar it must not be taken down all night. But the three words in Hebrew which are rendered ‘it is that which goeth up’ are really superfluous, and therefore are interpreted as excluding three cases, as enumerated in the text, from the operation of this law.
(5) That if it goes up, it does not descend.
(6) Sc. as burnt-offerings.
(7) A male animal and a female animal respectively used for bestiality.
(8) Referring to Deut. XXIII, 19: Thou shalt not bring the hire of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the house of the Lord thy God for any vow.
(9) Heb. zoth, a limitation excluding these.
(10) And thus sanctified it, in the sense that it cannot be collected for re-sprinkling.
(11) That if they ascend, they do not descend, though the Scriptural text refers only to the outer altar.
(12) For some blood, though that particular blood should not have been applied there.
(13) Flour is never burnt on the inner altar.
(14) That flour is not removed.
(15) The incense of a private and votive meal-offering. Scripture permits incense only at public sacrifices.
(16) V. infra 83b.
(17) It is an immovable un-anointed erection of stone.
(18) It was moveable, and consecrated by anointing, like all other service vessels. Therefore its sanctity and sanctifying powers are greater.

(19) V. Glos.
(20) V. Gemara.
(21) Even if one actually eats it without.
(22) Even if one eats it in the proper time.