is as the fat-tail:1 [then the difficulty arises:] surely he intends for man what is for the altar's consumption?2 —

Said Samuel, The author of this is R. Eliezer, who maintains that you can intend [with effect] for human consumption what is meant for the altar's consumption, and for the altar's consumption what is meant for human consumption.3 For we learnt: If one slaughters a sacrifice [intending] to eat what is not normally eaten,4 or to burn [on the altar] what is not normally burnt, it is fit;5 but R. Eliezer invalidates [the sacrifice].6 How have you explained it? as agreeing with R. Eliezer? Then consider the sequel: This is the general rule: Whoever slaughters, receives, carries, and sprinkles [intending] to eat what is normally eaten or to burn [on the altar] what is normally burnt [after time, etc....]... thus, only what is normally eaten, but not what is not normally eaten, which agrees with the Rabbis. Thus the first clause agrees with R. Eliezer and the final clause with the Rabbis? — Even so, he answered him.

R. Huna said: The skin of the fat-tail is not as the fat-tail.8 Rabbah observed. What is R. Huna's reason? — The fat thereof [is] the fat-tail [entire],9 but not the skin of the fat-tail.

R. Hisda said: In truth, the skin of the fat-tail is as the fat-tail, but we treat here [in the Mishnah] of the fat-tail of a goat.10 Now, all these [scholars] did not say as Samuel, [because] they would not make the first clause agree with R. Eliezer and the second clause with the Rabbis. They did not say as R. Huna, because they hold that the skin of the fat-tail is as the fat-tail. [But] why do they not say as R. Hisda? — Because what does [the Tanna of the Mishnah] inform us [on this view]? [Presumably] that the skin of the fat-tail is as the fat-tail!11 Surely we have learnt it: The skin of the following is as their flesh: the skin under the fat-tail?12 And R. Hisda?13 — It is necessary: You might think that only in respect of uncleanness does it combine, because it is soft;14 but as for here, I would say [Scripture writes] [Even all the hallowed things of the children of Israel unto thee have I given them] for a consecrated portion,15 which means, as a symbol of greatness,[so that they must be eaten] just as kings eat; and kings do not eat thus.16 [Hence] I would say [that it is] not [as the flesh]; therefore he informs us [that it is]. An objection is raised: if one slaughters a burnt-offering [intending] to burn [on the altar] what is not normally burnt, it is Piggul, and involves kareth. Eleazar b. Judah of Avlas said on the authority of R. Jacob, and thus also did R. Simeon b. Judah of Kefar ‘Iccum say on the authority of R. Simeon: The skin of the legs of small cattle, the skin of the head of a young calf, and the skin under the fat-tail, and all cases which the Sages enumerated of the skin being the same as the flesh, which includes the skin of the Pudenda: [if he intended eating or burning these] out of bounds [the sacrifice] is invalid, and does not involve kareth; after time, it is Piggul, and involves kareth. Eleazar b. Judah of Avlas said on the authority of R. Jacob, and thus also did R. Simeon b. Judah of Kefar ‘Iccum say on the authority of R. Simeon: The skin of the legs of small cattle, the skin of the head of a young calf, and the skin under the fat-tail, and all cases which the Sages enumerated of the skin being the same as the flesh, which includes the skin of the Pudenda: [if he intended eating or burning these] out of bounds [the sacrifice] is invalid, and does not involve kareth; after time, it is Piggul, and involves kareth.18 Thus [this is taught] only [of] the burnt-offering.19 but not [of] a sacrifice.20 As for R. Huna, it is well; it is right that he specifies a burnt-offering.21 But according to R. Hisda,22 why does he particularly teach ‘burnt-offering’: let him teach ‘sacrifice’? — R. Hisda can answer you: I can explain this as referring to the fat-tail of a goat;23 alternatively I can answer: Read ‘sacrifice’.24

IT IS UNFIT, AND DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH, etc. Whence do we know it? — Said Samuel: Two texts are written. What are they? — Said Rabbah: [And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be at all eaten] on the third day: this refers to [an intention of eating the flesh] after time; it shall be Piggul [an abhorred thing] refers to [an intention of eating the flesh] out of bounds; and the soul that eateth of it [shall
bear his iniquity:]25 [only] one [involves kareth], but not two,26 viz., after time, and excluding out of bounds. Yet say that ‘and the soul that eateth of it’ refers to out of bounds, and excludes after time? — It is logical that after time is graver, since [Scripture] commences with it. On the contrary, out of bounds is more likely [to be meant] since it is near it?27 — Rather said Abaye: When R. Isaac b. Abdimi came,28 he said: Rabbah29 relies on what a Tanna taught. [Viz.;] When Scripture mentions the ‘third [day]’ in the pericope ‘Ye shall be holy’,30 which need not be stated, since it has already been said, And if any of the flesh of his sacrifices be at all eaten on the third day, etc.;

1 (1) Even in respect of burning on the altar, so that in the case of lamb peace-offerings, the skin of the fat-tail, just as the fat-tail itself, is burnt on the altar ‘entire’ (v. Lev. III, 9).
(2) Which intention should not count at all.
(3) I.e., the intention counts.
(4) E.g., the emurim, which are burnt on the altar.
He intended eating these after time or out of bounds.
(5) Because such an illegitimate intention concerning time or place does not count, seeing that the things could not be eaten or burnt at all.
(6) Infra 35a.
(7) The end of the present Mishnah, infra 29b.
(8) It is eaten, and not burnt on the altar. The difficulty therefore does not arise.
(9) Lev. III, 9.
(10) Which was not burnt on the altar; v. supra 9a.
(11) If the Mishnah treats of the fat-tail of a lamb, then on Samuel's interpretation we are informed that you can intend for human consumption what is meant for the altar's consumption; while on R. Huna's interpretation the Tanna informs us that the skin of the fat-tail is not as the fat-tail itself. But if it treats of the fat-tail of a goat, then the only thing that the Tanna can inform us is that its skin is regarded as itself in the sense that it is edible, because it is soft, and therefore counts as ordinary flesh.
(12) There must be at least as much as an olive of flesh before it can be defiled, and at least as much as the size of an egg before it can defile as nebelah (carrion. v. Lev. XI, 39f). If there is less than these standards, it can be made up by the skin under the fat-tail (Hul. 122a). Thus this teaches that this skin is as the fat-tail itself, and so the present teaching on R. Hisda's interpretation is superfluous.
(13) How does he answer this?
(14) And edible.
(15) Num. XVIII, 8.
(16) Though the skin is edible, yet kings would not eat it.
(17) Heb. ל.Rem, which generally refers to the burning of these parts (the emurim) which are always burnt on the altar, even in the case of peace-offerings.
(18) V. Hul. (Sonc. ed.) 132a, q.v. notes.
(19) Only there does an illegitimate intention in respect of the skin of the fat-tail disqualify the sacrifice, since the whole sacrifice is burnt.
(20) Unspecified, which would include peace-offerings.
(21) According to R. Huna, Scripture definitely teaches that the skin of the fat-tail is not counted as emurim. But there is no such teaching in respect of a burnt-offering: hence the present ruling can apply to a burnt-offering but not to other sacrifices.
(22) Who maintains that the skin of the fat-tail of all sacrifices is burnt along with it as emurim.
(23) In which case the reference is to an intention of eating it out of bounds or after time, not to burning it on the altar.
(24) Instead of burnt-offering.
(25) Lev. VII, 18; ‘shall bear his iniquity’ means that he incurs kareth.
(26) This follows from the sing. ‘it’.
(27) The word mimennu, (‘of it’), is in immediate proximity to the word Piggul, which on the present exegesis extends the law to eating out of bounds.
(28) From Palestine to Babylon.
(29) Emended text. Printed edd: Rab.
(30) This is the name of the pericope or weekly reading commencing with Lev. XIX, 1. The verse alluded to is: And if it (the flesh of a sacrifice) be eaten at all on the third day, it is Piggul (a vile thing); it shall not be accepted.
that nothar must be made to involve kareth, so that the meaning of ‘iniquity’, where it refers to [the intention of] eating after time, may be learned by analogy, since it is similar thereto in respect of Zab. On the contrary, [eating] without bounds should be made to involve kareth, so that the meaning of ‘iniquity’, where it refers to [the intention of] eating after time, may be learned by analogy, since it is similar thereto in respect of Mikdash.

Rather said R. Johanan, Zabdi b. Levi taught: Kodesh is learned from Kodesh. Here is written, Because he hath profaned the Kodesh [holy thing] of the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from the people; and it is written elsewhere, [And if ought of the flesh of the consecration, or of the bread, remain unto the morning,] then thou shalt burn the nothar [remainder] with fire,’ it shall not be eaten, because it is Kodesh: just as there, [Kodesh is connected with] nothar, so here too [it is connected with] nothar, and the Divine Law expresses a limitation in connection with nothar: But every one that eateth it shall bear his iniquity, which excludes without bounds from kareth. And why do you interpret the long text as referring to after time, and ‘third’ in the pericope ‘Ye shall be holy’ as referring to without bounds; perhaps I may reverse it?

— It is logical that the long text refers to after time, since the meaning of ‘iniquity’ is learned by analogy from nothar, and [after time] is similar thereto in respect of Zab. On the contrary, [say that ] the long text refers to without bounds, and ‘third’ in ‘Ye shall be holy’ refers to after time: because it is similar thereto [Scripture] places it close by and excludes it?

Rather said Raba: The whole is deduced from the long text. For it is written, ‘[But if any of the flesh be] at all eaten’: Scripture refers to two eatings, viz., eating by man and eating by the altar. ‘Of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings’: as [parts of] the peace-offerings render Piggul, and parts are rendered Piggul, so [in sacrifices where there are parts which] render Piggul and [parts which] are made Piggul [the law of Piggul applies]. ‘Third’ means after time. ‘It shall not be accepted’: as the acceptance of the valid [sacrifice], so is the acceptance of the invalid. And as the acceptance of the valid necessitates that all its mattirin be offered, so does the acceptance of the invalid necessitate that all its mattirin be offered. ‘Him that offereth’: it becomes unfit in offering, but does not become unfit through [being eaten on] the third [day]. ‘It’: Scripture speaks of the sacrifice, and not of the priest.

(1) While Piggul mentioned in Lev. VII, 18 will definitely refer to the intention of eating after time, to which the whole verse is now understood to refer.

(2) V. Glos.

(3) Zab is a mnemonic, standing for zeman, (time) and bamah, (high place). — In both texts, viz., Lev. VII, 18 and Lev. XIX, 8 Scripture states that he who eats it ‘shall bear his iniquity’; the meaning of ‘iniquity is further clarified in the latter text by the addition, ‘and that soul shall be cut off from his people’, i.e., kareth. Now, on the present exegesis this latter verse may refer either to nothar or to eating without bounds, while the former text (Lev. VII, 18) definitely refers to the eating of the flesh before it is actually nothar and within bounds, after the illegitimate intention of eating it after time. Now, if the punishment of kareth in Lev. XIX, 8 is made to refer to nothar (owing to the word ‘it’ it can only refer to one), then we can argue that ‘iniquity’ in VII, 18 too means kareth, by analogy with ‘iniquity’ in Lev. XIX, 8. And the reason for drawing this analogy is that the two are alike in two respects: (i) Both are defects arising through time, nothar being the case where he actually eats the flesh after time, and Lev. VII, 18 refers to the illegitimate intention of eating after time. (ii) Both were forbidden not only in the Temple, but also in the High Places used before the Temple was built. For but for this similarity, the meaning of ‘iniquity’ in VII, 18 might be deduced from Ex. XXVIII, 38: And Aaron shall bear the iniquity committed in the holy things. There ‘iniquity’ refers to sacrificing in a state of uncleanness, which is forbidden by a negative injunction, but does not involve kareth, and so if an analogy were drawn with this verse, one would say that in Lev. VII, 18 too there is no kareth. But if Lev. XIX, 8 is made to refer to eating without bounds, this second analogy might
indeed be drawn, since it lacks the two points of similarity, (a private sacrifice offered at a high place might be eaten anywhere) and accordingly nothing will indicate that ‘iniquity’ means kareth. So Rashi. Tosaf. explains that there was already a tradition that the meaning of ‘iniquity’ must be deduced by drawing an analogy between Lev. VII, 18 and XIX, 8. and not with Ex. XXVIII, 38. But for that very reason it is logical to make Lev. XIX, 8 refer to nothar, so as to justify the analogy through the two points of similarity.

(4) M = Mahshabah (intention); K = Kezath (a part or portion); D = Dam (blood), and SH = SHelishi (third). (i) Both after time and without bounds invalidate the sacrifice by mere intention. (ii) In both cases the illegitimate intention even in respect of a portion of the flesh only disqualifies. (iii) Both disqualify only if expressed during the service in connection with the blood (sprinkling) but not after. And finally (iv) the ‘third’ day is mentioned in connection with both. Uncleanness is dissimilar in respect of all these: (i) The flesh does not become unclean merely through the intention of defiling it. (ii) If a portion of the flesh is defiled, the rest remains clean. (iii) The flesh can be defiled after the sprinkling of the blood. And finally (iv) ‘third’ is not stated in connection with both. But it is mentioned redundantly in connection with the others, as shown above, so that an analogy (gezerah shawah) might be drawn.

(5) Lev. XIX, 8.
(6) Ex. XXIX, 34.
(8) And ‘third’ in Lev. XIX, 7 refers to after time, and it is that which is excluded from kareth.
(9) Because the intention to eat after time is similar to eating nothar, Scripture couples them, and expresses a limitation to show that no kareth is involved, as otherwise we would think that kareth is involved in the former because it is similar to nothar.
(10) Lev. VII, 18.
(11) V. supra 13b. — The exegesis of the whole verse is irrelevant here, but as Raba quotes it he interprets the whole (Sh. M.).
(12) The blood of the peace-offerings is the vehicle through which Piggul is effected, viz., if an illegitimate intention is expressed during one of the services connected with the blood, the flesh and the emurim are thereby rendered Piggul. Just as this is so in the case of the peace-offerings, so does the law of Piggul operate in the case of all sacrifices of which the same can be said. This excludes the meal-offerings of priests and of the anointed priest and of the drink-offerings. He treats the word ‘sacrifice’ in the text as alluding to other sacrifices too, which are thus assimilated to peace-offerings, since they are coupled with them.
(13) He understands ‘it shall not be accepted’, to refer to the sprinkling of the blood, which is the last of the mattirin, i.e., the services which make the sacrifice ‘accepted’, — valid. Thus he renders: this sprinkling shall not be accepted (valid), which implies that the sacrifice does not become Piggul until the sprinkling, and if e.g., the blood is spilt and not sprinkled, the sacrifice is not Piggul. The acceptance of the invalid means the stamping of the sacrifice as Piggul, and this does not take place unless the mattirin are offered, as explained.
(14) Here he deduces that the sacrifice becomes Piggul through an illegitimate intention, thus: the sacrifice becomes unfit only when he is actually offering it, viz., by then intending to eat thereof on the third day. But if he had no illegitimate intention at the actual offering, yet ate thereof on the third day, it does not become Piggul retrospectively.
(15) Var. lec. the sacrificer. — Scripture does not mean that the priest is henceforth unfit to officiate, but that the sacrifice is unfit. Without this ‘it’ the text might mean: he that offereth (viz., the priest) shall not be accepted, i.e., shall henceforth be disqualified to officiate.

Other intentions must not be mingled therein.1 ‘An abhorred thing [Piggul]’: this refers to [the intention of eating it] without bounds.2 ‘It shall be’: this teaches that they combine with each other.3 ‘And the soul that eateth of it’: one, but not two; and which is it? [the intention of eating it] after time, for the meaning of ‘iniquity’ is learnt from nothar, since it is similar to it in Zab.4

R. Papa said to Raba: According to you, how do you interpret ‘third’ in the pericope. ‘Ye shall be holy’5? — That is needed to teach [that the illegitimate intention must concern] a place which has a threefold function, viz., in respect of the blood, the flesh, and the emurim.6 But I may deduce that from the earlier text, viz., ‘And if [it] be at all eaten’, since the Divine Law expresses it by the word ‘third’7 —

Said R. Ashi: I reported this discussion before R. Mattenah, whereupon he answered
me: If [I deduced it] from there, I would say: ‘Third’ is a particularization, and ‘Piggul’ is a generalisation, and so the generalization becomes an addition to the particularization, and therefore other places are included too. Hence [the text in ‘Ye shall be holy’] informs us [that it is not so].

Our Rabbis taught: ‘And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be at all eaten [on the third day]’: R. Eliezer said: Incline your ear to hear: Scripture speaks of one who intends eating of his sacrifice on the third day. Yet perhaps that is not so, but rather [Scripture speaks] of one who eats of his sacrifice on the third day? You can answer: After it has become fit, shall it then become unfit? Said R. Akiba to him: Behold, we find that a Zab and a Zabah and a woman ‘who watches from day to day’ are presumed to be clean, yet since they have a discharge they undo [their cleanness];10 hence you too need not wonder at this, that after [the sacrifice] has become fit it then becomes unfit. Said he to him: Lo, it says, ‘unto him’ that offereth, [intimating that] it becomes unfit at the offering, but it does not become unfit on the third [day]. Yet perhaps that is not so, but it says, ‘him that offereth’, meaning the priest who offers it?11 When it says ‘it’, [Scripture] speaks of the sacrifice, and does not speak of the priest.

Ben ‘Azzai said: Why is ‘it’ stated? Because it is said, [When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God,] thou shalt not delay to pay it:12 You might think that also he who delays [the fulfillment of] his vow incurs [the sentence] ‘it shall not be accepted’: therefore it says, ‘it’: ‘it’ [Piggul] is subject to ‘it shall not be accepted’, but he who delays his vow is not subject to ‘it shall not be accepted’. Others13 say: ‘it shall not be imputed’ [teaches that] it becomes unfit through imputation [illegal intention], but does not become unfit through [being eaten on] the third [day]. Now, how does Ben ‘Azzai know that Scripture speaks of the sacrifice and not of the priest?14 — I can say that he deduces it from [the exegesis of] the ‘Others’.15 Alternatively, I can say [that he knows this] because it is written, [it] shall not be accepted, and ‘[it] shall not be accepted’ can only apply to the sacrifice.16 Now Ben ‘Azzai [deduces]: ‘it’ is subject to ‘it shall not be accepted’, but he who delays [the payment of] his vow is not subject to ‘it shall not be accepted’: [but] is this deduced from the present text? Surely it is deduced from [the text cited by] ‘Others’? For it was taught: Others say: You might think that a firstling which passed its [first] year17 is

(1) The animal is Piggul only if this, sc. to eat it after time, was his only intention. But if he also expressed another which would disqualify the sacrifice without rendering it Piggul, this intention negatives the other; cf. Mishnah on 27b and infra b.
(2) Since the intention of eating it after time has already been dealt with.
(3) He understands ‘it shall be’ to intimate that both these illegitimate intentions rank as one and combine. Thus, if he intended eating half as much as an olive after time and half as much as an olive without bounds (the standard of disqualification is an olive) the intentions combine to invalidate the sacrifice.
(4) V. notes supra 28b.
(5) For it is unnecessary in respect of after time, as stated supra 28a and b, while on Raba's present exegesis it is also irrelevant in respect of without bounds.
(6) It is disqualified only if he intends to eat it in a place where the blood is sprinkled, the flesh is eaten, and the emurim (q.v. Glos.) are burnt, e.g., without the Temple court. This excludes an intention to partake thereof in the Hekal, since the flesh is not eaten, nor are the emurim burnt there. So Rashi. Tosaf. gives several other explanations.
(7) ‘Third’ intimates after time, and in the same verse without bounds is hinted at too, as already explained. Hence ‘third’ here can have that same significance as is now attributed to it in the pericope ‘Ye shall be holy’.
(8) I.e., ‘third’ indicates a place with that threefold function, while Piggul is a general term denoting all places.
(9) Surely not. If it was sacrificed with the proper intention, and so was fit, surely it cannot become retrospectively unfit because he eats it on the third day.
(10) When a Zab or a Zabah (q.v. Glos.) cease to discharge, they must count seven consecutive clean days without any discharge. During this period they are presumed to be clean, yet a discharge within the seven days undoes the days which have already passed and they become retrospectively unclean for that time too, and they must count seven days anew. Similarly, according to Biblical law a niddah (q.v. Glos.) can cleanse herself seven days after her menstrual flow commenced. During the following eleven days, which are called the eleven days between the menses, she cannot become a niddah again, it being axiomatic that a discharge of blood in that period is not a sign of niddah, but may be symptomatic of gonorrhea. A discharge on one or two days within the eleven renders her unclean for that period only, and if she has a ritual bath (Tebillah) the following morning she is clean. Yet if she has another discharge on the same day after the ritual bath, she is retrospectively unclean for the whole day, and retrospectively defiles any human beings or utensils with which she came into contact. Should she experience three discharges on three consecutive days within that period she becomes unclean as a Zabah; hence on the first and the second days she is called 'one who watches from day to day', to see whether she will be unclean for those days only, or as a Zabah.

(11) He is henceforth unfit to officiate.

(12) Deut. XXIII, 22.

(13) ‘Others’ often refers to R. Meir, Hor. 13b.

(14) Seeing that he utilizes ‘it’ for a different purpose.

(15) Since according to them ‘it shall not be imputed’ is necessary to teach that there is no unfitness through the sacrifice being eaten on the third day. Scripture obviously does not refer to the unfitness of the priest, for if it did, how could I think that he is unfit? Not he has done wrong but the eater.

(16) The Hebrew is not applicable to a priest.

(17) The firstling must be sacrificed within its first year. If it is not, its owner transgresses the injunction, Thou shalt not delay.

Zevachim 29b

as dedicated animals rendered unfit,1 and so unfit; therefore it says. And thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God... the tithe of thy corn... and the firstlings of thy herd and of thy flock;2 the firstling is assimilated to tithe: as tithe does not become unfit through [being kept] from one year until the next? — It is necessary: You might think that this holds good only of a firstling, which is not subject to acceptance.3 but [other] sacrifices which are subject to acceptance, I would say that they are not ‘accepted’.4 Hence [‘it’] informs us [that it is not so]. Yet still it is deduced from elsewhere [viz..] [Thou shalt not delay to pay it...] and it will be sin in thee, [which teaches,] but it will not be sin in thy offering?5 — But we have interpreted this according to Ben ‘Azzaï [as teaching ‘and it will be sin in thee’, but it will not be sin in thy wife. For you might think that I can argue. Since R. Eleazar — others state, R. Johanan — said: A man’s wife does not die save when money is demanded from him and he lacks it,7 for it says. If thou hast not wherewith to pay, why should he take away thy bed from under thee?8 she also dies on account of this sin of [violating the injunction] ‘Thou shalt not delay’; [hence Scripture] informs us [that it is not so]. ‘Others say, ”It shall not be imputed” [teaches that] it becomes invalid through imputation [intention], but it does not become invalid through [being eaten on] the third day.’ Now, how does R. Eliezer utilize this [text], ‘it shall not be imputed’? — He needs it for the teaching of R. Jannai. For R. Jannai said: How do we know that [illegal] intentions negative each other? Because it says, ‘it shall not be imputed’, [which means,] other [illegal] intentions shall not be mingled therewith.9 R. Mari recited it [thus]: R. Jannai said: How do we know that he who purposes an [illegitimate] intention in respect of sacrifices is flagellated?10 Because it says. Lo yehasheb.11 Said R. Ashi to R. Mari: But it is a negative injunction not involving an action,12 and one is not flagellated on account of a negative injunction which does not involve action? — This is according to R. Judah, he replied, who maintained: One is flagellated on account of a negative injunction which does not involve action.

MISHNAH. THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: HE WHO SLAUGHTERS OR RECEIVES [THE
(1) Through a blemish.
(2) Deut. XIV, 23.
(3) The firstling does not come to make atonement, and therefore is not subject to ‘acceptance’.
(4) If delayed. i.e., that the vower has not duly fulfilled his vow and must bring another sacrifice.
(5) i.e., the offering does not become invalid.
(6) Emended text.
(7) The money which he robbed.
(8) Prov. XXII, 27; ‘thy bed’ is understood to mean ‘thy wife’.
(9) V. supra a top.
(10) As are all who violate a negative injunction.
(11) It shall not be imputed. But with a different voweling this reads lo yahshob, he (the priest) shall not intend (to eat it after time), and thus this becomes a negative injunction.
(12) Talking is not considered an action.
(13) The enabler, i.e., the blood, through the sprinkling of which the sacrifice may be eaten.
(14) i.e., that no other illegitimate intention is expressed.
(15) As different sacrifices, whereby they are invalid, supra 2a.
(16) In all these cases there was an illegitimate intention which invalidated the sacrifice in addition to that which would render it Piggul. Hence it is not Piggul but only invalid, as already stated.
(17) The intentions being in that order.
(18) For the same reason as before.
(19) R. Judah holds that an invalidating intention does not negative a Piggul intention if the latter is expressed first.
(20) Whatever the order.
(21) In intention.
(22) Even R. Judah agrees that where both intentions are expressed at the same service, the sacrifice is not Piggul but merely unfit, even if the Piggul intention preceded.
(23) As it is explicitly taught: IF ONE SLAUGHTERED [INTENDING TO EAT] AFTER TIME AND RECEIVED THE BLOOD, etc. WITHOUT BOUNDS.
(24) Sc. IF ONE SLAUGHTERED INTENDING TO EAT AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW AND AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT BOUNDS.

We learnt: SAID R. JUDAH: THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF THE INTENTION OF TIME PRECEDED THE INTENTION OF PLACE, IT IS PIGGUL, AND INVILOVES KARETH. As for R. Johanan, it is well: hence he teaches, THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE. But according to Ilfa, what is the implication of THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE? — That is indeed a difficulty.

We learnt elsewhere: [If one declares.] ‘This [animal] be a substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offerings,’ it is a substitute for a burnt-offering [only]: this is R. Meir’s view. Said R. Jose: If such was his original intention, since it is impossible to pronounce both designations simultaneously, his declarations are valid. But if, having declared, ‘This [animal] be a substitute for a burnt-offering,’ he declared as an afterthought, ‘This be a substitute for a peace-offerings,’ it is a burnt-offering. It was asked: What if [one declares.] ‘This [animal] be a substitute for a burnt-offering and a peace-offerings,’ [or] ‘[This animal be a substitute for] half [a burnt-offering] and half [a peace-offering]’? Said Abaye: Here R. Meir certainly agrees [with R. Jose]. Raba said: There is still the controversy. Raba said to Abaye: According to you who maintain that here R. Meir certainly agrees, Yet lo! slaughtering is analogous to half and half, yet they disagree? — Said he to him: Do you think that shechitah counts only at the end? [No:] Shechitah counts from the beginning until the end, and our Mishnah means that he declared [that he cut] one organ [intending to eat the flesh] after time and the second organ [intending to eat it] without bounds. Yet surely kemizah is analogous to halves, yet they disagree? — There too it means that he burnt a fistful of the meal-offering [with the intention of eating] after time and a fistful of the frankincense [intending to eat] without bounds. Yet they disagree in respect of the fistful of a sinner's meal-offering, where there is no

Zevachim 30a

— Even so: the first clause treats of two services, while the second clause can refer to either one service or two services.
frankincense? — They do not disagree there. R. Ashi said: If you should say that they do disagree, they disagree in the steps. R. Shimi b. Ashi recited [the passage] as Abaye; R. Huna b. Nathan recited [it] as Raba.

When R. Dimi came, he said: R. Meir stated [his ruling] in accordance with the thesis of R. Judah, who maintained: Regard the first expression. For we learnt: R. Judah said, THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF THE INTENTION OF TIME PRECEDED THE INTENTION OF PLACE, IT IS PIGGUL, AND INVOLVES KARETH.

(1) This phrase is always regarded as including something not explicitly stated; according to R. Johanan then it includes the case of both intentions being expressed at one service.
(2) To declare it a substitute for both.
(3) V. Lev. XXVII, 33: He shall not inquire whether it be good or bad, neither shall he change it; and if he change it at all, then both it and that for which it is changed shall be holy. This is interpreted as meaning that if an animal is dedicated for a particular sacrifice, e.g., a peace-offerings, and then a second is substituted for it, both are holy, the second having exactly the same holiness as the first. Now R. Meir rules that if he declares it a substitute for two consecrated animals in succession, only the first declaration is valid, and the second is disregarded. But R. Jose maintains that if the second statement was not added as an afterthought but was part of the original intention, the whole is valid. Consequently, the animal is put out to graze until it receives a blemish, when it must be sold, and the money expended half for a burnt-offering and half for a peace-offering.
(4) When one slaughters the sacrifice with the intention of eating as much as an olive without bounds and as much as an olive after time, the second intention is not an afterthought cancelling the first, since both are possible; yet R. Judah regards the first statement only. This is analogous to making an animal a substitute for half a burnt-offering and half a peace-offerings, for here too both are possible. Now R. Meir who regards the first statement only in substitution agrees with R. Judah in our Mishnah, and therefore in the declaration in question too he should regard the first statement only.
(5) Shechitah consists of cutting across the two organs of the throat, viz., the windpipe and the gullet. Here R. Judah disagrees, because he regards them as two separate statements; but in a statement of ‘halves’ R. Judah (and R. Meir) would agree that the whole counts as one statement and that both parts are regarded. V. also Pes. (Sonn. ed.) p. 315, n. 3.
(6) V. Glos.
(7) If the priest takes the fistful of the meal-offering for burning on the altar while expressing the intention of eating as much as an olive after time and as much as an olive without bounds. There is the same controversy in Men. 12a between R. Judah and the Sages as here.
(8) As the priest took one step while carrying the fistful to the altar he declared his intention of partaking of the offering without bounds, and as he took another step, his intention of partaking thereof after time. Hence here also we have two separate statements.
(9) From Palestine to Babylon.

Said Abaye to him: Yet surely Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in R. Johanan’s name: When you bring R. Meir and R. Jose together, [you find that] they do not disagree.1 But do they not disagree? Surely they do disagree? — They disagree in what they disagree, he answered him, and they do not disagree in what they do not disagree.2 For R. Isaac b. Joseph said in R. Johanan’s name: All agree that if he declared ‘Let this [sanctity] fall upon the animal and after that let that [sanctity] fall upon it,’ [the latter] does not fall upon it.3 ‘Let this [sanctity] not fall upon it unless the other falls upon it [too],’ all agree that [the latter] does not fall upon it.4 They disagree only where he declares, ‘[Let this animal be] a substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering.’ R. Meir holds: Since he should have said, ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering and a peace-offering.’5 but said [instead], ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering,’ you may infer that he has indeed retracted.6 And R. Jose?7 — Had he declared, ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering and a peace-offering,’ I might have interpreted it, Half as a substitute for a burnt-offering and half as a substitute for a peace-offering;8 therefore he declared, ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute
for a peace-offerings,’ to intimate that the whole should be a burnt-offering and the whole should be a peace-offerings? —

Said he [R. Dimi] to him [Abaye]: He [Rabbah b. Bar Hanah] said that they do not disagree, but I maintain that they do disagree.10 ‘Ulla-others state, R. Oshaia — said: Perhaps our Babylonian colleagues know whether we learnt, ‘As much as an olive... as much as an olive’; or did we learn, ‘As much as an olive... and as much as an olive’?11 [The point of the question is this:] Did we learn, ‘As much as an olive... as much as an olive,’12 but [if he declared,] ‘... As much as an olive... and as much as an olive,’ all agree that it constitutes a mingling of intentions.13 Or perhaps we learnt’. ... as much as an olive... and as much as an olive,’ and this, in R. Judah’s opinion, constitutes a detailed enumeration,14 and all the more [if he declared]’. ... as much as an olive... as much as an olive?’ —

Come and hear, for Levi asked Rabbi: What if he intended eating as much as an olive on the morrow [after time] without bounds? Said he to him: That is indeed a question: it constitutes a mingling of intentions.15

Thereupon R. Simeon b. Rabbi observed, is this not [taught in] our Mishnah: [IF HE INTENDED] TO EAT AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT, AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW; [OR] AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW, AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT; [OR] HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT, HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW. HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT: IT IS INVALID, AND DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH. Hence it follows that the other case16 constitutes a mingling of intentions.17 Nevertheless he asked me a profound question, he replied, though you say that it is [implied in] our Mishnah. Since I taught you both [cases], you find no difficulty.18 But him I taught only one,19 while he heard that the Rabbis read both versions [in the Mishnah]. Hence his doubt: was my teaching exact,20 whereas their [additional case] constitutes a mingling of intentions;21 or perhaps their [version] is exact,22 whilst I had simply omitted [one case when I taught him], and just as I had omitted this instance, so had they omitted the other instance.23 Now, which [case] did he teach him? If we say [that] he taught him: ‘... as much as an olive... and as much as an olive,’ [surely] that is not an omission!24 Hence he taught him, ‘As much as an olive... as much as an olive.’25 Then let him ask about ‘as much as an olive... and as much as an olive,’ it is well if he answers me that it is a comprehensive statement.26 But, as shown anon, both reject the view that only the first statement is regarded. That being so R. Meir’s ruling on substitution does not agree with R. Judah in our Mishnah.

(1) For, as shown anon, both reject the view that only the first statement is regarded. That being so R. Meir’s ruling on substitution does not agree with R. Judah in our Mishnah.

(2) They disagree only in the case cited, where their controversy is explicitly stated. But they do not disagree on the general question whether a man’s first statement only is to be regarded, for they both hold that a man’s complete intention must be taken into account, the point at issue being what is his intention.
If he declared, ‘Let the sanctity of this animal, dedicated for a burnt-offering, fall upon this one as its substitute, and then let the sanctity of the other dedicated for a peace-offerings fall upon it’; it is not seized with the sanctity of the second, for sanctity cannot fall upon an animal which already possesses it.

(4) Since he obviously intended the animal to assume both sanctities simultaneously.

(5) If he intended both.

(6) Having declared it a substitute for the one, he retracted and made it a substitute for the other. But retraction is not permitted, and therefore it retains the first sanctity only.

(7) Does he not allow this argument?

(8) In which case it could not be sacrificed at all.

(9) Erroneously thinking that then the animal itself could be offered (presumably, as whichever sacrifice he desired, when he actually came to sacrifice it). — Thus on the present interpretation R. Meir too does not disagree with R. Jose that you cannot regard only a man’s first statement, which contradicts R. Dimi.

(10) Precisely on the point whether a man’s first statement only is to be regarded.

(11) In the Mishnah, did the man state, ‘I declare my intention to eat as much as an olive without bounds, as much as an olive after time’, or, and as much as an olive after time’?

(12) R. Judah regards this as two distinct (and to some extent self-contradictory) intentions, since they are not joined by ‘and’.

(13) Hence it is not Piggul.

(14) Each is a separate statement, and there is no mingling of intentions. Hence R. Judah regards the first only.

(15) Even in R. Judah’s opinion.

(16) Viz., where he declares both intentions in respect of the same piece.

(17) Why praise it then as a question worthy of asking?

(18) I taught you both versions, viz., that he declares, ‘as much as an olive... as much as an olive’; or ‘as much... and as much’, etc., and the controversy of R. Judah and the Rabbis applies to both. Hence, since the Mishnah teaches these, and not a twofold declaration in respect of the same piece, you rightly deduce that there obviously even R. Judah admits that we have a mingling of intentions.

(19) Which one is explained anon.

(20) Viz., that the controversy applies to one case only.

(21) In my opinion, so that they read this into the Mishnah incorrectly. If so, a twofold declaration in respect of the same piece certainly constitutes a mingling of intentions.

(22) The controversy applies to both.

(23) Viz., two declarations in respect of the same piece. Hence he was right to raise the question.

(24) For the case of ‘as much as an olive... as much as an olive’ follows a fortiori. If R. Judah holds that we have a detailed enumeration and no mingling of intentions even when the priest uses the copulative, how much more so when his statements are disjointed. Hence he would have understood that this too is included, but only this and no other, so that a twofold declaration in respect if the same piece would certainly be a mingling of intentions, and there would be no room for his question.

(25) Only on this assumption is there room for his question. This proves that the reading in the Mishnah is ‘as much as an olive... as much’, etc.

(26) According to the explanation above he was in doubt about that too.

(27) Sc. it is a mingling of intentions.

Zevachim 31a

Said Raba: ‘Then the Piggul awakened as one asleep’. But R. Hamnuna maintained: This constitutes a mingling of intentions. Raba said: Whence do I say it? Because we learnt: if one combines as much as an egg of an edible of first degree with as much as an egg of an edible of second degree, [the combination] ranks as first degree. If one separates them, each ranks as second degree. But if one re-combined them, [the mixture] ranks as first degree. Whence [does this follow]? — Because the second clause teaches: If each falls separately on a loaf of terumah, they render it unfit; if they both fall [on it] simultaneously, they render it second degree. But R. Hamnuna argues: There you had the requisite standard; but here the standard is absent.

R. Hamnuna said: Whence do I say it? — Because we learnt: An edible which was
defiled by a principal degree of uncleanness, and [one] which was defiled by a derivative of uncleanness combine with each other to defile according to the lesser of the two.9 Surely that means even if [the standard quantity] is subsequently made up?10 — [No:] perhaps [this holds good only] when one does not make up [the standard]. When R. Dimi came, he said: [When one declares his intention of eating] half an olive without bounds and half an olive after time and [another] half an olive after time, —

Bar Kappara taught: It is Piggul, [because the declaration in respect of] half an olive is of no effect as against [that in respect of] an olive.11 When Rabin came, he said: [If one declares his intention of eating] half as much as an olive after time and [another] half an olive after time and half an olive without bounds, —

Bar Kappara taught: It is Piggul, [because the declaration in respect of] half an olive is of no effect as against [that of] an olive.12 R. Ashi recited it thus: [If one declares his intention to eat] half an olive after time, and an olive, half without bounds and half after time,13 —

Bar Kappara taught: It is Piggul, [because the declaration in respect of] half an olive is of no effect as against [that of] an olive.14 R. Jannai said: If one intended dogs to eat it on the morrow, it is Piggul, because it is written, And the dogs shall eat Jezebel in the portion of Jezreel.15 To this R. Ammi demurred: If so, if he intended fire to eat it on the morrow, is that too Piggul, since it is written, A fire not blown by man shall eat [consume] him?16

And should you say, That indeed is so, — surely we learnt, [IF HE INTENDED] TO EAT HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE [ILLEGITIMATELY] AND TO BURN HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE [ILLEGITIMATELY], IT IS FIT, BECAUSE EATING AND BURNING DO NOT COMBINE? — If he expressed [his intention] in terms of eating, that indeed would be so;17 here [in the Mishnah] however he expressed it in terms of burning: [hence they do not combine,] because the term eating is one thing and the term burning is another. R. Assi18 asked: What if he intended as much as an olive to be eaten [illegitimately] by two men? Do we go by his intention, and there is the standard [of disqualification]; or do we go by the eaters, and there is not the standard? —

Said Abaye, Come and hear: [IF HE INTENDED] TO EAT HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE AND TO BURN HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE [ILLEGITIMATELY]. IT IS FIT, BECAUSE EATING AND BURNING DO NOT COMBINE.

(1) i.e., Rabbi would have replied with asperity, ‘Why, even the former case is a mingling of intentions; how much more so that which you ask’.
(2) Cf. Ps. LXXVIII, 65. — The first half, on finding as it were the last half, awakes from its slumber and combines with it. Thus he intends to eat as much as an olive after time; this renders it Piggul and cannot be undone by the intention if eating half as much as an olive without bounds.
(3) Hence it is not Piggul.
(4) A man who becomes unclean through contact with a corpse, and a Sherez (‘creeping thing’) rank as principal (ab, lit., ‘father’) degree of uncleanness, and if a foodstuff comes into contact with them, it becomes unclean in the first degree; if that in turn comes into contact with another foodstuff, the latter is unclean in the second degree. The minimum standard of foodstuffs to defile is as much as an egg. Now, the first combination contains the standard quantity for defilement, and that in the first degree; hence the whole ranks as such. But if one divides the whole, each part contains less than the standard in the first degree; hence each part is second degree
(5) In hullin (non-sacred food) there is nothing below second degree, so that if second degree food touches hullin, the latter remains clean. In terumah (q.v. Glos.) there is a third degree, but it goes no further, and the terumah is then called unfit, but not unclean, since it cannot defile other terumah. Now, if each of these separated masses falls on terumah consecutively, the terumah is
disqualified only, since neither mass contains as much of first degree to render it second. But if they both fall on it together, as much as an egg of first degree has touched it at the same moment, and therefore the terumah becomes unclean in the second degree, so that it can render other terumah unfit. This proves that the firsts in each combine, and the same is true here.

(6) In the first place there was one mass of the requisite standard; therefore the two masses recombine.

(7) There was never the complete standard by itself to render it Piggul.

(8) ‘Derivative’ is another name for first degree.

(9) If each contains only half the standard. Thus the combination disqualifies terumah (rendering it third), but does not defile it (i.e., it does not render it second).

(10) Even if one adds a first degree edible to make up to the size of an egg, yet since the combination is only a second, that portion thereof which is first does not re-awake to combine with the addition.

(11) Since the two Piggul intentions (viz., to eat after time) were consecutive.

(12) But only in this case. In the former case, however, when he declares his intention to eat half an olive without bounds and half an olive after time, these two intentions immediately combine, and his subsequent declaration that he will eat half an olive after time cannot upset the previous combination; hence it is not Piggul. Thus we have a controversy between R. Dimi and Rabin as to Bar Kappara’s teaching.

(13) Thus combining the latter two in his declaration.

(14) This goes further than R. Dimi’s view. For here he actually combined the latter two intentions, and yet they are separated and the two intentions concerning after time recombined.

(15) II Kings IX, 10. This proves that eating by dogs is designated eating.

(16) Job XX, 26.

(17) They would combine.


Raba asked: What if he intended to eat as much as an olive within more than the time required for eating half [a loaf]? Do we compare this to the eating of the All-High, or do we liken it to human eating? —

Said Abaye, Come and hear: [IF HE INTENDED] EATING HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE AND BURNING HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE, IT IS FIT, BECAUSE EATING AND BURNING DO NOT COMBINE. Thus only eating and burning; but eating and eating in a way similar to eating and burning combine, though burning requires more than the time for eating half [a loaf]. — [No:] perhaps it means in a big fire.

[IF HE INTENDED] TO EAT HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE AND TO BURN HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE IT IS FIT. Thus only to eat and to burn; but [if he intended] to eat [what is fit for eating] and to eat what is not fit for eatings they combine. Yet surely the first clause teaches: [IF HE INTENDS] TO EAT WHAT IS NORMALLY EATEN [IT IS UNFIT]. Hence, only what is normally eaten, but not what is not normally eaten? —

Said R. Jeremiah. This is in accordance with R. Eliezer, who maintained [that] you can intend [with effect] for the altar's consumption what is meant for human consumption and for human consumption what is meant for the altar’s consumption. For we learnt: If one slaughters the sacrifice intending to eat what is not normally eaten or to burn [on the altar] what is not normally burnt, it is fit; but R. Eliezer invalidates it.

Abaye said: You may even say that it is according to the Rabbis; but do not deduce: But [if he intends] to eat [what is fit for eating] and to eat what is not normally eaten [it is fit]; deduce rather: But [if he intends] to eat [what is normally eaten] and to eat what...
is normally eaten [it is invalid]. [Then] what does [the Tanna] inform us? if he informs us [the law concerning] what is normally eaten,9 you can infer this from the first clause: [IF HE INTENDS TO EAT] HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT, HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW, [HIS INTENTIONS] COMBINE. If [he informs us about intending] to eat and to burn,10 you can infer this by deduction from the first clause, [viz.,] only [if he intends] to eat what is normally eaten, but not [if he intends to eat] what is not normally eaten. Then seeing that [intentions] to eat [what is normally eaten] and to eat what is not normally eaten do not combine, is it necessary [to teach about intentions] to eat and to burn [that they do not combine]?11 — He needs [to teach about intending] to eat and to burn. For you might argue, Only there12 [do they not combine], because his intention is not normal; but here, where [his intentions in respect of] each are normal,13 I would say that they combine. Hence he informs us [otherwise].

CHAPTER III

MISHNAH. ALL UNFIT PERSONS14 WHO SLAUGHTERED, THEIR SLAUGHTERING IS VALID, FOR SLAUGHTERING IS VALID [EVEN WHEN PERFORMED] BY LAY-ISRAELITES [ZARIM], AND BY WOMEN, AND BY SLAVES, AND BY UNEFFECTIVE, EVEN IN THE CASE OF SACRIFICES OF HIGHER SANCTITY, PROVIDED THAT UNEFFECTIVE [PERSONS] DO NOT TOUCH THE FLESH; THEREFORE THEY15 INVALIDATE [THE SACRIFICE] BY AN [ILLEGITIMATE] INTENTION.

(1) A loaf is the size of eight (according to Maim. six) eggs, and half a loaf constitutes the average meal. The eating of forbidden food in general is punishable only if as much as an olive thereof, which is the standard for punishment, is eaten in the time of an average meal.
(2) Sc. the consumption of the emurim on the altar. Naturally, this sometimes requires more time than the human standard, and therefore if this comparison is made his intention counts.
(3) Emended text (Rashi). ‘Eating and eating’ means an intention to eat half as much as an olive and another intention to eat half as much as an olive.
(4) Where it will be quickly consumed.
(5) For what he would burn (the emurim) is not fit for eating.
(6) The final clause.
(7) V. supra 28a for notes. In view of R. Eliezer’s opinion it is necessary to state here that intentions in respect of eating and burning (human consumption and the altar’s consumption) do not combine.
(8) I.e., two intentions in respect of two half standards.
(9) Viz., that they combine.
(10) That they do not combine. I.e., if the law is taught for its own sake, and not for the sake of a deduction.
(11) Surely not.
(12) When he intends to eat what is normally eaten and to eat what is not normally eaten.
(13) He intends to eat what is eaten, and to burn what is burnt, though not in the right time or place.
(14) As enumerated in the Mishnah supra 15b.
(15) These unfit persons.

Zevachim 32a


IF HE RECEIVED [THE BLOOD] IN HIS RIGHT HAND AND TRANSFERRED [IT] TO HIS LEFT, HE MUST RE-TRANSFER IT TO HIS RIGHT. IF HE RECEIVED [IT] IN A SACRED VESSEL AND POURED IT [THENCE] INTO A SECULAR [NON-SACRED] VESSEL, HE MUST RETURN IT TO THE SACRED VESSEL. IF IT SPILT FROM THE VESSEL ON TO THE PAVEMENT AND ONE COLLECTED IT, IT IS FIT. IF [THE PRIEST] APPLIED IT ON THE ASCENT [OR ON THE ALTAR], [BUT]

GEMARA. ‘WHO SLAUGHTERED’ [implies] only if done, but not at the very outset.2 But the following contradicts it: And he shall slaughter:3 [this teaches that] slaughtering by a Zar is valid,4 for slaughtering by Zarim, women, slaves, and unclean persons is valid, even in the case of most sacred sacrifices. Yet perhaps that is not so, but rather [it must be done] by priests? You can answer: Whence do you come [to propose this]? From the fact that it is said, And thou and thy sons with thee shall keep the priesthood in everything that pertaineth to the altar,5 you might think that this applies to shechitah too. Therefore Scripture states, And he shall kill the bullock before the Lord; and Aaron's sons, the priests, shall present the blood:6 from receiving onwards priesthood is prescribed, which teaches that shechitah by any person is valid!7 — The truth is that it [may be performed] even at the very outset too, but because [the Tanna] wishes to include unclean, who may not [slaughter] in the first place lest they touch the flesh,8 he states, WHO SLAUGHTERED. Is then [the slaughtering by] an unclean person well if it was done? The following, however, contradicts it: And he shall lay [his hands upon the head of the burnt-offering...] and he shall kill the bullock [before the Lord]:9 as ‘laying’ must be [done] by clean [persons only], so must shechitah [be done] by clean [persons only]? — That is [only] a Rabbinical law.10 Why does ‘laying’ differ? because it is written, before the Lord?11 Yet surely ‘before the Lord’ is written of shechitah too? — It is possible to make a long knife and slaughter.12 But in the case of ‘laying’ too, he can project his hands [into the Temple court] and lay?13 — He holds that partial entry is designated entry.14

R. Hisda recited it reversely: And he shall lay... and he shall kill: as shechitah requires clean persons, so ‘laying’ requires clean persons. Why does shechitah differ? because it is written, ‘before the Lord’?

(1) V. supra 26a for notes.
(2) I.e., if they slaughtered, it is valid; but we do not permit them to slaughter in the first place.
(3) Lev. I, 5.
(4) Since Scripture does not specify a priest.
(5) Num. XVIII, 7.
(7) This implies at the very outset.
(8) And defile it.
(9) Ibid. I, 4f.
(10) By Scriptural law, however, shechitah may be done in the first place by unclean persons; hence their shechitah is valid, if performed, even by Rabbinical law. The exegesis is therefore to be understood as a mere support to the law, and not as its source.
(11) In the text just quoted. Since shechitah must be ‘before the Lord’ i.e., in the Temple court, ‘laying’ too must be done there, as shechitah immediately follows it. Hence unclean are excluded, since they may not enter the Temple court.
(12) The sacrifice, which is within, while he stands without.
(13) While his body is without.
(14) Even if his hands only enter the Temple court, it is as though he entered it entirely.

Zevachim 32b

but ‘before the Lord’ is written in connection with ‘laying’ too? — He can project his hands within and lay [them on the bullock]. Then in the case of shechitah too, he can make a long knife and slaughter? — This agrees with Simeon the Temanite. For it was taught: And he shall kill the bullock before the Lord: the bullock [must be] before the Lord, but the slaughterer need not be before the Lord. Simeon the Temanite said: Whence do we know that the slaughterer’s hands must be on the inner side of the slaughtered?
From the text, And he shall slaughter the bullock before the Lord: he that slaughters the bullock [must be] before the Lord.\\n\\n‘Ulla said in the name of Resh Lakish: If an unclean person projects his hands within, he is flagellated, because it says, She shall touch no hallowed things, nor come into the sanctuary; entry is assimilated to contact. As partial contact ranks as contact, so partial entry is designated entry. R. Hoshia raised an objection to ‘Ulla: If a leper whose eighth day fell on the eve of Passover and who had a nocturnal discharge on that day, and performed immersion, — the Sages said: Though any other Tebul yom may not enter [the Levitical camp], this one does enter: it is preferable that an affirmative precept which involves kareth should come and override an affirmative precept which does not involve kareth. Now R. Johanan said: By the law of the Torah there is not even an affirmative precept in connection therewith, for it is said, And Jehoshaphat stood in the congregation of Judah and Jerusalem, in the house of the Lord, before the new court. What does ‘the new court’ mean? That they introduced a new law there and ruled: A Tebul Yom must not enter the Levitical camp. Now if you say that partial entry is called entry, how can he insert his hands for [the sprinkling of his] thumbs; in both cases there is an affirmative precept involving kareth? — from your very refutation, he replied: A leper is different. Since he was permitted in respect of his leprosy, he was permitted in respect of his nocturnal discharge. R. Joseph observed: ‘Ulla holds [that] if the majority were Zabin and they became unclean through the dead, since they are permitted in respect of their defilement, they are permitted in respect of their zibah. Said Abaye to him, How can you compare? Uncleanness was permitted, but Zibah was not permitted! Perhaps this is what you meant: If the majority are unclean through the dead and they become Zabin, since they are permitted in respect of their uncleanness they are permitted in respect of their Zibah? — Yes, he replied. Said he to him: Yet they are still not alike. [In the case of] a leper it is permitted, and since it is permitted [in respect of leprosy], it is permitted [in respect of his nocturnal discharge]. But defilement is merely superseded: in respect of one it was superseded, while in respect of the other [Zibah] it was not superseded? — Said Raba to him: On the contrary, the logic is the reverse: [In the case of] a leper it is permitted: then it is permitted in respect of the one and not permitted in respect of the other. But uncleanness is superseded: What does it matter then whether it is superseded in one instance or whether it is superseded in two instances?

(1) Reading we-shohet, and the slaughterer, for we-shahat, and he shall slaughter. Thus he holds that the slaughterer must be inside too.
(2) Lev. XII, 4.
(3) Since normally a man does not touch a thing with his whole body.
(4) When a leper was healed from his leprosy he waited seven days, performing immersion on the seventh, and brought his sacrifices on the eighth (v. Lev. XIV, 9f). When he brought these he was still not permitted to enter the Temple court (‘the camp of the Shechinah’ — divine Presence) but stood at the east gate (‘the gate of Nicanor’), whose sanctity was lower (it was regarded as ‘the Levitical camp’), while the priest, standing inside the Temple court, applied the blood and the oil to the thumb and the great toe of the leper (ibid. 14f).
(5) Before he had offered his sacrifices. One who suffered such a discharge might not enter even the Levitical camp.
(6) Again. Though he had performed immersion the previous day, that was on account of his leprosy, whereas now he performs it on account of his discharge.
(7) V. Glos.
(8) For his purification rites.
(9) Sc. the Passover-offering. He went through his purification rites so that he might eat of the Passover-offering in the evening, the eating of which is enjoined by an affirmative precept.
(10) Sc. that a Tebul Yom must not enter the Levitical camp. That is derived in Naz. 45a from, he shall be unclean; his uncleanness is yet upon him (Num. XIX, 13); since this is an affirmative statement, the injunction likewise counts as an
affirmative precept. Its violation does not involve kareth.
(11) The Pentateuch.
(12) II Chron. XX, 5.
(13) Since this was an innovation, it is only Rabbinical, and as seen supra it was waived for the sake of the Passover-offering.
(14) An unclean person may not enter the Temple court on pain of kareth.
(15) Lit., ‘burden’.
(16) This is obvious, as Scripture ordains it, and it cannot be done in any other way but by inserting his hands (or thumbs) into the Temple court.
(17) For Zab (pl. Zabim, Zabin), Zibah v. Glos. If the majority of the community are unclean on the eve of Passover through the dead, they are permitted to offer the Passover-offering, as this uncleanness is inoperative (or superseded) in such circumstances. But if they are unclean as Zabin, they may not offer. Now, if they were thus unclean, and then became unclean through the dead too, since they are permitted in respect of the latter, they are also permitted in respect of the former. This follows from ‘Ulla’s answer.
(18) Though the uncleanness through the dead is permitted, yet since it came after Zibah it cannot render that permitted too, for if it did it would create the absurd position that whereas Zibah alone is not permitted, yet when defilement through the dead is added to it, it is permitted.
(19) To project his hands into the Temple court.
(20) Sc. defilement through the dead.

Zevachim 33a

This proves that both hold that uncleanness is [merely] superseded in the case of a community.2 Shall we say that the following supports him:3 In all cases of laying [hands] I apply [the norm], shechitah must immediately follow laying, except this one,4 which took place at the Nicanor Gate, because the leper might not enter therein until the blood of his sin-offering and his guilt-offering was sprinkled on his account.5 Now, if you say that partial entry is not designated entry, let him project his hands [into the Temple court] and lay [them on the sacrifice]?7 — Said R. Joseph: This is in accordance with R. Jose son of R. Judah, who maintained: The north is at a distance [from the entrance].8 Then let a small gate be made?9 — Abaye and Raba both quoted [in reply]: All this [do I give thee] in writing, as the Lord hath made me wise by His hand upon me, even all the works of this pattern.10 Others state [that] R. Joseph said: When one lays [hands], he must project his head and the greater part [of his body into the Temple court].11 What is the reason? — We require [him to lay hands with] all his strength; therefore it cannot be done [otherwise]. What does [the Tanna] hold?12 If he holds that the laying [hands on] the guilt-offering of a leper is a Scriptural requirement, and that [the law that] shechitah must immediately follow laying is Scriptural, then let him [the leper] enter [the Temple court] and lay [hands], since the Divine Law ordained it? —

Said R. Adda b. Mattenah: It is a preventive measure, lest he prolong his route.13 Others state [that] R. Adda b. Mattenah said: Laying of [hands on] the guilt-offering of a leper is Scriptural, but [that] shechitah must immediately follow laying is not Scriptural.14 An objection is raised: And he shall lay [his hands... ] and he shall kill:15 As ‘laying’ must be [done] by clean [persons only], so must shechitah be [done] by clean [persons only]. If, however, you say that it is not Scriptural, then it can be [done] by unclean persons too?16 — Rather, reverse it: Laying of [hands on] the guilt-offering of a leper is not Scriptural, while [the law that] shechitah must immediately follow laying is Scriptural.

(1) Abaye and Raba.
(2) V. supra p. 163, n. 11, and Yoma 6b.
(3) ‘Ulla, that partial entry is designated entry.
(4) Laying of hands on the leper’s guilt-offering.
(5) Into the Temple court.
(6) Hence the animal was brought to the Nicanor Gate, which had intentionally been left unsanctified to enable the leper to stand there, and he laid hands upon it; then it was led to the Temple court and slaughtered, and so these two actions had to be separated by a short interval.
(7) So here too shechitah could immediately follow laying.
(8) Sc. of the Temple court. V. supra 20a. The sacrifices of the leper had to be slaughtered at the north side of the altar, which was more than 22 cubits from the main entrance of the Temple.
court. Hence he could not possibly reach it from outside.
(9) On the north wall of the Temple court facing the altar, whereby the animal could be slaughtered immediately after his laying on of hands.
(10) I Chron. XXVIII, 19. Thus the Temple was designed by divine guidance, and nothing might be added to it.
(11) So that it would not be partial entry but complete entry, which is forbidden to the leper.
(12) When he rules that shechitah must always immediately follow laying save in the case of a leper.
(13) Lit., ‘take many steps’ — into the Temple court — more than is necessary for laying hands. This would not be covered by the Scriptural dispensation.
(14) Hence we cannot permit him to enter the Temple court.
(16) Viz., by laying hands outside the Temple court, and then the sacrifice is led in and slaughtered.

It was taught in accordance with Resh Lakish: ‘She shall touch no hallowed thing’: [this is] a forewarning in respect of eating. You say [that it is] a forewarning in respect of eating; yet perhaps it is not so, but rather in respect of touching? Therefore the text states, ‘She shall touch no hallowed thing, nor come into the sanctuary’: the ‘hallowed thing’ [sacred flesh] is assimilated to the sanctuary. As [the offence in connection with] the sanctuary is one which involves

prescribes the penalty and gives a forewarning, so here too [Scripture] prescribes the penalty and implies a forewarning! — [That] an unclean person who touched sacred flesh [is flagellated follows] from the fact that the Divine Law expressed this in terms of touching; while a forewarning to one who eats [sacred flesh while unclean follows] from the assimilation of sacred flesh to the sanctuary.

Rabina said: It was stated: [only] in respect of flagellation. When Rabin came, he said in the name of R. Abbahu: It was stated in respect of an unclean person who touched sacred flesh. For it was stated: If an unclean person touches sacred flesh, Resh Lakish maintains: He is flagellated; R. Johanan said: He is not flagellated. Resh Lakish maintained [that] he is flagellated, [because it is written] She shall touch no hallowed thing. But R. Johanan maintains that he is not flagellated. Resh Lakish maintained that [text] is written in reference to terumah. Now [does] Resh Lakish maintain that this text comes for this purpose? [surely] it is required as a forewarning against eating sacred flesh? For it was stated: Whence do we derive a forewarning against eating sacred flesh?

Resh Lakish says: [From the text,] ‘She shall touch no hallowed thing’. R. Johanan said, Bardela taught: It is derived from the expression ‘his uncleanness’ occurring here and in reference to [an unclean person's] entry into the sanctuary: as there [Scripture]
of sprinkling was not dashed against him, he shall be unclean; his uncleanness is yet upon him.

(8) The forewarning is in Num. V, 3: That they (the unclean) defile not their camp.

(9) Thus Resh Lakish utilizes the text for a different purpose.

(10) Since Scripture actually writes, She shall touch no hallowed thing.

(11) Scripture writes, She shall touch no hallowed thing, nor come into the sanctuary. Thus the two, being brought together in this way, are assimilated to each other. Hence this deduction is made: as the forewarning in respect of the sanctuary involves kareth, so the forewarning in respect of the ‘hallowed thing’ i.e., sacred flesh, is in respect of an action which involves kareth, viz., eating sacred flesh whilst unclean, for we do not find that an unclean person who touches sacred flesh incurs kareth. Nevertheless, since Scripture does use the expression ‘touch’, a forewarning in respect of touching too must be understood from this text.

The death penalty,₁ so the offence in connection with the hallowed thing is one which involves the death penalty. Now, if this treats of touching, is then the death penalty involved?₂ Hence it must treat of eating. Yet it is still required in respect of an unclean person who ate the sacred flesh before the sprinkling [of the blood]? For it was stated: If an unclean person ate the sacred flesh before the sprinkling [of the blood]? For it was stated: If an unclean person ate the sacred flesh before the sprinkling of the blood, Resh Lakish maintained that he is flagellated; while R. Johanan ruled that he is not flagellated. Resh Lakish maintained [that] he is flagellated, [for it is written,] ‘She shall touch no hallowed thing’, no distinction being drawn whether it is before sprinkling or after sprinkling. While R. Johanan ruled [that] he is not flagellated, as Bardela taught: ‘It is derived from the recurring expression, ‘his uncleanness’, and that is written after the sprinkling’:³ — If so,⁴ let Scripture say, ‘[She shall not touch] a hallowed thing’; why state no hallowed thing?⁵ Hence two things may be inferred from it.

The [above] text [stated]: ‘If an unclean person ate sacred flesh before sprinkling, Resh Lakish maintained: He is flagellated: while R. Johanan ruled: He is not flagellated.’ Abaye said: This controversy applies only to bodily uncleanness; but where the flesh is unclean, all rule that he is flagellated, because a Master said:⁶ And the flesh [that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten]⁷ is to include wood and frankincense; though these are not edible, yet Scripture includes them.⁸ Raba said: The controversy is in respect of bodily uncleanness, but where the flesh is unclean all agree that he is not flagellated. What is the reason? — Since we cannot apply to him the text, Having his uncleanness upon him, that soul shall be cut off,¹⁰ you cannot apply to him the text, And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten. But a Master said, And the flesh includes the wood and the frankincense? — That is where they were sanctified in a vessel,¹¹ so that they become as though all their mattirin¹² had been performed. For we learnt: All which have mattirin [involve a penalty through defilement] once their mattirin have been offered;¹³ whatever has no mattirin [involves a penalty through defilement] when it has been sanctified in a [service] vessel.¹⁴

It was stated: If one brings up the limbs of an unclean animal¹⁵ on the altar, Resh Lakish maintained: He is flagellated; R. Johanan said: He is not flagellated. ‘Resh Lakish maintained [that] he is flagellated’, [for Scripture implies,] Only a clean animal [may be offered], but not an unclean one,¹⁶ and one is flagellated on account of a negative injunction which is inferred from an affirmative precept. ‘R. Johanan said, He is not flagellated’, because one is not flagellated on account of a negative injunction which is inferred from an affirmative precept.

R. Jeremiah raised an objection: That may ye eat,¹⁷ but not an unclean animal; and a negative injunction which is inferred from an affirmative precept ranks as an affirmative precept ?¹⁸ — Said R. Jacob to R. Jeremiah b. Tahlifa: I will explain it to you: There is no
disagreement at all about the limbs of an unclean [domesticated] animal; they disagree about a beast [of chase], and it was thus stated: ‘R. Johanan said: He transgresses an affirmative precept. While Resh Lakish said: He does not transgress anything.’ ‘R. Johanan said, He transgresses an affirmative precept’, [for Scripture says,] [Ye shall bring your offering] of the cattle [behemah]: [this implies] only of the cattle, but not of the beast [of chase]; while Resh Lakish said, He does not transgress anything, [for] that [text] intimates that it is meritorious.

Raba raised an objection: If it were said, ‘[When any man of you bringeth] an offering to the Lord,’ cattle [behemah], I would agree that hayyah [beast of chase] is included in behemah, as in the verse, These are the animals [behemah] which ye may eat: the ox, the sheep, and the goat, the hart and the gazelle and the roebuck, etc. Therefore the text states, ‘even of the herd or of the flock’: of the herd or of the flock have I prescribed unto thee, but not a beast of chase [hayyah]. You might think [that] one must not bring [a hayyah], yet if one did bring [it] it is valid: for to what is this like? To a disciple whom his master bade, ‘Bring me wheat’ and he brought him wheat and barley, where he is not regarded as having flouted his orders, but as having added thereto — and it is valid; therefore the text states, ‘even of the herd or of the flock’: of the herd and of the flock have I prescribed unto thee, but not a beast. To what is this like? To a disciple whom his master bade, ‘Bring me naught but wheat’ and he brought him wheat and barley. He is not regarded as having added to his words, but as having flouted them.

(1) I.e., kareth.
(2) Surely not!
(3) For the forewarning is learned from the penalty, and the penalty of kareth is only incurred after the sprinkling, v. Men. 25b. — Returning to our subject, we see that Resh Lakish utilizes the text for a different purpose.
(4) That the text is required for this purpose only.
(5) Expressed in Heb. by the addition of be-kol, (‘all’ or ‘every’); the emphasis implies an additional teaching.
(6) Emended text (Bah).
(8) The exegesis is to show that these can become unclean like an edible (though usually only an edible or a utensil can be defiled), and then the same law applies to them as to food. Now, flesh before sprinkling cannot be worse than these; if these involve flagellation cannot be worse than these; if these involve flagellation does likewise.
(9) Var. lec.: The controversy is in respect of the uncleanliness of the flesh, but in the case of bodily uncleanness, etc. (Sh. M.).
(10) Ibid. 20. The text refers to bodily uncleanness, which supports the var. lec. — Kareth is not incurred before the sprinkling of the blood (p. 167, n. 5).
(11) The wood was removed from the altar in a service vessel, and the frankincense was sanctified in a censer. These, as the Talmud explains, are then in the same position as though all their ritual had been performed, and therefore are analogous to flesh after sprinkling.
(12) V. Glos.
(13) E.g., flesh, whose mattirin is the blood which by being sprinkled on the altar permits the flesh to be eaten.
(14) V. Me’il. 10a.
(15) E.g., of horses or camels.
(16) In the verse, Ye shall bring your offering of the cattle, even of the herd or of the flock (Lev. I, 2.). Thus Scripture specifies clean animals.
(17) Lev. XI, 3.
(18) And but for the special negative injunction which follows in the Scriptural text it would involve no flagellation.
(19) Animals are technically divided into behemah (domesticated animal) and hayyah (wild beast, lit., ‘living thing’). The former includes dogs, horses and camels; the latter includes the hart, deer and roebuck.
(20) To offer sacrifices of the cattle, whereas offering a beast of chase is voluntary and permissive. Nevertheless, though we have no affirmative precept forbidding it, anything unclean of either species may certainly not be offered, v. Men. 6a.
(21) Deut. XIV, 4f. The last three belong to the class of hayyah.
(22) And here too, since one need not offer a sacrifice at all, when one offers a hayyah he is as though adding to God’s words.
— and it [the sacrifice] is invalid. This refutation of Resh Lakish is indeed a refutation.

AND IF ANY OF THESE RECEIVED, etc. Resh Lakish asked R. Johanan: Does an unfit person render [the blood in the throat] a residue? — Said he to him: There is no case of sprinkling rendering [the remaining blood] a residue, save [where it is done with the illegal intention of] after time or without bounds, since it counts in respect of piggul.4

R. Zebid recited it thus: Resh Lakish asked R. Johanan: Does an unfit goblet [of blood] render [the remainder] a residue?5 — Said he to him: What is your opinion about an unfit person himself? If an unfit person renders [the blood] a residue, then an unfit goblet too renders [the blood] a residue; if an unfit person does not render a residue, an unfit goblet too does not render a residue. R. Jeremiah of Difti recited it thus: Abaye asked Rabbah: Does one goblet render another rejected or a residue? — Said he to him: It is the subject of a controversy between R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon and the Rabbis. For it was taught: Above it is stated, And the [remaining] blood thereof shall he pour out [at the base of the altar]; while below it is stated, And all the [remaining] blood thereof shall he pour out [at the base of the altar]. How do we know that, if the priest received the blood of the sin-offering in four goblets and made one application [of blood] from each, all [the rest] are poured out at the base? From the text, And all the [remaining] blood thereof shall he pour out [at the base of the altar]. You might think that, if he made the four applications from one goblet, all [the rest] are poured out at the base: therefore the text states, And the [remaining] blood thereof shall he pour out [at the base of the altar]. You might think that, if he made the four applications from one goblet, all [the rest] are to be poured out at the base: therefore the text states, And the [remaining] blood thereof [etc]. How is this to be understood? [The remaining blood of] that [goblet] is poured out at the base, but they [the other goblets] are poured out into the duct.6

R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon said: Whence do we know that, if [the priest] received the blood of the sin-offering in four goblets and made the four applications from one goblet, all are poured out at the base? From the text, And all the [remaining] blood thereof shall he pour out [at the base of the altar]. Yet surely it is written, ‘And the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out, etc.’? — Said R. Ashi: That is to exclude the residue [of the blood left] in the throat of the animal.

IF THE FIT PERSON RECEIVED [THE BLOOD] AND GAVE [IT] TO AN UNFIT ONE, etc. Now, all these are necessary: For if we were informed about an unfit person, I would say, what is an unfit person? An unclean [priest] who is eligible for public service; but the left [hand] is not so. And if we were informed about the left hand, that is because it is fit on the Day of Atonement, but a secular [non-sacred] vessel is not so. While if we were informed about secular vessels, that is because they are eligible for sanctification; but as for the others, I would say that it is not so. Thus they are all necessary. Now, let it be regarded as rejection?

Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Thus said R. Jeremiah of Difti in Raba's name: This is in accordance with Hanan the Egyptian, who does not accept the law of rejection. For it was taught: Hanan the Egyptian said: Even if the blood is in the cup he brings its companion and pairs it.8 R. Shaya observed: Reason supports R. Ashi. [For] whom do you know to accept the law of rejection? R. Judah, as we learnt: Even more did R. Judah say: If the blood [of the he-goat to be sacrificed] was spilt, the [he-goat] which was to be sent away must perish; if the [he-goat] which was to be sent away perished, the blood [of the other] must be poured out.

Yet we know him to rule that where it lies in
one's power [to rectify the matter] there is no rejection. For it was taught, R. Judah said: He [the priest] used to fill a goblet with the mingled blood and sprinkled it once against the base [of the altar]. This proves that where it lies in one's own hands, there is no rejection. This proves it.

[To turn to] the main text: 'It was taught, R. Judah said: He [the priest] used to fill a goblet with the mingled blood, so that should the blood of one of them be spilt, the result is that this renders it valid. Said they to R. Judah: But surely it [the mingled blood] had not been received in a vessel?' How do they know? — Rather [they said to him]: perhaps it was not caught in a vessel? I too, he answered them,

(1) If he sprinkles the blood, can a fit person make the sacrifice valid by catching more blood from the animal's throat and sprinkling it? Or do we say, Once the unfit person has sprinkled the blood, what still remains in the throat is regarded as the residue of the blood, which cannot be used for sprinkling, and therefore the sacrifice is invalid? (The Mishnah speaks only of receiving the blood, not of sprinkling.)

(2) Emended text (Bah).

(3) Lit., 'propitiates'.

(4) Since such sprinkling counts as sprinkling to render the sacrifice Piggul, it also counts to render the rest of the blood a residue. But no other illegal sprinkling renders the remainder of the blood a residue.

(5) If the goblet containing the blood to be sprinkled was taken outside the Temple court, whereby it becomes unfit, and it was then sprinkled, does it render the remainder in the throat a residue?

(6) E.g., if the blood of a sin-offering was received in two goblets, and all the sprinklings were performed out of one, is the blood in the other regarded as the residue, which must be poured out at the foot of the altar (cf. Lev. IV, 7; and all the remaining blood of the bullock shall he pour out at the base of the altar)? Or do we say that by not using it he intentionally, as it were, rejected it, and therefore it is simply poured out into the duct or sewer in the Temple court which discharged its contents into the stream of Kidron?

(7) Lev. IV, 25, 30.

(8) Four applications of blood were made on the horns of the altar.

(9) But not all, which apparently contradicts the other text.

(10) Since it is the residue of what was actually sprinkled.

(11) Because one goblet renders another rejected.

(12) V. Mishnah.

(13) When the whole community is unclean, including the priests, they sacrifice the Passover-offering in that state.

(14) Therefore, if the priest transferred the blood into his left hand, it should be permanently invalid.

(15) The High Priest took the censer in his right hand and the spoon in his left.

(16) The blood was fit in the first place, but by taking it in the wrong hand or in a secular vessel it was rejected, and therefore should no more be fit.

(17) Viz., that once rejected it remains permanently so.

(18) Two he-goats were taken on the day of Atonement, one of which was sacrificed as a sin-offering, and the other was sent away-into the wilderness (the 'scapegoat'), the function of each being decided by lot. The blood of the former was received in a cup or basin and sprinkled on the altar. Now, if the scapegoat died before the blood of the other was sprinkled, Hanan rules that we do not say that the blood is thereby rejected, and two other goats must be brought, but only one more is brought and paired up with the one already slaughtered. For other views that the blood is thereby rejected permanently (the two goats being interdependent) v. Mishnah Yoma 62a.

(19) Here it lies in his power to rectify the matter by transferring the blood.

(20) But not sent to Azazel, because the two are interdependent, and since a new animal must be brought for the first, as its blood was spilt before sprinkling, a new pair must be brought.

(21) And likewise two fresh animals brought. Thus in each case one is rejected because of the other, and remains so permanently.

(22) Of many Passover-offerings. Lit., 'the blood of those which were mixed'.

(23) In case the blood of one of them would be spilt, this would make it valid.

(24) This is an interjection: how do the Rabbis, who raise this objection, know that it was not caught in a vessel?

(25) But poured straight from the animal's throat on to the ground. Rashi (in Pes. 65a): in that case sprinkling is of no avail. Tosaf.: sprinkling, if already performed, is efficacious, but such blood must not be taken up to the altar in the first place.
spoke only of that which was received in a vessel. And how does he himself know that? — The priests are careful; but as they work quickly [the blood] may be spilt. But the draining-blood is mixed with it?  

R. Judah is consistent with his view, for he maintained: The draining-blood is called blood. For it was taught: The draining-blood is subject to a ‘warning;’ R. Judah said: It is subject to kareth. But surely R. Eleazar said: R. Judah agrees in respect to atonement, that it does not make atonement, because it is blood. But surely it was taught: For it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life: a blood wherewith life departs is called blood; blood wherewith life does not depart is not called blood? —

Rather [reply]: R. Judah is consistent with his view, for he maintained: Blood cannot nullify [other] blood. R. Judah said to them [the Sages]: On your view, why did they stop up [the holes in] the Temple court? — Said they to him: It is praiseworthy for the sons of Aaron [the priests] to walk in blood up to their ankles. But blood constitutes an interposition? — It was moist, and did not constitute an interposition. For it was taught: Blood, ink, honey, and milk, if dry, interpose; if moist, they do not interpose. But their garments become [blood-] stained, whereas it was taught: If his garments were soiled and he performed the service, his service is unfit? And should you answer that they raised their garments, surely it was taught: [And the priest shall put on] his linen measure: [that means] that it must not be [too] short nor too long? — They raised them at the carrying of the limbs to the [altar] ascent, which was not a service. Nevertheless, how could they walk at the service? — They walked on balconies.

† MISHNAH. IF ONE SLAUGHTERS THE SACRIFICE [INTENDING] TO EAT WHAT IS NOT NORMALLY EATEN, OR TO BURN [ON THE ALTAR] WHAT IS NOT NORMALLY BURNT, IT IS VALID; BUT R. ELIEZER INVALIDATES [THE SACRIFICE]. [IF HE SLAUGHTERS IT INTENDING] TO EAT WHAT IS NORMALLY EATEN AND TO BURN WHAT IS NORMALLY BURNT, [BUT] LESS THAN THE SIZE OF AN OLIVE, IT IS VALID. TO EAT HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE AND TO BURN HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE, IT IS VALID, BECAUSE [INTENTIONS CONCERNING] EATING AND BURNING DO NOT COMBINE.

‡ IF ONE SLAUGHTERS THE SACRIFICE [INTENDING] TO EAT AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE OF THE SKIN, OR OF THE JUICE, OR OF THE JELLY, OR OF THE OFFAL, OR OF THE BONES, OR OF THE TENDONS, OR OF THE HORN, OR OF THE HOOFS, EITHER AFTER TIME OR OUT OF BOUNDS, IT IS VALID, AND ONE IS NOT CULPABLE ON THEIR ACCOUNT IN RESPECT OF PIGGUL, NOTHAR, OR UNCLEANNESS.


GEMARA. R. Eleazar said: If [the priest] expressed a Piggul intention in respect of the sacrifice, the fetus [too] becomes piggul; if he expresses a Piggul intention] in connection with the fetus, the sacrifice does not become piggul. If he expresses a Piggul intention in respect of the offal, the crop becomes Piggul;
in respect of the crop, the offal does not become piggul. If he expresses a Piggul intention in respect of emurim, the bullocks become Piggul; in respect of the bullocks, the emurim do not become piggul. Shall we say that the following supports him: And both agree that if he expressed an intention [of Piggul] in connection with the eating of the bullocks and their burning, he has done nothing? Surely then, if however he expressed an intention concerning the emurim, the bullocks become Piggul? — No:

(1) Tamzith denotes the last blood which slowly drains off the animal, contrad. to the life-blood, which gushes forth in a stream.
(2) Whereas ‘lifeblood’ is required for sprinkling.
(3) For the purposes of sprinkling.
(4) This is a technical designation for a negative injunction whose violation is punished by lashes. But it involves no kareth, as does the consuming of the life-blood (v. Lev. XVII, 10f).
(5) Just like life-blood. Hence it is also the same in respect to sprinkling.
(6) Lev. XVII, 11.
(7) And makes atonement.
(8) To the objection, ‘But the draining-blood is mixed with it’.
(9) And there is certainly at least a little of the life-blood in this goblet of mixed blood, and that is sufficient for atonement.
(10) That they did not fill a goblet of mixed blood.
(11) On the eve of Passover they stopped up the holes through which the blood of the sacrifices passed out to the stream of Kidron.
(12) Between the pavement and their feet, whereas they had to stand actually on the pavement itself, supra 15b.
(13) When a person takes a ritual bath (Tebillah), nothing must interpose between the water and his skin; if something does interpose, it invalidates the bath.
(14) I.e., they were short and did not reach down to the blood.
(15) E.V. garment, Lev. VI, 3.
(16) But reach exactly to the ground.
(17) And only then was it praiseworthy for the priests to walk up to their ankles in blood.
(19) Sc. of the sprinkling of the blood.
(20) Projecting boards alongside the walls.
(21) V. supra 28a.
(22) The whole Mishnah refers to intentions of eating and/or burning after time or out of bounds.
(23) The sediments of boiled meat coagulated.
(24) If the sacrifice became Piggul, nothar, or unclean, and a priest ate of the skin, etc., he is not liable, since we do not designate his action eating, as these are not eaten.
(25) I.e., sacrifices. The Heb. (Mukdashin) always refers to females.
(26) And he who eats the fetus incurs kareth, as for eating Piggul.
(27) He holds that the fetus is an integral part of the sacrifice, being regarded, as it were, as a limb of its mother. Nevertheless, this intention does not render the sacrifice Piggul, because it is not usually eaten. The fetus itself too does not become Piggul, in accordance with the Mishnah.
(28) The offal is edible, but not the crop. Therefore an intention in respect of the latter is not efficacious; but an intention in respect of the former makes the whole Piggul, including the crop.
(29) If he slaughtered the bullocks which are burnt intending to burn the emurim on the altar after time.
(30) Intending to eat of their flesh after time.
(31) Because it is the intention to eat what is not usually eaten. The bullocks themselves do certainly not become Piggul.
(32) In his view that a thing can become Piggul through something else, e.g., the fetus, the crop, and the flesh of the bullocks, though it cannot be the vehicle of rendering the sacrifice Piggul.
(33) ‘Both’ refers to R. Simeon and the Rabbis, v. infra 43a. The present reference is to the bullocks which were to be burnt without, and they agree that if the priest expressed an intention during one of the blood services to eat of the bullocks on the morrow or to burn them as required in the ash-house on the morrow, his intention is of no effect, because his intention to eat does not count, since this is not normally eaten and his intention with regard to the burning does not count either, for only an intention that the altar should consume (expressing it so, but not ‘burn’) counts.

Zevachim 35b

[deduce thus:] but if he expressed an intention concerning the emurim, the emurim themselves become piggul.

Come and hear: The bullocks which are to be burnt and the he-goats which are to be burnt are subject to [the law of] sacrifice from the time they are consecrated. Having been slaughtered, they are ready to become unfit through [the touch of] a Tebul Yom and one
who lacks atonement, and through being kept overnight [Linah]. Surely that means, through the flesh being kept overnight; and you may infer from this [that] since being kept overnight renders it unfit, an [illegitimate] intention renders it unfit! — No: it refers to keeping the emurim overnight.

Rabbah objected: The following neither render nor are rendered piggul: the wool on the head of lambs, and the hair of he-goats’ beards, and the skin, the juice, the jelly, the offal, the crop, the bones, the tendons, the horns, the hoofs, the fetus, the after-birth, the milk of consecrated animals, and the eggs of doves; all of these neither render nor are rendered Piggul, and one is not liable on their account in respect of Piggul or uncleanness, and one who carries them up without is not liable. Does this not mean: They do not render the sacrifice Piggul, and they are not rendered Piggul through themselves.

We learnt elsewhere: And blemished animals: R. Akiba declares blemished animals fit. R. Hiyya b. Abba declared in R. Johanan’s name: R. Akiba declares [them] fit only in the case of cataracts in the eye, since such are fit in the case of birds, and provided that their consecration [for a sacrifice] preceded their blemish; and R. Akiba admits that a female burnt-offering must be [taken down], because that is tantamount to the blemish preceding its consecration. R. Zera objected: ‘One who offers them up without is not liable;’ but [if one offers up the flesh] of the mother, one is liable; and how is that possible? In the case of a female burnt-offering.

Now, it is well if you say that R. Akiba holds that if a female burnt-offering goes up, it does not come down: then this is in accordance with R. Akiba. But if you say that [even] if it went up, it goes down, in accordance with whom is this? — Say: He who offers up [the flesh] of them without is exempt, hence he who offers up of their mother’s emurim is liable. But he teaches, ‘of them’, and the mother is analogous to them? — Rather say: He who offers up of their emurim without is exempt; hence [he who offers up] of their mother’s emurim is liable.

MISHNAH. IF HE SLAUGHTERED IT WITH THE INTENTION OF LEAVING ITS BLOOD
OR ITS EMURIM FOR THE MORROW, OR OF CARRYING THEM WITHOUT, R. JUDAH DISQUALIFIES [IT], BUT THE SAGES DECLARE IT FIT. [IF HE SLAUGHTERED IT] WITH THE INTENTION OF SPRINKLING [THE BLOOD] ON THE ASCENT, [OR ON THE ALTAR] BUT NOT OVER AGAINST ITS BASE; OR OF APPLYING BELOW [THE LINE]

WHAT SHOULD BE APPLIED ABOVE, OR ABOVE WHAT SHOULD BE APPLIED BELOW, OR WITHOUT WHAT SHOULD BE APPLIED WITHIN,

(1) But not the flesh.
(2) One must not misappropriate a consecrated animal (or anything set apart for sacred purposes, e.g., money consecrated to Temple use) for secular use, and if one does, he becomes liable to a trespass-offering (Me’ilah).
(3) These defile its flesh, but do not make it unclean to enable it to communicate uncleanness to others, but only unfit. On lacking atonement v. p. 80, n. 2; on unfitness and uncleanness v. p. 155, nn. 3 and 4.
(4) Now, that cannot mean an illegitimate intention to eat the flesh on the morrow (which is tantamount to an intention to keep it overnight), for it has already been stated that this is of no account. Hence it must mean that an illegitimate intention to burn the emurim on the morrow renders the flesh Piggul, which supports R. Eleazar.
(5) And you may infer that an intention to keep the emurim overnight renders the emurim Piggul, but not the flesh.
(6) Where the flesh is burnt.
(7) An illegitimate intention in respect of them does not render the sacrifice Piggul, nor do they become Piggul themselves, as the Talmud proceeds to explain.
(8) A Piggul intention in respect of themselves does not make them Piggul.
(9) The same is taught at the beginning.
(10) Obviously, if they cannot become Piggul, there can be no liability for same. Thus this is certainly a repetition, on any interpretation.
(11) On my interpretation.
(12) That the fetus and the placenta are rendered but do not render Piggul.
(13) Which apparently contradicts the first clause.
(14) They can be rendered Piggul through the rest of the sacrifice.
(15) If a blemished animal is taken up on to the altar, it must be taken down again; v. infra 84a.

(16) If taken up on to the altar, they are not taken down again.
(17) This blemish does not disqualify a bird at all, which is unfit only when it lacks a limb.
(18) An animal burnt-offering must be a male (Lev. I, 3). If a female is offered, it must be taken down, although a bird burnt-offering may be of any gender, because there can be no greater blemish than the forbidden sex.
(19) V. Baraitha supra; ‘them’ includes the fetus.
(20) For one who offers up the flesh of a peace-offering without is not liable (v. infra 112b). — A female must be meant since the fetus is discussed.
(21) Since it does not come down within, it involves liability without, the two being interdependent (v. infra 112a).
(22) ‘Of them’ means of course of their flesh, and so the deduction in respect of the mother must also refer to the mother’s flesh.
(23) Lit., ‘on condition’.
(24) Running along the middle of the altar.

ZEVACHIM 36a


GEMARA. What is R. Judah’s reason? — Said R. Eleazar, Two texts are written in reference to nothar. One text says, And ye shall let nothing of it remain until the morning,3 and another text says, He shall not leave any of it until the morning.4 Since one is
superfluous in respect of [actual] leaving, apply it to the intention of leaving it. Now [does] R. Judah [hold] that this text comes for this purpose? Surely it is required for what was taught: ‘And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings for thanksgiving [shall be eaten on the day of his offering: he shall not leave any of it until the morning]’: we have thus learnt that the thanks-offering is eaten a day and a night. How do we know [the same of] an exchange, an offspring, or a substitute?

— From the text, ‘And the flesh’. How do we know [the same of] a sin-offering and a guilt-offering? — Because it says, ‘[And the flesh of] the sacrifice [etc]’. And whence do we know to include a Nazirite’s peace-offerings and the peace-offerings of the Passover-offering? From the text, ‘his peace-offerings’. Whence do we know [the same of] the loaves of the thanks-offering and a Nazirite’s loaves and the wafers? Because ‘his offering’ is written; [and] to all of these I apply [the injunction], ‘he shall not leave any of it until the morning’!

— If so, let Scripture write, ‘lo tothiru’; why [write] ‘lo yaniah’? [To teach that] since it is superfluous in respect of actual leaving, apply it to the intention of leaving. Granted that this [reason] is satisfactory in respect of [the intention] to leave [the blood or the emurim], what can you say about [the intention] to carry [them] out? Moreover R. Judah's reason is based on logic. For it was taught: R. Judah said to them [the Sages]: Do you not admit that if he left it [the blood or the emurim] for the morrow, [the sacrifice] is invalid? So also if he intended to leave it for the morrow, it is invalid! (And do you not admit that if he carried them without, it is invalid? So also if he intended to carry them without, it is invalid.)

Rather, R. Judah's reason is based on logic. Now, let R. Judah disagree in the other cases too? — In which case should he disagree? In the case of [intending] to break the bones of a Passover-offering and eating thereof half-roast! does then the sacrifice itself become invalid? In the case of the intention that unclean [persons] should eat it or that unclean [persons] should offer it! does then the sacrifice itself become invalid? [In the case of] the intention that uncircumcised persons should eat it or uncircumcised persons should offer it! Is then the sacrifice itself invalidated?

Another version: Does it entirely depend on him? [As for the intention] to mingle its blood with the blood of invalid [sacrifices], R. Judah is consistent with his view, for he maintains that blood does not nullify [other] blood. [As for the intention] to apply below what should be applied above, and above [what should be applied] below, — R. Judah is consistent with his view, for he maintains: Even what is not its place is also called its place. Then let him disagree where he applied without what should be applied within, or within, what should be applied without? —

R. Judah holds: We require a place which has a threefold function, [Viz.,] in respect of the blood, the flesh, and the emurim. Does then R. Judah accept that view? Surely it was taught: R. Judah said: [Scripture states, Thou shalt not sacrifice unto the Lord thy God an ox, or a sheep, wherein is a blemish, even any] evil thing here [Scripture] extends the law to a sin-offering which one slaughtered on the south [side of the Temple court], or a sin-offering whose blood entered within [the inner sanctum], [teaching that] it is invalid? — But does then R. Judah not accept [this interpretation of] ‘third’? Surely we learnt: R. Judah said: If one carried [the blood] within in ignorance, it is valid; hence if [one did this] deliberately, it is invalid, and we have explained this as meaning where he made atonement. Now if in that case, where he has actually carried it within, if he made atonement [therewith] it does [invalidate the sacrifice], but if he did not make atonement, it does not: how much...
the more so here, where he has merely intended?28 —

There is a controversy of two Tannaim as to R. Judah's view. Now, does R. Judah hold that when one slaughters a sin-offering in the south

(1) I.e., the blood or the emurim.
(2) Both of which are forbidden, Ex. XII, 9, 46.
(3) Ex. XII, 10.
(4) Lev. VII, 15. The first refers to the Passover-offering, the second to the thanks-offering. Both were peace-offerings, and therefore it need be stated for one only, and the other would follow.
(5) Thus Scripture forbids the intention, and therefore the intention disqualifies.
(6) The text has the plural. — If the animal originally set aside for the offering is lost, and another consecrated in its stead, and then the first is found, the second is called the exchange. ‘Offspring’: if the consecrated animal lambed or calved before it was sacrificed. For ‘substitute’ v. p. 22, n. 8. All three are sacrificed as thanks-offerings.
(7) ‘And’ is an extension.
(8) ‘The sacrifice’ is superfluous, for Scripture could say, And the flesh of his peace-offerings. Hence it is understood to include these other sacrifices.
(9) V. Num. VI, 14f. This, like an ordinary thanks-offering, was accompanied by loaves of bread.
(10) Rashi: the festival sacrifices (Hagigah) which accompanied the Passover-offering on the eve of Passover. Tosaf. (supra 9a): a Passover remainder, i.e., an animal consecrated as a Passover-offering but not sacrificed as such.
(11) The Heb. denotes two different kinds of loaves.
(12) Thus R. Judah utilizes the verse for a different purpose!
(13) If this is the only purpose of the text.
(14) ‘Ye shall not let any remain’. Tothiru (fr. hothir) is the verb used in Ex. XII, 10, and we would expect the same here.
(15) Not a Scriptural exegesis.
(16) Bracketed addition a var. lec.
(17) Enumerated in the Mishnah.
(18) Even if he actually breaks the bones or eats of it half-roast. Surely not, and so the intention does not invalidate it either.
(19) Other reasons why R. Judah does not dispute the other cases of the Mishnah.
(20) When he intends that unclean or uncircumcised should partake thereof or offer it up, he may not find such to carry out his intention. Hence his intention does not count.
(21) Supra 35a. Hence even if he did it, it would not invalidate the sacrifice.
(22) V. supra 27a.
(23) V. supra 29a.
(24) Deut. XVII, 1.
(25) Though this carrying without bounds is not in respect of a place that has that threefold function.
(26) V. infra 82a.
(27) The mere carrying of the blood into the inner sanctum, even deliberately, does not invalidate the sacrifice, but only its actual sprinkling (called ‘making atonement’) on the inner altar.
(28) The intention alone certainly does not disqualify it, and the reason must be because R. Judah accepts the interpretation of ‘third’ given supra 29a.

he is liable?1 Surely it was taught, R. Judah said: You might think that if one slaughters a sin-offering in the south he is liable; therefore Scripture states, ‘Thou shalt not sacrifice unto the Lord thy God an ox, or a sheep wherein is a blemish, even any evil thing’: You can declare him liable for any evil thing,2 but you cannot make him liable for slaughtering a sin-offering in the south?

There is a controversy of two Tannaim as to R. Judah's view. R. Abbas said: Yet R. Judah admits that he [the priest] can subsequently render it piggul.4 Said Raba: This is the proof, viz.: [a] Piggul [intention made] before the sprinkling is nothing, yet the sprinkling comes and brands it as piggul.5 Yet that is not so: there there was only one intention:6 there there are two intentions.7

R. Huna raised an objection to R. Abba: [If the priest intended] applying [the blood] which should be applied above [the line] below [it], [or what should be applied] below, above, immediately, it is valid. If he subsequently intended [to consume it] without bounds, it is invalid, but does not involve kareth: [if he intended consuming it] after time, it is unfit, and one is liable to
kareth on its account. [If he intended sprinkling the blood in the wrong place] on the morrow, it is unfit; if he subsequently intended [to consume it] without bounds or after time, it is unfit, and does not involve kareth.8 This refutation of R. Abba is indeed a refutation.

R. Hisda said in the name of Rabina b. Sila: If he intended that unclean [persons] should eat it on the morrow,9 he is liable.10 Said Raba: This is the proof, viz., before sprinkling the flesh is not fit [for eating], and yet when he declares a [Piggul] intention it becomes unfit.11 Yet it is not so: there he will sprinkle [the blood] and [the flesh] will be fit; here [the unclean] are not fit at all.

R. Hisda said: R. Dimi b. Hinena was wont to say: One is liable for uncleanness in respect of unroasted flesh of a Passover-offering and loaves of a thanks-offering of which no separation [for the priest] was made.12 Raba said, This is the proof, viz.: It was taught, [But the soul that eateth of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace — offerings,] that pertain unto the Lord [having his uncleanness upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people];13 this includes the emurim of lesser sacrifices in respect of uncleanness.14 This proves that though they are not fit for eating at all, one is liable for uncleanness on their account. So here too, though they are not fit for eating, one is liable for uncleanness on their account. Yet it is not so: there the emurim of lesser sacrifices are fit for the Most-High;15 which excludes unroasted flesh of the Passover-offering and the loaves of the thanks-offering of which no separation was made, which are fit neither for the Most-High nor for man. (Another version: Now the emurim are not fit! — Yet it is not so: these emurim are fit for their purpose, whereas these are not fit at all.)16

CHAPTER IV


GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: How do we know that if [the priest] made one application in the case of those [bloods] which are to be sprinkled on the outer altar, he has made atonement? From the text, And the blood of thy sacrifices shall be poured out.22 Now, is this text required for that purpose? Surely it is needed for what was taught:

(1) To flagellation, the usual punishment for violating a negative command. This follows since R. Judah includes slaughtering a sin-offering in the south in the Scriptural injunction quoted above.
(2) In Bek. 37a this is held to mean a patent blemish.
(3) Sh. M. emends: Raba.
(4) Where he intended leaving the blood for the morrow or carrying it without. Although R. Judah holds that he thereby disqualifies the sacrifice, yet if he intended at a subsequent service to eat the flesh after time, he renders it Pigigul. This is so in spite of the fact that generally speaking a Pigigul intention is operative only when there is no other disqualification, such as intending to eat it without bounds.

(5) Raba proves that the intention to leave the blood until the morrow is not the same as the intention to eat the flesh without bounds, which makes Pigigul impossible. For if, before sprinkling, the priest declares his intention of sprinkling the blood on the morrow, it does not render the sacrifice Pigigul, it being axiomatic that a sacrifice is not rendered Pigigul unless the mattirin (q.v. Glos.) have been properly offered. Nevertheless, if he subsequently sprinkles the blood properly, his previously declared intention is retrospectively valid and renders the sacrifice valid. Now, this intention was in effect an intention to leave the blood until the morrow, which in R. Judah’s view disqualifies the sacrifice (though not rendering it Pigigul). This proves that we do not say, Since it did not become Pigigul at the outset it is disqualified through the intention of leaving the blood, and it cannot subsequently become Pigigul.

(6) Viz., to sprinkle the blood on the morrow, which is a Pigigul intention.

(7) Viz., first to leave the blood until the morrow, which disqualifies but does not render Pigigul, and then to eat the flesh after time.

(8) V. supra 26b for notes. The last clause definitely contradicts R. Abba.

(9) Which is after time.

(10) On account of Pigigul. We do not say that this is not an efficacious intention in respect of Pigigul since the unclean may not eat of it at any time.

(11) As Pigigul. This case is analogous.

(12) A thanks-offering was accompanied by forty loaves, four of which were taken off for the priest. Before that was done, the loaves might not be eaten; similarly, a Passover-offering might be eaten roast only. Nevertheless, an unclean person who partakes of them is liable on account of his defilement, though they could not be eaten even by a clean person.


(14) Though the lesser sacrifices were eaten by their owners, the emurim were burnt on the altar and thus ‘pertained unto the Lord’, and Scripture teaches that an unclean priest who eats these emurim incurs kareth.

(15) Viz., to be burnt on the altar.

(16) The bracketed addition is omitted in some MSS.

(17) The sacrifice is valid, though in the first place two applications are required.

(18) Since the first alone sufficed. — According to Beth Shammai this holds good of all sacrifices except a sin-offering, and according to Beth Hillel that too is not excepted.

(19) The second intention does not neutralize the first.

(20) I.e., with wrongful intention.

(21) Since one application is insufficient to make the sacrifice fit; — he holds that a sacrifice cannot be made Pigigul through a service which is incomplete in itself to make the sacrifice fit.

(22) Deut. XII, 27. — This implies a single pouring out.

Whence do we know that all blood must be poured out at the base [of the altar]? From the text, And the blood of thy sacrifices shall be poured out against the altar! — Heb deduces that from Rabbi’s [inference]. For it was taught: Rabbi said: [Scripture writes,] And the rest of the blood shall be drained out [at the base of the altar]. Now, ‘of the blood’ need not be stated; why then is it stated? Because we have learnt only that that blood which requires four applications must be poured out at the base; 5 whence do we know it of other blood? From the text, ‘And the rest of the blood shall be drained out [at the base of the altar]’. Yet still, does it come for this purpose? It is required for what was taught: How do we know that if [the priest] poured out [the blood] which should be sprinkled, 7 he has fulfilled [his obligation]? From the text, And the blood of thy sacrifices shall be poured out. He holds as R. Akiba who maintained: pouring is not included in sprinkling, nor is sprinkling included in pouring. For we learnt: If he recited the blessing for the Passover-offering, he thereby exempts the [festival] sacrifice; but if he recited the blessing for the sacrifice, he does not exempt the Passover-offering. This is the view of R. Ishmael. R. Akiba said: The former does not exempt the latter, nor does the latter exempt the former. Yet still, is it required for this purpose? [Surely] it is...
needed for what was taught, [viz.]: R. Ishmael said: From the text, But the firstling of an ox, or the firstling of a sheep, or the firstling of a goat [thou shalt not redeem; they are holy: thou shalt dash their blood against the altar, and shalt make their fat smoke for an offering made by fire],12 we learn that a firstling must have its blood and its emurim presented at the altar. Whence do we know [it of] the tithe and the Passover-offering? Because it says, ‘And the blood of thy sacrifices shall be poured out’? —

He agrees with R. Jose the Galilean. For it was taught: R. Jose the Galilean said: [Thou shalt dash their blood against the altar, and shalt make their fat smoke]:13 not ‘its blood’ is said, but ‘their blood’; not ‘its fat’ is said, but ‘their fat’.14 This teaches concerning the firstling, the tithe [of animals], and the Passover-offering, that their blood and emurim must be presented at the altar.15

Now, does R. Ishmael utilize this text for both purposes?16 — There is a controversy of two Tannaim as to R. Ishmael’s view.17 As for R. Ishmael, who makes the whole verse refer to a firstling, it is well: hence it is written, And the flesh of them shall be thine.18 But according to R. Jose the Galilean, who makes it refer to the tithe and the Passover-offering too, [surely] the tithe and the Passover-offering are eaten by their owners; what then is the meaning of ‘And the flesh of them shall be thine’? — [The plural intimates,] whether it be whole or blemished, (8) The sacrifice is valid.

(9) The plural indicates all sacrifices, even those for which Zerikah is prescribed.

(10) Therefore where Scripture prescribes sprinkling, the sacrifice is not valid if the blood is merely poured out at the base. Hence he rejects the above interpretation, and so utilizes the text for the purpose originally stated.

(11) In Pes. 121a it is explained that in R. Ishmael’s opinion sprinkling (Zerikah) is included in pouring (shefikah), but pouring is not included in sprinkling; whereas R. Akiba holds that neither is included in the other. Thus (as explained by Rashbam a.l.): Both R. Ishmael and R. Akiba hold that the blood of the Passover-offering must be poured out, i.e., the priest must stand quite close to the altar and gently pour the blood on to its base. But the blood of the festival-offering (Hagigah) requires sprinkling, i.e., from a distance and with some force. Now R. Ishmael holds that if the latter is poured out instead of sprinkled, the obligation of sprinkling has nevertheless been discharged. Consequently, the blessing for the Passover-offering includes that of the festival-offering, since in both the blood may be poured on to the base of the altar. But if the blood of the Passover-offering is sprinkled, the obligation has not been discharged: consequently the blessing for the festival-offering, whose blood is normally sprinkled, does not exempt the Passover-offering. By the same reasoning we infer that in R. Akiba’s view neither includes the other.

(12) Num. XVIII, 17.

(13) Ibid.

(14) Though the passage treats of the firstling only. The plural possessive suffix indicates that other sacrifices too are included in this law.

(15) These are the only sacrifices in connection with which it is not mentioned elsewhere, hence the plural is applied to them.

(16) Lit., ‘for this purpose and for that purpose’. Surely not! The reference is to ‘and the blood of thy sacrifices thou shalt pour out’, from which he learns that if the priest pours out blood which really should be sprinkled, he discharges his obligation. The author of that cannot be R. Akiba, for if it is, why does the blessing for the Passover-offering not exempt that of the festival sacrifice, since, as shown supra, one is dependent on the other? Hence the author must be R. Ishmael; but he also interprets the same verse as intimating that the blood of the Passover-offering is to be poured, not sprinkled.

(17) Rashi: He who learns from this text that the blood of the Passover-offering is poured out, rejects the ruling that the benediction for the Passover-offering exempts that for the festival-offering, and holds that R. Ishmael does not

(1) If any blood is left over after the regulation sprinkling. — This is stated explicitly of the sin-offering only (Lev. IV, 18), and the Talmud now wishes to extend it to other sacrifices too.

(2) The author of the first deduction.


(4) It is understood from the general context.

(5) Viz., the sin-offering.

(6) The two lines that follow in the original are a mere repetition, and are deleted by Sh. M.

(7) Some blood requires sprinkling (Zerikah), i.e., from the distance: other requires pouring out (shefikah), i.e., the priest must stand at the side of the altar and pour the blood out.
disagree with R. Akiba on this matter, for now we cannot learn from the text that what should be sprinkled is also valid if poured out. He however who maintains that they do disagree, holds that the blood of the Passover must be sprinkled, not poured out, like a peace-offering. Nevertheless, the Passover-offering is the principal one, while the festival-offering is only subsidiary to it; therefore the benediction for the former exempts that of the latter, but not vice versa. Tosaf. Strongly criticizes this explanation, and offers others, none of which, however, are quite free from objections.

(18) Num. XVIII, 18. — *Thine* means the priest’s, to whom the firstling belongs. The Plural ‘them’ is then understood to mean the ox, sheep, and goat, enumerated in the preceding verse.

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Hence intimating that a blemished firstling is given to a priest, for which [teaching] we do not find [any other text] in the whole Torah.1 And R. Ishmael?2 — He deduces it from ‘it shall be thine’, [written] at the end [of the verse].3 It is well according to R. Jose the Galilean, who makes it refer to the tithe and the Passover-offering too: hence it is written, Thou shalt not redeem; they are holy,4 [which intimates] ‘they’ are offered, but their substitutes are not offered.5 And we learnt [even so]. The substitutes of a firstling or tithe — they themselves, their young, and the young of their young ad infinitum are as the firstling or tithe [respectively], and are eaten, when blemished, by their owners.6 And we [also] learnt: R. Joshua said: I have heard [from my teachers] that the substitute of a Passover-offering is offered,7 and that the substitute of a Passover-offering is not offered,8 and I cannot explain it.9 But according to R. Ishmael who makes the whole of it refer to a firstling, whence does he know that the substitute of tithe and the Passover-offering are not offered? — As for tithe, he learns similarity of law with a firstling from the fact that ‘passing’ is written in both cases.10 As for the Passover-offering, [consider:] ‘lamb’ is explicitly written in connection with it; why then does Scripture write, If he bring a lamb for his offering?11 To include the substitute of a Passover-offering after Passover, [intimating] that it is sacrificed as a peace-offering. You might think that it is likewise so before Passover, therefore Scripture writes, It [is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover].12

Now, all these Tannaim who utilize this [text], ‘the blood of thy sacrifices shall be poured out’, for a different exegesis, how do they know this [law of the Mishnah that] WITH REGARD TO ANY [BLOOD] WHICH IS SPRINKLED ON THE OUTER ALTAR, IF [THE PRIEST] APPLIED [IT] WITH ONE SPRINKLING, HE HAS MADE ATONEMENT? — They hold as Beth Hillel who maintained: WITH REGARD TO THE SIN-OFFERING TOO, IF [THE PRIEST] APPLIED IT WITH A SINGLE APPLICATION, HE HAS MADE ATONEMENT; and we learn all the others from the sin-offering.13

BUT IN THE CASE OF A SIN-OFFERING TWO APPLICATIONS [ARE INDISPENSABLE]. R. Huna said, What is Beth Shammai’s reason? — The plural form Karnoth [horns] is written three times, denoting six [applications], [thus intimating that] four are prescribed while two [at least] are essential. But Beth Hillel [argue]: [The written forms are] Karnath [singular] twice, and Karnoth [plural] once,14 which denotes four, implying that three [applications] are prescribed, while [only] one is essential. Yet say, that all are [only] prescribed?15 We find no atonement without rite. Alternatively, this is Beth Hillel’s reason: Both Mikra [the version as read] and Masoreth [the version as traditionally written] are effective: the Mikra is effective in adding one [application], while the Masoreth is effective in subtracting one.16 If so, [when Scripture writes] letotafath, letotafath, letotafoth17, which denotes four [compartments], [you can likewise argue that] both the Mikra and the Masoreth are effective: then five compartments should be necessary? — He18 holds as R. Akiba, who said: Tot means two in Katpi,19 and foth
means two in Afriki. 20 [Again] if so [when Scripture writes], ba-sukkath, ba-sukkath, ba-sukkoth,21 [you may argue that] both the Mikra and the Masoreth are effective: then one should have five walls [for the tabernacle booth]? (1) The point of the question and answer is this: ‘Them’ obviously cannot mean the tithe and the Passover-offering, as R. Jose explains the plural in v. 17, since these belong to the owner. Nor can the plural here refer, in his view, to the ox, sheep, and goat, for in that case he could explain ‘their blood’ and ‘their fat’ similarly. Hence the difficulty, why is the plural used? The answer is, to intimate two categories of firstlings, whole and blemished. (2) Whence does he know this? (3) This repetition is to include the blemished firstling. (4) Ibid. (5) If one declares another animal a substitute for them, they are not offered, contrary to the general rule that the substitute is offered (together with the original) in exactly the same way as the original. (6) But not sacrificed while they are whole. (7) As a peace-offering, after Passover. — This is where the original is available for Passover. (8) As a peace-offering, but must graze until it is blemished, when it is redeemed. (9) For the explanation v. Pes. 96b. (10) V. supra 9a. (11) Lev. III, 7. — Scripture prescribes a lamb for a Passover-offering (Ex. XII, 5) which was in the nature of a peace-offering. Why then must Scripture also inform us that a lamb might be brought for a peace-offering? (The Talmud does not quote the exact wording, as Keseb is not written in connection with the Passover-offering, but a lamb is prescribed, though a slightly different word (kebes) is used.) (12) Ex. XII, 27. — ‘It’ (Heb. Hu) is emphatic, and teaches that only the original animal dedicated for a Passover-offering is to be sacrificed, but not its substitute which is kept until after Passover. An animal would be proposed as a substitute if the first one was lost, and is subject to the laws stated here if the first one is refunded in time to be sacrificed for its original purpose. If the first is not found until after the second has been offered, it becomes a Passover remainder’, and is sacrificed as a peace-offering after the festival. (13) The case of the sin-offering itself is learnt infra. (14) The reference is to Lev. IV, 25, 30, 34 q. v. The traditional reading in all cases is Karnoth horns, but it is actually written Karnath (תְּהַנָּה) singular) twice. Beth Shammai make the reading decisive, while Beth Hillel follow the written forms. (15) In the first place, but are not essential, since Scripture does not repeat any of them to intimate that they are indispensable. (16) Since the Mikra implies six while the Masoreth implies four, the implication of both is five; but as there are only four horns on the altar, the fifth must be regarded as a reiteration of one application, and hence it (i.e., one application) becomes indispensable; v. Sanh. (Sonc. ed.) p. 4b. q.v. notes. (17) Frontlets. V. Ex. XIII, 16; Deut. VI, 8, XI, 18: — and it shall be... for frontlets between thine eyes. This is the law of tefillin (v. Glo.s.); the word is written twice defectively and once plene (in our version it is written only once defectively), but read plene in every case. From the two defective and one plene forms the Rabbis learnt that the tefillin of the head must consist of four compartments. (18) The author of this interpretation of Karnoth. (19) Perhaps the Coptic language. (20) The language of N. Africa or Phrygia in Asia Minor. Hence the word Totalfoth itself implies four, without recourse to its repetition. (21) ‘In booths’: Ye shall dwell in booths seven days, etc. (Lev. XXIII, 42-43). Here too it is written twice defectively and once plene, and the Rabbis learn that the number of walls required by a booth is four, in the same way that they learn that the tefillin must have four compartments.

— There, subtract one text for the command itself, and one for the covering, so three are left. Then the [Mosaic] halachah4 comes and diminishes the third [wall], fixing it at a hand-breadth.5 If so, [when Scripture states] Then she shall be unclean two weeks [shebu'ayim],6 shib'im [seventy] [is actually written],7 then [argue,] the Mikra and the Masoreth are both effective, and so she should have to spend forty-two days [in uncleanness]?a — There it is different, because it is written, as in her menstrual state.a

Now the Tanna [of the following Baraitha] adduces it [Beth Hillel's ruling] as follows: We-ripper [and he shall make atonement] is
stated three times, on account of the analogy [which might otherwise be drawn],
But surely we have an analogy to this effect: blood is prescribed below [the red line], and blood is prescribed above: as with the blood which is prescribed below, if one made a single application, he effects atonement; so with the blood which is prescribed above, if one makes a single application, he makes atonement. Or you may reason in this direction: Blood is prescribed within, and blood is prescribed without: as in the case of blood prescribed within, if [the priest] omits a single application his action is ineffective; so in the case of the blood prescribed without, if he omits a single application his action is null. Then let us see to which it is comparable:

You can draw an analogy between sacrifices offered on the outer altar, but you cannot draw an analogy between [sacrifices offered on] the outer altar and [those offered on] the inner altar. Or, you might argue to the contrary: You may draw an analogy between sin-offerings whose blood is sprinkled on four horns [of the altar], and let not the outer altar prove it, which is not a sin-offering nor [is its blood sprinkled on the] four horns. Therefore Scripture states ‘we-kipper’ three times, on account of the analogy [which might otherwise be drawn], [teaching]: ‘and he shall make atonement even though he sprinkled [the blood] only three times; ‘and he shall make atonement even though he sprinkled [it] only twice; ‘and he shall make atonement’ even though he sprinkled it but once. But this is required for its own purpose?

Said Raba b. Adda: Mari explained it to me: Scripture says, and he shall make atonement... and he shall be forgiven: atonement and forgiveness are identical. Yet say [that] ‘and he shall make atonement’ [intimates] even if he made only three applications above [the red line] and one below; and he shall make atonement’ even if he made only two applications above and two below; ‘and he shall make atonement even if he did not apply [the blood] above but only below? —

Said R. Adda b. Isaac: If so, you annul the law of horns. But if the Divine Law has ordained [it so], let them be annulled? —

Said Raba: What thing is it that requires three? Surely the horns. Yet say, ‘and he shall make atonement’ [teaches] even if he made only one application above and three below? — We do not find blood [applied] half above and half below. Do we not? Surely we learnt: He sprinkled thereof once above and seven below? — That was done as mazlif [one swinging a whip]. What is a mazlif? — Rab Judah showed it by imitating the movements of a whipper. [Again, we learnt:] He besprinkled the surface of the altar seven times.

(1) I.e., one of the five implied by the text.
(2) There must be at least one to state the law of sitting in booths.
(3) The booth must have a covering, which is governed by laws of its own.
(4) A law traditionally imputed to Moses at Sinai, but not stated in the Pentateuch.
(5) There was a Mosaic tradition that however many walls the sukkah required, one of these need be no more than a handbreadth in width.
(6) Lev. XII, 5.
(7) Though vocalized shebu'ayim.
(8) This figure is arrived at by taking a point midway between fourteen (days) and seventy.
(9) Ibid. E.V. as in her impurity. The menstrual state lasts seven days, hence the word must be understood as read, two weeks, which is fairly close to the menstrual state. But forty-two days of uncleanness bear no similarity at all to the menstrual state.
(10) In connection with the sprinkling of the blood of sin-offerings. Lev. IV, 26, 31, 35.
(11) That the omission of a single application invalidates the offering.
(12) I.e. to prove that the omission of any application does not invalidate the offering. Wherefore then is there any need of a verse to intimate this law?
(13) Which encompassed the altar at the middle of its height. — The blood of burnt-, peace- and trespass-offerings was sprinkled below it, infra 53a.
(14) As deduced supra 36b, 37a.
(15) I.e., to be sprinkled on the inner altar. Viz.: the blood of sacrifices offered on the Day of Atonement, and the sacrifices brought by the High Priest and the community for having sinned through ignorance.
(16) He does not make atonement.
(17) Lit., ‘you judge without from without.’
(18) Lit., ‘you judge a sin-offering and four horns from a sin-offering and four horns.’
(19) I.e., the burnt-offering, whose blood was sprinkled on the outer altar.
(20) Consequently, by this analogy one might deduce that the omission of an application invalidates the sin-offering.
(21) Surely in each of the three cases referred to (supra p. 192, n. 14). Scripture must state ‘and he shall make atonement’ to teach that each sin is atoned for by its respective sin-offering.
(22) Hence ‘and he shall make atonement’ is superfluous.
(23) Whence then is it known that atonement is effected even if no application at all was made?
(24) Whereas Scripture states that the blood must be applied on the horns of the altar, which of course were above the red line.
(25) Each ‘we-kipper’ makes one horn less necessary. Hence the threefold repetition diminishes them by three, leaving sprinkling on one essential; for in order to render effective the application of all the four below the line four texts would be required.
(26) Of the blood of the bullock sacrificed on the Day of Atonement.
(27) He did not aim above or below, but made the movement of swinging a whip.
(28) The High Priest, during the Atonement Day Service.
(29) Lit., ‘the pure’ (golden front).

Surely that means on the [upper] half of the altar, as people say, The noon-light shines, and so it is midday?!

Said Raba b. Shila, No: [it means] on the [altar's] top surface [cleared] from ashes, for it is written, and the like of the very heaven for clearness.2 But there is the remainder [of the blood]?3 — The [pouring out of] the remainder [at the altar's base] is not essential.4 But there is the remainder of inner sin-offerings,5 which, according to one view is essential?6 We mean in one and the same place.7

It was taught: R. Eliezer b. Jacob said: Beth Shammi maintain [that] two applications in the case of the sin-offering and one in the case of all [other] sacrifices permit [them for consumption] and may render them piggul;8 Beth Hillel rule: One application [only] in the case of a sin-offering and one in the case of all [other] sacrifices permit [them for consumption] and may render them Piggul. To this R. Oshaia demurred: If so, this [controversy] should be recited among the lenient rulings of Beth Shammi and the stricter rulings of Beth Hillel?9 — Said Raba to him: When the question was [first] asked, it was whether [the sacrifice] was permitted,10 so that Beth Shammi were stricter.

R. Johanan said: The three [final] applications of sin-offerings may not be made at night, and are made after [the owners’] death, while he who presents them without the Temple court is culpable.11

R. Papa said: In some respects [they are] as the first blood, while in others they are as the last:12 [In respect of sprinkling them] without [the Temple court], at night, zaruth,13 [the requirement of] a service-vessel, [sprinkling on] the horn, [with] the finger, washing,14 and residue,15 they are as the first blood. [In respect of] death, not permitting [the flesh], not rendering [it] Piggul, and not entering within, they are as the last blood.16

R. Papa said: How do I know it?17 — Because we learnt: If [the blood] spurted [direct] from the [animal's] throat on to the [priest's] garment, it does not need washing; from the horn or from the base of the altar, it does not need washing. Hence, [if some] of [the blood] which was fit for the horn [spurted on the garment], it does need washing.18 Then on your reasoning [you may argue, ‘If it spurted] from the base, it does not need
wearing; hence if some of the blood which was fit for the base19 [spurted on the garment], it does need washing? [Yet surely] it is written, And if aught of the blood which is to be sprinkled [spurt] upon any garment, thou shalt wash that whereon it was sprinkled in a holy place,20 which excludes this [residue], as the [blood] has already been sprinkled? [Hence you must say that] this is in accordance with R. Nehemiah, for we learnt: R. Nehemiah said: If one presented the residue of the blood without [the Temple court], he is liable.21 But granted that you know R. Nehemiah [to rule thus] in respect of presenting [the blood without the Temple court], by analogy with the limbs and the fat pieces,22 do you [however] know him [to rule thus] in respect of washing? — Yes,

(1) This is to show that the root Tahor (pure) denotes half, as it is used for midday (actually, because then the sun shines in all its clarity and purity). And in this case it was hardly possible to avoid some of the blood falling below the line.

(2) Ex. XXIV, 10 — Heb. lo-tohar. This gives the word its usual meaning, and here it is interpreted, the cleared surface (on top).

(3) Which is poured out at the base of the altar. Thus part of the blood is applied above, and part is applied below.

(4) But we find no case of the essential sprinkling being partly above and partly below.

(5) I.e., the remainder which is poured out on the base of the outer altar, v. infra 47a.

(6) V. infra 52a. Thus the blood itself is applied on the upper part of the inner altar, while another portion of it, the remainder, is poured out at the base of the outer altar.

(7) There is no instance of the blood being poured partly above and partly below on the same altar.

(8) Only if a Piggul intention is expressed during both applications does the sin-offering become Piggul. For since both are essential, each sprinkling is only half a Mattir (q.v. Glos.), through which one cannot render a sacrifice Piggul.

(9) In the numerous controversies between these two schools Beth Shamai generally holds the stricter, Beth Hillel the more lenient view; the exceptions are enumerated in the Tractate ‘Eduyyoth, and the present controversy is not included. But in fact here too Beth Hillel are more severe, in that they rule that a Piggul intention expressed during one application only renders the sin-offering Piggul.

(10) If one application only was made.

(11) Though the first application is sufficient, the other three are not essential, and so might not be regarded as real sprinklings at all; nevertheless, they must not be done at night, in accordance with the general law that the blood must not be kept until the night. Again, if the owner of the sacrifice dies before its blood is sprinkled, the blood cannot be sprinkled and the sacrifice is burnt. But if the owner dies after the first application, which in itself rendered the sacrifice valid, the other three applications are made. And similarly since the sprinkling of these is deemed a valid sacrificial service, to sprinkle them without is to incur guilt.

(12) Lit., ‘some of them are as the beginning, and some of them are as the end.’ — The three final applications are governed in some respects by the laws appertaining to the first application; while in others they are regarded simply as the pouring out of the remainder of the blood.

(13) The ineligibility of a lay-Israelite (a non-priest, Heb. Zar) to perform the sprinkling.

(14) If blood spurts on the priest’s vestment after the first application, it must be washed in a holy place, just as if it had spurted before the first application. But if it spurts on to it after the four applications before the pouring out of the residue, it need not be so washed, as is shown infra.

(15) If the blood of the sin-offering was received in four cups, and one application is made from each, the remaining blood in each counts as the residue, which is to be poured out at the base.

(16) (i) The three applications are made even after the owner’s death, just as the residue would be poured out after all the applications. (ii) They do not permit the flesh, since this was permitted by the first application. (iii) If the first application was made in silence, and these with a Piggul intention, they do not render the sacrifice Piggul. Finally, (iv) if the first application was properly made, on the outer altar, and the blood for these applications was taken within, into the Hekal (q.v. Glos.), the sacrifice does not become invalid, as it would be if the blood for the first application were so treated. For Scripture says, And no sin-offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the tent of meeting (i.e. the inner sanctum, corresponding to the Hekal) to make atonement in the holy place, shall be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire (Lev. VI, 23). With the first application, however, atonement is made, and so this blood is not brought ‘to make atonement’. — In all these respects the blood for the three applications is regarded as the residue, just as that which remains after all the applications.

(17) Referring to the requirement of washing in n. 3.
(18) The blood which is fit for the horn is that which is to be sprinkled upon it, even in the last three applications.
(19) I.e., the residue.
(20) Lev., VI, 20. E.V. and when there is sprinkled of the blood thereof upon any garment, etc.
(21) Even in the case of the sin-offerings of the outer altar. Thus R. Nehemiah regards this as blood, and therefore it bears that status in respect to washing too. Hence this does not support R. Papa, as it is an individual view. The others, however, who rule that there is no liability, will also hold that no washing is required.
(22) Liability is incurred for presenting these outside the Temple court; though they are not blood. Hence the same may hold good of the residue, even if it should not bear the status of blood.

and [so] it was taught: The bloods which require the base necessitate washing, and an [illegitimate] intention in connection with same is effective, and one who presents thereof without [the Temple court] is liable. The blood, however, which is poured out into the duct does not necessitate washing, and an [illegitimate] intention in connection with same is not effective, and one who presents thereof without is exempt [from punishment]. Now, whom do you know to rule that one who presents thereof without is liable?

R. Nehemiah: and he [also] rules [that] it necessitates washing and [that] an [illegitimate] intention in connection with the same is effective. But it was taught: [The pouring out of] the residue and the burning of the limbs [on the altar], which are not indispensable for atonement, are excepted, in that an [illegitimate] intention in connection with same is of no effect? — Thats was taught in reference to the [last] three applications of a sin-offering. If so, [why does it say] ‘which requires the base?’ [Surely] it is sprinkled on the horn [of the altar]? — Say, which is required for the base.5 But then, what of ‘And an [illegitimate] intention in connection with same is effective’? Surely you said, ‘It does not permit [the flesh], it does not render [it] Piggul, and does not enter within, as the last blood’? — Rather that [Baraita] was taught in respect of the blood of the inner [sacrifices].6 But in the case of the blood of outer [sacrifices] what [will you say]? he is exempt?7 Then instead of teaching [about] the blood which is poured out into the duct, let [the Tanna] teach a distinction in that very case. [Thus:] This is said only of the blood of inner [sacrifices], but in the case of the outer sacrifices, he is exempt? — This is in accordance with R. Nehemiah, who maintained [that] one who presents the residue of the bloods without is liable, and so he [the Tanna] could not enumerate three instances of exemption corresponding to three instances of liability.9

Rabina said, ‘From the horn’ is meant literally, but ‘from the base’ means, from that which is fit for the base.10 Said R. Tahlifa b. Gaza to Rabina: perhaps both mean [the blood] that is fit [etc.]?11 — How is that possible: Seeing that you say that [even the blood] fit for the horn [does] not [necessitate washing], need one speak about the blood fit for the base? Hence ‘from the horn’ is meant literally, while ‘from the base’ means from that which is fit for the base.

ALL [BLOOD] WHICH IS SPRINKLED ON THE INNER ALTAR, etc. Our Rabbis taught: Thus shall he do [with the bullock]; as he did [with the bullock of the sin-offering, so shall he do with this]:12 Why is this stated? As a repetition of the [law of sprinkling], to teach that if [the priest] omitted one of the applications, he has done nothing.13 I know this only of the seven applications,14 which are indispensable in all cases; whence do we know [it] of the four applications? From the text, ‘So shall he do with this’.15 ‘With the bullock’ means the bullock of the Day of Atonement.16

(1) I.e., the residue which must be poured out at the base.
(2) Blood which had become unfit was poured into a duct in the Temple court, whence it flowed out into the stream of Kidron.
(3) Cf. supra 13a bottom.
(4) Sc. the ruling that an illegitimate intention is effective.
(5) The ultimate residue is poured out at the base.
(6) It refers indeed, as hitherto assumed, to the residue, not to the three applications, but to the residue of sin-offerings presented at the inner altar, and in accordance with the view that that is indispensable (infra 52a); consequently it can render the sacrifice Piggul.
(7) For presenting it without the Temple court.
(8) Even of the outer sin-offerings.
(9) The Baraita enumerates three instances of liability and three of exemption (i.e., three instances where the residue bears the full status of blood, and three where it does not). But if the Tanna drew a distinction between the residue of inner sacrifices and that of outer sacrifices respectively, he could not maintain that parallelism.
(10) He refers to the Mishnah quoted supra 38b. For if it is meant literally, it is superfluous: seeing that the blood which spurts from the horn does not necessitate washing, it is surely obvious that that which spurts from the base does not necessitate washing. — Thus he answers the objection ‘then on your reasoning’, etc., which was raised against R. Papa’s proof.
(11) Which interpretation, implying that there is blood fit for the horn, i.e., the three last applications, and yet it does not necessitate washing, would refute R. Papa!
(12) Lev. IV, 20. This treats of the sin-offering brought when the whole congregation sins, which was offered on the inner altar. The verse itself is apparently superfluous, since all its rites are described in detail.
(13) The sacrifice is invalid.
(14) Before the veil of the ark.
(15) This is yet another repetition. Since its implication of indispensability is not required in respect of the seven applications, it is transferred to the four applications on the altar.
(16) Teaching that its laws are the same as those which govern that bullock brought for the whole congregation’s sin.

Zevachim 39b

‘As he did with the bullock’ refers to the bullock of the anointed priest;1 ‘the sin-offering’ refers to the goats of idolatry.2 You might think that I include the festival goats

and new-moon goats.3 Therefore Scripture states, ‘[So shall he do] with this’.4 And what [reason] do you see for including the former and excluding the latter? Since the Writ intimates extension and intimates limitation, I include the former, which make atonement for the known transgression of a precept: while I exclude the latter, which do not make atonement for the known transgression of a precept.5 And [the priest] shall make atonement6 — even though he had not laid hands [on the bullock]: and it shall be forgiven to them7 — even though he had not poured out the residue.8 And what [reason] do you see for invalidating [the sacrifice] in the case of sprinklings and validating [it] in the case of laying on [of hands] and the residue?9 You can answer: I invalidate in the case of sprinklings, as they are indispensable elsewhere:10 while I validate in the case of laying on [of hands] and the residue, which are not indispensable in all [other] cases.

(1) Which is treated of in the previous section (Lev. IV, 3 seq.). This thus becomes a repetition, with the same implication that there too all the blood applications are essential.
(2) I.e., which were brought to atone for idolatry; v. Num. XV, 27 seq. which is applied to this case. The details of their rites are not explained there; by making the present text refer to them, we learn that their rites are the same as those prescribed here.
(3) To teach that their rites too are the same.
(4) But not with other sacrifices.
(5) The festival and new-moon sin-offerings made atonement for the inadvertent defiling of the Temple, of which the offender would not know at all (v. Shebu. 2a).
(6) Num. XV, 28.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Of the blood, on the outer altar.
(9) Why interpret the verse so that an omission of one of the sprinklings invalidates the sacrifice, while the omission of laying hands or pouring out the residue at the base of the outer altar, leaves it valid? Perhaps you should reverse it.
(10) Lit., ‘in all places.’ — The allusion is explained anon.
The Master said: ‘I know [it] only of the seven applications which are indispensable elsewhere.’ Where? — Said R. Papa: In the case of the [red] heifer and leprosy.1 ‘How do we know [it] of the four applications? Because it is written, so shall he do’. Why do the seven applications differ? [presumably] because they are prescribed and reiterated? Then the four applications too are prescribed and reiterated?2 —

Said R. Jeremiah: This is necessary only according to R. Simeon. For it was taught: In the upper section ‘horns’ is written, [where] horn [would suffice] [which implies] two, and in the lower section ‘horns’ is written [instead of] horn, which implies four: this is R. Simeon’s view.3 R. Judah said: It is unnecessary, [for] surely it says, [which] is in the tent of meeting,4 [intimating,] upon all which is mentioned in the tent of meeting.5

Now, how does R. Judah employ [the text], so shall he do?6 He requires it for what was taught: As we have not learnt about laying on [of hands] and the residue of the blood in the case of the bullock of the Day of Atonement,7 whence [then] do we know it? From the text, So shall he do.8 But have we not learnt [it] of the bullock of the Day of Atonement? Surely you said, ‘”with the bullock” refers to the bullock of Atonement Day.’9 — It is necessary: You might think that it applies only to a service which is indispensable for atonement;10 but as for a service which is not indispensable for atonement, I would agree that it is not so.11 Hence he informs us [otherwise].

Now, how does R. Simeon employ this [phrase] ‘in the tent of meeting’? — He utilizes it [as teaching] that if the ceiling of the Hekal was broken, [the priest] did not sprinkle.12 And the other?13 — [He deduces it] from ‘which is’.14 And the other?15 — He does not interpret ‘which is’ [as having a particular significance].

Abaye said: According to R. Judah too [the text] is required. You might think that it is analogous to laying [hands] and [pouring out] the residue of the blood, which are not indispensable in spite of being prescribed and reiterated; so you might argue that the four applications too are indispensable. Hence [the text] informs us [that it is not so].

[The Master said:] ‘’With the bullock’ refers to the bullock of the Day of Atonement.’ In respect of which law? if [to intimate] that [the four applications] are essential, it is obvious, [since] ‘statute’ is written in connection with it.16 —

Said R. Nahman b. Isaac: This is necessary only on R. Judah’s view, for he maintained: ‘Statute’ is written only in reference to the rites performed in the white vestments, within [the inner Sanctuary], [and it teaches] that if one rite was [wrongly] performed before another, [the High Priest] has done nothing;17 but as for the rites performed in the white vestments without, if not performed in correct order,18 what he has done is done.19 Then I might argue, since their [prescribed] order is not indispensable, the sprinklings too are not indispensable. Hence [the text] informs us [otherwise].

To this R. Papa demurred: Can you say so?20 Surely it was taught: And he shall make an end of atoning for the holy place, [and the tent of meeting, and the altar]:21 if he atoned,22 he made an end;23 while if he did not atone, he did not make an end: this is R. Akiba’s view. Said R. Judah to him: Why should we not interpret: If he made an end, he atoned, while if he did not make an end, he did not atone?24 Rather said R. Papa: It25 is required only in respect of [deductions from] the eth and [those relating to] the blood and the dipping.26 ‘Eth’: R. Aha b. Jacob said: That is required only to teach that
(1) The red heifer: This is the statute (Hukkath) of the law... And Eleazar... shall... sprinkle of her blood toward the front of the tent of meeting seven times (Num. XIX, 2-4). Leprosy: This shall be the law of the leper in the day of his cleansing... And the priest... shall sprinkle of the oil with his finger seven times before the Lord (Lev. XIV, 2, 16). It is a general principle that where a law is designated ‘statute’ or introduced by ‘shall be’, denoting emphasis, it is indispensable.

(2) Why is an additional text required to show that all the four applications are essential? The reiteration of the seven applications (according to the present exegesis) is pari passu a reiteration of the four.

(3) The upper and the lower sections are Lev. IV, 1-12, and Lev. IV, 13-21, dealing with the bullock of the anointed priest and the bullock of the whole congregation respectively. In the upper section: And the priest shall put of the blood upon the horns of the altar (v. 7). In the lower section: And he shall put of the blood upon the horns of the altar which is before the Lord (v. 18). The plural implies two in each case, and then by analogy the provisions of each are transferred to the other too, which gives the four horns for each. But this transference is made only because we have the repetition, which is thus necessary in R. Simeon’s view.

(4) Lev. IV, 7, 18.

(5) I.e., upon all the horns which Scripture prescribed for the altar in the tent of meeting.

(6) Why this repetition?

(7) I.e., that laying hands and pouring out the residue at the altar’s base are necessary. These are not prescribed in Lev. XVI, which treats of the Day of Atonement ritual.

(8) An extension which intimates that the bullock of the Day of Atonement requires these, since ‘with the bullock’ has been interpreted as referring to it.

(9) Which exegesis automatically teaches that the provisions of the passage, including the two under discussion, apply to it; what need then of the further words, ‘so shall he do?’

(10) Only those services are included, since Scripture adds, And the priest shall make atonement for them.

(11) Such are not included in the extension implied in the text. Laying hands and pouring out the residue at the altar's base are not essential for atonement.

(12) Because it is no longer the ‘tent’ (of meeting).

(13) R. Judah; whence does he know this?

(14) Which he regards as superfluous.

(15) R. Simeon: how does he interpret ‘which is’?

(16) Lev. XVI, 29: And it shall be a statute for ever unto you — which implies that all the prescribed rites are essential!

(17) His service is invalid.

(18) Lit., ‘one before the other.’

(19) It is valid; v. Yoma 60a.

(20) That R. Judah learns the indispensable character of the four sprinklings from the present text.


(22) I.e., if he performed the rites which are essential for atonement in other cases, e.g., the four sprinklings on the altar and the seven sprinklings before the veil.

(23) He could end his service there, even if he did not pour out the residue of the blood at the base of the outer altar.

(24) I.e., the service is valid and atonement is made only if he made an end, having performed all the prescribed rites (v. Yoma 60b). Thus it is from this text that R. Judah deduces the indispensability of the prescribed rites, including the four applications.

(25) The text ‘with the bullock’.

(26) In connection with the anointed priest’s bullock it is written: And the priest shall dip (eth) his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood seven times before the Lord (Lev. IV, 6). ‘Eth’, which is the sign of the accusative, which is treated as an extension, as well as the phrases ‘he shall dip’ and ‘in the blood’ teach the number of additional laws about the sprinkling and dipping as anon. Through the present exegesis, that ‘with the bullock’ applies to the Atonement Day bullock, Scripture assimilates it to the bullock of the anointed priest, and so teaches that what is deduced from the ‘eth’ applies to this too.

Zevachim 40b

if there is a wart on the finger it is fit.1 ‘In the blood’ [teaches] that there must be sufficient blood for dipping at the outset.2 ‘And he shall dip’ [teaches] but not sponge up.3 Now it is necessary to write both ‘and he shall dip’ and ‘in the blood’.4 For if the Divine Law wrote, ‘and he shall dip’ [only], I would say, even where there is insufficient for dipping in the first place; therefore the Divine Law wrote, ‘in the blood’. And if the Divine Law wrote ‘in the blood’ [only], I would say [that] he may even sponge it up; therefore the Divine Law wrote, ‘and he shall dip’. What is the purpose of the altar of sweet incense?5 — [To
teach] that if the altar had not been consecrated by sweet incense, [the priest] did not sprinkle.6

It was taught in accordance with R. Papa: ‘Thus shall he do...as he did’: why does Scripture say, ‘with the bullock’? — To include the bullock of the Day of Atonement in respect of all that is prescribed in this passage: that is Rabbi's view.7 Said R. Ishmael: It follows a fortiori:8 if rites [of diverse sacrifices] were assimilated to each other even where the sacrifices are not the same,9 Surely rites are assimilated to each other where the sacrifices are the same.10 What then does Scripture intimate by [the phrase] ‘with the bullock’? This refers to the bullock brought for the community's unwitting transgression; while [the other] ‘with the bullock’11 refers to the bullock of the anointed priest.12

The Master said: ‘If where the sacrifices are not assimilated to each other’. To what does ‘the sacrifices are not assimilated to each other’ allude? Shall we say, to the bullock of the Day of Atonement and the goat of the Day of Atonement?13 Then [the argument] can be refuted: as for these, [their rites are similar] because their blood enters the innermost sanctum!14 Rather, it alludes to the community's bullock for unwitting transgression and the goats [sacrificed] on account of idolatry.15 But [here too the argument] can be refuted: As for these, [their rites are the same] because they make atonement for the violation of a known precept?16 Rather, it alludes to the community's bullock for unwitting transgression and the he-goat of the Day of Atonement, and this is what he means: If where the sacrifices are not the same, since one is a bullock and the other is a goat, yet the rites are alike as far as what is prescribed in their case is concerned,17 then where the sacrifices are the same, this one being a bullock and the other being a bullock, it is surely logical

(1) That is learnt from the eth: though the blood is taken up by the wart, yet it is fit.
(2) Sufficient must be caught in one vessel at the outset; but the blood must not be received in two vessels and poured together to make enough for that purpose.
(3) By wiping round the sides of the utensil.
(4) Emended text (Sh. M.)
(5) Ibid. 7. Seeing that ‘in the tent of meeting’ has been interpreted as intimating everything which was in the tent of meeting, why specify ‘the altar of sweet incense’?
(6) If this bullock was offered at a new altar, upon which incense had never yet been burnt, the priest did not sprinkle.
(7) Yalkut reads: that is R. Akiba's view.
(8) No text is necessary for this.
(9) Even where the sacrifices differed in certain respects.
(10) E.g., the Day of Atonement bullock and that brought for the sin of the whole community. These are similar, since they both belong to the same category.
(11) The phrase is repeated in the verse, q.v.
(12) Teaching that the same law applies to this as to the former, viz., that if one of the sprinklings is omitted, the sacrifice is invalid.
(13) These are not the same, being different animals, yet their rites of sprinkling, etc. are the same.
(14) But the blood of the community's bullock did not enter the innermost sanctum.
(15) Whose rites are the same, as stated supra.
(16) V. Shebu. 2a.
(17) In the matter of sprinkling, which Scripture prescribes for both, they are alike. Both are sprinkled with the finger, on the horns of the altar, and before the veil. Thus they are alike in essence, notwithstanding that the blood of one entered the inner sanctum while that of the other did not, and one requires eight sprinklings as against the other's seven.

Zevachim 41a

that their rites shall be alike.1 Then the [rites of the] Day of Atonement bullock are learnt from [those of] the bullock of the anointed priest, [insofar as the latter are deduced] from 'eth', 'in the blood’ and the mention of dipping.2 And [the rites of] the goat of the Day of Atonement are also learnt from [those of] the goats brought on account of idolatry, a fortiori.3 But can that which is learnt
through a Hekkesh then in turn teach a fortiori?

Said R. Papa: The Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael holds [that] that which is learnt through a Hekkesh can in turn teach a fortiori. ‘“With the bullock” refers to the community’s bullock for unwitting transgression.’ But that is written in the very text?

Said R. Papa: Because he wishes that the community’s bullock for unwitting transgression shall teach that the goats for idolatry require [the burning of] the lobe [above the liver] and the two kidneys [on the altar]; yet that is not prescribed in the actual passage on the community’s bullock for unwitting transgression, but is learnt through a Hekkesh; therefore ‘with the bullock’ is needed, to make it as though it were prescribed in the actual text, and thus it should not be a case of what is learnt through a Hekkesh in turn teaching through a hekkesh.

It was taught in accordance with R. Papa: ‘Thus shall he do [with the bullock] as he did’: why does Scripture [further] state, with the bullock? Because it is said, And they have brought their offering, an offering made by fire unto the Lord, [and their sin-offering before the veil and on the golden altar]. Now, ‘their sin-offering’ refers to the he-goats for idolatry, while ‘their error’ alludes to the community’s bullock for unwitting transgression. [Hence when the text says] ‘their sin-offering... for their error’, the Torah intimates: Behold, you must treat their sin-offering as their [offering for] error. But whence have you learned [the law in the case of] their [offering for] error? Was it not through a hekkesh? Can then that which is learnt through a Hekkesh in turn teach through a Hekkesh? Therefore the text states, ‘[As he did] with the bullock’, which refers to the community’s bullock for transgression; while [the other] ‘with the bullock’ alludes to the anointed priest’s bullock.

The Master said: “‘Their sin-offering” refers to the he-goats for idolatry.’ Deduce this from the earlier verse, for a master said, “‘The sin-offering” is to include the he-goats of idolatry”

Said R. Papa, It is necessary. I might argue that [the force of this extension] applies only to the sprinklings, which are prescribed in that very passage;

(1) Such as the sprinklings before the veil and on the golden altar.
(2) V. supra 40a.
(3) If where the sacrifices are not the same, viz., the community’s bullock for unwitting transgression and the goat of the Day of Atonement, the rites prescribed for both are alike, since Scripture does not explicitly say that those which they have in common, e.g., the sprinklings in the Hekal, are different; then where the sacrifices are the same, e.g. the goat of the Day of Atonement and the goats of idolatry, their rites are surely alike.
(4) As here. For the rites of the anointed priest’s bullock, insofar as these are deduced from ‘eth’, ‘in the blood’ and the mention of dipping, are transferred to the goats for idolatry only by a Hekkesh (q.v. Glos.); then we make them in turn teach a fortiori that the same applies to the goats of the Day of Atonement.
(5) The whole passage deals with this.
(6) As here. For the rites of the anointed priest’s bullock, insofar as these are deduced from ‘eth’, ‘in the blood’ and the mention of dipping, are transferred to the goats for idolatry only by a Hekkesh (q.v. Glos.); then we make them in turn teach a fortiori that the same applies to the goats of the Day of Atonement. Now, here we have in any case a Hekkesh between the community’s bullock and the anointed priest’s bullock, since ‘as he did with the bullock’ has been interpreted as referring to the anointed priest’s bullock, while the whole passage in which it occurs treats of the community’s bullock. Hence when Scripture further reiterates this Hekkesh by saying, ‘thus shall he do with the bullock’, which being superfluous is made to refer to the community’s bullock.
bullock, the effect of this repeated Hekkesh is to make it as though the burning of the lobe and the kidneys were not derived through a Hekkesh but explicitly prescribed. Hence one can no longer object that what is learnt through a Hekkesh cannot teach through a Hekkesh.

(7) Num. XV, 25.
(8) Viz., that the lobe and the kidneys of the former, as of the latter, must be burnt on the altar. This is a Hekkesh deduction.
(9) V. p. 205, n. 5.
(10) That the lobe and kidneys of these must be burnt on the altar.
(11) Sc. Lev. VII, 19 which is now being discussed.
(12) Supra 39b. By this inclusion its rites are brought into line with those of the other sacrifices alluded to in that verse, and hence include the burning of the lobe and the kidneys on the altar.
(13) Teaching that the blood of the he-goats must be sprinkled in the same way as that of the community's bullock.

**Zevachim 41b**

It is a controversy of Tannaim. The Tanna of the Academy includes it in this way, while the Tanna of the School of R. Ishmael includes it in that way. The School of R. Ishmael taught: Why are the lobe and the two kidneys mentioned in connection with the anointed priest's bullock, but not in connection with the community's bullock for unwitting transgression? It may be compared to a king of flesh and blood against whom a province sinned — If a minority offended, his retainers remain [with them], but if the majority offend, his retainers do not remain [with them].

**THEREFORE, IF HE APPLIED ALL CORRECTLY, AND ONE INCORRECTLY, IT [THE SACRIFICE] IS INVALID, BUT DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH.** We learnt elsewhere: If [the priest] made a Piggul intention at the [burning of the] fistful [of flour] but not at [the burning of the] incense, but at the frankincense but not at the fistful, R. Meir says that it is Piggul, and one is liable to kareth on its account; but the Sages maintain: It does not involve kareth unless [the priest] makes a Piggul intention for the whole Mattir. R. Simeon b. Lakish commented: Do not say that R. Meir's reason is because he holds that you can make a [sacrifice] Piggul in half a Mattir. Rather the circumstances here are that [the priest] presented the fistful [on the altar] with a [Piggul] intention, and the frankincense in silence. He [R. Meir] holds [that] when one does [a thing], he does it with his first intention. How do you know it?

Because [the Tanna] teaches: **THEREFORE IF HE APPLIED ALL CORRECTLY, AND ONE INCORRECTLY, IT [THE SACRIFICE] IS INVALID, BUT DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH.** Hence [if he applies] one correctly and all [the others] incorrectly, it is Piggul. With whom does this agree? If with the Rabbis? Surely the Rabbis say [that] you cannot make Piggul at half a Mattir? Hence it must be R. Meir; now if R. Meir's reason is that you can make Piggul at half a Mattir, then even in the conditions which he teaches it is still piggul. Hence it must surely be because he holds that when one does [a thing], he does it with his first intention. Said R. Samuel b. Isaac: In truth it agrees with the Rabbis, and what is meant by
CORRECTLY? In the proper manner for piggul.10

But since [the Tanna] teaches: THEREFORE, IF HE APPLIED ALL CORRECTLY, AND ONE INCORRECTLY, IT [THE SACRIFICE] IS UNFIT, BUT DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH, it follows that INCORRECTLY means [in a manner] to make it fit?11 — Said Raba: What does INCORRECTLY mean? — [With an intention of eating it] without bounds. R. Ashi said: [It means] under a different designation. Hence it follows that if [the priest] did not do it [with an intention of consuming it] without bounds or under a different designation, one is liable?12 —

Because the first clause teaches, IT IS PIGGUL, AND ONE IS LIABLE TO KARETH ON ITS ACCOUNT, the second clause too teaches, IT IS UNFIT, AND DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH.14

An objection is raised: When is this said?15 In the case of blood that is presented on the outer altar.

(1) Which implies that even the sprinklings are indispensable, whereas you say (supra 40a bottom) that only those laws which are deduced from ‘eth’, etc. are learnt in this way.
(2) This is the meaning of Be Rab as used here, and it refers to the anonymous statement introduced by ‘Our Rabbis taught’.
(3) In the same way God treats the community's offence more shortly, and leaves a number of details to be deduced rather than state them explicitly.
(4) Lev. IV, 6, speaking of the former, states, And the priest... shall sprinkle of the blood... in front of the veil of the sanctuary. But in IV, 17, which treats of the latter, Scripture merely mentions ‘the veil’ not the veil of the sanctuary.
(5) To show his resentment he withdraws them. Thus where the whole community sins God, as it were, withdraws His holiness, and there is no sanctuary left.
(6) The burning of these two permits the meal-offering to be eaten. The two rites together therefore constitute the matter (q.v. Glos.), and each is only half a Mattir.

(7) If one eats of the offering.
(8) Hence his silence here is the equivalent of a Piggul intention.
(9) Even if the first application is made in silence and the others with a Piggul intention, it should be Piggul.
(10) In a manner which will render it Piggul. Thus: the first application with a Piggul intention, and the others in silence.
(11) For silence could not be called’ INCORRECTLY’.
(12) And since it is a sin-offering, it becomes invalidated (v. supra 2a) and consequently is not rendered Piggul.
(13) I.e., if the second application was made in silence, it is Piggul, which shows that we regard the second action as done with the same intention as the first. But that is R. Meir's view, not the Rabbis.
(14) CORRECTLY does mean in a proper manner for Piggul whilst INCORRECTLY means with the intention of consuming it without bounds. Actually then even if he made the second sprinkling in silence it would not be Piggul, but INCORRECTLY is taught for the sake of parallelism. For in the first clause, dealing with the outer sacrifices, he teaches IF HE APPLIED THE FIRST WITH THE INTENTION OF CONSUMING IT AFTER TIME, AND THE SECOND WITH THE INTENTION OF CONSUMING IT WITHOUT BOUNDS, IT IS PIGGUL AND INVOLVES KARETH. There, this second intention is particularly stated in order to teach that it does not nullify the first and free it from Piggul, because since a single application permits it, a single application makes it Piggul. For that reason he teaches in the second clause, dealing with the inner sacrifices, that here the second intention does nullify the first and free it from Piggul, though this in truth need not be taught, since in any case, even if he remained silent at the second application, it would not be Piggul, as the Rabbis do not hold that he makes the second application with the same intention as the first.
(15) That the sacrifice becomes Piggul through one application.

Zevachim 42a

But in the case of blood presented on the inner altar, e.g., the forty three [applications] of the Day of Atonement,1 the eleven of the anointed priest’s bullock, and the eleven of the community’s bullock of unwitting transgression,2 if he [the priest] declared a
Piggul intention whether at the first, the second, or the third, R. Meir maintains [that] it is Piggul and involves kareth; while the Sages say: It does not involve kareth unless [the priest] declares a Piggul intention at the whole Mattir. Incidentally he teaches, ‘if [the priest] declared a Piggul intention whether at the first, at the second, or the third,’ and yet [R. Meir] disagrees?

Said R. Isaac b. Abin: The circumstances here are e.g. that he declared a Piggul intention at the shechitah, this being one mattir. If so, what is the reason of the Rabbis? — Said Raba: Who are the Sages [in this passage]? R. Eleazar. For we learnt: [With regard to] the fistful [of flour], the frankincense, the incense, the priest's meal-offering, the anointed priest's meal-offering, and the meal-offering of the libations, if [the priest] presented as much as an olive of one of these without [the Temple court], he is liable. But R. Eleazar exempts [him] unless he offers the whole [without]. But surely Raba said: Yet R. Eleazar admits in the case of blood, for we learnt: R. Eleazar and R. Simeon maintain: From where he left off there he recommences!

Rather said Raba: It [the Baraitha] means e.g. where he declared a Piggul intention at the first [applications], was silent at the second, and again declared a Piggul intention at the third. Now we might argue, If you claim that he acts with his original intention, why should he repeat his Piggul intention at the third [applications]? Therefore he informs us [that we do not argue so]. To this R. Ashi demurred: Does he then teach [that] he was silent?

Rather said R. Ashi: The circumstances here are e.g., that he declared a Piggul intention at the first, second, and third. You might argue, If you think that whatever one does, one does with the first intention, why must he repeat his Piggul declaration at each one? Therefore he informs us [that we do not argue so].

(1) One application of the blood of the bullock above the red line and seven below (v. supra 38a bottom), and similarly with the blood of the he-goat, which gives sixteen. There were similar applications on the veil of the sanctuary, making thirty two. Further, four applications of the blood of both mixed together, on the four horns of the altar, and seven applications on the top of the altar, giving a total of forty-three.

(2) Seven on the veil and four on the altar.

(3) The first, second and third are the applications in the innermost sanctuary, on the veil, and on the golden altar respectively.

(4) Thus, if he declared this intention at the second application only, though not at the first, it is still Piggul, though here he was certainly not continuing his first intention. Hence he must hold that one can render a sacrifice Piggul at a portion of the Mattir, which contradicts R. Simeon b. Lakish.

(5) Rashi: After the first blood applications the blood was accidentally spilt. A second animal is slaughtered, and the sprinkling is continued, starting with the second applications on the veil. Only here does R. Meir rule that it is Piggul, since shechitah is a service complete in itself. Rashbam: At the shechitah the priest declared his intention to make the second blood applications after time. This explanation saves the introduction of a second animal.

(6) Emended text (Sh. M.); cur. edd. R. Eliezer.

(7) Thus even when he actually presents it without the Temple court, R. Eleazar holds that he is not liable, since it was done with a portion of the Mattir only, which proves that it does not count as a service unless he completes the whole service. So here too, although shechitah is a service complete in itself, yet since this particular shechitah was merely to make up another shechitah (rendered necessary through the spilling of the blood), it is incomplete, and cannot render the sacrifice Piggul.

(8) V. infra 110a and b. — Since he recommences from where he left off (where the blood was spilt; v. n. 2), this shows that what he did do is a complete service; hence it can become Piggul thereby. This refutes Raba's explanation that the Sages in the Baraitha quoted supra are R. Eleazar.

(9) Only then does R. Meir rule it to be Piggul, as he holds that the second applications in silence were made with the same intention as the first. So that ‘whether at the... second or third’ means whether he was silent at the third and declared a Piggul intention at the second, or vice versa. But in both cases he had declared a Piggul intention at the first.
But he teaches, ‘whether... or’?1 That is indeed a difficulty.

The Master said: ‘R. Meir said, It is Piggul, and involves kareth’.2 But consider: one is not liable to kareth until all the mattirin are offered, for a master said: As the acceptance of the valid, so is the acceptance of the invalid. As the acceptance of the valid necessitates that all its mattirin be presented, so does the acceptance of the invalid necessitate that all its mattirin be presented.4 Now here he has [already] invalidated it [the sacrifice] by declaring an [illegitimate] intention within, so that it is as though he had not sprinkled [the blood] at all;5 when therefore he sprinkles again in the Hekal, he is merely sprinkling water?6 —

Said Rabbah: It is possible in the case of four bullocks and four he-goats.7 Raba said: You may even say [that R. Meir rules thus] in the case of one bullock and one he-goat: it [the sprinkling] is efficacious in respect of its Piggul status.8 [Do you say that there are] forty-three [sprinklings]?9 Surely it was taught [that there are] forty-seven? The former agrees with the view that you mingle [the blood of the bullock and of the he-goat] for [sprinkling on] the horns; while the latter agrees with the view that you do not mingle [them] for [sprinkling on] the horns.10 But it was taught [that] forty-eight [are required]? — One agrees with the view that [the pouring out of] the residue [at the base of the altar] is indispensable;11 while the other agrees with the view that the residue is not indispensable.12

An objection is raised: When is this said?13 In [the case of] the taking of the fistful, the placing in the vessel, and the carriage.14 But when he comes to the burning [of the fistful and the frankincense], if he presents the fistful with a [Piggul] intention and the frankincense in silence; or if he presents the

fistful in silence and the frankincense with a [Piggul] intention, — R. Meir declares it Piggul, and it involves kareth; while the Sages rule: It does not involve kareth unless he declares a Piggul intention in respect of the whole Mattir. Now he teaches incidentally, [If he presents] ‘the fistful in silence and the frankincense with a [Piggul] intention’, and yet they disagree!15 — Say ‘having already presented the frankincense with a [Piggul] intention’. One [objection] is that that is the first clause. Moreover, it was indeed taught,16 ‘and after that.’17 That is indeed a difficulty.

MISHNAH. THESE ARE THE THINGS FOR WHICH ONE IS NOT LIABLE ON ACCOUNT OF PIGGUL: THE FISTFUL, THE INCENSE, THE FRANKINCENSE,

(1) Implying alternatives: either at one or at the other.
(2) V. supra 42a.
(3) For eating thereof.
(4) V. supra 28b.
(5) Var. lec. omits ‘then... at all’.
(6) This is a difficulty on the view that R. Meir’s reason is that one can make a sacrifice Piggul at half a Mattir. Granted that this is possible in the case of the fistful and the frankincense of a meal-offering, it is surely impossible in the case of sprinkling, for the reason stated. — ‘He is merely sprinkling water’ means that his sprinkling of the blood is just as though he were sprinkling water, since the sacrifice is already invalid.
(7) He declared a Piggul intention during all the applications of the blood between the staves; then the blood was spilt, so that another animal was slaughtered. He sprinkled its blood on the veil (he would start there, and not repeat the first sprinklings between the staves; V. supra a) and the blood was again spilt. The same happened with the applications on the horns of the altar, and the same with the sprinklings on the top. Here then all the mattirin have been presented, and each counts as a real sprinkling because it is the blood of a different animal; consequently the first is Piggul, while the same would hold good if he declared his Piggul intention in connection with any of the other animals.
(8) If the Priest declares a Piggul intention at the slaughtering, though he thereby invalidates the sacrifice, yet the following sprinklings are counted as the presenting of its mattirin. Thus they are
obviously efficacious to stamp the animal as Piggul, for otherwise an animal could not become Piggul at slaughtering, whereas it is deduced supra 13a that it does. In the same way then R. Meir holds that when some of the sprinklings are done with a Piggul intention, the subsequent sprinklings count as the presenting of the mattirin, so as to make the sacrifice Piggul.

(9) Supra a top.
(10) But each is sprinkled separately, which gives an additional four, bringing up the number to forty-seven.
(11) Hence it is regarded as another sprinkling.
(12) V. supra 40b.
(13) That a meal-offering becomes Piggul at one service.
(14) Where each service consists of a single act.
(15) R. Meir maintains that it is Piggul. Here his second act was not done with the same intention as the first, since he was silent at the first. Hence R. Meir's reason must be because he holds that one can make the sacrifice Piggul during half a Mattir.
(16) In another Baraita.
(17) He presented the frankincense with a Piggul intention.


But we have learnt it: [Flesh] that is kept overnight, or that goes out [of its permitted boundaries], or which is unclean, or which was slaughtered [with the intention of being consumed] after time or without bounds, if it ascended [the altar], does not descend?14 — Rather, [he informs us] that if it was taken down [from the altar], it must be taken up [again]. But surely we have learnt:16 Just as it does not descend once it had ascended, so it does not ascend after having descended!17 — That [Ulla's teaching] is only when the fire [of the altar] has taken hold of it.18 But this too ‘Ulla has already stated once? For ‘Ulla said: They learnt this only where the fire had not taken hold of it; but if the fire had taken hold of it,
it must go up [again]! — You might think that this holds good only of

(1) If the sacrifice is made Piggul and one eats these things enumerated here, he is not liable to Piggul. E.g., if the priest took off the fistful with the intention of eating the remainder on the morrow, he thereby renders the whole sacrifice Piggul; nevertheless he incurs no liability for eating the fistful itself. For Piggul applies only to that which is permitted through something else (e.g., the rest of the meal-offering is ordinarily permitted for consumption through the taking of the fistful), whereas the fistful is not permitted through anything else. The same applies to the incense, the frankincense, and the others enumerated in the Mishnah. — Votive meal-offerings brought by ordinary priests and the statutory bi-daily offerings of the anointed priest (v. Lev. VI, 13 seq.) were wholly burnt on the altar without the rite of taking the fistful; thus they were not permitted by anything else. Drink-offerings could be brought separately or as an accompaniment to animal sacrifices. R. Meir rules that whether they are brought entirely by themselves, nothing else having been vowed, or they are brought actually as an addition to an animal sacrifice, but on the following day, they do not involve liability for Piggul, because in that case they are not permitted through something else (the sacrificing of the animal), but through themselves. If however they are brought at the same time as the animal, they are permitted through the sacrificing of same, and therefore involve kareth. The Sages however maintain that even then we do not regard them as permitted through the animal sacrifice, since they could have been presented separately on the morrow.

(2) A liquid measure = 549.391338 cu. centimeters (J.E. art. ‘Weight — Measures’, Vol. XII. pp. 483 2 and 490, Table).

(3) Lev. XIV, 10, 15-18. The residue of this was consumed.

(4) If the priest rendered the guilt-offering which it accompanied Piggul, one is not liable to kareth for consuming the oil. Though the efficacy of the oil rite is dependent on the prior application of the blood of the guilt-offering on the leper, nor may it be consumed unless the blood of the offering was duly sprinkled; nevertheless since the oil can be brought ten days after the offering, it is not regarded as permitted for consumption through it, and therefore does not involve kareth on account of Piggul even when the oil is brought on the same day.

(5) Where it is brought on the same day, to which case R. Meir refers.

(6) As explained in n. 4, p. 213.

(7) Where the law of Piggul is stated.

(8) The Talmud explains this anon.

(9) This reason is apparently why it should retain its status as Piggul.

(10) If it is not fit for burning on the altar because it is Piggul.

(11) And so, if one burns the fistful with the intention of consuming the remainder on the morrow, how can the meal-offering become Piggul if we do not regard the burning of the fistful as a valid act, seeing that a sacrifice cannot become Piggul unless its mattirin are offered (supra 42b)? Hence we must say that the fistful loses its Piggul status, so that by its burning on the altar the mattirin are duly offered, and for that reason the remainder becomes Piggul. This is then what he means: seeing that it is acceptable (a valid service) in point of making the rest fit to be Piggul, it is surely acceptable in respect of itself!

(12) In respect of what law does it lose its Piggul status?

(13) It loses its Piggul status insofar as it is taken up on to the altar it remains there, and we do not remove it as Piggul.

(14) And this includes an instance of Piggul.

(15) After having been placed on it.

(16) Emended text (Sh. M).

(17) Though it should not have been taken down in the first place:

(18) Then, even if it is taken down, it must be taken up again. Whereas the Baraitha refers to a case where the fire had not yet taken hold of it.

Zevachim 43b

a limb, which is all one; but as for the fistful, which is divisible, I would say [that it is] not [so]. Therefore he informs us [otherwise]. R. Ahai said: Therefore, when half of the fistful, which is Piggul, is lying on the ground, and half has been taken up on the wood-pile [on the altar], and the fire has taken hold of it, we must take up the whole of it, even at the very outset.

R. Isaac said in R. Johanan's name: If Piggul, nothar, or unclean [flesh] is taken up to the altar, their forbidden status leaves them. Said R. Hisda: O author of this [statement]! Is then the altar a ritual bath of purification! —

Said R. Zera: [This law applies] where the fire has taken hold of it.2 R. Isaac b. Bisna
objected: Others\textsuperscript{3} say: [When Scripture writes, But the soul that eateth of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings... ] having his uncleanness upon him [that soul shall be cut off from his people],\textsuperscript{4} [it implies] one whose uncleanness can leave him, thus excluding flesh, whose uncleanness cannot leave it.\textsuperscript{5} But if this is correct,\textsuperscript{6} surely the uncleanness does leave it, through the fire? —

Said Raba: We mean, through a mikweh.\textsuperscript{7} Is then a Mikweh written [in the text]? — Rather said R. Papa: We are dealing with the flesh of peace-offerings, which is not eligible for presenting [on the altar].\textsuperscript{8} Rabina said: ‘Having his uncleanness upon him’ implies, one whose uncleanness leaves him while he is yet whole; thus flesh is excluded, because uncleanness does not leave it while it is whole, but only when it is defective.\textsuperscript{9} [To turn to] the main text: ‘Having his uncleanness upon him’: Scripture speaks of uncleanness of the person. You say, Scripture speaks of uncleanness of the person: yet perhaps it is not so, but rather of uncleanness of the flesh? Here ‘having his uncleanness [upon him]’ is said; while elsewhere it says, his uncleanness is yet upon him:\textsuperscript{10} as there Scripture speaks of uncleanness of the person, so here too Scripture speaks of uncleanness of the person.

R. Jose said: Since the ‘holy things’ are mentioned, in the plural, whilst ‘uncleanness’ is stated in the singular, Scripture must refer to uncleanness of the person.\textsuperscript{11} Rabbi said: ‘And eat’ [shows that] Scripture speaks of uncleanness of the person.\textsuperscript{12} Others say: ‘Having his uncleanness upon him’ [implies] one whose uncleanness leaves him, thus excluding flesh, whose uncleanness cannot leave it. A Master said: ‘Rabbi said: "And eat"' [shows that] Scripture speaks of uncleanness of the person.’ How does this imply it?\textsuperscript{13} —

Said Raba, Every text which R. Isaac b. Abudimi, and every Mathnitha [Baraitha] which Ze'iri did not explain, are not explained. Thus did R. Isaac b. Abudimi say: Since the Writ commences in the feminine form and ends in the feminine, while [it employs] the masculine form in the middle, the Writ must speak of uncleanness of the person.\textsuperscript{14} ‘A Mathnitha’?\textsuperscript{15} — For it was taught: If the lighter ones were stated, why were the more stringent ones stated; and if the more stringent ones were stated, why were the lighter ones stated?\textsuperscript{16} If the lighter ones were stated and not the more stringent ones, I would say: The lighter ones involve a negative injunction,\textsuperscript{17} and the more stringent ones involve death;\textsuperscript{18} therefore the more stringent ones are stated.\textsuperscript{19} While if the more stringent were stated and not the lighter, I would say: The stringent ones involve culpability, but the lighter ones do not involve culpability at all; therefore the lighter ones are stated.

Now, what are the lighter ones and the more stringent ones? Shall we say [that] the lighter ones are the tithe, and the more stringent ones are terumah?\textsuperscript{20} [Can you then say,] ‘I would say: The more stringent ones involve death’? Surely now it too involves death!\textsuperscript{21} Moreover, if it were not stated, would I say that it involves death? Surely it is sufficient for the conclusion to be as its premise?\textsuperscript{22} Again if ‘the lighter ones’ mean uncleanness of a reptile, and ‘the more stringent ones’ uncleanness of a corpse,\textsuperscript{23} to what then [does it refer]?\textsuperscript{24} If to terumah? both involve death!\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, [can you say,] ‘Therefore the more stringent ones are stated, [to teach] that they involve a negative injunction [only]?’ but surely it involves death? Whilst if it refers to the eating of tithe,

(1) Only the flour which has actually been burnt through must be taken up again, but not the rest.
(2) Then it belongs, as it were, to the altar.
(3) This usually refers to R. Meir; Hor. 13b.
(5) The Heb. we-tumatho ‘alaw might mean, having its uncleanness upon it, and thus imply that a clean person who partakes of the unclean
flesh of a sacrifice incurs koreth. It is explained, however, that the phrase implies that the uncleanness is in force only now and that it can be raised; hence it must refer to the person, not to the flesh, which once unclean can never become clean again.

(6) That when unclean flesh is carried up to the altar and the fire takes hold of it, it loses its forbidden status.

(7) V. Glos.

(8) But is eaten; hence it can never become clean.

(9) I.e., when the fire has already partially destroyed it.

(10) Num. XIX, 13. Emended text.

(11) Sh. M.: Scripture writes, Whosoever... approacheth unto the holy things... having his uncleanness upon him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me (Lev. XXII, 3). Now there it cannot refer to the sacrifices, for in that case the plural, having their uncleanness upon them would be required. Hence it must refer to the person, and therefore the same is assumed here.

(12) Ibid. VII, 21. The verse reads: And when any one shall touch any unclean thing... and eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings. That verse obviously refers to uncleanness of the person, and thus it illumines the previous verse (v. 20), showing that that too refers to the same.

(13) That the previous verse too refers to the same. Perhaps the previous verse treats of uncleanness of the flesh.

(14) The second verse (v. 21) writes: And when any one (Heb. Nefesh, lit. ‘soul’, fem.) shall touch (Heb. tiga’, fem.) any unclean thing... and eat (we-akal, masc. instead of we-aklah, fem.) of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings, that soul shall be cut off (we-nikrethah, fem.) of the flesh of the sacrifices of peace-offerings, that soul shall be cut off (we-nikrethah, fem.). The preceding verse (v. 20) runs: But the soul (fem.) that eateth (fem.) of the flesh (masc.)... having his (or its) uncleanness upon him (or it) masc.), that soul shall be cut off (fem.) Since the suffixes of ‘uncleanness’ and ‘upon’ are masc., it might be assumed that they refer to ‘flesh’ which is masc. But when we see the same change of gender in the following verse, though that obviously refers to the uncleanness of the person, it is reasonable to say the same here. For Scripture has already treated of uncleanness of the flesh earlier in the section: And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing, shall not be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire (v. 19). It continues with, And as for the flesh, any one that is clean may eat thereof, which indicates that unclean flesh is no longer being dealt with. Hence when it proceeds, But the soul that eateth... having his uncleanness upon him, it is logical to assume that uncleanness of the person is referred to, in suite of the change of gender.

(15) Which mathnitha required Ze’iri’s explanation?

(16) This treats of the interdict of eating sacred food while personally unclean. By ‘lighter’ and ‘more stringent’ are meant food of lighter and of more stringent sanctities respectively. The Talmud explains anon which these are.

(17) Which is punishable by flagellation.

(18) At the hands of heaven.

(19) To show that these too involve a negative injunction only.

(20) V. Lev. XXII, 6f: The soul that toucheth any such (unclean reptiles, etc.) shall be unclean until the even, and shall not eat of the holy things, unless he bathe his flesh in water. And when the sun is down, he shall be clean; and afterwards he may eat of the holy things. These two verses are apparently contradictory, for the first implies that he may eat of the ‘holy things’ immediately after a ritual bath, even before sunset, while the second teaches that even after the ritual bath he must wait until sunset. Therefore the Rabbis (in Yeb. 74b) made the first refer to tithe, whose sanctity is lighter, and the second to terumah, whose sanctity is more stringent. Its greater stringency lies in the fact that a Zar (a lay Israelite) may not partake of terumah, whereas he may partake of tithe. Scripture then goes on to say in v. 9: They (i.e. the priests) shall therefore keep My charge, lest they bear sin for it, and die therein, if they profane it. This is understood to mean that an unclean priest eating terumah is liable to death (v. n. 4).

(21) Scripture does in fact teach that for partaking of terumah whilst unclean one is liable to death.

(22) This is a general principle: when one thing is taught from another, a fortiori or a minori, it cannot go further than its premise. Now, if terumah were not stated, it could be learnt from tithe, a minori. But it could not involve a greater punishment than tithe, which is subject to a negative injunction only.

(23) I.e., ‘lighter’ and ‘more stringent’ apply not to the ‘holy things’ (the sacred food) but to the source of the priest’s defilement. Both are enumerated in that passage, viz.: And whoso toucheth any one that is unclean by the dead... or whosoever toucheth any swarming thing (i.e. a reptile) Lev. XXII, 4-5.

(24) To the eating of which sacred food?

(25) Whether a priest is unclean in the one way or the other, he is liable to death for eating terumah.
[can you say,] ‘If the more stringent ones were not stated, I would say that the more stringent ones involve death’? but Surely it would be derived from the uncleanness of a reptile, and it is sufficient for the conclusion to be as the premise!2 —

Said Ze'iri: The ‘lighter ones are uncleanness of a reptile, while ‘the more stringent ones are uncleanness through a corpse, and this is what [the Tanna] means:

If uncleanness of a reptile were stated, and tithe and terumah were enumerated, but uncleanness of a corpse were not stated, I would say: The lighter [defilement] involves a negative injunction in respect of the lighter ['holy things'], and death in respect of the more stringent.3 And since the lighter [defilement] involves death in respect of the more stringent ['holy things'], the more stringent [defilement] too involves death in respect of the lighter ['holy things']. Therefore the more stringent [defilement] is stated.

WHATEVER HAS AUGHT THAT MAKES IT PERMITTED, WHETHER FOR MAN OR FOR THE ALTAR, INVOLVES LIABILITY ON ACCOUNT OF PIGGUL. Our Rabbis taught:... Or perhaps it includes only that which is similar to a peace-offering: as a peace-offering is distinguished in that it is eaten two days and one night, so all that may be eaten two days and one night [are included].4 How do we know that that which is eaten a day and a night [only, is also included]? Because Scripture saith, [And if any] of the flesh [of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings, etc.],5 [which includes] all whose remainder is eaten.6 How do we know [that] a burnt-offering, whose remainder is not eaten, [is included]? Because Scripture says ‘the sacrifice’.7 Whence do we know to include the bird-offerings and meal-offerings, until I can include a leper's log of oil? From the text, ‘which they hallow unto Me’: nothar is then learned from uncleanness, because ‘profanation’ is written in connection with both; and Piggul is learned from nothar, because iniquity is written in connection with both.8 Now, since it [Scripture] ultimately includes all things, why then are peace-offerings specified? To teach you: as a peace-offering is distinguished in that it has something which permits it both for man and for the altar, so everything which has something which permits it both for man and for the altar involves liability on account of Piggul. [The sprinkling of] the blood of a burnt-offering permits its flesh for [burning on] the altar, and its skin to the priests. The blood of a bird burnt-offering permits its flesh for the altar. The blood of a bird sin-offering permits its flesh to the priests. The blood of the bullocks that are burnt and the goats that are burnt permits their emurim to be offered [on the altar]. And I exclude the fistful, the frankincense, the incense, the priests’ meal-offering, the anointed priest's meal-offering, and the blood.

R. Simeon said: As a peace-offering is distinguished in that it comes on the outer altar [for sprinkling], and it involves liability; so all that come on the outer altar involve liability on account of Piggul; thus the bullocks which are burnt and the goats which are burnt are excluded; since they do not come on the outer altar, like the peace-offering, they do not involve liability.

The Master said: ‘That which is similar to a peace-offering’. What [sacrifice] is it? The firstling, which is eaten two days and one night! But how is this learnt? If by analogy? it can be refuted: as for a peace-offering, [it is subject to the law of Piggul] because it requires laying [of hands], [the accompaniment of] drink-offerings [libations], and the waving of the breast and the shoulder? again if [it is learnt] from [the text], And if there be at all eaten [any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings on the third day... it shall be an abhorred thing]
[Piggul],10 these are two generalizations which immediately follow each other?11 —

Said Raba: It is as they say in the West:12 Wherever you find two generalizations close to each other, insert the specific proposition between them, and interpret them as a case of a generalization followed by a specific proposition [and followed again by a generalization].13

‘Until I include a leper’s log of oil’. With whom does that agree? With R. Meir. For it was taught: A leper's log of oil involves liability on account of Piggul: that is the opinion of R. Meir. Then consider the next clause: And I exclude the meal-offering of libations and the blood. This agrees with the Rabbis. For it was taught: The drink-offering which accompanies an animal [sacrifice] involves liability on account of Piggul, because the blood of the sacrifice permits it to be offered [on the altar]: that is R. Meir's view. Said they to him: But a man can bring his sacrifice to-day and the drink-offering even ten days later! I too, he answered them, ruled [thus] only when they come together with the sacrifice! —

Said R. Joseph: The author of this is Rabbi, who maintained [that] the applications of the leper's log of oil permit it,14 and since its sprinklings permit it, its sprinklings render it Piggul. For it was taught: You commit trespass in respect of a leper’s log of oil until the blood is sprinkled; once the blood is sprinkled, you may not use it, and you do not commit trespass.

Rabbi said: You commit trespass until its sprinklings are made. And both agree that it may not be eaten until its seven sprinklings and the applications on the thumbs are made.15 This was reported before R. Jeremiah, [whereupon] he exclaimed, That a great man like R. Joseph should say such a thing!

(1) I.e., for eating tithe while unclean through a corpse one is liable to death.
(2) Hence as a negative injunction only is involved in eating tithe whilst unclean through a reptile, so it is likewise in eating tithe while unclean through the dead.
(3) As Scripture states.
(4) The law of Piggul is stated in Scripture in reference to a peace-offering only. The present quotation, which is fragmentary, commences thus: You might think that only a peace-offering involves liability for Piggul; how do we know that other sacrifices too are included in this law? Because Scripture says in reference to uncleanness: Speak unto Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the holy things of the children of Israel, which they hallow unto Me, and that they profane not My holy name (Lev. XXII, 2). This applies to all sacrifices, since the peace-offering is not specified, and an analogy is drawn anon between defilement and Piggul, and thus other sacrifices too are included in the law of Piggul. The passage then proceeds as in the text: perhaps only these sacrifices which are similar to a peace-offering are included, etc., but not such sacrifices e.g., a sin-offering, or a thanks-offering, which are eaten only on the day they are sacrificed and the night following.
(5) Lev. VII, 18. This treats of Piggul. ‘Of the flesh’ is superfluous, since Scripture could say, And if any of his peace-offerings, etc.; hence it is treated as an extension.
(6) The remainder after the fats, etc. are burnt on the altar.
(7) In the text just quoted. That too is superfluous, and therefore extends the law to every sacrifice.
(8) Uncleanliness, as quoted p. 219, n. 7; nothar: But every one that eateth it shall bear his iniquity, because he hath profaned the holy thing (same root as ‘hallow’) of the Lord (Lev. XIX, 8). As the interdict of defilement applies to all sacrifices, so does that of nothar. Then the scope of Piggul is learnt from nothar, because ‘iniquity’ is written in connection with both: nothar, in the text just quoted; Piggul: it shall be an abhorred thing (Piggul), and the soul that eateth of it shall bear his iniquity (Lev. VII, 18): as the interdict of nothar applies to all sacrifices, so does that of Piggul.
(9) Whereas a firstling does not require these.
(10) Lev. VII, 18. The E.V. has been slightly departed from so as to follow the exact order of the Hebrew, which comes under discussion. The Heb. for ‘be at all eaten’ is heakel yeakel, i.e., the infinitive of the verb followed by the finite form, which is the usual mode of expression. The Talmud now interprets the two forms as two generalizations (anything which is eaten), while
‘peace-offerings’ is a specific proposition. In that case it is a rule of exegesis that the generalization includes everything which is similar in its general features (even if not in every detail) to the specific proposition. Hence the firstling is included, as generally speaking it is similar to the peace-offering, in spite of differing from it in several details.

(11) Whereas the exegetical rule applies to two generalizations which are separated by the specific proposition.

(12) Sc. Palestine, which lay to the west of Babylon.

(13) Hence the firstling would be included, but not sacrifices which are eaten one day only, since these differ even in the general features (the difference in length of time allowed for eating is an important one). Therefore recourse must be had to the other texts.

(14) V. Lev. XIV, 16 seq. Now, Rabbi agrees with the Rabbis that since the drink-offering can be brought after the animal sacrifice which it accompanies, the blood of the sacrifice cannot render it Piggul. And when the Baraitha teaches that the log of oil can be Piggul, it does not mean that the blood of the guilt-offering which the leper brings renders it Piggul, but the sprinklings of the oil itself do effect this: i.e., if he sprinkles the oil with the intention of consuming the remainder after time.

(15) On trespass v. p. 176, n. 10. Now, the log of oil may not be consumed until the blood is sprinkled; therefore until then it is sacred, and if one does consume it, he commits trespass. When the blood has been sprinkled, the oil is Scripturally permitted to the priests, and this Tanna holds that whatever is permitted to the priests does not involve trespass even for a Zar (lay Israelite). Nevertheless, by Rabbinical law its consumption is forbidden until the seven sprinklings of the oil. Rabbi holds that it is even Scripturally forbidden until then, and therefore it still involves trespass. But they both agree that it is forbidden by Rabbinical law until all its sprinklings have been made. — From this passage we see that Rabbi holds that the oil is permitted for consumption not by the blood of the sacrifice, but by its own sprinklings.

THE BLOOD OF THE BIRD SIN-OFFERING PERMITS ITS FLESH TO THE PRIESTS. Whence do we know it? — For Levi taught: [This shall be thine — the priest’s... ] every offering of theirs: every offering of the ‘omer and the meal-offering of jealousy,10 I might think [that it is written,] And they shall eat these things wherewith atonement was made,11 whereas the meal-offering of the ‘omer comes to permit [the new corn], while the meal-offering of jealousy comes to establish guilt; therefore [the text] informs us [that it is not so]. And every sin-offering of theirs includes the sin-offering of a bird. I might think that it is nebelah;13 therefore [the text] informs us [that it is not so]. But it is explicitly written that a leper's log of oil?

Rather said R. Jeremiah: In truth it agrees with R. Meir, but delete ‘drink-offerings’ from this passage. Abaye said: After all, you need not delete [it]. But he [first] teaches about the log which comes with the guilt-offering,2 and the same applies to the drink-offering which comes with the sacrifice. And then he teaches about the drink-offering which comes separately,3 and the same applies to the log which comes separately.

Zevachim 44b

Lo, all agree that when the log comes separately, its sprinklings permit it, and yet they do not render it Piggul. For it was taught, A leper's log of oil involves liability on account of Piggul, because the blood permits it for [sprinkling on] the thumbs: that is R. Meir's view. Said they to R. Meir: But a man can bring his guilt-offering now, and his log even ten days later! I too, he answered them, ruled [thus] only when it comes with the guilt-offering! —
they may render includes what is taken by robbery from a proselyte. They shall be for thee: it shall be thine even for betrothing a woman.

It was taught, R. Eleazar said on the authority of R. Jose the Galilean: If [the priest] declared a Piggul intention in respect of a rite which is performed without, he renders it Piggul; in respect of a rite which is performed within, he does not render it Piggul. How so? If he stood without and declared, ‘Lo, I slaughter [this sacrifice intending] to sprinkle its blood to-morrow,’ he does not render it Piggul because it is an intention [expressed] without concerning a rite which is performed without. If he stood within and declared, ‘Lo, I sprinkle [the blood], intending to burn the emurim and pour out the residue to-morrow,’ he does not render it Piggul, because it is an intention [expressed] without concerning a rite which is performed without. If he stood without and declared, ‘Lo, I slaughter [this sacrifice intending] to pour out the residue to-morrow, or ‘to burn the emurim to-morrow,’ he renders it Piggul, because it is an intention [expressed] without concerning a rite which is performed without.

R. Joshua b. Levi said: Which text [teaches this]? As is taken from the ox of the sacrifice of peace-offerings. What then do we learn from the ox of the sacrifice of peace-offerings? [Scripture] however likens the anointed priest's bullock to the ox of the sacrifice of peace-offerings: as the ox of the sacrifice of peace-offerings [does not become Piggul] unless its rites and its intentions are [done] on the outer altar, so the anointed priest's bullock [does not become Piggul] unless its intentions and its rites are [done] in connection with the outer altar. R. Nahman said in Rabbah b. Abbuha's name in Rab's name: The halachah is as R. Eleazar's ruling in the name of R. Jose. Said Raba:

(1) I.e., when the leper brings it some days after his guilt-offering.
Zevachim 45a

[Do we need] a halachah [for the days of] the Messiah?1 — Abaye answered: If so, we should not study the whole of ‘The slaughtering of sacrifices’?2 Yet we say, study and receive reward;3 so in this case too, study and receive reward. [He replied] This is what I mean: Why [state] a halachah? Another version: He replied, I mean, [Why state the] halachah?

MISHNAH. THE SACRIFICES OF HEATHENS6 DO NOT INVOLVE LIABILITY ON ACCOUNT OF PIGGUL, NOTHAR, OR DEFILEMENT, AND IF [A PRIEST] SLAUGHTERS THEM WITHOUT [THE TEMPLE], HE IS NOT LIABLE: THAT IS R. SIMEON’S VIEW. BUT R. JOSE DECLARES HIM LIABLE.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: You may neither benefit from the sacrifices of heathens,7 nor do you commit trespass;8 and they do not involve liability on account of Piggul, nothar or defilement. And they [the heathens] cannot effect substitution;9 and they cannot bring drink-offerings,10 but their [animal] sacrifices require drink-offerings [to accompany them]: that is the view of R. Simeon.11

Said R. Jose: I hold that a stringent view should be taken on all these matters,12 because it is said of them, [Any man... that bringeth his offering...] unto the Lord.13 This applies only to sacrifices of the altar;14 but in the case of objects sacred to the Temple repair,15 one does commit trespass. ‘You may neither benefit nor do you commit trespass.’ You may not benefit by Rabbinical law. ‘Nor do you commit trespass,’ because in respect of the trespass-offering identity of law is derived from the fact that ‘sin’ is written here and in the case of terumah:16 while in respect to terumah ‘the children of Israel’ is written,17 [which intimates,] but not [those of] heathens. ‘And they do not involve liability on account of Piggul, nothar or defilement.’ What is the reason? — Because the scope of Piggul is derived from nothar, since ‘iniquity’ is written in connection with both, and the scope of nothar is derived from defilement, because ‘profanation’ is written in connection with both; while in respect to defilement ‘the children of Israel’ is written,18 [which intimates,] but not [those of] heathens. ‘And they cannot effect substitution.’ What is the reason? — Because substitution is assimilated to the tithe of cattle,19 and cattle tithe is assimilated to corn tithe,20 while ‘the children of Israel’ is written in connection with corn tithe,21 [which intimates,] but not that of heathens. Can then that which is learnt through a Hekkesh in turn teach through a hekkesh?22 —

Corn tithe is hullin.22 That is well on the view that the teacher is the determining factor; but on the view that the taught is the determining factor, what can be said?24 — Rather, cattle tithe is an obligation for which there is no fixed time, and as it is an obligation for which there is no fixed time, it is brought by Israelites, but not by heathens.25

‘And they cannot bring drink-offerings.’ Our Rabbis taught: [Scripture saith,] [All that are] home-born [shall do these things after this manner:]26 the home-born can bring drink-offerings but a heathen cannot bring drink-offerings. You might think then that his burnt-offering does not require a drink-offering;27 therefore Scripture teaches, Thus [shall be done for each bullock, etc.].28

‘Said R. Jose: I hold that a stringent view should be taken on all these matters. This applies only to sacrifices of the altar, etc.’ What is the reason? — He holds that when [the scope of] trespass is derived from terumah, because ‘sin’ is written in connection with both, [it applies only to that which is] like terumah, whose holiness is intrinsic;29 but not to the sanctity of the Temple repair, which is [but] monetary sanctity.30
Our Rabbis taught: If blood was defiled, and [the priest] sprinkled it unwittingly, it [the sacrifice] is accepted;

(1) Since the Temple no longer stands there is no practical utility in this ruling, which can become effective only in the days of the Messiah, when the Temple is rebuilt.
(2) I.e., the present Tractate.
(3) Learning for its own sake is meritorious.
(4) While it is right to study the subject, the fixing of a halachah is unnecessary.
(5) Why state the accepted practice when sacrifices are obsolete? Apart from the slight verbal variants in the two versions as indicated by the square brackets, in the first version the Aramaic hilkhetha is used, in the second the Hebrew halachah is used.
(6) Their votive offerings to the Temple.
(7) Before the blood is sprinkled, just as is the case of all sacrifices.
(8) V. p. 176, n. 10.
(9) V. p. 22, n. 8. If the owner is a heathen, he cannot effect substitution in the sense of making the second animal holy.
(10) Unless they accompany an animal sacrifice. Whereas Israelites can do so (Men. 104b).
(11) Possibly ‘that... R. Simeon’ should be deleted.
(12) The sacrifices of heathens should be treated as stringently as those of Israelites.
(13) Lev. XXII, 18. In Hul. 13b this verse is made to include the sacrifices of heathens; thus these too are ‘unto the Lord’ just as those of Israelites, and therefore they must be treated with equal severity.
(14) I.e., unblemished animals, which will be sacrificed on the altar.
(15) This is the technical designation of anything which is dedicated to the Temple, whether it be a blemished animal which cannot be sacrificed or any other object; it is then used for some Temple purpose.
(16) Trespass: If a soul commit a trespass, and sin through ignorance in the holy things of the Lord (Lev. V, 15); terumah: Lest they bear sin for it (Ibid. XXII, 9).
(17) Ibid. 15: And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel.
(18) Lev. XXII, 2: Speak unto Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves (when unclean) from the holy things of the children of Israel.
(19) Ibid. XXVII, 32f: And all the tithe of the herd or the flock... the tenth shall be holy unto the Lord. He shall not... change it, etc. Thus substitution of sacrifices in general, to which the second verse refers, is made part of the law of substitution of tithe.
(20) Deut. XIV, 22: Thou shalt surely tithe all the increase of thy seed. The emphatic ‘thou shalt surely tithe’ is expressed in Heb. as usual by the repetition of the verb; this repetition is Talmudically interpreted as referring to two tithes, cattle-tithe and corn-tithe. Thus they are assimilated to each other by being included in the same text.
(21) Num. XVIII, 26: When ye take of the children of Israel the tithe which I have given you.
(22) It is only by analogy with corn-tithe that we learn that the law of cattle does not operate in respect of the cattle of heathens. Can that in turn teach that the law of substitution does not operate in respect of heathens’ sacrifices?
(23) And only in the case of holy things is this exegesis not permitted.
(24) The ‘teacher’ is corn-tithe, which throws light on ‘cattle-tithe’, which is the ‘taught’. Here the ‘teacher’ is hullin, whereas the ‘taught’ is holy: if the ‘teacher’ is the determining factor, then the ‘teacher’ is indeed hullin and the exegesis is permitted; but if the ‘taught’ is the determining factor, then the ‘taught’ is holy, and so that exegesis is not allowable.
(25) As they can bring only votive offerings. — They do not bring obligatory offerings for which there is a fixed time either e.g., the festival peace-offerings. Nevertheless this is not mentioned, since they can bring peace-offerings in general; but the law of cattle-tithe does not apply to them at all.
(26) Num. XV, 13. ‘These things’ refers to the rites enumerated in the preceding passage, which includes the bringing of drink-offerings.
(27) To accompany it, as does the burnt-offering of an Israelite.
(28) Ibid. 11. Thus Scripture makes the sacrifice, not the donor, the determining factor.
(29) Terumah itself is holy and must be treated as such, similarly the sacrifices of the altar.
(30) When an object is dedicated to the Temple repair fund, that object itself is sacred only in so far that it must be redeemed and the redemption money expended on sacred purposes. But when it is redeemed it loses its sanctity.

if deliberately, it is not accepted. This was said only of a private sacrifice, but a public sacrifice, whether done unwittingly or deliberately, is accepted. But a heathen [‘s sacrifice], whether it is done unwittingly or deliberately, is not accepted. Now, the Rabbis
stated the following in R. Papa's presence: With whom does this agree? Not with R. Jose, for if [it agrees with] R. Jose, surely he said: I hold that a stringent view should be taken on all these matters?2 Said R. Papa to them: You may even say [that it agrees with] R. Jose: there it is different, because Scripture says, [that it may be accepted] for them [before the Lord]:3 for them, but not for heathens. Said R. Huna the son of R. Nathan to R. Papa: If so, [when Scripture says,] [Speak unto Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the holy things of the children of Israel] which they hallow unto Me,4 does that also mean: They, but not heathens?5 — Rather said R. Ashi: Scripture says, ‘that it may be accepted for them’, whilst heathens are not subject to ‘acceptance’.

MISHNAH. THE THINGS WHICH DO NOT INVOLVE LIABILITY ON ACCOUNT OF PIGGUL,6 INVOLVE LIABILITY ON ACCOUNT OF NOTHAR AND DEFILEMENT EXCEPT BLOOD. R. SIMEON DECLARES ONE LIABLE IN RESPECT OF ANYTHING WHICH IS NORMALLY EATEN, BUT THE WOOD, THE FRANKINCENSE AND THE INCENSE DO NOT INVOLVE LIABILITY ON ACCOUNT OF DEFILEMENT.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: You might think that liability on account of defilement is incurred only in respect of that which has mattirin both for man and for the altar;7 and that is logical: If liability on account of Piggul is incurred only in respect of that which has mattirin both for man and for the altar, though it is fixed [invariable], and [is incurred] in one state of awareness, and was never permitted contrary to its general prohibition;8 then surely it is logical that defilement involves liability only in respect of that which has mattirin both for man and for the altar, seeing that it requires a variable burnt-offering,9 two states of awareness,10 and is [sometimes] permitted in opposition to its general prohibition. Therefore Scripture wrote, [Speak unto Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the holy things of the children of Israel,] which they hallow unto Me.11 You might think [that liability is involved] immediately;12 therefore Scripture teaches, [Whoever he be...] that approacheth [unto the holy things... having his uncleanness upon him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me].13

Now R. Eleazar said: Is then one who [merely] touches [the holy things] liable?14 Why does it say ‘that approacheth’?15 [To teach that] the Writ speaks of flesh which was made fit to be offered.16 How so? If it has mattirin, [culpability is incurred] only when the mattirin have been offered; if it has no mattirin, [culpability is incurred] as soon as it is sanctified in a [sacred] vessel. We have thus found [it of] defilement. How do we know [it of] nothar?17 Identity of law with defilement is learnt from the fact that ‘profanation’ is written in both. Yet let us learn identity of law from Piggul, because ‘iniquity’ is written in connection with both? — Reason asserts that we should learn it from uncleanness, because [they are alike in respect of] Gezel, [this being a] mnemonic.18 On the contrary, one should learn it from Piggul, because [it resembles it in the following points:] permissibility, the head-plate, cleanness, time, that which is offered; and these are more numerous?19 — Rather, it [is derived] from Levi’s teaching. For Levi taught: How do we know that the Writ speaks of time disqualification too?20 Because it says, They that profane not [My holy name]:21

(1) Lit., ‘made acceptable’. The language is Biblical, cf. Lev. I, 4: and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him — i.e., the sacrifice effects its purpose. By Biblical law it is accepted in both cases, but the Rabbis penalized the priests by not permitting the flesh to be eaten when it was done deliberately.
(2) Thus he regards the heathen's sacrifice the same as an Israelite's sacrifice; then here too the same law should apply to both.

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(3) Ex. XXVIII, 38. The passage refers to the wearing of the head-plate by the High Priest, and teaches (according to the Talmudic interpretation) that in virtue of this wearing sacrifices are accepted, i.e., valid, even when the blood is defiled.

(4) Lev. XXII, 2.

(5) I.e., that unclean priests need not separate themselves from the sacrifices of heathens. — Surely R. Jose said that he takes a stringent view in all these matters?

(6) As enumerated in the Mishnah 42b seq.

(7) V. notes on Mishnah 42b.

(8) The sin-offering for eating Piggul is fixed, and is the same for rich and poor alike — a lamb or a she-goat. It is incurred in one state of awareness, i.e., to be liable is it not necessary that one should know at first that it is Piggul, then forget and eat it, and then become aware of it again, as it is in the case of defilement (v. note 2, p. 230). If only one ate it unwittingly, not having known at all that it was unclean, and then became aware of it, there is culpability. Again, the prohibition of Piggul is never raised, even if all the sacrifices of the whole community had been rendered Piggul, whereas in the case of uncleanness, if the whole community was in a state of uncleanness, the Passover-offering is brought and is eaten in that same state too.

(9) A wealthy man offers an animal-sacrifice; a poor man two doves; and a very poor man offers the tenth of an ephah of meal.

(10) For one to be culpable he must have known at first that it was unclean, then forgotten and eaten it, and then learn of its uncleanness again (Shebu. 4a).

(11) Lev. XXII, 2. The passage refers to uncleanness, and ‘which they hallow unto Me’ is an extension (being superfluous in itself), and therefore includes all hallowed things.

(12) As soon as it is dedicated liability is incurred for eating it in an unclean state.

(13) Ibid. 3.

(14) Surely not, for culpability is incurred only for eating (as in v. 4.)!

(15) Which implies mere touch.

(16) ‘Offered’ is the same root as ‘approacheth’;

(17) That there is liability even where there are no mattirin.

(18) G = Guf (body); Z = Zerikah (sprinkling); and L = hillul. Nothar and defilement are both intrinsic (i.e., bodily) disqualifications in the flesh, whereas Piggul is disqualification through intention. Nothar and defilement do not disqualify through the sprinkling of the blood, whereas Piggul does. And finally, hillul (profanation) is written in connection with nothar and defilement, but not in connection with Piggul.

(19) (i) Nothar and Piggul are never permitted in opposition to the general interdict, whereas defilement is. (ii) The head-plate does not propitiate for these, though it does in the case of defilement (v. supra a bottom and note a.l.). (Though we are now discussing the uncleanness of the person, whereas the head-plate propitiates only if the blood of the sacrifice is unclean, nevertheless it is true to say that the head-plate does propitiate in a case of uncleanness.) (iii) Nothar and Piggul are both clean. (iv) Both are disqualified through the time element, nothar because it was left until after the proper time, Piggul because of an illegitimate intention in respect of after time. Finally, (v) they are both disqualifications in respect of the sacrifice, which is offered; whereas defilement is a disqualification of the priest, who offers it.

(20) Such as nothar.

(21) Lev. XXII, 2.

**Zevachim 46a**

the Writ speaks of two modes of profanation, viz., the disqualification of nothar and the disqualification of defilement.

**EXCEPT BLOOD, etc.** Whence do we know it? — Said ‘Ulla, Scripture saith, [For the life of the flesh is in the blood,] and I have given it to you [upon the altar to make atonement for your souls]:2 [this teaches,] it is yours.3 The school of R. Ishmael taught: ‘To make atonement’ [implies] but not for trespass. R. Johanan said: Scripture saith, it is [which intimates,] it is before atonement as after atonement: as there is no trespass after atonement,4 so there is no trespass before atonement. Say, it is after atonement as before atonement: as it involves trespass before atonement,5 so it involves trespass after atonement? — Nothing involves trespass once its function is performed. Does it not? But lo, there are the separated ashes?6 — That is because the separated ashes and the priestly vestments7 are [taught in] two texts which come for the same purpose,8 and wherever two texts come for the same purpose, they do not illumine [other cases].9
That is well according to the Rabbis who maintain that, [And Aaron... shall put off the linen garments... ] and shall leave them there teaches that they must be stored away. But what can be said on the view of R. Dosa, who maintained [that] they are permitted to an ordinary priest, only that he [the High Priest] does not use them on another Day of Atonement?

Because the separated ashes and the beheaded heifer are [taught in] two texts which come for the same purpose, and wherever two texts come for the same purpose, they do not illumine [other cases]. That is well on the view that they do not illumine; but what can be said on the view that they do illumine? — Two limitations are written: here is written, [over the heifer] whose neck was broken; while there it says, [And he shall take up the ashes...] and he shall put them [beside the altar]. Now, why do I need three texts in connection with blood? One excludes it from trespass, another from nothar, and a third from defilement. But no text is required for Piggul for we learnt: Whatever has mattirin, whether for man or for the altar, involves liability on account of Piggul: whereas blood is itself a Mattir.

R. Johanan said: For what purpose is kareth stated three times in connection with peace-offerings?

(1) The two profanations are deduced from the fact that Scripture employs a longer form, yehallelu (profane) instead of yehallu.
(2) For it is — Hu — the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life. (Lev. XVII, 11).
(3) ‘Ulla said this in reference to trespass: ‘it is yours’ means that in respect of trespass it is treated as secular, and so involves no offering for misappropriation. The deductions by the school of R. Ishmael and R. Johanan which follow, point to the same conclusion. Thus we have three texts showing that blood does not involve trespass; since three are unnecessary for this purpose, they are ultimately employed to teach that blood does not involve liability in respect of nothar, trespass, and defilement.
(4) After the blood has been sprinkled and atonement thereby made, there is no trespass in putting it to secular use, since it is no longer required for a sacred purpose.
(5) This would have to be assumed in default of a text to the contrary. R. Johanan of course does not deduce the contrary from the other texts.
(6) A shovelful of ashes was removed every day from the altar and placed at the east side of the altar, where they might not be used, though their function had already been performed, but left to become absorbed in their place.
(7) The four additional vestments worn by the High Priest when he entered the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement. On leaving it he removed them, and they might not be put to secular use. Both these cases are deduced from Scriptural texts.
(8) In both trespass is involved after their function has been fulfilled.
(9) For if they were to serve as an illustration for others, one only need be stated, and the other, together with other cases, would follow.
(10) Lev. XVI, 23.
(11) And not used. Thus there are two such instances.
(12) V. Deut. XXI, 9. The Rabbis deduce from the superfluous ‘there’ in the passage, and shall break the heifer’s neck there in the valley (v. 4), that the heifer must be buried there and not put to any use.
(13) Sh. M. deletes ‘two’.
(14) Deut. XXI v. 6; lit. ‘the broken-necked’. The deduction is from the article ‘the’: only this animal whose function has been performed may still not be used, but no other similar sacred animal, i.e., one whose function has been performed, may not be used.
(15) Lev. VI, 3. Here too ‘them’ implies, only these ashes may not be used in such a case, but other sacred things may be used after their function has been performed.
(16) To show that blood does not involve nothar. This is the completion of the answer to the question, ‘How do we know that blood does not create liability for nothar’, etc., as explained p. 231. n. 7.
(17) I.e., that blood does not involve culpability on account of these.
(18) V. Lev. VII, 20, 21; XXII, 3.

Zevachim 46b

One to serve as a generalization the second as a particularization, and the third [is required] in respect of things which are not
eaten.2 And according to R. Simeon who maintained that the things which cannot be eaten do not involve liability on account of uncleanness, what does it include? — It includes the inner sin-offerings. You might think that since R. Simeon said, Whatever does not come on the outer altar, like peace-offerings, does not involve liability on account of Piggul then it does not involve liability on account of uncleanness either. Hence [Scripture) informs us [that it is not so].

Said R. Simeon: That which is normally eaten, etc.3 It was stated, R. Johanan and Resh Lakish, R. Eleazar and R. Jose son of R. Hanina [are the pairs concerned in the following discussion], one of the former pair and one of the latter pair: One maintained: The controversy [in the Mishnah] refers to uncleanness of the flesh;4 but in the case of personal uncleanness all agree that [the offender] is not flagellated. But the other maintained: As there is a controversy in the one case, so is there in the other. [Raba said, Logic supports the view that as there is a controversy in the one case, so is there in the other.]5 What is the reason? —

Since the text, And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing is applicable to it, then the text having his uncleanness upon him is applicable to it too.8 That is how R. Tabyomi recited [this discussion]. R. Kahana recited [the views of] one of the former pair and one of the latter pair as referring to the final clause:9 One maintained: The controversy refers to personal uncleanness, but in the case of uncleanness of flesh all agree that he is flagellated. While the other maintained: As there is a controversy in the one case, so is there in the other. Raba said, Logic supports the view that as there is a controversy in the one case, so is there in the other. What is the reason? —

Since the text, ‘Having his uncleanness upon him’, is not applicable to it,10 the text, ‘And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing’ is not applicable to it. But surely a master said: ‘And the flesh’ is to include the wood and the frankincense?11 — That is a mere disqualification.12


GEMARA. Rab Judah said in Rab's name: [Scripture says, It is a burnt-offering, an offering made by fire, of pleasing savor unto the Lord].14 ‘A burnt-offering’ [intimates that it must be slaughtered] for the sake of a burnt-offering, excluding [where it is slaughtered] for the sake of a peace-offering, in which case it does not [acquit the owner of his obligation]. ‘An offering made by fire’ [intimates that] it must be for the sake of an offering made by fire, excluding the charring of the meat,15 which is not [valid]. ‘Savor’ [intimates that] it must be for the sake of a savor: this excludes the roasting of limbs [elsewhere] and bringing them up [on the altar], which is not [valid].16 For Rab Judah said in Rab's name: If one roasted limbs and took them up on to the altar, they do not fulfill the requirements of ‘savor’. ‘Pleasing’ [intimates that] it must be for the sake of pleasing the Lord, for the sake of Him who spoke and called the world into existence.

Rab Judah said in Rab's name: If one slaughtered a sin-offering under the designation of a burnt-offering, it is invalid;
[if one slaughtered it] under the designation of hullin, it is valid. R. Eleazar said: What is Rab's reason? — And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel:18 ‘holy things’ profane ‘holy things’, but hullin does not profane holy things.19

Rabbah raised an objection: R. JOSE SAID: EVEN IF ONE DID NOT HAVE ANY OF THESE PURPOSES IN HIS HEART, IT IS VALID, BECAUSE IT IS A REGULATION OF THE BETH DIN. Thus it is only because he had no [purpose] in his heart at all; hence, if he intended it20 for the sake of hullin, it is invalid? — Said Abaye to him: Perhaps [this deduction is to be made]: if he had no intention at all, it is valid and propitiates while if he intended it for the sake of hullin it is valid but does not propitiate.21

R. Eleazar said: If one slaughters a sin-offering for the sake of hullin,22 it is valid; [if one slaughtered it] as hullin,23 it is invalid.24 This is as the question which Samuel asked R. Huna:

(1) When anything is included in a generalization, and is then made the subject of a particularization, it throws light not only upon itself but upon everything included in the generalization. Now Lev. XXII,3 (q.v.) is a generalization, including all ‘holy things’ and thus the peace-offering too. The latter is therefore singled out in Lev. VII, 20 to teach that as peace-offerings are of the ‘holy things’ of the altar, so does the ‘holy things’ in XXII,3 also mean those belonging to the altar, sc. sacrifices.
(2) E.g., the wood used on the altar and the frankincense. If one nevertheless ate these whilst unclean, he incurs kareuth.
(3) As in the Mishnah, 4Sb, with slight variation. V. Rashi on the Mishnah.
(4) Hence of the wood and incense.
(5) Bracketed passage added by Sh. M.
(7) Ibid. 20.
(8) I.e., if the first text applies to wood and frankincense, then the second does too.
(9) I.e., to R. Simeon’s exemption from liability.
(10) In the Rabbis’ view. — Before he said, ‘is applicable to it’, as he referred to R. Simeon’s view.
(11) Supra 34a.

How do we know that when one is unaware engaged in sacrifices,1 it [the sacrifice] is invalid? Because it says, And he shall kill the bullock before the Lord,2 [which intimates] that the killing must be for the sake of the bullock.3 We know this,4 said he to him, [but] how do we know that [awareness] is indispensable?5 Ye shall slaughter it with your will,6 said he, [which teaches,] slaughter it with your knowledge.7

SINCE THE INTENTION IS DETERMINED ONLY BY THE CELEBRANT. Our Mishnah does not agree with the following Tanna. For it was taught, R. Eleazar son of R. Jose said: I have heard that the owner [of the sacrifice] renders [it] piggul!5 Raba said: What is R. Eleazar son of R. Jose’s reason? Because Scripture says, Then shall he that offereth [his offering] present [unto the Lord, etc.].9

Abaye said: R. Eleazar son of R. Jose, R. Eliezer and R. Simeon b. Eleazar all hold that
when one expresses an intention while another performs the act, it is an effective intention. R. Eleazar son of R. Jose: this view that we have stated. R. Eliezer: as we learnt: If one slaughters for a heathen, his shechitah is fit; but R. Eleazar declares it unfit. R. Simeon b. Eleazar: as it was taught: R. Simeon b. Eleazar stated a general rule: That which is not fit to put away, and such is not generally put away, yet it did become fit to a certain person and he did put it away, and then another came and carried it out, the latter is rendered liable through the former's intention. Now, both of them agree with R. Eleazar son of R. Jose: if we say thus without, is there a question about within?

R. Eleazar son of R. Jose does not agree with the other two: perhaps he ruled thus only in reference to within, but not in reference to without. R. Simeon b. Eleazar agrees with R. Eliezer: if we say thus in connection with the Sabbath, is there a question about idolatry? R. Eleazar does not agree with R. Simeon b. Eleazar: perhaps you rule thus only in connection with idolatry, because it is similar to ‘within’; but in the case of the Sabbath, the Torah interdicted only a considered labour.

CHAPTER V

though the law of intention is not written in connection with these at all, they hold that where one man performs an act, another man's intention in reference thereto is effective. Then they will certainly hold the same in reference to sacrifices, where the disqualification of an illegal intention is actually written.

But when he saw that it cannot be done adequately without a vessel [also being used], he re-included it. For it was taught: And the priest shall take [of the blood of the guilt-offering]:

GEMARA. Yet let him [the Tanna] also teach [in the very first clause]. And the reception of their blood is [done] in a service vessel at the north? — Since there is the leper's guilt-offering, whose blood is received in the hand, he omits it. Is it then not [received in a vessel]? Surely he teaches later on: As for a Nazirite's guilt-offering and a leper's guilt-offering, their slaughtering is at the north, and the reception of their blood is [done] with a service vessel at the north? —

At first he thought that the blood was received in the hand, [and so] he omitted it. But when he saw that it cannot be done adequately without a vessel [also being used], he re-included it. For it was taught: And the priest shall take [of the blood of the guilt-offering]:

(1) The sin-offerings of the Day of Atonement and the other sin-offerings which were burnt.
(2) The place where the ashes of the outer altar were deposited.
(3) A sacrifice of higher sanctity.
(4) Infra 54b.
(5) The mention of the reception of the blood in the introductory clause.
(6) Lev. XIV, 14.
(7) Ibid.
(8) That the blood which is sprinkled on the altar too is not received in a vessel.
(9) Ibid. 13. This rendering follows the exact order of the Hebrew.
it on the side of the altar northward. We have thus found [it of] the flocks; how do we know [it of] the herd? — Scripture saith, And [we] if his offering be of the flock:7 the waw [and] continues the preceding section, so that the [subject] above may be deduced from [that] below.9 That is well on the view that you can learn [the subject above from that below]; but on the view that you cannot learn [it thus], what can be said? For it was taught: And if any one sin, etc.;11 this teaches that one is liable to a guilt-offering of suspense on account of doubtful trespass:12 that is R. Akiba's ruling. But the Sages exempt [him]. Surely then they disagree in this: one master holds that we learn [the subject above from that below],13 while the other master holds that we do not learn it? —

Said R. Papa: All agree that we do learn [thus], but this is the Rabbis' reason:14 mizwoth15 is employed here, and Mizwoth is employed in connection with the sin-offering of forbidden fat:16 as there it means a law whose deliberate infringement entails kareth and its unwitting infringement entails a sin-offering, so here too17 [it is entailed only by] that whose deliberate infringement entails kareth, while its unwitting infringement involves a sin-offering.18 And R. Akiba?19 — As there it is fixed, so here it is fixed, thus excluding the sin-offering for the defilement of the sanctuary and its sacred objects [sacrifices], which is variable.20 And the Rabbis?21 — There is no semi gezerah shawah.22 But R. Akiba too [surely admits that] there is no semi gezerah shawah? — That indeed is so; here, however, they differ in this: R. Akiba holds: ‘And if a soul’ is written, and the waw indicates conjunction with the preceding subject.23 But [according to] the Rabbis too, surely it is written, And if a soul?24 Shall we say that they differ in this: one master holds that a Hekkesh is stronger; while the other master holds that a gezerah shawah is stronger?25 —

No: all agree that the gezerah shawah is stronger, but the Rabbis can answer you: the subject below is learnt from that above, that the guilt-offering must be [two] silver shekels in value,26 so that you should not say: Surely the doubt cannot be more stringent than the certainty: as the certainty [of sin] requires a sin-offering [even] a sixth [of a zuz in value], so [for] the doubt a guilt-offering of a sixth [of a zuz] is sufficient.27 Now, how does R. Akiba know this? — He deduces it from [the text,] And this is the law of the guilt-offering,28 which intimates that there is one law for all guilt-offerings. That is well on the view that ‘law’ can be [so] interpreted; but on the view that ‘law’ cannot be so interpreted, whence does he derive [it]? — He derives [it from] the repetition of ‘according to thy valuation.’29 [But] what can be said of the guilt-offering of a maidservant promised in marriage,30 where according to thy valuation is not written? — He derives [it from] the repetition of ‘with the ram.’31 How do we know that a sin-offering requires the north? — Because it is written, And he shall kill the sin-offering in the place of the burnt-offering.32 We have found [it of] slaughtering: how do we know [it of] receiving? Because it is written, And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin-offering.33 How do we know that the receiver himself [must stand in the north]?34 The text says, ‘And he shall take’, [which intimates,] he shall [be]take himself [to the place where the blood is received].35 We have thus found [it as] a regulation; how do we know that it is indispensable?36 — Another text is written, And he shall kill it for a sin-offering in the place where they kill the burnt-offering;37 and it was taught: Where is the burnt-offering slaughtered? in the north: so this too38 is [slaughtered] in the north.

(1) V. infra 53b.
(2) I.e., the Tanna is more desirous of teaching the results of exegesis than what Scripture states explicitly, and therefore he gives them preference.
(3) V. infra 52b.
(4) It is more important in his eyes, and hence he teaches it first.
(6) To which the text refers.
(7) Ibid. 10; and is expressed by the letter waw in Heb., punctuated we.
(8) Lit., ‘adds to’.
(9) When a passage commences with ‘and’, this conjunction links it with the previous portion, and a law stated in one applies to the other too. Here the subject above is the burnt-offering of the herd, and the subject below is that of the flock.
(10) By means of a conjunction waw.
(12) V. Mishnah infra 54b. Now, the subject immediately preceding deals with the guilt-offering for putting sacred things to secular use (vv. 14-16), when the offender learns that he has definitely sinned. If one is in doubt whether he has offended, this text teaches that he must bring a guilt-offering of suspense (i.e., doubt). The doubt arises thus: Two things lie before a man, one of which he puts to secular use. Subsequently he learns that one of these was sacred, and he does not know which.
(13) And if any one sin introduces the law of the guilt-offering of suspense for doubtful sin. By learning the subject above from it, it follows that this is entailed by doubtful trespass too.
(14) For not doing so here.
(15) Lit. ‘commandments’: and if any one sin, and do any of the Mizwoth (E.V. things) which the Lord hath commanded not to be done, etc.
(16) Lev. IV, 27. Forbidden fat is not mentioned there, but ‘a sin-offering of forbidden fat’ is the usual designation in the Talmud for an ordinary sin-offering. The reason is because Ye shall eat neither fat nor blood (Lev. III, 17) is followed by Ch. IV, which deals with sin-offerings (Rashi in Sot. 15a). Asheri (in Ned. 4a) explains the reason because the most usual form of sinning thus is eating forbidden fat through having it in the house.
(17) Sc. the guilt-offering of suspense.
(18) I.e., a guilt-offering of suspense is brought only when one is in doubt whether he has committed an offence, which, if certainly committed, entails kareth or a sin-offering. But the secular misuse of sacred property does not involve a sin-offering, consequently one is not liable to a guilt-offering for doubtful trespass.
(19) How does he interpret this gezerah shawah? (20) Lit., ‘ascends (in value) and descends’. — The ordinary sin-offering is fixed and the same for rich and poor alike. This gezerah shawah then teaches that a guilt-offering of suspense is incurred only for the doubtful violation of a law which, if definitely violated, involves a fixed sin-offering.
But if one is doubtful whether he entered the Temple whilst unclean, he does not bring a guilt-offering of suspense, because if he were certain he would only be liable to a variable sacrifice (v. Lev. V, 1-10).
(21) What is their view on this?
(22) A gezerah shawah shows similarity in all respects, not in some only.
(23) As above.
(24) And it was stated above that all agree that the subject above is learnt from that below.
(25) The Hekkesh or analogy arises from the waw, which couples both subjects. Thus apparently the Rabbis give preference to the gezerah shawah, while R. Akiba gives preference to the Hekkesh (only one can be employed here, since they yield apparently contradictory results).
(26) The earlier passage reads: then he shall bring... according to thy valuations in silver by shekels... a guilt-offering (v. 15), which the Rabbis interpret as meaning not less than two shekels. The analogy therefore teaches that the guilt-offering of suspense in v. 18 must also have that value.
(27) Hence the Hekkesh teaches otherwise.
(28) Lev. VII, 1.
(29) Heb. יִרְבָּא. It is repeated in Lev. V, 15 and Lev. V, 18, and this furnishes a gezerah shawah, which teaches that they must be of equal value in both cases.
(30) Ibid. XIX, 20-22.
(31) Ibid. V, 16 and XIX, 22.
(32) Ibid. IV, 24.
(33) Ibid 25. This is connected with the immediately preceding words, ‘in the place where they kill the burnt-offering.’ — ‘Take’ means to receive the blood.
(34) And not in the south and stretch out his hand to the north. (A line — imaginary — demarcated the north and the south, and so it would be possible to stand on one side of the line — south — and receive the blood on the other — the north.)
(35) I.e., the north.
(36) That the sacrifice is invalid otherwise.
(37) Ibid. 33. This treats of a lamb brought by a prince (ruler) as a sin-offering.
(38) Sc. the sin-offering.

Zevachim 48b

Do you then learn it from this verse? Is it not already stated, In the place where the burnt-offering is killed shall the sin-offering be killed? if why then has this2 been singled out? To fix the place for it, so that if one did not slaughter it in the north, it is invalid.3 You
say it has been singled out for this purpose, yet perhaps it is not so, but rather [to teach] that this one [alone] requires the north,4 but no other requires the north? Therefore it states, ‘And he shall kill the sin-offering in the place of the burnt-offering,’ thus constituting a general law in respect of all sin-offerings that they require the north. We have thus found [it true of] a prince's sin-offering, that it is both a recommendation and indispensable; we have also found it as a recommendation in the case of other sin-offerings; how do we know that it is indispensable [for other sin-offerings]? Because it is written in reference to both the lamb5 and the she-goat.6 Then what is the purpose of ‘it’?7 — That is required for what was taught: ‘It’ [is slaughtered] on the north, but Nahshon's goat was not [slaughtered] in the north.8 And it was taught: And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat9 includes Nahshon's goat, in respect of laying [hands]: that is R. Judah's view.

R. Simeon said: It includes the goats brought on account of idolatry, in respect of laying [hands]. You might argue, Since they are included in respect of laying [hands], they are included in respect of the north. Hence we are informed [otherwise].

To this Rabina demurred: That is well on R. Judah's view; but what can be said on R. Simeon's?10 —

Said Mar Zutra son of R. Mari to Rabina: And is it well on R. Judah's view? [surely], where it is included, it is included, and where it is not included, it is not included?11 And should you say, Had Scripture not excluded it, [its inclusion] would be inferred by analogy: if so, let laying [hands] itself be inferred by analogy? But [you must answer that] a temporary [sacrifice] can not be inferred from a permanent one,12 so here too,13 a temporary [sacrifice] cannot be inferred from a permanent one?14 —

Rather [it teaches this]: ‘It’ [is slaughtered in the north], but the slaughterer need not be in the north.15 But [the law concerning] the slaughterer is deducted by R. Ahia's [exegesis]? For it was taught, R. Ahia said: And he shall kill it on the side of the altar northward’: why is this stated? Because we find that the receiving priest must stand in the north and receive [the blood] in the north, while if he stood in the south and received [the blood] in the north it is invalid. You might think that this [slaughtering] is likewise. Therefore Scripture states, ‘[And he shall kill] it’, [ intimating that] ‘it’ must be in the north, but the slaughterer need not be in the north! —

Rather, [it teaches this]: ‘It’ [must be killed] in the north, but a bird does not need the north.16 For it was taught: You might think that a bird-offering needs the north, and this is indeed logical: If [Scripture] prescribed north for a lamb, though it did not prescribe a priest for it,17 is it not logical that it should prescribe north for a bird, seeing that it did prescribe a priest for it? Therefore ‘it’ is stated.18 [No:] as for a lamb, the reason is because [Scripture] prescribed a utensil for it!19 —

Rather, [it teaches this]: ‘It’ [must be killed] in the north, but the Passover-offering [need] not [be slaughtered] in the north. For it was taught, R. Eliezer b. Jacob said: You might think that a Passover-offering needs the north, and this is indeed logical: if [Scripture] prescribed the north for a burnt-offering, though it did not prescribe a fixed season for its slaughtering; is it not logical that it should prescribe the north for a Passover-offering, seeing that it did prescribe a fixed season for its slaughtering?

Therefore ‘it’ is stated. [No:] as for a burnt-offering, the reason is because it is altogether burnt. [Then learn it] from a sin-offering.20 As for a sin-offering, the reason is because it makes atonement for those who are liable to
kareth! [Then learn it] from a guilt-offering. [No:] as for a guilt-offering, the reason is because it is a most sacred sacrifice! [And you] cannot [learn it] from all these21 likewise, because they are most sacred sacrifices! — After all, it is as we said originally: ‘It’ [must be] in the north, but the slaughterer need not be in the north, and as to your difficulty, ‘That is deduced from R. Ahia’s exegesis’, [the answer is that] it does not [really] exclude the slaughterer from the north,22 but [is meant thus]: The slaughterer need not be in the north, [whence it follows that] the receiver must be in the north, ‘The receiver’? Surely that is deduced from ‘and he shall take,’ [which we interpret] let him [be] take himself [to the north]? —

He does not interpret ‘and he shall take’ as meaning ‘let him [be] take himself,’23 We have thus found a recommendation that slaughtering a burnt-offering must be in the north, and a [similar] recommendation about receiving; how do we know that [the north] is indispensable in the case of slaughtering and receiving?24 —

Said R. Adda b. Ahabah, — others state, Rabbah b. Shila: [It is deduced] a fortiori: If it is indispensable in the case of a sin-offering, which is [only] learnt from a burnt-offering,25 surely it is logical that it is indispensable in the case of a burnt-offering, from which a sin-offering is learnt. [No:] As for a sin-offering, the reason is because it makes atonement for those who are liable to kareth! Said Rabina: This is R. Adda’s difficulty:26 Do we ever find the secondary more stringent than the primary?27 Said Mar Zutra son of R. Mari to Rabina: Do we not?

(1) Lev. VI, 18. This applies to all sin-offerings.
(2) The sin-offering brought by a prince.
(3) The repetition teaches this.
(4) Sc. that mentioned in Lev. IV, 33.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid. 29.
(7) In verse 33 quoted supra: ‘it’ implies limitation, whereas all sin-offerings have been included.

Yet there is the [second] tithe, which itself can be redeemed, and yet what is purchased with the [redemption] money of tithe cannot be redeemed. For we learnt: If that which was purchased with the [redemption] money
of the [second] tithe became defiled, it must be redeemed. R. Judah said: It must be buried! — There the sanctity is not strong enough to take hold of its redemption. Yet there is the case of a substitute: whereas [sacrificial] sanctity does not fall upon an animal with a permanent blemish, it [substitution] does fall upon an animal with a permanent blemish? —

[The sanctity of] a substitute is derived from a consecrated animal, while [that of] a consecrated animal comes from hullin. Yet there is a Passover-offering, which itself does not require laying [of hands], drink-offerings, and the waving of the breast and the shoulder; whereas its remainder does require laying [of hands], drink-offerings, and the waving of the breast and the shoulder? —

A Passover remainder during the rest of the year is a peace-offering. Alternatively, Scripture says, the burnt-offering, [which intimates] it must be in its [appointed] place. How do we know that a guilt-offering requires the north? —

Because it is written, in the place where they kill the burnt-offering shall they kill the guilt-offering. We have thus found [it of] slaughtering; how do we know [it of] receiving? — [Because it is written.] And the blood thereof shall be dashed, etc. [which teaches that] the receiving of its blood too must be in the north. How do we know [that] the receiver himself [must stand in the north]? — ‘And its blood’ [is written where] ‘its blood’ [alone] would suffice. We have thus found it as a recommendation: how do we know that it is indispensable? — Another text is written, And he shall kill the he-lamb [in the place where they kill the sin-offering and the burnt-offering]. Now, does that come for the present purpose?

Surely it is required for what was taught: If anything was included in a general proposition, and was then singled out for a new law, you cannot restore it to [the terms of] its general proposition, unless the Writ explicitly restores it to [the terms of] its general proposition. How so? Scripture saith, And he shall kill the he-lamb in the place where they kill the sin-offering and the guilt-offering, in the place of the sanctuary; for as the sin-offering so is the guilt-offering; it is the priest’s; it is most holy. Now, ‘as the sin-offering so is the guilt-offering’ need not be said. Why then is ‘as the sin-offering so is the guilt-offering’ said? Because a leper's guilt-offering was singled out and made subject to a new law, viz., that in respect of the thumb of the hand, the big toe of the foot, and the right ear, you might think that it does not require the presentation of [its] blood and emurim at the altar; therefore Scripture says, ‘as the sin-offering so is the guilt-offering’: as the sin-offering requires the presentation of [its] blood and emurim at the altar, so does a leper's guilt-offering require the presentation of blood and emurim at the ‘altar’? —

If so, let it be written in the latter [passage] and not in the former. Now, that is well if we hold that when anything is made the subject of a new law, it cannot be learnt from its general law,

(1) Second tithe was a tithe of the produce which was to be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there by its owner. If it was too burdensome, he could redeem it, take the redemption money to Jerusalem, and expend it there (Deut. XIV, 22-27).
(2) An object must possess a certain degree of sanctity before it can be transferred to something else, whereas the sanctity of this is too light to permit such transfer. Hence R. Judah's ruling, though strict, arises out of the lesser, not the greater, sanctity of what is brought.
(3) If a man dedicates a blemished animal for a sacrifice, it merely receives monetary sanctity, and can be redeemed, whereupon it becomes hullin (q.v. Glos.) entirely, and may be put to any use, including shearing and labor. But if a man
declares a blemished animal a substitute for a consecrated animal, it becomes holy, and must be redeemed, but when redeemed it may not be kept for shearing or service, but must be eaten (this is also the law where an animal without a blemish is dedicated for a sacrifice and then receives a blemish). Thus the sanctity of the substitute is greater than that of the original.

(4) A substitute receives sanctity because another animal has already been sanctified, whereas the originally consecrated animal receives it direct from hullin.

(5) V. supra 37b, p. 190, n. 7.

(6) Emended text (Sh. M.)

(7) And not a Passover-offering at all. Hence it is a different sacrifice and naturally governed by different laws.

(8) In reply to the question whence do we know that the north is indispensable in the case of a burnt-offering.

(9) The north is not only prescribed, but is also essential.

(10) Lev. VII, 1.

(11) Ibid. 2.

(12) Sh. M.: The waw ('and') joins the sentence to the preceding verse, and so the regulation concerning the place of killing applies to the receiving of the blood too. This second verse must be applied to receiving and not to sprinkling, since the blood was not sprinkled at the north.

(13) Rashi: the deduction is made from the eth (sign of the accusative) before ‘its blood’, which could be omitted. This is therefore regarded as extending the law to the receiver.

(14) Lev. XIV, 13. This treats of a leper’s guilt-offering. The repetition of place shows that it is indispensable.

(15) For if it is to teach that it is slaughtered in the north, that follows from the first half of the verse. While if it teaches that the sprinkling of its blood and its consumption are the same as those of the sin-offering, that too is superfluous, since it is already covered by the general regulations prescribed for all guilt-offerings in Lev. VII, 1-10.

(16) V. Ibid. XIV, 14 seq. These rites are absent in the case of other guilt-offerings.

(17) This is the example: since a leper’s guilt-offering was singled out for special treatment, the general laws of guilt-offerings could not apply to it without a text specifically intimating that they do. — Thus the text is utilized for this purpose, and not to teach that the north is indispensable.

(18) That that is its only purpose.

(19) In the passage on leprosy.

but its general law can be learnt from it: then it is correct; but if we hold that neither can it be learnt from the general proposition, nor can the general proposition be learnt from it, then this [law]2 is required for its own purpose?

Since [Scripture] restored it, it restored it.

Mar Zutra son of R. Mari said to Rabina: Yet say, When Scripture restored it [to the general proposition] [it was only] in respect of the presentation of the blood and emmurim, since this requires priesthood; but slaughtering, which does not require priesthood, does not require the north [either]? — If so, let Scripture say, ‘for it is as the sin-offering’: why [state], ‘for as the sin-offering so is the guilt-offering’? [To teach:] Let it be like the other guilt-offerings. Why must it be likened to both a sin-offering and a guilt-offering?

Said Rabina, It is necessary: if it were likened to a sin-offering and were not likened to a guilt-offering I would say, Whence did we learn [that] a sin-offering [is slaughtered in the north]? from a burnt-offering: thus that which is learnt through a Hekkesh in turn teaches through a hekkesh.

Mar Zutra the son of R. Mari said to Rabina: Then let it be likened to a burnt-offering and not likened to a sin-offering? — Then I would say, [that elsewhere] that which is learnt through a Hekkesh in turn teaches through a hekkesh; and if you object, Then let it be likened to a sin-offering, [I could reply:] It [Scripture] prefers to liken it to the principal rather than to the secondary. Therefore it likened it to a sin-offering and it likened it to a burnt-offering, thus intimating that that which is learnt through a Hekkesh does not in turn teach through a Hekkesh.

Raba said: [It] is learnt from the following, for it is written, As is taken off from the ox of the sacrifice of peace-offerings. For what
purpose [is this written]? if for the lobe of the liver and the two kidneys,\textsuperscript{15} surely that is written in the body of the text!\textsuperscript{16} But because Scripture wishes to intimate that [the burning of] the lobe of the liver and the two kidneys of the he-goats [brought as sin-offerings] for idolatry shall be learnt by analogy from the community's bullock [for a sin-offering on account of sinning in unawareness],\textsuperscript{17} whereas this law is not explicitly stated in the passage on the bullock of unawareness, but is learnt from the anointed priest's bullock:\textsuperscript{18} therefore ‘as is taken off’ is required, so that it might count as written in that very passage\textsuperscript{19} and not as something which is learnt through a Hekkesh and then in turn teaches through a hekkesh.\textsuperscript{20}

Said R. Papa to Raba: Then let Scripture write it in its own context,\textsuperscript{21} and not assimilate [it to the anointed priest's bullock]?\textsuperscript{22} — If Scripture wrote it in its own context, and did not teach it by assimilation, I would say, That which is learnt through a Hekkesh can in turn teach through a Hekkesh and assimilated it, in order to teach that which is learnt through a Hekkesh does not in turn teach through a Hekkesh.

(Mnemonic: \textit{Hekkesh and gezerah shawah; kal wa-homer.})\textsuperscript{26}

[It is agreed that] that which is learnt through a Hekkesh does not in turn teach through a Hekkesh, [this being learnt] either by Raba's or by Rabina's [exegesis]. Can that which is learnt through a Hekkesh teach through a gezerah shawah?\textsuperscript{27} —

Come and hear: R. Nathan b. Abtolemos said: Whence do we know that a spreading outbreak [of leprosy] in garments [covering the whole] is clean? Karahath [baldness of the back of the head] and gabbahath [baldness of the front] are mentioned in connection with garments, and also in connection with man: just as in the latter, if [the plague] spread over the whole skin, he is clean;\textsuperscript{28} so in the former too, if it spread over the whole [garment], it is clean. And how do we know it there?\textsuperscript{29} Because it is written, [And if the leprosy... cover all the skin... from his head even to his feet,]\textsuperscript{30} and [thereby] his head\textsuperscript{32} is assimilated [through a Hekkesh] to his feet:\textsuperscript{33} as there, when it is all turned white, having broken out all over him, he is clean; so here too, when it breaks out all over him,\textsuperscript{34} he is clean.\textsuperscript{35}

Said R. Johanan:\textsuperscript{36} In the whole Torah we rule that whatever is learnt can teach, save in the case of sacrifices, where we do not rule that whatever is learnt can teach. For if it were so [that we did rule thus], let ‘northward’ not be said in connection with a guilt-offering, and it could be inferred from sin-offerings by the gezerah shawah of ‘it is most holy’.\textsuperscript{37} Surely then its purpose is to teach that that which is learnt by a Hekkesh does not in turn teach through a gezerah shawah.\textsuperscript{38} But perhaps [we do not learn it there] because one can refute it: as for a sin-offering, [it requires north] because it makes atonement for those who are liable to kareth? — A superfluous ‘most holy’ is written.\textsuperscript{39} That which is learnt through a Hekkesh teaches in turn by a kal wa-homer.\textsuperscript{40}

(1) The general law is that stated in VII, 1-10, while a leper's guilt-offering is singled out for a new law not in harmony with the general law, for whereas the blood of an ordinary guilt-offering is sprinkled on the altar, the blood of this is applied to the right thumb, right ear, and the great toe of the right foot. Now, if it were not stated in the general regulations on the guilt-offerings that it must be slaughtered in the north, but were stated here, this would come not under the preceding but under the following rule: if anything is included in a general proposition and is then singled out to teach a special regulation, this applies not only to the case where it is stated, but to the whole. Thus a leper's guilt-offering is included in the general
guilt-offerings dealt with in VII, 1-10; when it is
singled out here for slaughtering in the north, that
applies to all guilt-offerings, and not only to itself.
(The other rule with which we are now dealing
holds good only when the new law is not in
harmony with the general one, as explained at the
beginning of the note.) Hence on this view it need
not be stated in VII, 1-10 that it is killed in the
north, as this would follow from XIV. 14 seq.; its
repetition teaches that the north is indispensable.
(2) In VII, 1-10, that it is killed in the north.
(3) That it is killed in the north, for on the present
view we could not learn all guilt-offerings from a
leper's guilt-offering, even in respect of a law
which is not in disharmony (sc. slaughtering in the
north), since the latter is made the subject of one
law which is in disharmony (sc. sprinkling on the
right thumb, etc.).
(4) Scripture restored a leper's guilt-offering to
the general rule by saying, for as the sin-offering
so is the guilt-offering, whence we know that it
must be slaughtered in the north. ‘And he shall
kill the he-lamb in the place where they kill the
sin-offering and the burnt-offering’ (sc. in the
north), written in the same verse, is thus mere
repetition, and so teaches that the north is
indispensable.
(5) It must be done by a priest. Hence the
restoration to the general proposition shows that
its emurim and some of the blood must be
presented at the altar, in addition to its being
applied to the right thumb, etc.
(6) But for ‘and he shall kill’, etc. In that case it is
not a repetition, and does not teach that it is
indispensable.
(7) Why mention the guilt-offering, seeing that the
whole passage deals with it?
(8) Sc. that it must be slaughtered in the north.
Hence ‘and he shall kill’, etc. is a repetition.
(9) Therefore Scripture adds the burnt-offering, to
show that that is not so.
(10) I.e., there would be nothing in this text to
show the contrary.
(11) Which would positively prove it.
(12) The burnt-offering is the principal source of
the law, since it is there that the north is specified,
wheras the sin-offering is only a secondary
source, since it is derived from the former.
(13) That a thing derived through a Hekkesh
cannot in turn teach through a Hekkesh.
(14) Lev. IV, 10. This refers to the burning of the
emurim of the anointed priest's bullock for a sin-
offering.
(15) To intimate that these are burnt on the altar,
as in the case of a peace-offering.
(16) It is explicitly stated in v. 9.
(17) As stated supra 41a.
(18) As stated supra 39b.
(19) Sc. dealing with the bullock of unawareness.
It is so regarded because it is superfluous where it
stands.
(20) Which therefore shows that such is
inadmissible.
(21) Sc. in the section on the bullock of
unawareness.
(22) Since an extra text is required in any case, let
it be written explicitly in its own context.
(23) I.e., it would be possible to say so.
(24) Let Scripture teach it through a Hekkesh,
without writing it explicitly.
(25) In the passage dealing with the anointed
priest.
(26) V. p. 31, n. 6.
(27) Thus: The law, which is stated in A, is applied
to B by a Hekkesh; can that then be applied to C,
because there is a gezerah shawah between B and
C? Similarly in the other cases that follow.
(28) Leprosy in man: Lev. XIII, 42; in garments:
ibid. 55. In connection with garments, karahath
denotes leprosy on the inside (right) of the cloth;
gabbahath on the front or outside thereof.
(30) That a karahath or gabbahath which spreads
and covers the whole head is clean? For Lev. XIII,
12-13 refers to leprosy of the skin, not of the head;
moreover, they differ in their symptoms. For the
symptom of leprosy of the skin is that the hair
turns white (ibid. v, 3, 12), whereas that of a
karahath or gabbahath is that the hair turns
yellow or reddish-white (ibid. 30, 42).
(31) Ibid 12.
(32) I.e., the leprosy of his head, such as a scale, or
karahath or gabbahath.
(33) I.e., to the rest of the body.
(34) I.e., over his whole head or beard. —
Emended text (Sh. M).
(35) Thus we first learn by a Hekkesh that a
karahath or gabbahath in human beings covering
the whole head is clean, and then that same law is
applied to garments by a gezerah shawah.
(36) In rebutting this proof.
(37) Which is stated of both the sin-offering (Lev.
VI, 1) and the guilt-offering (VII, 1).
(38) For in fact the rule that what is learnt by a
Hekkesh cannot in turn teach by a Hekkesh
applies to sacrifices only, and it is now shown that
it cannot teach in turn through a gezerah shawah
either. Whereas the passage quoted referred to a
different subject, viz., leprosy, and there what is
learnt through a Hekkesh can teach in turn even
through a Hekkesh.
(39) In Num. XVIII, 9. Since this is superfluous,
a gezerah shawah could be learnt even through the
guilt-offering is dissimilar from the sin-offering.
The fact that we do not do so proves that what is
learnt by a Hekkesh does not, in the case of sacrifices, teach in turn by a gezerah shawah. (40) V. Glos.

Zevachim 50a

[This follows] from what the school of R. Ishmael taught.1 That which is learnt through a Hekkesh, can it teach through a Binyan ab?2—

Said R. Jeremiah: Let ‘northward’ not be written in connection with a guilt-offering, and it could be inferred from a sin-offering by a Binyan ab.3 For what purpose then is it written? Surely to intimate that that which is learnt through a Hekkesh cannot in turn teach through a Binyan ab. Yet according to your reasoning, let it be inferred from a burnt-offering by a Binyan ab.4 Why then is it not so inferred? Because you can refute it: as for a burnt-offering, [it requires the north] because it is altogether burnt. So in the case of a sin-offering too, you can refute it: as for a sin-offering, [it requires the north] because it makes atonement for those who are liable to kareth! One cannot be learnt from one; [but] let one be learnt from [the other] two?5—

From which could it be derived? [Will you say,] Let the Divine Law not write it in the case of a burnt-offering, and it could be derived from a sin-offering and a guilt-offering; [then you can argue,] as for these, [they require the north] because they make atonement. Let not the Divine Law write it in respect of a sin-offering, and let it be derived from the others; [then you can argue,] as for these, the reason is because they are males.6 Let not the Divine Law write it in connection with a guilt-offering and let it be derived from the others; [then you can argue,] the reason is because they operate in the case of a community as in the case of an individual.7 That which is learnt by a gezerah shawah, can it in turn teach through a Hekkesh?—

Said R. Papa, It was taught: And this is the law of the sacrifice of peace-offerings... if he offers it for a thanksgiving:8 [from this] we learn that a thanksgiving can be brought from tithe,9 since we find that a peace-offering can be brought from tithe.10 And how do we know [this of] a peace-offering itself? — Because ‘there’ is written in each case.11

Said Mar Zutra the son of R. Mari to Rabina: But corn tithe is merely hullin?12— Said he to him: Who says13 that which is learnt must be holy, and that which teaches must be holy?14 Can that which is learnt by a gezerah shawah teach by a gezerah shawah?—

Said Rami b. Hama, It was taught: Of fine flour soaked [murbeketh]:15 this teaches that the rebukah [soaked cake]16 must be of fine flour [soleth].17 How do we know [the same of] halloth?18 Because halloth is stated in both places.19 How do we know it of rekikin [thin wafers]? Because Mazzoth [ unleavened bread] is written in connection with each.20

Said Rabina to him: How do you know that he learns [the gezerah shawah of] Mazzoth, Mazzoth, from halloth; perhaps he learns it from oven-baked [cakes]?21 Rather said Raba: It was taught: And its inwards, and its dung, [even the whole bullock] shall he carry forth [without the camp]:22 this teaches that he carries it forth whole.23 You might think that he burns it whole; [but] ‘its head and its legs’ is stated here, and ‘its head and its legs’ is stated elsewhere:24 as there it means after cutting up,25 so here too it means after cutting up. If so, as there it is after the flaying [of the skin],26 so here too it means after the flaying? Therefore it says, ‘and its inwards and its dung’. How does this teach [the reverse]?—

Said R. Papa: Just as its dung is within it,27 so must its flesh be within its skin. And it was
[further] taught, Rabbi said: Skin and flesh and dung are mentioned here,

(1) V. supra 41a.
(2) Analogy. This differs from a Hekkesh, in that in a Hekkesh Scripture intimates that there is a certain similarity between two subjects, whereas in a Binyan ab (q.v. Glos.) the analogy is drawn from an inherent similarity between two subjects.
(3) For these are analogous, since both are brought on account of sin.
(4) For there it is explicitly stated, and the intermediate Hekkesh is not required at all.
(5) Let Scripture intimate that the north is required for two of these, and the third could then be deduced from it.
(6) Whereas a sin-offering is a female.
(7) Burnt-offerings and sin-offerings might be brought on behalf of the whole community, as public sacrifices, just as by an individual. But a guilt-offering could only be brought by an individual. — This whole passage is a digression.
(8) Lev. VII, 11f.
(9) A man can vow a thanksgiving and stipulate that he will purchase it with the redemption money of second tithe (v. p. 246, n. 3).
(10) And the thanksgiving is included therein by a Hekkesh.
(11) In connection with both a peace-offering and second tithe. Peace-offering: And thou shalt sacrifice peace-offerings, and shalt eat there (Deut. XXVII, 7); Tithe: And thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God, in the place which He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there, the tithe of thy corn —, etc. Deut. XIV, 23. Thus the peace-offering is learnt by a gezerah shawah, and that is transferred to the thanksgiving by a Hekkesh.
(12) V. Gloss. Whereas the question is about cattle tithe, which is holy.
(13) The translation here is a paraphrase, and conveys the general sense.
(14) I.e., it is unnecessary for both to be holy, but only one. We wish to learn about a peace-offering, and that indeed is holy.
(15) Lev. VII, 12.
(16) I.e., a cake made of flour that is first boiled. This is the Talmudic interpretation of murbeketh.
(17) As opposed to Kemah, a coarse meal.
(18) These are ordinary unleavened cakes.
(19) Rebukah: and halloth (E.V. cakes) mingled with oil, of fine flour soaked; halloth (one of the three kinds of unleavened bread brought with a thanksgiving): then he shall offer unleavened (Mazzoth) cakes (halloth) mingled with oil (Ibid.). The word halloth in both places shows that both must be of fine meal.
(20) For halloth v. preceding note; rekikin: and unleavened wafers (Rekike — construct form of rekikin-Mazzoth). Thus we first learn by a gezerah shawah that halloth must be of fine flour, and then by a further gezerah shawah we learn from halloth that rekikin too must be of fine flour.
(21) Lev. II, 4: And when thou bringest a meal-offering baked in an oven, it shall be unleavened cakes (halloth Mazzoth) of fine flour. Thus it can be learnt direct, without any intermediate gezerah shawah.
(22) Ibid. IV, 11f.
(23) For if it were cut up, how could he carry them out at once, which the text implies?
(25) Since ‘the pieces’ are mentioned.
(26) This being explicitly ordered (I, 6).
(27) For it would be repulsive to take it out and burn it separately.

and skin and flesh and dung are mentioned elsewhere: as there [it was burnt after] being cut up, but without flaying, so here too [it is burnt after being] cut up, but without flaying. 2 Can that which is learnt by a gezerah shawah teach in turn by a kal wa-homer? — [It can, and we learn this by a] kal wa-homer: If [that which is learnt by] a Hekkesh, which cannot teach by a Hekkesh, as follows from either Raba's or Rabina's [proof], can teach by a kal wa-homer, which follows from what the school of R. Ishmael taught; then [what is learnt through] a gezerah shawah, which can [in turn] teach by a Hekkesh, as follows from R. Papa, can surely teach [in turn] by a kal wa-homer! That is well according to him who accepts R. Papa's teaching; but what can be said on the view that rejects R. Papa's teaching? —

Rather [this is the] kal wa-homer: if [what is learnt by] a Hekkesh, which cannot [in turn] teach by a Hekkesh, as follows either from Raba or from Rabina, can teach [in turn] by a kal wa-homer, which follows from what the school of R. Ishmael taught; then a gezerah shawah, which does teach by a gezerah shawah like itself, which follows from Rami b. Hama, can surely teach through a kal wa-
homer. Can that which is learnt by a gezerah shawah subsequently teach by a Binyan ab? — The question stands.

Can that which is learnt by a kal wa-homer teach in turn by a Hekkesh? — [Yes, and we learn this by a] kal wa-homer: if a gezerah shawah, which cannot be learnt from a Hekkesh, as follows from R. Johanan's [dictum], can nevertheless teach by a Hekkesh, in accordance with R. Papa; then a kal wa-homer, which can be learnt from a Hekkesh, in accordance with the school of R. Ishmael, can surely teach by a Hekkesh! That is well on the view that accepts R. Papa's [dictum], but what can be said on the view that rejects R. Papa's [dictum]? Then the question stands.

Can that which is learnt by a kal wa-homer teach in turn by a gezerah shawah? — [Yes, for this follows by a] kal wa-homer: if a gezerah shawah, which cannot be learnt from a Hekkesh, in accordance with R. Johanan, can teach by a gezerah shawah, in accordance with Rami b. Hama; then is it not logical that a kal wa-homer, which can be learnt by a Hekkesh, in accordance with the school of R. Ishmael, can teach by a gezerah shawah?

Can that which is learnt by a kal wa-homer teach in turn by a kal wa-homer? [Yes, for this follows from a] kal wa-homer: if a gezerah shawah, which cannot be learnt by a Hekkesh, in accordance with R. Johanan, can teach by a kal wa-homer, as we have [just] said; then a kal wa-homer which can be learnt from a Hekkesh, in accordance with the school of R. Ishmael, is it not logical that it can teach by a kal wa-homer? And this is a kal wa-homer derived from a kal wa-homer.3 Surely this is a secondary derivation from a kal wa-homer? — Rather, [argue thus: Yes, and this follows from a] kal wa-homer: if a Hekkesh which cannot be learnt through a Hekkesh, in accordance with either Raba or Rabina, can teach by a kal wa-homer, in accordance with the school of R. Ishmael;5 then a kal wa-homer, which is learnt through a Hekkesh, in accordance with the school of R. Ishmael, can surely teach through a kal wa-homer! And this is a kal wa-homer derived from a kal wa-homer.

Can that which is learnt by a kal wa-homer teach in turn through a Binyan ab? — Said R. Jeremiah, Come and hear: If one wrung the neck [of a bird sacrifice] and it was found to be a Terefah, R. Meir said: It does not defile in the gullet; R. Judah said: It does defile in the gullet.6 Said R. Meir: It is a kal wa-homer: if the shechitah of an animal cleanses it, even when Terefah, from its uncleanness,7 yet when it is nebelah it defiles through contact or carriage; is it not logical that shechitah cleanses a bird, when Terefah, from its uncleanness, seeing that when it is nebelah it does not defile through touch or carriage? Now, as we have found that shechitah which makes it [a bird of hullin] fit for eating,

(1) In reference to the anointed priest's bullock. By 'here' he means in connection with the bullock and the he-goat of the Day of Atonement.
(2) Thus the result of one gezerah shawah is transferred by another gezerah shawah.
(3) Lit., 'a kal wa-homer the son of a kal wa-homer'. Thus a kal wa-homer is based on the fact that a gezerah shawah teaches through a kal wa-homer, and that itself is learnt only through a kal wa-homer.
(4) Lit., ‘the grandson of a kal wa-homer’. Thus: A, which is learnt through a kal wa-homer, teaches B by means of a kal wa-homer; that it does so is learnt from the fact C. Now, even if C were directly stated, B would still be the derivative (lit., ‘son’) of the first kal wa-homer. Since however C itself is known only through a kal wa-homer, B becomes the secondary derivative (lit., ‘grandson’). That is so in the present case. Possibly, however, this is straining the powers of a kal wa-homer too far, and is inadmissible, in which case the problem remains unanswered.
(5) This itself is not the result of a kal wa-homer, but a tradition.
(6) A bird sin-offering was not slaughtered by the usual ritual method (shechitah), but had its neck wrung. If an ordinary bird of hullin, or any animal, is killed by any method other than
shechitah, it becomes nebelah (carrion). The term Terefah is applied to a bird or an animal which was ritually slaughtered, but which was found to be suffering from a disease or other physical defect which renders it forbidden as food. Now when a clean animal, i.e., one permitted for food, becomes nebelah, it defiles any person who touches it or even carries it without actually touching it. A clean bird which becomes nebelah does not defile thus, but only the person who eats it, i.e., when it enters his gullet. In the present instance the bird's neck was wrung; had it been hullin, it would have become nebelah, and defiled accordingly. When it is found to be Terefah the sacrifice cannot be proceeded with, as the bird is unfit. R. Judah holds that it is the same, therefore, as hullin, and defiles as such. R. Meir, however, holds that since it was intended for a sacrifice when its neck was wrung, this was its correct method of slaughter, and so it does not defile.

(7) As is shown in Hul. 128b — Through the shechitah it is freed from the uncleanness of nebelah.

Zevachim 51a

cleanses it, when Terefah, from its uncleanness; so wringing [the neck], which makes it [a bird sacrifice] fit for eating, cleanses it, when Terefah, from its uncleanness.1

R. Jose said: It is sufficient that it be like the nebelah of a clean [i.e., edible] animal, which is cleansed by shechitah, but not by wringing its neck.2 Yet that is not so: even granted there that it is so, yet it is deduced from the shechitah of hullin.3 Can that which is learnt by a Binyan ab teach by a Hekkesh or by a gezerah shawah or by a kal wa-homer or by a Binyan ab? — Solve one [of the questions] from the following: Why did they say that if the blood is kept overnight [on the altar] it is fit?4 Because if the emurim are kept overnight they are fit.5 Why are the emurim fit if kept overnight? Because the flesh is fit if kept overnight.6 [Flesh that] goes out?7 Because [flesh that] goes out is fit at the high place [bamah].8 Unclean [flesh]? Because it was permitted in public service.9 [The emurim of a burnt-offering intended to be burnt] after time? Because it propitiates in respect of its Piggul status.10 [The emurim of a burnt-offering intended to be burnt] out of bounds? Because it was likened to [the intention to burn it] after time. Where unfit [persons] received [the blood] and sprinkled it — in the case of those unfit persons who are eligible for public service.11 Can you then argue from what is its proper way to that where the same is not the proper way?12 — The Tanna relies on the extension indicated by This is the law of the burnt-offering.13

THE RESIDUE OF THE BLOOD, etc. What is the reason? — Scripture saith, [And all the remaining blood of the bullock shall he pour out] at the base of the altar of burnt-offering [which is at the door of the tent of meeting];14 [this intimates]: the one which you first meet.15

Our Rabbis taught: ‘At the base of the altar of burnt-offering’, but not at the base of the inner altar; ‘at the base of the altar of burnt-offering’: the inner altar itself has no base; ‘at the base of the altar of burnt-offering’: apply [the laws of] the base to the altar of burnt-offering.16 Yet perhaps that is not so; rather [it intimates]: let there be a base to the altar of burnt-offering?17

Said R. Ishmael [This would follow] a fortiori: if the residue [of the blood of the sin-offering], which does not make atonement, requires the base; then surely the sprinkling itself of the [blood of the] burnt-offering,18 which makes atonement, requires the base!19 Said R. Akiba [too: This would follow] a fortiori: if the residue, which does not make atonement and does not come for atonement, requires the base; is it not logical that the sprinkling itself of the [blood of the] burnt-offering, which makes atonement and comes for atonement, requires the base? If so, why does Scripture state, ‘at the base of the altar of burnt-offering’? To teach: apply [the laws of] the base to the altar of burnt-offering. The Master said: ‘At the base of the altar of burnt-offering, but not at the base of the
inner altar.’ Surely that is required for its own purpose? (1) — That is learnt from, which is at the door of the tent of meeting. (2) ‘At the base of the altar of burnt-offering:

(1) This argument is a Binyan ab. Thus what was learnt by a kal wa-homer then teaches through a Binyan ab.
(2) Since the argument is alternately based on an animal, the bird sacrifice cannot be clean where the animal would not be.
(3) The Talmud rejects R. Jeremiah’s proof. Firstly, because R. Meir does not really learn it by a Binyan ab, as might appear here, but from Hekkesh, as stated infra 69b q.v. Yet even granted that he does learn it by a Binyan ab, the premise (i.e., the teacher) is hullin, and if R. Papa’s view is rejected even when what is to be learnt is sacred, nothing can be proved from the present instance (Rashi. Other commentaries explain differently).
(4) I.e., if it was taken up on the altar it is not taken down.
(5) Likewise in the same sense. Similarly the other cases mentioned.
(6) As two days were allowed for the eating of peace-offerings. Thus emurim are learnt by a Binyan ab from the flesh, and these in turn teach by a Binyan ab in respect of the blood.
(7) Why does such flesh not descend if this is taken up on the altar?
(8) Where sacrifices were offered before the building of the Temple (v. p. 82, n. 1.).
(9) V. p. 84, n. 7.
(10) The sprinkling of the blood is effective (technically ‘propitiates’) in making it Piggul and involving kareth, just as though all its mattirin had been offered (v. supra 28b, p. 143, n. 1.). The emurim of Piggul do not descend, once they ascended.
(11) E.g., an unclean priest, who is fit when the sacrifice is brought in uncleanness. — Only then does the blood not descend, once it ascended. This is apparently the meaning of the text, but in that case the question is left unanswered. Possibly, however, the second half is the answer; thus: Why does the blood not descend when unfit persons received or sprinkled it? Because it does not descend in the case of those unfit persons who are eligible for public service, i.e., unclean priests when the community is unclean.
(12) E.g., you argue that the emurim if kept overnight do not descend because the flesh if kept overnight is fit. But the flesh may be kept overnight, whereas the emurim may not. Similarly, when the Temple stood the flesh might not be taken out; whereas there were no boundaries at all in the case of the hamah.
he should certainly be permitted, since this is more sacred. Though it has been deduced that the inner altar had no special base at all, that is only on the assumption that all three are superfluous; but if the first is required for the purpose of stating the law, then the second is required for the present limitation, and the third as in the text, leaving nothing to show that the inner altar was not provided with a base.

(21) Which shows that the outer altar is meant; hence ‘of burnt-offering’ is superfluous.

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apply [the laws of] the base to the altar of burnt-offering.’ For if you think that it is meant literally as written, why do I need a text in respect of the residue, seeing that [the pouring out of] the residue was performed without?1 And should you say [that but for the text, I would argue] that it is indeed reversed:

(1) On the outer altar as is expressly prescribed in connection with the two inner sacrifices ‘at the entrance of the tent of meeting’, verses 7 and 8. Obviously then the residue of the blood too would be poured out at the base of the same.

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Zevachim 52a

[the residue of] the inner [offerings] on the outer [altar], and [that of] the outer [offerings] on the inner [altar];1 surely the inner altar had no base!2 ‘Yet perhaps that is not so; rather [it intimates]: let there be a base to the altar of burnt-offering! But is it written, ‘at the base of the burnt-offering’? surely it is written, ‘at the base of the altar of burnt-offering!’3 — If ‘at the base of the burnt-offering’ were written, I would say [that it means] on the vertical [wall] of the base;4 now that it is written, at the base of the altar of burnt-offering, it denotes on the roof [top] of the base.5

[Thereupon] R. Ishmael said: For the roof of the base, why do I need a text? [this would follow] a fortiori: if the residue [of the blood of the sin-offering], which does not make atonement, requires the roof; then the sprinkling itself of [the blood of] the burnt-offering, which makes atonement, is it not logical that it requires the roof [of the base]?

Said R. Akiba: If the residue [of the blood of the sin-offering], which does not make atonement and does not come for atonement, requires the roof of the base, is it not logical that the sprinkling itself of [the blood of] the burnt-offering, which makes atonement and comes for atonement, requires the roof of the altar? If so, why does Scripture state, ‘at the base of the altar of burnt-offering’? To teach: apply [the laws of] the base to the altar of burnt-offering. Wherein do they differ?6 —

Said R. Adda b. Ahabah: They disagree as to whether [the pouring out of] the residue is indispensable. One master holds: It is indispensable, while the other master holds: It is not indispensable.7 R. Papa said: All agree that the residue is not indispensable, but here they disagree as to whether the draining out of [the blood of] the bird sin-offering is indispensable or not:8 one master holds that it is indispensable, while the other master holds that it is not indispensable. It was taught in accordance with R. Papa: And all the remaining blood of the bullock shall he pour out at the base of the altar:9 Why is ‘the bullock’ stated?10 It teaches that the Day of Atonement bullock must have its blood poured out at the base:11 that is the view of R. Akiba.12

Said R. Ishmael: [This is inferred] a fortiori: if that whose blood does not enter within as a statutory obligation13 needs the base, that whose blood enters within as a statutory obligation,14 is it not logical that it needs the base? Said R. Akiba: If that whose blood does not enter the innermost sanctuary15 either as a statutory obligation or as a regulation needs the base, that whose blood enters the innermost sanctuary as a statutory obligation, is it not logical that it needs the base? You might think that it is indispensable for it:16 therefore it states, And he shall make
an end of atoning, which teaches, All the atoning services are [now] complete: these are the words of R. Ishmael. Now an a fortiori argument can be made in respect of the anointed priest’s bullock: If that whose blood does not enter within either as a statutory obligation or, as a regulation, needs the base; that whose blood enters within both as a statutory obligation and as a regulation, is it not logical that it needs the base?

You might think that it is indispensable for it; therefore Scripture says, ‘And all the remaining blood of the bullock shall he pour out’: the Writ transmutes it into the remainder of a precept to teach you that [the pouring out of the blood] of the bird sin-offering is indispensable? Surely the school of R. Ishmael taught: ‘And the rest of the blood shall be drained out’: that which is left must be drained out.

(1) I.e., the residue of the blood of the inner sin-offerings is to be poured out at the base of the outer altar, and vice versa.
(2) Hence it must be interpreted as stated.
(3) If it intimated that the sprinkling itself must be performed on that part of the altar which has a base (v. p. 259, n. 4). It could not refer to sin-offerings, whose blood was sprinkled on all the horns of the altar, including the south-east. Hence it would have to refer to the burnt-offering alone; but in that case Scripture should write, at the base of the burnt-offering, which would intimate that the blood of the burnt-offering must be sprinkled over against the base. The word ‘altar’ then becomes redundant.
(4) The base was a cubit high, the altar then being recessed one cubit; thus the base had a vertical wall of a cubit, and a top surface (roof) of a cubit.
(5) Which is hard by the altar itself.
(6) R. Ishmael and R. Akiba.
(7) R. Akiba holds the latter view; hence he emphasizes that it does not come for atonement.
(8) V. Lev. V, 9: and the rest of the blood shall be drained out at the base of the altar.
(9) Lev. IV, 7. The text refers to the anointed priest’s sin-offering.
(10) It is apparently superfluous, since the whole passage deals with it.
(11) ‘The bullock’, being superfluous, extends this law to another bullock.
(13) Sc. the anointed priest’s bullock of sin-offering. Its blood is sprinkled on the inner altar, where it is sacrificed, but there is no statutory obligation for the offering at all, as he need not have sinned.
(14) The Day of Atonement bullock is a statutory offering, whether the High Priest had sinned or not.
(15) The Holy of Holies.
(16) Sc. the pouring out of the blood of the Day of Atonement bullock at the base.
(18) I.e., all the services indispensable to atonement have by now been enumerated, and the pouring out of the blood at the base is not one of them.
(19) E.g., the blood of the ruler’s he-goat or of a common layman’s sin-offering: both were slaughtered at the outer altar, and their blood was poured out there.
(20) Viz., the blood of the anointed priest’s bullock. Rashi proposes the deletion of ‘a statutory obligation’, since it has just been stated that it is not one. If it is retained, we must explain that it is called a statutory obligation only by comparison with the blood of other sin-offerings, which does not enter within at all.
(21) Since it can be inferred thus, the explicit Scriptural law to that effect is apparently superfluous and so might be interpreted as teaching that it is indispensable. Therefore he proceeds to show that it is not indispensable.
(22) Scripture changed the form of expression here: for the other services (sc. the carrying and sprinkling) are ordered thus: and he shall take... and he shall sprinkle, etc. The different grammatical form in this case shows that this pouring out is, as it were, not an integral part of the rite, but the remaining portion of it, which should be done, yet is not indispensable.
(23) And since this is given as R. Ishmael’s view, it supports R. Papa’s thesis supra.

but what is not left is not drained out? —

There is a controversy of two Tannaim as to R. Ishmael’s opinion. Rami b. Hama said: The following Tanna holds that [the pouring out of] the residue is indispensable. For it was taught: [This is the law of the sin-offering... the priest that offereth it for sin [shall eat it]:2 [this teaches,] only that [sin-offering] whose
blood was sprinkled above [the red line], but not that whose blood was applied below. Say: whence did you come? From the implication of what is said, And the blood of thy sacrifices shall be poured out and thou shalt eat the flesh, we learn that if the blood of those sacrifices which need four applications was presented with one application only, it has made atonement; you might therefore think that also if the blood which should be sprinkled above was sprinkled below, it makes atonement. And it is indeed logical: Blood is prescribed above, and blood is prescribed below: as the blood which is prescribed below does not atone if it is sprinkled above, so also the blood which is prescribed above does not atone if it is sprinkled below. No: if you say thus in the case of the blood which should be sprinkled below, that is because it will not eventually be applied above; will you say the same of the blood which should be sprinkled above, seeing that it will eventually find its way below? Let the inner blood prove it, which will eventually come without, and yet if he applied it in the first place without, he did not make atonement. No: if you speak of the inner blood, that is because the inner altar does not complete it. Will you say thus of the upper blood, where the horns complete it? Since the horns complete it, if he sprinkled it below, it is fit. Therefore it says, ‘[The priest that offereth it]’ [for a sin-offering]’: that whose blood was sprinkled above, but not that whose blood was sprinkled below. Now, what is the meaning of ‘because the inner altar does not complete it’? Surely it must refer to the residue [of the blood]!

Said Raba to him: If so, you could infer it a minori: if the blood of the inner sacrifices, of which eventually the residue is obligatory without, yet if presented without in the first place, he does not make atonement; then the blood which is to be sprinkled above, and is not eventually obligatory below, is it not logical that if he applied it at the outset below he does not make atonement? — Rather [the meaning is this]: Not the altar alone completes it, but also the veil.

Our Rabbis taught: ‘And he shall make an end of atoning’: if he atoned, he made an end, while if he did not atone, he did not make an end: this is R. Akiba’s view. Said R. Judah to him: why should we not interpret: If he made an end, he atoned, while if he did not make an end, he did not atone, which thus intimates that if he omitted one of the sprinklings his service is ineffective? Wherein do they differ? —

R. Johanan and R. Joshua b. Levi [disagree]. One maintains: They differ on the mode of interpretation. The other maintains: They differ as to whether the [pouring out of the] residue is indispensable. It may be proved that it was R. Joshua b. Levi who maintained that [the pouring out of] the residue is indispensable. For R. Joshua b. Levi said: On the view that the residue is indispensable he brings another bullock and commences within. But does R. Johanan not hold this view? Surely R. Johanan said: R. Nehemiah taught in accordance with the view that the residue is indispensable? But you must say ‘In accordance with the view’, but not that of these Tannaim. Then here too, ‘on the view’ does not refer to that of these Tannaim.

MISHNAH. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SIN-OFFERINGS (THESE ARE THE PUBLIC SIN-OFFERINGS: THE HE-GOATS OF NEW MOONS AND FESTIVALS) ARE SLAUGHTERED IN THE NORTH, AND THEIR BLOOD IS RECEIVED IN A SERVICE VESSEL IN THE NORTH, AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES FOUR APPLICATIONS ON THE FOUR HORNS. HOW WAS IT DONE?

(1) I.e., all the blood may be used in sprinkling so that nothing is left for draining. Hence draining cannot be essential and indispensable.
(2) Lev. VI, 18, 19. ‘Offereth it for sin,’ Heb. hamehatte, is understood to mean, who correctly
performs all the rites (sprinkling) appertaining to a sin-offering; only then may he eat it. (3) As is necessary for a sin-offering, V. p. 48, n. 1. (4) The flesh may not be eaten. (5) Why would you think that the flesh may be eaten even if the blood was not properly sprinkled, that you need a text to show that it may not? (6) Deut. XII, 27. (7) Because ‘shall be poured out’ implies a single act. (8) Viz., that of an animal sin-offering. (9) That of a bird sin-offering; v. infra 64b. (10) V. infra 66a. (11) Hence when he sprinkles it above he is definitely performing it incorrectly. (12) I.e. the residue. Hence when he sprinkles it below the line, he is only applying it where it would eventually come, and so he may make atonement. — Emended text (Sh. M). (13) I.e., the blood of the inner sacrifices. (14) The residue is poured out at the base of the outer altar. — Emended text. (15) After the blood has been sprinkled on the inner altar there still remains an indispensable service to be performed. (16) No indispensable rite remains to be performed after the blood was sprinkled on the horns of the altar. (17) So we might argue. (18) Viz., that its pouring out at the base of the altar is indispensable. This proves Rami b. Hama’s assertion. (19) I.e., the residue of the blood which is sprinkled on the inner altar. (20) On the present hypothesis, and indispensable. The text is emended on the basis of Rashi. (21) Though the blood will be poured out below, this is not essential for the efficacy of the sacrifice. (22) The sacrifice is invalid, and the flesh may not be eaten. Why then is a Scriptural text necessary? Hence the premise of this argument, that the pouring out of the residue is essential, must be false! (23) The blood must be sprinkled on the veil too. (24) Lit., ‘he has done nothing’. — For notes v. supra 40a. (25) But not in law. Both hold that all the four applications are indispensable, and that the pouring out of the residue is not indispensable. R. Akiba holds that the conclusion (atonement) illuminates the beginning (make an end), whence we learn that the completion depends on atonement, i.e., on the four applications. R. Judah however maintains that ‘atonement’ might merely mean a single application, therefore (to avoid this conclusion) the interpretation must be reversed, and the beginning made to illumine the end: only when he quite makes an end, having completed the four applications, does he atone. (26) R. Akiba holds that it is not indispensable, and he interprets it thus: if he made atonement, i.e., performed all the rites for atonement as prescribed in that passage, he made an end. Thus the pouring out of the residue, which is not mentioned there, is not essential. R. Judah however interprets: Only when he made an end of all the rites, including those prescribed elsewhere (viz., the pouring out of the residue), did he make atonement. (27) If the residue of the blood was spilt after the four applications, another bullock must be slaughtered, and its blood first sprinkled within, and then the residue poured out at the base of the outer altar. But he cannot simply pour all the blood at the base, for then it is not a residue, whereas a residue is indispensable. — Thus R. Joshua b. Levi holds that there is a view that the pouring out of the residue is indispensable. (28) That there is a teacher who maintains that it is indispensable. (29) V. supra 42b. (30) Viz., R. Akiba and R. Judah. (31) In the case of R. Joshua b. Levi. (32) Which need special mention here, for several have already been taught in the preceding Mishnah (supra 47a).
on Rabbi's view:9 One master holds that a cubit in either direction is also against the horn; while the other master holds: Only at the edge, and no further.

An objection is raised: How was the blood of the public and the private sin-offerings applied? He went up the ascent, turned to the surrounding balcony, and passed on to the south-east horn, where he dipped his right finger — i.e., the index finger of his right hand — into the blood in the bowl, and supported it with his thumb on this side and his little finger on the other,10 and applied it with a downward movement against the edge of the horn until all the blood on his finger was gone, and thus [he did] at every horn? — This is what he means: Its regulation is [that it be applied] at the edge; yet if he applies it within a cubit in either direction, we have no objection.11 What was [this allusion to] Rabbi and R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon? — As it was taught: The upper blood is applied above the scarlet line, and the lower blood is applied below the scarlet line: that is Rabbi's view. R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon said: This holds good only of a burnt-offering of a bird; but in the case of an animal sin-offering, its [blood] is applied essentially on the very horn.12

R. Abbahu said: What is Rabbi's reason? Because it is written, And the altar shall be four cubits; and from the altar and upward there shall be four horns.13 Now, was the altar [only] four cubits?14 — Said R. Adda b. Ahaba: [It means,] And the place of the horns was four [cubits].15 Did the horns occupy four cubits?16 — Say rather: The limits of the horns were four [cubits].17

We learnt elsewhere: A scarlet line encompassed it about the middle, to distinguish between the upper and the lower bloods. Whence do we know it? — Said R. Aha b. R. Kattina, Because it said: That the net may reach halfway up the altar:18 thus the Torah prescribed a barrier to distinguish between the upper and the lower bloods.

THE RESIDUE OF THE BLOOD, etc. Our Rabbis taught: At the base of the altar19 means the southern base. You say, the southern base; yet perhaps it is not so, but rather the western base, and the undefined is learnt from the defined?20 You can answer: We infer his coming down the ascent from his exit from the Hekal: as his exit from the Hekal was to the nearest side, so his coming down the ascent was to the nearest side.21

It was taught, R. Ishmael said: In both cases22 the western base [is meant]. R. Simeon b. Yohai said: In both cases the southern base [is meant]. As for him who maintains that both [were poured out] at the western base, it is well: he holds that the undefined is learnt from the defined.23 But what is his reason who holds that the southern base [is meant] in both cases? — Said R. Assi: This Tanna maintains that the whole altar stood in the north.24 Another version: The whole entrance stood to the south.25

(1) Sobeb, a terrace or balcony which ran round the altar. He had to stand on the balcony because he applied the blood with his finger on the horns of the altar. For other sacrifices he stood on the pavement and dashed the blood from the vessel on to the altar.
(2) In the Tabernacle. These hangings corresponded to the walls of the Temple court.
(3) Roast or boiled.
(4) The application on the horn.
(5) He stood e.g. at the south-east corner and applied the blood either in the direction of south or east, but within a cubit from the actual corner; similarly with the other corners.
(6) Lit., performed the rites of the sin-offering; cf. supra 52b p. 263, n. 4. for this expression.
(7) Infra.
(8) The edge is certainly unnecessary, since anywhere within a cubit from the angle is the horn.
(9) Who holds that the blood may be applied above the line even not against the horn, v. infra.
(10) Like a balanced load. The reading adopted is that of Sh. M. Cur. edd. read: ‘with his thumb
above and his little finger below’ — a rather difficult procedure.
(11) As this counts as an extension of the edge.
(12) V. supra 10a.
(13) Ezek. XLIII, 15.
(14) It was much larger.
(15) I.e., the horns occupied four cubits of the altar, since each was a cubit in length and breadth.
(16) Since each was a cubit in length, actually only two cubits of the length or the breadth of the altar were occupied by the horns.
(17) A distance of four cubits below the horns, i.e., as far down as the scarlet line, still ranked as the horns. Therefore Rabbi says that the upper blood, i.e., the blood which is sprinkled on the horn, can be sprinkled anywhere above the scarlet line.
(18) Ex. XXVII, 5.
(19) Lev. IV, 30.
(20) Of the blood of the inner sin-offering it is said, at the base of the altar of burnt-offering, which is at the door of the tent of meeting (ibid., 7). Now, as one entered from the door he came first to the western base: this is therefore regarded as defined, and the question is: Why not learn v. 30, where it is undefined, from v. 7, where it is defined?
(21) When he left the Hekal with the residue of the inner blood, he poured it out at the western base, this being nearest to him. So also when he came down the ascent with the residue of the outer blood, after having applied the blood on the south-west corner he poured it out at the southern base, this being nearest to him.
(22) Sc. the inner and the outer sin-offerings.
(23) As in n. 3.
(24) I.e., to the north of the door of the Hekal, and no part of the altar actually stood in front of the door; then the immediate side would be the southern. It may also mean that it stood in the north of the Temple court, five cubits of it facing the door, and one of these five cubits was the southern base, which one would face as he came out of the door.
(25) Of the altar. This is the same as the preceding.

**Zevachim 53b**

The school of R. Ishmael taught in R. Simeon b. Yohai's ruling: In both cases the western base is meant; and your token is: Men pulled a man.

**Mishnah. The burnt-offering is a sacrifice of higher sanctity. It is slaughtered in the north, and its blood is received in a service vessel in the north; and its blood requires two applications, which are four. It had to be flayed, dismembered, and completely consumed by the fire.**

**Gemara. Why does he teach that the burnt-offering is a sacrifice of higher sanctity?** Because ‘it is most holy’ is not written in its case.

AND ITS BLOOD REQUIRES TWO APPLICATIONS [WHICH ARE FOUR]. How did he do it? — Rab said: He applied [the blood] and applied [it] again. Samuel said: He made a single application in the shape of a Greek Gamma. This is a controversy of Tannaim: [And the priests... shall dash the blood round about the altar]. You might think that he sprinkles it with a single sprinkling; therefore Scripture states, ‘round about’. If ‘round about’, you might think that he must encompass it [with blood] like a thread; therefore Scripture states, ‘And they shall dash’. How then [is it done]? Its blood requires two applications in the shape of a Greek Gamma, which constitute four. R. Ishmael said: ‘Round about’ is said here, and ‘round about’ is said elsewhere: as there it means four separate applications, so here too it means four separate applications. If so, just as there [it means] four applications on the four horns, so here too it means four applications on the four horns? — You can answer: The burnt-offering needs the base, whereas the south-east horn had no base. What was the reason?

Said R. Eleazar: Because it was not in the portion of the ‘ravener’. For R. Samuel son of R. Isaac said: The altar occupied a cubit in Judah’s portion. R. Levi b. Hama said in R. Hama son of R. Hanina's name: A strip issued from Judah's portion and entered Benjamin's portion, whereat the righteous
Benjamin grieved every day, wishing to possess it, as it is said

(1) Not southern, as above.
(2) To remember this.
(3) The school of R. Ishmael, representing many men, pulled the one man, R. Simeon b. Yohai, to the view of their master, R. Ishmael.
(4) The blood is sprinkled on the north-west and the southwest horns. The blood was not applied exactly on the edge, but spread further, so that all the four sides of the altar received some of it.
(5) Which he does not teach of sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, though they too are likewise.
(6) As it is of the others (v. Lev. VI, 18; VII, 1). Nevertheless the Tanna informs us that it is most holy, since it is altogether burnt. For those parts even of sacrifices of lesser sanctity which were burnt on the altar ranked as most holy.
(7) He applied it twice on each horn, one on each side of it.
(8) He dashed the blood against the edge and it spread on either side, forming an angle.
(9) Lev. I, 5.
(10) Which implies, from a distance, whereas to encompass it he would have to apply the blood directly with his finger round the sides of the altar.
(11) In reference to Aaron's sin-offering of consecration, Lev. VIII, 15.
(12) Lit., ‘a separation and four applications’. — The applications had to be separate, since they were made on the four horns.
(13) Its blood must be sprinkled on the horns over against the base.
(14) Sc. Benjamin; cf. Gen. XLIX, 27: Benjamin is a wolf that raveneth.
(15) I.e., the width of one cubit along the eastern and the southern sides of the altar, but not reaching right to the ends thereof. Hence the south-east horn was in Judah's portion and this was not provided with a base.
(16) And on this strip was situated part of the Temple, including a portion of the altar.
(17) To have the honor that the whole Temple and everything in it might be in his portion.

Come and hear: The base ran along the whole of the north and the west sides, and extended one cubit into the south and one cubit into the east? — By ‘extended’ is meant in respect of blood.

Come and hear: The altar was thirty-two [cubits] by thirty-two? — This was the side length.

Come and hear: For Levi taught: How did they build the altar? They brought a frame thirty-two [cubits] square and one cubit deep; and they brought round smooth stones of all sizes; then they brought plaster, molten lead and pitch, melted them down and poured them in; and this was the place of the base. Then they brought a frame thirty cubic square and five cubic deep, and they brought smooth stones etc, [and this was the place of the balcony]. Then they brought a frame twenty-eight cubic square, and three cubic deep; and they brought smooth stones etc, [and this was the place of the balcony]. Then they brought a frame one cubic square, and they brought smooth round stones, of all sizes, and pitch and molten lead, melted them down, and poured them in, and
this formed the horn; and similarly for each horn.20 And should you answer

(1) Deut. XXXIII, 12. E.V.: He (sc. God) covereth him (Benjamin) all day.
(2) Ibid. The significance of this is explained anon.
(3) By pinching through both organs, the windpipe and the gullet. In the case of a sin offering of a bird only one organ was pinched.
(4) And this was done on the south-east born; v. infra 64a.
(5) I.e., the blood would simply fall to the earth. Surely that was not permitted!
(6) Possibly there was a little ledge on that side, more than three hand-breadths from the ground, where it would not count as belonging to Judah, and on this ledge the blood fell and was thus sacred. Nevertheless, this ledge could not count as a base, where blood actually had to be poured out on the base.
(7) The base, which was a separate structure, did not reach under the south-eastern horn.
(8) The base did run along the whole length of the eastern side of the altar, but blood was not poured out nor applied in Judah's portion.
(9) ‘And he dwelleth between his shoulders.’
(10) Hence the base, which was the understructure and foundation of the altar, was omitted from that side which belonged to Judah.
(11) There was a base under the south-east horn, but it was not sanctified for the purpose, since it was not in Benjamin's portion.
(12) The blood could be poured out there, yet there was no actual construction.
(13) This implies that it was of equal length on all sides, whereas according to Rab it was a cubit short on the east and the south.
(14) Only the north and west sides were of this length; the other two sides were each a cubit less.
(15) V. infra 62b. This refers to the ascent, which joined the altar from the south, and thus implies that there was the base on the south.
(16) I.e., the cubit which would have been occupied by the base, had there been one on the south side.
(17) The original implies fresh from the ground.
(18) Lit., ‘both large and small’.
(19) I.e., the top of the altar, where the wood for the fire was placed.
(20) Thus the base consisted of a complete square, which implies the inclusion of the south and the east sides too!

Zevachim 54b

that he [subsequently] cut it away,1 [surely] ‘unhewn [whole] stones’ are prescribed!2 — They placed a plank there, and then removed it.3 For if you will not say thus, when R. Kahana said: The horns were hollow, for it is written, And they shall be filled like the basins, like the horns of the altar,5 here too [you may object that] the Divine Law prescribed ‘whole stones’?6 But [you must answer] that something was [first] placed there7 and then removed; so here too, planks were [first] placed there and then removed.

Raba lectured: What is meant by the verse, [And he asked and said: ‘Where are Samuel and David?’] And one said: ‘Behold, they are at Naioth in Ramah’:8 What connection then has Naioth with Ramah? It means, however, that they sat at Ramah and were engaged with the glory [beauty] of the world.9 Said they, It is written, Then shalt thou arise, and ascend unto the place [which the Lord thy God shall choose]:10 this teaches that the Temple was higher than the whole of Eretz Israel,11 while Eretz Israel is higher than all other countries. They did not know where that place was. Thereupon they brought the Book of Joshua.12 In the case of all [tribal territories] it is written, ‘And the border went down’ ‘and the border went up’ ‘and the border passed along’,13 whereas in reference to the tribe of Benjamin ‘and it went up’ is written, but not ‘and it went down’.14 Said they: This proves that this is its site. They intended building it at the well of Etam, which is raised, but [then] they said: Let us build it slightly lower,15 as it is written, And He dwelleth between his shoulders.16 Alternatively,17 there was a tradition that the Sanhedrin18 should have its locale in Judah's portion, while the Divine Presence19 was to be in Benjamin's portion. If then we build it in the highest spot,20 [said they,] there will be a
considerable distance between them. Better then that we build it slightly lower, as it is written: ‘And He dwelleth between his shoulders’. And for this Doeg the Edomite envied David, as it is written, Because envy on account of Thy house hath eaten me up.

And it is written, Lord, remember unto David all his affliction; how he swore unto the Lord, and vowed unto the Mighty One of Jacob: ‘Surely I will not come into the tent of my house, nor go up into the bed that is spread for me; I will not give sleep to mine eyes, nor slumber to mine eyelids; until I find out a place for the Lord, a dwelling-place for the Mighty One of Jacob. Lo, we heard of it as being in Ephrath; we found it in the field of the forest.’

‘In Ephrath’ means in the Book of Joshua, who [Joshua] was descended from Ephraim. ‘In the field of the forest’ alludes to [the territory of] Benjamin, as it is written, Benjamin is a wolf that raveneth.

MISHNAH. THE PEACE-OFFERINGS OF THE CONGREGATION AND THE GUILT-OFFERINGS (THESE ARE THE GUILT-OFFERINGS: THE GUILT-OFFERING FOR ROBBERY; FOR TRESPASS; FOR A BETROTHED BONDMAID; A NAZIRITE’S GUILT-OFFERING; A LEPER’S GUILT-OFFERING; AND THE GUILT-OFFERING OF SUSPENSE) ARE SLAUGHTERED IN THE NORTH, AND THEIR BLOOD IS RECEIVED IN A SERVICE VESSEL IN THE NORTH, AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES TWO SPRINKLINGS, WHICH CONSTITUTE FOUR. AND THEY ARE EATEN WITHIN THE HANGINGS, BY MALE PRIESTS, PREPARED IN ANY MANNER, A DAY AND A NIGHT, UNTIL MIDNIGHT.

(1) After the base was built, a cubit was cut away on the south side.

(2) Deut. XXVII, 6. Cutting away from the base would inevitably cut into the stones, so that they would not be whole.

(3) In the first mould planks were placed on the south and the east sides, a cubit from the edge, so that when the stones, etc. were poured in, these strips would be left empty; subsequently they were removed.

(4) So emended by Sh. M.

(5) Zech. IX, 15. — That implies that the horns were hollowed out to form a receptacle.

(6) Whereas if the horns were hollowed or perforated after they were made, the stones would have to be cut into.

(7) Thin laths formed the hollow or channels before the stones, etc. were poured into it, and these were not filled in.

(8) I Sam. XIX, 22.

(9) Connecting Naioth with Na’eh, beautiful, glorious. The reference is to the Temple-they sought to determine its exact site.

(10) Deut. XVII, 8.

(11) Since one had to ‘ascend’ to it from wherever he might be.

(12) To study the topography of Eretz Israel.

(13) Cf. Josh. XV-XVIII.

(14) The border of other tribes ran in a southerly direction from the well of Etam, and the north as far as the well of Etam constituted Benjamin’s boundary. Now, the boundaries of other tribes as they proceeded south from the well of Etam are described as going down, whereas the boundary of Benjamin as it proceeded to the well of Etam is described as going up. Hence the well of Etam must have been the highest spot of all. Rashi identifies the well of Etam with ‘the waters of Nephtoah’ (ibid. XVIII, 15.) V. also J.E. art. ‘Etam’.

(15) Sc. in Jerusalem.

(16) Deut. XXXIII, 12. ‘Shoulders’ but not ‘head’ implies that it should not be at the very highest point.

(17) An alternative reason why they did not build it at the well of Etam.

(18) The Supreme Court of seventy-one; v. Sanh. 2a. Its seat was in a special chamber (‘Chamber of Hewn Stone’) in the Temple court.

(19) The Temple.

(20) Lit., ‘if we raise it’.

(21) I.e., because David had thus decided the site of the Temple.

(22) Ps. LXIX, 10. E.V., ‘zeal for Thy house, etc.’

(23) Ps. CXXXII, 2-6.

(24) Emended text (Aruk).

(25) Gen. XLIX, 27. Being a ‘wolf’, he would naturally be found in the forest.

(26) The lambs offered on Pentecost, Lev. XXIII, 19.


(28) V. p. 176, n. 10.; ibid 15f.

(29) V. ibid. XIX, 20 seq.

(30) A Nazirite who became defiled through a corpse, v. Num. VI, 9 seq.

(31) At his purification, v. Lev. XIV, 12.
GEMARA. How do we know that it requires the north? — As Raba son of R. Hanan recited before Raba: And ye shall offer one he-goat for a sin-offering, [and two he-lambs of the first year for a sacrifice of peace-offerings] as a sin-offering requires the north, so [must] the peace-offerings of the congregation be slaughtered in the north. Said Raba to him: Now, whence do we learn this about a sin-offering? From a burnt-offering. Can then what is learnt through a Hekkesh teach in turn through a hekkesh?

— Rather, [said Raba], It follows from what R. Mari the son of R. Kahana recited: [Ye shall blow with the trumpets] as a burnt-offering was a sacrifice of higher sanctity, so were the public peace-offerings sacrifices of higher sanctity; as a burnt-offering [was slaughtered] in the north, so were the public peace-offerings slaughtered in the north. Now, what is the purpose of the first hekkesh? — [To teach that it is] like a sin-offering: as a sin-offering is eaten by male priests only, so are public peace-offerings eaten by male priests only. Said Abaye to him [Raba]: If so, when it is written in connection with a Nazirite's ram: And he shall present his offering unto the Lord, one he-lamb of the first year without blemish for a burnt-offering, and one ewe-lamb of the first year without blemish for a sin-offering, and one ram without blemish for a peace-offering: will you say that here too the Divine Law assimilated it to a sin-offering: as a sin-offering may be eaten by male priests only, so the Nazirite's ram may be eaten by male priests only?

How compare: There, since it is written, And the priest shall take the shoulder of the ram when it is sodden, [.... this is holy, for the priest] it follows that the whole of it is eaten by its owner. But at least the shoulder that is sodden should be eaten by male priests only? — That is a difficulty. Alternatively [you can answer]: It is called ‘holy’, but not ‘most holy’.

MISHNAH. THE THANKS-OFFERING AND THE NAZIRITE'S RAM ARE SACRIFICES OF LESSER SANCTITY. THEY ARE SLAUGHTERED ANYWHERE IN THE TEMPLE COURT, AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES TWO SPRINKLINGS, WHICH CONSTITUTE FOUR; AND THEY ARE EATEN IN ANY PART OF THE CITY, BY ANY PERSON, PREPARED IN ANY MANNER, THE SAME DAY AND THE NIGHT FOLLOWING, UNTIL MIDNIGHT. THE PARTS THEREOF WHICH ARE SEPARATED ARE GOVERNED BY THE SAME LAW, SAVE THAT THESE ARE EATEN ONLY BY THE PRIESTS, THEIR WIVES, THEIR CHILDREN AND THEIR SLAVES.

GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: And the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving shall ye eat in a clean place: Said R. Nehemiah: Did they then eat the earlier sacrifices in uncleanness? Rather, ‘clean’ implies that it is [partially] unclean: thus it means, clean from the defilement of a leper, but unclean with the uncleanness of a Zab, and which place is that? The camp of the Israelites. Yet say [that it means] clean from the defilement of a Zab, yet unclean with the defilement of the dead, and which [place] is that? The Levitical camp? —

Said Abaye, Scripture saith, And ye shall eat it in a holy place: ‘it’ [must be eaten] in a holy place, but another [need] not [be eaten] in a holy place, thus withdrawing it from the Camp of the Divine Presence into the Levitical Camp. Then ‘in a clean place’ is written, which withdraws it
into the camp of the Israelites. Raba said: ‘It [must be eaten] in a holy place but another [need] not [be eaten] in a holy place, withdraws it altogether;\(^{22}\) then the Divine Law wrote ‘in a clean place’, [thereby] bringing it into the Israelites’ camp.\(^{22}\) Yet say that it brought it into the Levitical camp?\(^{23}\) — We bring it back into one [camp], not into two. If so, [you can] also [argue in respect of] withdrawing: we withdraw it from one, but not from two?\(^{24}\) Moreover, it is written, Thou mayest not eat within they gates etc?\(^{25}\) Rather, it clearly must be explained as Abaye.

**Mishnah.** The peace-offering is a sacrifice of lesser sanctity. It may be slain in any part of the temple court, and its blood requires two sprinklings, which constitute four; and it may be eaten in any part of the city, by any person, prepared in any way, during two days and one night. The parts thereof which are separated are similar, save that these are eaten by priests, their wives, their sons, and their slaves.

**Gemara.** Our Rabbis taught: And he shall kill it at the door of the tent of meeting... and he shall kill it before the tent of meeting:\(^{26}\) this teaches that all sides [of the Temple court] are fit in the case of sacrifices of lesser sanctity,\(^{27}\) and the north [side] a fortiori: if sacrifices of higher sanctity, which were not made fit [for slaughtering] on all sides, are fit on the north; is it not logical that sacrifices of lesser sanctity, which are fit on all sides, are fit in the north?\(^{28}\) R. Eliezer said: The Writ comes specifically to declare the north fit.\(^{29}\) For you might say, is not [the reverse] logical: If sacrifices of lesser sanctity, which are fit on all sides, yet their place is not fit for sacrifices of higher sanctity;\(^{30}\) then sacrifices of higher sanctity, which are permitted in the north only, is it not logical that their [particular] place is not permitted for sacrifices of lesser sanctity? Therefore ‘the tent of meeting’ is stated.\(^{31}\)

(1) Emended text (Sh. M.)
(2) Lev. XXIII, 19.
(3) Surely not. V. supra 48a, 49b.
(4) Num. X, 10. It must mean the peace-offerings of the congregation, since private peace-offerings did not require the blowing of trumpets.
(5) Where it is assimilated to a sin-offering.
(6) Num. VI, 14.
(7) Ibid. 19, 20.
(8) The shoulder that is sodden.
(9) Therefore it cannot be like the sin-offering, which is ‘most holy’.
(10) Sc. the Nazirite’s ram to a sin-offering.
(11) At the termination of his vow a Nazirite must bring three sacrifices, viz., a burnt-offering, a sin-offering, and a peace-offering. Yet if he brings only one and shaves, the prohibitions of a Nazirite, such as drinking wine, are lifted, because it is written, And after that the Nazirite may drink wine (v. 20), ‘after that’ meaning, according to the Rabbis, after he brings his peace-offering. Then the sin-offering is assimilated to the peace-offering to show that the same applies to the former too.
(12) I.e., even by a Zar.
(13) In the case of the thanks-offering, the thigh and breast, and four loaves out of the forty by which it is accompanied. In the case of the Nazirite’s ram, likewise the thigh and the breast, the boiled shoulder, one unleavened loaf and one unleavened wafer.
(15) Those enumerated earlier in this passage, which treats of Aaron's consecration.
(16) Since Scripture writes ‘in a clean place instead of in a holy place,’ as in the preceding verse.
(17) Three ‘camps’ of lessening degrees of sanctity were recognized in the wilderness: (i) The camp of the Divine Presence, — the Tabernacle; (ii) the camp of the Levites — literally the Levitical camp which immediately surrounded the Tabernacle; and (iii) the camp of the Israelites, likewise literally, each tribe within the camp of his standard, v. Num. II. To these three corresponded the Temple, the Temple Mount, and the city of Jerusalem respectively. A leper was expelled from all three, a Zab was not permitted in the first two, and permitted in the third. Hence this text teaches that it might be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem.
(18) Where a corpse might be taken. So that the flesh of this sacrifice may be eaten in the Temple Mount only, but not anywhere in Jerusalem.
(20) Emended text (Sh. M.).
(21) This would imply that it need not even be eaten in the third camp, hence even outside Jerusalem.
(22) Hence it must be eaten within the walls of Jerusalem.
(23) Teaching that it must be eaten in the Temple Mount.
(24) When Scripture implies that it is not bound to be eaten in a particular place, say that one camp (that of the Divine Presence) is excluded, but not two.
(25) Deut. XII, 17. ‘Within thy gates’ means in the cities outside Jerusalem.
(26) Lev. III, 2, 8, 13. The three texts refer to the different animals brought as peace-offerings.
(27) As ‘before’ implies on any side.
(28) Thus in the view of this Tanna no text is necessary to show that it can be slain in the north.
(29) Otherwise we would not know it.
(30) The latter cannot be slaughtered in any part of the Temple.
(31) Implied any part of same.

Zevachim 55b

Wherein do they differ? — The first Tanna holds, Three texts are written: a one is for its own purpose, to intimate that the door of the tent of meeting is required; b the second is to permit the sides; c and the third is to invalidate the sides of the sides; d while no text is necessary for the north. Whereas R. Eliezer holds: One is for its own purpose, to intimate that the door of the tent of meeting is required; the second is to permit the north; and the third is to permit the sides; but no text is required in respect of the sides of the sides. Why is ‘the door of the tent of meeting’ written in one case, whereas ‘before the tent of meeting’ is written in the others? —

We are thereby informed of Rab Judah’s teaching in Samuel’s name. For Rab Judah said in Samuel’s name: If a peace-offering is slaughtered before the doors of the Hekal are opened, it is invalid, because it is said, ‘And he shall kill it at the entrance [opening] of the tent of meeting’: when it is open, and not when it is shut.

In the West [Palestine] they recited it thus: R. Aha b. Jacob said in R. Ashi’s name: If a peace-offering is slaughtered before the doors of the Hekal are opened, it is invalid; in the Tabernacle, if it is slaughtered] before the Levites set up the Tabernacle or after the Levites take down the Tabernacle, it is invalid. It is obvious that if it is shut, it is as though it were locked. What if a curtain [shuts it off]? — Said R. Zera: That itself is made only for an open door. What of an elevation?

Come and hear: For it was taught, R. Jose b. R. Judah said: There were two wickets in the knives’ recess and their elevation was eight cubits, in order that the whole of the Temple court might be made fit for the consumption of sacrifices of higher sanctity and the slaughtering of sacrifices of lower sanctity. Does this not mean that [an elevation] eight cubits high stood before them [these wickets]? — No: it means that they [themselves] were eight cubits high. An objection is raised: All the gates there were twenty cubits high and ten cubits wide? — The wickets were different. But there were the sides? — They were built at the corners. What about the space behind the place of the Mercy Seat [Kapporeth]?

Come and hear, for Rami son of Rab Judah said in Rab’s name: There was a small passage way behind the place of the Mercy Seat, in order to make the whole Temple court fit for the consumption of most holy sacrifices and the slaughtering of minor sacrifices, and there were two such, and thus it is written, And two le-par bar. What does le-par bar mean? — Said Rabbah son of R. Shila: As one says, facing
without [ke-lappe le-bar]. Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: Liability for uncleanness is incurred

(1) The 'tent of meeting' is repeated three times.
(2) I.e., as stated infra, the animal may be slain only when this door is open.
(3) One is not limited to the space directly in front of the door.
(4) I.e., chambers opening into the Temple court. These, even if sanctified, are unfit.
(5) When there was no door, but only an opening.
(6) The sacrifice then is certainly invalid.
(7) The curtain is hung there only because the door of the Hekal is open and it is indecorous for the priests to look into the Hekal while they are engaged on the sacrifice. Hence it counts as open, and the sacrifice is valid (Sh. Mek.).
(8) I.e., a raised construction, e.g., a beam or a board which shuts off the door while it is actually open.
(9) The Ulam (v. Glos.) overlapped the Hekal by 11 cubits on each side. Now, the sacrifices had to be slain in front of the Hekal, corresponding to 'before the tent of meeting', and this would apparently not include the area directly in front of the overlap, in which there was a special recess for the knives. By means of wickets set in the Ulam on either side the whole of the area facing the Ulam, including the overlap, was thus made fit.
(10) Which proves that such leaves it technically open.
(11) The entrances to the wickets.
(12) Consequently the reference must be to the construction before the wickets.
(13) Since their purpose was only symbolic.
(14) Of the Ulam, on the north and the south beyond the wickets. The area in front of these would not be made fit by the wickets.
(15) Diagonally, so that the space opposite them, viz., up to the north and the south walls of the Temple court, would still be technically 'before the door'.
(16) A space of eleven cubits between it and the western wall of the court (v. Mid. V, I); was that fit too?
(17) Emended text.
(18) E.V. 'at the precinct'. I. Chron. XXVI, 18. The M.T. reads this as one word: parbar.
(19) I.e., for entering the precincts of the Temple court in an unclean state.

only in respect of [an area] a hundred and eighty-seven cubits in length by a hundred and thirty-five in breadth.

A Tanna recited before R. Nahman: The whole Temple court was a hundred and eighty-seven cubits in length by a hundred and thirty-five in breadth. Said he to him, Thus did my father say: Within such an area the priests entered, consumed the most holy and slaughtered the minor sacrifices there, and were liable for uncleanness. What does this exclude? Shall we say that it excludes the windows, doors and the thickness of the wall? Surely we learnt: The windows and the thickness of the wall are as within? — Rather, it is to exclude the chambers. But if they are built on non-sacred ground and open into sacred ground, surely we learnt: Their inside is holy? — That is by Rabbinical law [only] — And not by Scriptural law? Surely it was taught: How do we know that the priests may enter the chambers which are built on non-sacred ground and open into sacred ground, eat there the most holy sacrifices and the residue of the meal-offering? Because it says, In the court of the tent of meeting they shall eat it: a Scripture permitted many courts for eating!

Said Raba: Eating is different. But are they not [holy] in respect of uncleanness? Surely it was taught: The chambers built on non-sacred ground: priests may enter therein and eat there the most holy sacrifices; you may not slaughter minor sacrifices there, and they involve culpability on account of uncleanness? — Did you not say, you may not slaughter? Then learn too, and they do not involve culpability. [No:] as for [saying] you may not slaughter, it is well, [the reason being that] it [slaughtering] must be opposite the door, which it is not [in these chambers]. But why [should you learn] ‘and they do not involve culpability’? — Yet on your view, [consider: when you say,] you may not
slaughter, are we not discussing a case where the shechitah is opposite the entrance, for if it is not, why is it necessary [to teach it]? Hence [you must admit that] although he would slaughter opposite the entrance, yet he teaches, ‘You may not slaughter’, because they are not sanctified. Then learn also, They do not involve culpability. Now, do we not require the consumption to be facing the entrance? Surely R. Jose son of R. Hanina taught: There were two wickets in the knives’ recess, and their elevation was eight cubits, in order to make the Temple court fit for the eating of most sacred sacrifices and the slaughtering of minor sacrifices? —

Said Rabina: Delete ‘eating’ from this passage. But it is written, Boil the flesh at the door of the tent of meeting, and there eat it? Temporary sacrifices are different.

R. Isaac b. Abudimi said: How do we know that the blood is invalidated by sunset? Because it says, It shall be eaten on the day that he offereth his slaughtering: on the day that you slaughter, you can offer; on the day that you do not slaughter, you cannot offer. But this text is needed for its own purpose? — If so, let Scripture say, ‘It shall be eaten on the day of its slaughtering’: what is the purpose of ‘that he offereth’? Infer from it: on the day that you slaughter, you can offer; on the day that you do not slaughter, you cannot offer. Yet perhaps this is what the Divine Law means: If he [the priest] presents the blood on the same day, you may eat the flesh on the same day and on the next; while if he presents the blood on the morrow, you may eat the flesh on the morrow and on the day after? —

If so, let Scripture write, ‘It shall be eaten on the day that he offereth’; what is the purpose of ‘his slaughtering’? Infer from it: On the day that you slaughter, you can offer: on the day that you do not slaughter, you cannot offer. It was stated: If one intends [eating the flesh] on the evening of the third day, Hezekiah said: It [the sacrifice] is fit; R. Johanan said: It is unfit. Hezekiah said: It is fit, seeing that it was not yet relegated to the fire. If one eats [the flesh] on the evening of the third day, Hezekiah maintained: He is exempt, seeing that it was rejected from eating. If one eats [the flesh] on the evening of the third day, R. Johanan maintained, He is culpable, seeing that it was rejected from eating. It was taught in accordance with R. Johanan: With regard to sacrifices which are eaten on the same day [only], an intention is effective in respect of their blood from sunset, and in respect of their flesh and their emurim, from dawn. But as to sacrifices which are eaten two days and one night, an intention is effective in respect of their blood from sunset; in respect of their emurim, from dawn; and in respect of their flesh, from sunset on the second day.

(1) Sacred; hence these cannot be excluded.
(2) Flanking the Temple court.
(3) What is left after the fistful is separated and burnt on the altar.
(4) Lev. VI, 9.
(5) These correspond to the chambers under discussion. Since the most holy sacrifices may be eaten there, they must be sacred by Biblical law too.
(6) Eating is permitted because Scripture intimated it so.
(7) As these are the ‘sides of the sides’ (v. supra 53b), and not ‘before the tent of meeting’.
(8) Which proves that they are not holy.
(9) The text must be so amended.
(10) I.e., that the door of this chamber faces that of the knives’ recess, so that when both are open it is technically ‘at the door of the tent of meeting’, and yet you may not slaughter there.
(12) These sacrifices were not statutory ones, but specially commanded for the consecration of Aaron. They are not subject to the ordinary laws.
(13) It is unfit for sprinkling on the morrow.
(15) Sc. on the morrow. ‘Offering’ is essentially sprinkling.
Our Rabbis taught: You might think that they [peace-offerings] may be eaten on the evening of the third day, and this is indeed logical. Some sacrifices are eaten on the same day, and others are eaten during two days; as those sacrifices which are eaten on the same day [only], the night follows them; so also the sacrifices which are eaten during two days, the night follows them. Therefore it says, And if aught remain until the third day: while it is yet day it may be eaten, but it may not be eaten on the evening of the third day. You might think that it is burnt immediately, and this is logical: some sacrifices are eaten on the same day, and others are eaten during two days: as the sacrifices which are eaten on the same day, burning immediately follows eating; so the sacrifices which are eaten during two days, burning immediately follows eating. Therefore it says, ‘On the third day it shall be burnt with fire’: you must burn it by day, but you must not burn it at night.

MISHNAH. THE FIRSTLING, TITHE AND PASSOVER-OFFERING ARE SACRIFICES OF LESSER SANCTITY. THEY ARE SLAUGHTERED IN ANY PART OF THE TEMPLE COURT, AND THEIR BLOOD REQUIRES ONE SPRINKLING, PROVIDED THAT IT IS APPLIED OVER AGAINST THE BASE. THEY DIFFERED IN THEIR CONSUMPTION [AS FOLLOWS]: THE FIRSTLING WAS EATEN BY PRIESTS [ONLY], WHILE THE TITHE MIGHT BE EATEN BY ANY MAN. AND THEY WERE EATEN IN ANY PART OF THE CITY, PREPARED IN ANY MANNER, DURING TWO DAYS AND ONE NIGHT. THE PASSOVER-OFFERING MIGHT BE EATEN ONLY AT NIGHT, ONLY UNTIL MIDNIGHT, AND IT MIGHT BE EATEN ONLY BY THOSE REGISTERED FOR IT, AND IT MIGHT BE EATEN ONLY ROASTED.

GEMARA. Which Tanna [rules thus]? — Said R. Hisda, It is R. Jose the Galilean. For it was taught, R. Jose the Galilean said: Not ‘its blood’ is said, but ‘their blood’: not ‘its fat’ is said, but ‘their fat’: this teaches concerning the firstling, tithe, and the Passover-offering, that their blood and emurim must be presented at the altar. How do we know [that it must be sprinkled] over against the base? — Said R. Eleazar: The meaning of ‘sprinkling’ is learned from a burnt-offering.

(1) To teach that a peace-offering is eaten on the day it is slaughtered and on the next day.
(2) The evening preceding the third day, i.e., after the two days permitted for its eating.
(3) If it remains until the evening of the third day it does not become nothar, to require burning, but only if it remains until the morning (v.v. 17). Hence the intention to eat it then, expressed at the sacrificing, does not invalidate it.
(4) It may not be eaten after the two days.
(5) From the penalty for eating nothar.
(6) If he intended sprinkling their blood after sunset, or eating their flesh or burning their emurim after the dawn of the morrow, his intention makes the sacrifice unfit.
(7) I.e., the evening of the third day.
(8) I.e., they are eaten on the night following.
(9) Lev. XIX, 6.
(10) At the end of the second day, after sunset.
(11) From the moment that it may no longer be eaten, it is to be burnt.
(12) Sc. of cattle; v. Lev. XXVII, 32.
(13) On a part of the altar which has a base under it. This excludes the east and south (v. supra 53b).
(14) By people who had previously registered themselves for that particular animal.
(15) The Mishnah enumerates the differences in their mode of consumption only. Whence it follows that they are alike in respect of sprinkling and presentation of emurim. Whose view is this?
(16) V. supra 37a for notes.
(17) Written in connection with the firstling and tithe.