CHAPTER I


GEMARA. Why does the Mishnah state SAVE THAT? It could have simply stated, ‘But they do not discharge the obligation of the owner’? — It teaches this: The owner's obligation is not thereby discharged, but the meal-offering itself is in each case valid, and it is therefore forbidden to make any further changes with regard to it.6 This is in accordance with Raba, for Raba said, If a burnt-offering was slaughtered under any name other than its own, it is nevertheless forbidden to sprinkle its blood under any other name than its own. You may, if you wish, explain this by logical reasoning, or if you wish, by reference to a verse. ‘You may, if, you wish, explain this by logical reasoning’ — is it to be permitted, because a change has been made with regard to it, to go on making more and more changes? ‘Or if you wish, by reference to a verse’ — for it is written, That which is done out of thy lips thou shalt observe and do; according as thou hast vowed unto the Lord thy God, a freewill-offering.7 ‘A freewill-offering’? It is a vow, is it not? Hence the verse is to be explained thus: if thou hast done according as thou hast vowed, then it is a votive offering; and if not it shall be a freewill-offering.

(1) Cf. Lev. II, 2ff. The usual procedure in making a meal-offering consisted of the following four services: taking the handful out of the meal-offering, putting it into a vessel, bringing it nigh to the altar, and burning it. These services correspond respectively to the four main services in connection with animal sacrifices, viz., slaughtering, receiving the blood, bringing it nigh to the altar, and sprinkling it.

(2) Either declaring it to be a different offering, שינוי קדש e.g., while dealing with a meal-offering prepared on a griddle the officiating priest expressly declares that he is dealing with one prepared in a pan; or declaring it to be on behalf of a different person, שינוי בעלים e.g., while dealing with A’s meal-offering the priest declares that he is dealing with it on behalf of B.

(3) And he must bring again the offering which he had undertaken to bring either by vow or of his free will.

(4) The meal-offering brought as a sin-offering by a person of poor means on the commission of any of the transgressions mentioned in Lev. V, 1-4.

(5) Brought by a woman suspected of adultery by her husband; cf. Num. V, 15. In these two cases the meal-offering, if brought under another name, is invalid.

(6) The expression ‘SAVE THAT’ in the Mishnah implies that in every other respect the meal-offering is a valid meal-offering.

(7) Deut. XXIII, 24.
meal-offerings are unlike [animal] offerings. For if [the priest] takes the handful from a meal-offering prepared on a griddle and expressly refers to it as one prepared in a pan, his intention is of no consequence. For the preparation thereof clearly indicates that he is dealing with a dry meal-offering. But with [animal] offerings, it is not so; the same slaughtering is for all offerings, the same manner of receiving the blood for all, and the same manner of sprinkling for all.

This indeed presents no difficulty according to R. Ashi who said, ‘Here he took the handful from that which was prepared on a griddle and referred to it as prepared in a pan, there he took the handful from a meal-offering prepared on a griddle and referred to it as a meal-offering prepared in a pan’, for our Mishnah is a case where one meal-offering was referred to as another meal-offering. But what can be said according to the answers suggested by Rabbah and Raba?

For should you accept the answer suggested by Rabbah namely, ‘Here the change was as regards the offering, there as regards the owner’, [the difficulty of reconciling R. Simeon’s view with that of our Mishnah remains, for] our Mishnah speaks of the change as regards the offering, since it reads, HOW CAN THEY BE UNDER THEIR OWN AND ANOTHER NAME? IF OFFERED AS A SINNER’S MEAL-OFFERING AND AS A FREEWILL MEAL-OFFERING! — It is clear then that according to Rabbah and Raba our Mishnah is not in agreement with R. Simeon.

Now I can point out a contradiction between the words of R. Simeon here and the words of R. Simeon elsewhere. For it has been taught: R. Simeon says, It is written, It is most holy, as the sin-offering, and as the guilt-offering, that is, some [meal-offerings] are like the sin-offering, and some like the guilt-offering. The sinner’s meal-offering is like the sin-offering, so that if [the priest] took the handful thereof from under any other name than its own, it would be invalid, as is the sin-offering [in such circumstances]; the freewill meal-offering is like the guilt-offering, so that if he took the handful thereof from under any other name than its own, it would remain valid. ‘And as the guilt-offering’, that is, as the guilt-offering is valid [even when offered under any other name than its own], but does not satisfy [the obligation of the owner], so the freewill meal-offering is valid but does not satisfy [the obligation of the owner], —

Rabbah answered, It is no contradiction: here the change was as regards the offering, there as regards the owner. Thereupon Abaye said to him, But consider, since it is established by analogy that, according to Divine Law, a wrongful intention renders the offering invalid, what difference does it make whether the change was as regards the offering or as regards the owner?

He replied, The rule of R. Simeon that the preparation thereof clearly indicates [the true nature of the offering] is founded on reason (for R. Simeon generally expounds the reasons of Scriptural law); therefore a wrongful intention which is not manifestly absurd the Divine Law declares capable of
rendering an offering invalid, but a wrongful intention which is manifestly [absurd]13 the Divine Law declares incapable of rendering invalid. (Mnemonic: a burnt-offering; he nipped off a burnt-offering; he drained; a sin-offering of a bird; Most Holy sacrifices; Lesser Holy sacrifices.) In that case it should follow that if [the priest] nipped off the head of a burnt-offering of a bird above [the red line which went around the altar]14 under the name of a sin-offering of a bird, it discharges15 [the owner], since the treatment thereof indicates plainly that it is a burnt-offering of a bird, for if it were a sin-offering of a bird he would have performed [the nipping] below [the red line];16 — Do you think the sin-offering of a bird may not be performed above [the red line]?

Surely a Master has stated that the nipping [of the sin-offering of a bird] may be performed at any place on the altar!17 Again, if he drained the blood of a burnt-offering of a bird above [the red line] under the name of a sin-offering of a bird, it should discharge [the owner], since the treatment thereof indicates plainly that it is a burnt-offering, for if it were a sin-offering he would have drained it below [the red line], and [would also have first] sprinkled [the blood upon the side of the altar]!18 —

(1) Certainly not! v. Sifra on Lev. I, 9. Hence even though the original sacrifice has been varied (as here from a votive to a freewill-offering) it is forbidden to make any further changes with regard to it, just as it is forbidden to vary the freewill-offering.
(2) V. Ibid. II, 5, 7; and infra 59a and 63a.
(3) I.e., one not mixed with oil, e.g., a sinner's meal-offering, or the meal-offering of jealousy.
(4) R. Simeon apparently disagrees with our Mishnah on two points: (a) He makes no exception for the sinner's meal-offering and the meal-offering of jealousy, and (b) he declares that even though the meal-offering was treated under another name the owner has discharged his obligation.
(5) In answer to the contradiction pointed out between the two statements of R. Simeon, infra.
(6) Where the officiating priest does not mention ‘meal-offering’ but merely the vessel in which it has been prepared, referring to one kind as another, it is clear that his words are meaningless and are to be ignored, since the very preparation of the meal-offering contradicts him; hence the offering is in no wise affected thereby and it discharges the owner's obligation. On the other hand, where he refers to one meal-offering as another, as is clearly the case in our Mishnah, the offering is affected thereby, since he has expressed a wrongful intention in connection with a meal-offering, and it therefore does not discharge the owner's obligation.
(7) Where the change was expressed in respect of the kind of offering, e.g., a meal-offering prepared on a griddle being referred to as one prepared in a pan, the offering is not thereby invalidated, for it is clear to all that it is the former and not that which he declares it to be, and therefore counts in fulfillment of the owner's obligation. Where, however, the change was expressed in respect of the owner of the offering, the offering cannot discharge the true owner's obligation.
(8) In the former case the owner's obligation is discharged in spite of the variation in the kind of meal-offering, in the latter case it is not discharged.
(9) Lev. VI, 10.
(10) This latter statement of R. Simeon wholly agrees with our Mishnah, so that it is in conflict with the former statement of R. Simeon on two points; v. supra p. 3 n. 2.
(11) V. Supra p. 3 n. 5.
(12) In Lev. VI, 10, the meal-offering is equated with the animal sacrifices of the sin-offering and guilt-offering, and as a wrongful intention with regard to these sacrifices, whether in respect of the kind of sacrifice or of the owner, renders them invalid, so it should be with regard to the meal-offering too.
(13) I.e., where the actions of the officiating priest belie his expressed intention. In such a case his words cannot be taken seriously.
(15) Lit., ‘render acceptable’.
(16) The rule is that the burnt-offering of a bird must be prepared above the red line (v. Zeb. 65a); the sin-offering of a bird, on the other hand, was usually prepared below the red line. Hence in spite of the priest’s express intention to the contrary, the fact that he is nipping the bird above the red line clearly indicates that he is dealing with a burnt-offering, and the offering should count in fulfillment of the owner's obligation; nevertheless the established law is not so.
(17) Zeb. 63a. So that the treatment does not clearly mark the offering as a burnt-offering.
(18) The fixed routine in bird-offerings was (a) in the case of a burnt-offering: the head was nipped
off but not severed from the body, the blood was drained at the side of the altar above the red line, then the whole bird was burnt on the altar; (b) in the case of a sin-offering: the head was nipped off and also not severed from the body, the blood was sprinkled upon the side of the altar, the rest of the blood was drained at the base of the altar, then the flesh was consumed by the priests.

Menachoth 3a

It might be said that it is now being drained, the sprinkling having already taken place; and [as for its being drained above the red line], has not the Master stated that wherever upon the altar the blood was drained it is valid?

Again, if he sprinkled the blood of the sin-offering of a bird below [the red line] under the name of a burnt-offering of a bird, it should discharge [the owner], since the treatment thereof indicates plainly that it is a sin-offering of a bird, for if it were a burnt-offering of a bird he would have performed [the sprinkling] above [the red line], and would also have drained out the blood? —

This is so.1 But did he not say, ‘Since meal-offerings are unlike [animal] offerings’? — Yes, unlike [animal] offerings, but not unlike bird-offerings.2 Again, if one slaughtered Most Holy sacrifices on the north side [of the altar] under the name of Lesser Holy sacrifices, they should discharge [the owners], since the treatment thereof indicates plainly that they are Most Holy sacrifices, for if they were Lesser Holy sacrifices, [the slaughtering] surely would have been performed on the south side! —

No, the rule of the Divine Law is [that Lesser Holy sacrifices may be slaughtered] even on the south side, but not on the south side to the exclusion of the north.3 For we have learnt: [The Lesser Holy sacrifices] may be slaughtered in any part of the Temple court.4 Again, if one slaughtered Lesser Holy sacrifices on the south side under the name of Most Holy sacrifices, they should discharge [the owners], since the treatment thereof indicates plainly that they are Lesser Holy sacrifices, for if they were Most Holy sacrifices, [the slaughtering] would surely have been performed on the north side! —

It might be said that they really were Most Holy sacrifices but that [the slaughterer] had transgressed the law and slaughtered them on the south side. If so, in the case where a meal-offering prepared on a griddle was referred to as one prepared in a pan, it might also be said that the owner had vowed a meal-offering prepared in a pan and the priest when taking the handful therefrom [rightly] referred to it as prepared in a pan, for it was to be a meal-offering prepared in a pan, but he [the owner] had transgressed and brought one prepared on a griddle!5 —

There, even though he had vowed a meal-offering prepared in a pan, if he brought it prepared on a griddle it must be treated as prepared on a griddle.6 As we have learnt: If a man said, ‘I take it upon myself to bring a meal-offering prepared on a griddle’, and he brought one prepared in a pan; or if he said, ‘a meal-offering prepared in a pan’, and he brought one prepared on a griddle, what he has brought he has brought, but he has not discharged the obligation of his vow.7 But perhaps he used the expression ‘This’;8 as we have learnt: If he said, ‘Let this [meal] be brought [as a meal-offering prepared] on a griddle’, and he brought it [prepared] in a pan, or if he said, ‘Let this [meal be brought as a meal-offering] prepared in a pan’, and he brought it [prepared] on a griddle, it is invalid! —9

According to the view of the Rabbis this would indeed be [a difficulty]; but we are arguing according to the view of R. Simeon, and R. Simeon holds that [in the first case] he has even discharged the obligation of his vow. Hence the description [of the meal-offering] by the particular vessel is of no consequence,10 and it is immaterial whether
he said ‘Let this be’ or ‘I take it upon myself’. Again, if one slaughtered a burnt-offering under the name of a sin-offering it should discharge [the owner], for the one is a male animal and the other a female! —

Since there is the goat of the sin-offering of a ruler, which must be a male, it is not so evident. Then what can be said if he referred to it as a sin-offering of an individual? Moreover, if one slaughtered the sin-offering of an individual under the name of a burnt-offering, it should discharge [the owner], since a sin-offering must be a female animal, and a burnt-offering a male! — It is covered by the tail.

In truth people don't usually think of distinguishing between male and female animals. Again, if one slaughtered the Passover-offering under the name of a guilt-offering it should discharge [the owner], since the former must be in its first year whereas the latter must be in its second year! —

Since there is the guilt-offering of the Nazirite and of the leper, it is then not so certain. Then what can be said if he expressly referred to it as the guilt-offering for robbery or for sacrilege? Moreover, if one slaughtered the guilt-offering for robbery or for sacrilege under the name of the Passover-offering it should discharge [the owner], since the Passover-lamb must be in its first year whereas the others must be in their second year! —

In truth people don't usually distinguish between an animal in its first year and one in its second year, for an animal in its first year may sometimes look like one in its second year, and one in its second year may look like one in its first year. Again, if one slaughtered a he-goat under the name of a guilt-offering it should discharge [the owner], since the one has wool and the other hair! — people might think that it is a black ram. Again, if one slaughtered a calf or a bullock under the name of the Passover-offering or a guilt-offering it should discharge [the owner], since a calf or a bullock cannot serve as the Passover-offering or as a guilt-offering! — This is indeed so;

(1) That according to R. Simeon in such a case the owner counts the offering as the fulfillment of his obligation.
(2) I.e., a bird-offering like a meal-offering, although offered under a different name, discharges the obligation of the owner, for the treatment thereof clearly indicates the true nature of the sacrifice.
(3) Lit., ‘did it say, On the south side and not on the north?’ In contradistinction from the Most Holy sacrifices — the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, and the guilt-offering, which must be slaughtered on the north side of the altar only (v. Lev. I, 11; VI, 18; VII, 2). — Scripture does not specify any particular place for the slaughtering of the Lesser Holy sacrifices, and the implication clearly is that it may be slaughtered in any part of the Temple court.
(4) Zeb. 55a.
(5) And why does R. Simeon hold that in such a case the express intention is to be ignored? The text in cur. edd. is somewhat involved, and the reading of Sh. Mek. is followed.
(6) And therefore to refer to it as a meal-offering prepared in a pan is mere empty words.
(7) Infra 102b.
(8) So Sh. Mek, omitting the words, ‘to be brought prepared on a griddle and he brought it prepared in a pan’.
(9) Infra 102b. Consequently where the expression ‘this’ was used it cannot be offered as anything else. Now in the present case it might be thought that the priest when taking the handful therefrom and referring to it as a meal-offering prepared in a pan, refers actually to its true character, so that his expressed intention cannot be said to be idle talk.
(10) But it is the vessel in which the meal is actually put that decides the kind of meal-offering it is to be; so that what is put on a griddle cannot be anything else, and the priest's reference to it as something else is idle talk.
(11) Sc. the burnt-offering.
(12) Sc. the sin-offering.
(13) And it is evident to all that to refer to this animal as a sin-offering is idle talk, for it is a male animal.
(14) V. Lev. IV, 22f.
(15) For the burnt-offering that he is slaughtering might reasonably be taken to be the goat of the sin-offering of a ruler, particularly since he refers to it as a sin-offering.
(16) Which every one knows must be a female animal. The fact therefore that he is dealing with a male animal indicates clearly that his words are meaningless.
(17) So that the sex of the animal is not noticeable.
(18) Which has no tail, i.e., its tail does not cover fully its hind quarters, like a sheep, and its sex is easily noticeable.
(19) Which must also be in the first year, for כבש, sheep, signifies a lamb not more than one year old, whereas the term איל, ram, signifies a sheep in its second year and not more than two years old (v. Parah I, 3). V. Num. VI, 12; and Lev. XIV, 12.
(20) Which must be a sheep in its second year; v. Lev. V, 25 and 15.
(21) The he-goat of the sin-offering of a ruler.
(22) Sc. the sheep for the guilt-offering.
(23) Sc. the he-goat; since goats are usually dark in color (cf. Rashi and Tosaf.).
(24) For these must be of the flock.

Menachoth 3b

and by the term ‘animal offerings’¹ he meant the majority of animal-offerings. Raba answered:² It is no contradiction: here he took the handful out of a meal-offering and referred to it as [another] meal-offering, there he took the handful out of a meal-offering and referred to it as an animal-offering. Where one meal-offering was referred to as [another] meal-offering [it discharges the owner's obligation, for it is written,] ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’: there is but one law for all meal-offerings.³ Then what is the meaning of the statement, ‘But with animal-offerings it is not so’?⁴ — It means, in spite of the fact that the same manner of slaughtering is for all offerings, it is written, ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’, and not ‘of the animal-offering’. In that case, if one slaughtered a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] forbidden fat under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] blood, or under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of idolatry, or under the name of the sin offering of the Nazirite or of the leper, it should be valid and also discharge [the owner], for the Divine Law says, This is the law of the sin-offering:⁵ there is but one law for all sin-offerings!⁶ According to R. Simeon it is indeed so; and⁷ as for the view of the Rabbis,⁸

Raba said, If one slaughtered a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] forbidden fat under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of [eating] blood, or under the name of a sin-offering brought on account of idolatry, it is valid;⁹ if [he slaughtered it] under the name of the sin-offering of the Nazirite or of the leper it is invalid, because with each of these there is a burnt-offering too.¹⁰ R. Aha the son of Raba reports that it is invalid in every case, for it is written, And he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering,¹¹ that is, for that [particular] sin.¹²

R. Ashi answered, It is no contradiction: Here he took the handful out of that which was prepared on a griddle and referred to it as prepared in a pan, there he took the handful out of a meal-offering prepared on a griddle and referred to it as a meal-offering prepared in a pan.¹³ Where what is prepared on a griddle is referred to as prepared in a pan, [it discharges the owner's obligation, for] the wrongful intention is in respect of the...
vessel used, and a wrongful intention in respect of the vessel used does not invalidate the offering. Where a meal-offering prepared on a griddle is referred to as a meal-offering prepared in a pan, [it does not discharge the owner's obligation, for] the wrongful intention is in respect of a meal-offering, and it is thereby rendered invalid. But did not the Tanna [R. Simeon] say, ‘For the preparation thereof clearly indicates [the true nature of the offering]’?

He meant thus: Although the expressed statement clearly does not [correspond with the actual offering], and consequently it should be invalid, [yet it is not so, for] the intention is in respect of the vessel and any wrongful intention in respect of the vessel does not invalidate the offering. Then what is the meaning of the statement, ‘But with animal-offerings it is not so’? — It means, in spite of the fact that the same manner of slaughtering is for all offerings, and the same manner of receiving the blood and sprinkling it for all offerings, the wrongful intention is in respect of the slaughtering and it is thereby rendered invalid.

R. Aha the son of Raba asked R. Ashi, Then why does R. Simeon say [that it discharges the owner's obligation] where a dry [meal-offering] was referred to as one mingled [with oil]? He replied, [The intention was] for anything that is mingled. If so, when referring [to a burnt-offering] as a peace-offering it might also be taken to mean anything that brings about peace! — There is no comparison at all! There the actual sacrifice is termed shelamim [peace-offering], as it is written, He that offereth the blood of the shelamim, which means, he that sprinkles the blood of the peace-offering; but here, is the meal-offering ever referred to simply as Belulah [mingled]? It is written, And every meal-offering, mingled with oil [Belulah ba-shemen] or dry; it is indeed referred to as ‘mingled with oil’, but never as ‘mingled’ by itself.

Now they all do not adopt Rabbah's answer, for [they say], on the contrary, an intention which is manifestly [absurd] the Divine Law declares capable of rendering an offering invalid. They also do not adopt Raba's answer, for they do not accept his interpretation of the verse, ‘And this is the law of the meal-offering’. And they do not all adopt R. Ashi's answer because of the difficulty raised by R. Aha the son of Raba. That which is clear to Rabbah in one way and is clear to Raba in the opposite way, is a matter of doubt to R. Hoshaya. For R. Hoshaya put the question (others say, R. Hoshaya put the question to R. Assi): Where one referred to a meal-offering as an animal-offering?

(1) V. supra 2b: ‘Since meal-offerings are not like animal offerings’. In some cases, however, as in the last case stated, the express variation of the sacrifice is so absurd as to be absolutely ignored; and therefore the sacrifice serves to discharge the obligation of the owner.

(2) To reconcile the contradiction cited between the statements of R. Simeon, v. supra p. 4.

(3) Lev. VI, 7.

(4) I.e., all meal-offerings are regarded as one form of offering, and therefore when dealing with one kind of meal-offering to refer to it as another is of no consequence.

(5) Accordingly a meal-offering referred to as an animal-offering should be valid since the reference is apparently absurd.

(6) In the case where the priest expressly refers to a meal-offering prepared on a griddle as one prepared in a pan.

(7) For the view now held is that where the expressed intention is absurd on the face of it, it most certainly renders the offering invalid, for otherwise it may be said that it is permitted to vary offerings.

(8) This statement originally was taken to mean that any variation in an animal-offering affects the owner in that his obligation is not discharged. Now, however, according to the interpretation suggested, the contrast with meal-offerings must give the result that any variation in animal-offerings discharges the owner's obligation since, after all, there is but one manner of slaughtering and one manner of sprinkling for all offerings.

(9) Lev. VI, 18.
(10) Consequently any variation regarding the kind of sin-offering should be of no consequence; wherefore then have we learnt that the sin-offering is thereby rendered invalid (Zeb. opening Mishnah)?

(11) The text is extremely doubtful and the suggested emendations are various each with different interpretations. The translation follows the text as suggested by Sh. Mek. in the margin, which is supported by MS. M. V. also commentaries of Birkath Hazebeh (B.H.) and Z. Kodoshim (Z.K.)

(12) Who do not adopt the interpretation of And this is the law of the sin-offering.

(13) Although it does not count for the fulfillment of the owner's obligation (Rashi). It is valid, however, because each offering mentioned bears the name and true characteristic of the sin-offering.

(14) And it might be said that a sin-offering offered under the name of a burnt-offering is also valid, which is certainly not the law. According to another reading, the word מֵאָכָל תָּהָל is omitted, and the translation would be: ‘these are (sc. have the characteristics of) burnt-offerings’; i.e., the sin-offering of the Nazirite and of the leper do not, like all other sin-offerings, bring about atonement, but only serve to render the person fit to partake of that which he was forbidden heretofore, namely, to permit the Nazirite to drink wine, and the leper to enter the Temple and to partake of sacred food.

(15) Ibid. IV, 33.

(16) Heb. התשאיא translated ‘it’ is often interpreted by the Rabbis as the demonstrative pronoun ‘that’; i.e., he shall slaughter the offering for that particular sin.

(17) V. supra p. 3, n. 4.

(18) Accordingly a meal-offering prepared on a griddle and referred to as a meal-offering prepared in a pan should also be valid since the expressed intention is apparently absurd.

(19) V. supra p. 10, n. 5.

(20) So in MS. M. and Sh. Mek.

(21) V. supra p. 10, n. 6.

(22) The variation here is clearly not in respect of the vessel in which the meal-offering is put, but rather in respect of the meal-offering itself, and therefore the wrongful intention should invalidate the offering.

(23) But not necessarily a meal-offering; such an intention therefore could in no wise affect the offering.

(24) And not necessarily a peace-offering; such an intention therefore should not invalidate the sacrifice, nevertheless it is admitted by R. Simeon that with regard to animal offerings a wrongful intention does invalidate the sacrifice.

(25) And nowhere in the Bible has this word any other connotation.


(27) V. Zeb. 98b.

(28) יָרָאֵל

(29) Lev. VII, 10.

(30) So that to refer to a dry meal-offering as mingled does not necessarily mean that it is intended to be a meal-offering mingled with oil, for this would have been expressly stated; it is regarded as empty words and the offering is not affected thereby.

(31) The Gemara, having argued fully upon the suggested answers of Rabbah, Raba and R. Ashi in reconciling the conflicting views of R. Simeon, now proceeds to explain why these three Rabbis cannot agree upon one answer.

(32) For otherwise it may be said that one may vary the services of the sacrifices.

(33) Ibid. VI, 7. For if they accepted this interpretation, they would also have to accept the similar interpretation of the verse in connection with the sin-offering, and there is no evidence to show that R. Simeon ever held such a view with regard to the sin-offering, namely, that if one slaughtered a sin-offering brought on account of eating forbidden fat under the name of the sin-offering of the Nazirite, it discharges the owner's obligation.

(34) For the answer given is not quite satisfactory, since the term ‘Belulah’ by itself generally refers to a meal-offering mingled with oil.

(35) That a statement which is manifestly absurd with regard to the offering, as when the actions of the officiating priest belie his expressed intention, does not render the offering invalid; v. supra p. 5.

(36) That a statement which is manifestly absurd does render the offering invalid; v. supra p. 9, n.7.

Menachoth 4a

what would be R. Simeon's view? Is this the reason for R. Simeon's opinion, namely, that a wrongful intention which is manifestly [absurd] does not invalidate the offering, and here also the intention is manifestly [absurd]; or is it this, namely, it is written. And this is the law of the meal-offering,1 but it is not written ‘of the animal-offering’? — He replied, We cannot fathom R. Simeon's mind, Hez would not give Rabbah's answer because of Abaye's objection to it;3 nor Raba's answer because of the objection from the verse, And this is the law of the sin-offering;4 nor R.
Ashi’s answer because of the objection raised by R. Aha the son of Raba.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SINNER’S MEAL-OFFERING AND THE MEAL-OFFERING OF JEALOUSY. It is indeed clear with regard to the sinner’s meal-offering, for the Divine Law terms it a sin-offering, as it is written, He shall put no oil upon it, neither shall he put any frankincense thereon; for it is a sin-offering.5 But whence do we know it with regard to the meal-offering of jealousy? From the following which a Tanna recited before R. Nahman: The surplus of the meal-offering of jealousy was used for [public] freewill-offerings.6 Whereupon he [R. Nahman] said to him, Well spoken, indeed! For the expression ‘iniquity’ is used with regard to it as well as with regard to the sin-offering;7 and as the surplus of the sin-offering goes for [public] freewill-offerings,8 so the surplus of the meal-offering of jealousy goes for [public] freewill-offerings. And again like the sin-offering; as the sin-offering Is invalid if offered under any other name than its own, so the meal-offering of jealousy is also invalid if offered under any other name than its own. In that case the guilt-offering should also be invalid if offered under any other name than its own, since one can infer it from the sin-offering by means of the common expression ‘iniquity’!9 — We may infer ‘iniquity’ from ‘iniquity’, but we may not infer ‘iniquity’ from ‘his iniquity’. But what does this [slight variation] matter?

Was it not taught in the School of R. Ishmael that in the verses, And the priest shall come again,10 and And the priest shall come in,10 ‘coming again’ and ‘coming in’ have the same import [for purposes of deduction]? Moreover, one can infer ‘his iniquity’ [stated in connection with the guilt-offering] from ‘his iniquity’ stated in connection with ‘the hearing of the voice of adjuration’, where it is written, if he do not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity.11 — Indeed the inference [from the sin-offering] relates only to the surplus [that it shall go] for freewill-offerings. Should you, however, retort, Surely an inference cannot be restricted to one point!12 [I answer that] the Divine Law has expressly stated ‘it’ with regard to the sin-offering, as it is written, And he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering;13 ‘it’ [namely, the sin-offering, if slaughtered] under its own name is valid but under any name other than its own is invalid, whereas all other offerings are valid whether offered under their own or under any other name. Then whence do we know that the sinner's meal-offering and the meal-offering of jealousy are invalid [if offered] under any name other than their own? —

Why is it [that this is so]14 regarding the sin-offering? Because there is written, It is [a sin-offering].15 With these, too, there is written, ‘It is’.16 Then, with the guilt-offering we also find ‘It is’?17 — That is stated after the burning of the sacrificial parts; as it was taught: But with regard to the guilt-offering the expression ‘It is’ is stated after the burning of the sacrificial parts. And if the sacrificial parts thereof were not burnt at all, it is valid18. Then what is the purpose of the expression ‘It is’ [in the case of the guilt-offering]? — It is required for the teaching of R. Huna in the name of Rab, viz., If a guilt-offering that was assigned to pasture19 was slaughtered without any specified purpose, it is valid as a burnt-offering. That is so only if it was assigned to pasture, but if it was not so assigned it is not [valid], for the verse reads. It is [a guilt-offering],17 that is it retains its status.20

Rab said, If [the priest] took the handful from the meal-offering of the ‘Omer21 under any name other than its own it is invalid,22 for it is brought in order to render permitted [the new harvest] and it has not been done so.23 In like manner you may say with regard to the guilt-offering of the Nazirite
(1) Lev. VI, 7.
(2) R. Hoshia who put this question.
(3) V. supra p. 4.
(4) Ibid. VI, 18; v. supra p. 11.
(5) Ibid. V, 11. And as the sin-offering if offered under any other name than its own is invalid (v. Zeb. 2a). So it is also with the sinner's meal-offering.
(6) I.e., if a sum of money was set aside for the purpose of acquiring barley for the meal-offering of jealousy, and if in the meantime barley fell in price, the surplus money was to be put into the special collecting boxes in the Temple (v. Shek. VI, 1, 5). The accumulated money was expended in the purchase of animals for sacrifices which were offered as public freewill-offerings whenever the altar was 'vacant'.
(7) So according to the text of MS.M. and Sh. Mek. In connection with the sin-offering it is written (Ibid. X, 17). And he hath given it to you to bear the iniquity of the congregation; and in connection with the meal-offering of jealousy it is written (Num. V, 15). Bringing iniquity to remembrance.
(8) V. Tem. 23b.
(9) For in connection with the guilt-offering there is also used the expression ‘iniquity’: Yet is he guilty and shall bear his iniquity (Lev. V, 17). Nevertheless it is established law that a guilt-offering offered under any other name than its own is valid.
(10) Ibid. XIV, 39 and 44. The reference is to the treatment of a leprous spot in the walls of a house. (v. Sifra a.l.).
(11) Ibid. V, 1, where a sin-offering is prescribed for the atonement.
(12) Lit., ‘there is no inference by halves; i.e., an inference cannot be drawn in respect of one law and not in respect of another law.
(13) Ibid IV, 33.
(14) Sc. that if offered under any other name than its own it is invalid.
(15) Ibid. 24.
(17) Lev. VII, 5: And the priest shall burn them upon the altar... it is a guilt-offering. Accordingly if the guilt-offering was offered under another name it should be invalid.
(18) V. Pes. 59b, and Zeb. 5b. As the expression ‘it is’ refers only to the burning of the sacrificial parts it follows that the other services are valid even though performed under another name. Moreover to suggest that the burning of the sacrificial parts is invalid if performed under another name is out of the question, for the offering is valid without it.
(19) This was the usual course whenever an animal having once been set aside for a guilt-offering was no longer required for that purpose. e.g., where the owner who was to bring this guilt-offering died, or where the animal was lost and another was used in its stead and was later found. This animal was assigned to the care of a shepherd and put out in the field to pasture until it became blemished, when it might be redeemed and the money used for freewill burnt-offerings (Rashi).
(20) Sc. that of a guilt-offering until it is expressly assigned to pasture when it is destined for a burnt-offering.
(21) V. Ibid. II, 14 and XXIII, 10ff. Only after the offering of the ‘Omer on the sixteenth day of Nisan was it permitted to eat of the new harvest.
(22) I.e., the handful may not be burnt upon the altar, nor may the rest be eaten by the priests.
(23) Since it was offered under another name.

and the guilt-offering of the leper, viz., if one slaughtered them under any name other than their own they are invalid, for they are brought in order to render [the person] fit and they have not done so.

[An objection was raised:] We have learnt: ALL MEAL-OFFERINGS FROM WHICH THE HANDFUL WAS TAKEN UNDER ANY OTHER NAME THAN THEIR OWN ARE VALID, SAVE THAT THEY DO NOT DISCHARGE THE OBLIGATION OF THE OWNER, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SINNER'S MEAL-OFFERING AND THE MEAL-OFFERING OF JEALOUSY. Now if the [above ruling of Rab] were correct, then it should have also stated ‘with the exception of the meal-offering of the ‘Omer’! — It only states those [meal-offerings] which are brought by an individual and not that which is brought by the whole community; furthermore, it only states those which are brought by themselves and not that which accompanies an animal-offering; furthermore, it only states those which are brought at no fixed time and not that which is brought at a fixed time.
‘In like manner you may say with regard to the guilt-offering of the Nazirite and the guilt-offering of the leper, viz., if one slaughtered them under any name other than their own they are invalid, for they are brought in order to render [the person] fit and they have not done so’. [An objection was raised:] We have learnt: All animal-offerings that were slaughtered under any name other than their own are valid, save that they do not discharge the obligation of the owner, with the exception of the Passover-offering and the sin-offering.3 Now if [the above ruling of Rab] were correct, then it should have also stated with the exception of the guilt-offering of the Nazirite and the guilt-offering of the leper’, for they are brought in order to render [the person] fit and they have not done so! —

Since there is also the guilt-offering for robbery and the guilt-offering for sacrilege which are brought for atonement,4 [the Tanna] therefore could not have stated it absolutely.5 Why is it that the guilt-offering of the Nazirite and the guilt-offering of the leper [if slaughtered under another name are invalid]? It is, is it not, because they are brought in order to render [the person] fit and they have not done so? Then with the other [guilt-offerings] too, it might be said, they are brought to make atonement and they have not done so! —

R. Jeremiah answered, It is because we find that Scripture distinguishes between sacrifices that bring about atonement and those that render [the person] fit; those that bring about atonement are sometimes brought after death;6 whereas those that render [the person] fit are never brought after death. As we have learnt:7 If a woman had brought her sin-offering and then died, her heirs must bring her burnt-offering; but if she had first brought her burnt-offering and then died, her heirs need not bring her sin-offering.8

R. Judah the son of R. Simeon b. Pazzi demurred: But are not sacrifices that render the person fit also brought after death? Surely we have learnt: If a man set apart money for his Nazirite offerings,9 it is forbidden to make any other use of it, yet there would be no infringement of the law of sacrilege, since it may all be used for the purchase of peace-offerings.10 If he died and the money was not yet apportioned [for the respective offerings], it all goes for freewill-offerings;11 if it was apportioned, the price of the sin-offering must be cast into the Dead Sea12 — no use may be made of it; yet [if one did] there would be no infringement of the law of sacrilege;13 with the price of the burnt-offering a burnt-offering must be brought and the law of sacrilege applies to it; with the price of the peace-offering a peace-offering must be brought which must be eaten the same day14, but it does not require the Bread-offering.15 Now are not the burnt-offering and the peace-offering of the Nazirite brought in order to render him fit and yet are brought after death? —

Said R. Papa. This is what R. Jeremiah meant: We do not find an absolute offering,16 serving to render the person fit, that can be brought after death, for as regards the Nazirite, the offering which serves to render him fit is not absolute,

(1) The guilt-offering of a Nazirite, which was brought if during the period of his vow the Nazirite contracted uncleanness, rendered him fit to resume his Nazirite mode of life; cf. Num. VI, 12. The guilt-offering of the leper rendered him fit to partake of consecrated food.
(2) As is the case with the meal-offering of the ’Omer; v. Lev. XXIII, 12.
(3) Which are invalid if slaughtered under any other name; Zeb. 2a.
(4) And from the above rule of Rab it is to be inferred that whatsoever is brought for atonement, even if offered under another name, is valid; v. infra.
(5) I.e., the Tanna could not have stated absolutely in the Mishnah ‘with the exception of the Passover-offering, the sin-offering and the guilt-offering’, for the rule in the latter case is not

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general but varies according to the kind of guilt-offering.
(6) Sc. of the person for whom the atonement was to be made.
(7) Kin. II, 5; Kid. 13b.
(8) A woman after childbirth was enjoined to bring these two offerings: the burnt-offering for atonement, and the sin-offering in order to render her fit to partake of consecrated food; cf. Lev. XII, 6. It is clear from this Mishnah that only the sacrifice which brings atonement is brought after death.
(9) Viz., the burnt-offering, the sin-offering and the peace-offering; cf. Num. VI, 14.
(10) And peace-offerings are not subject to the law of sacrilege (except the sacrificial portions thereof after the sprinkling of the blood) since they are not regarded as consecrated property.
(11) This is a traditional ruling, referred to as a halachah given to Moses from Sinai, v. Nazir 25a.
(12) Lc., it must be disposed of so that no benefit whatsoever be derived from it by anybody, this being in accordance with the established law that a sin-offering whose owner had died must be left to die.
(13) Since the money is to be destroyed it cannot be said to be consecrated property and therefore cannot be subject to the law of sacrilege; cf. Me'il, 3a.
(14) Lc., not as the ordinary peace-offering which may be eaten during two days and one night, but as the Nazirite peace-offering which is limited to one day.
(15) Cf. Num. VI, 19. Since the Nazirite is dead the requirement regarding the Bread-offering, And he shall put them (sc. the loaves) upon the hands of the Nazirite, cannot be fulfilled; Me'il, 11a. Nazir 24b.
(16) Lc., an offering which is indispensable in every one of its parts and rites.

for a Master has said, If [the Nazirite] shaved [his head] after [the sacrifice of] any one of the three offerings, he has fulfilled his obligation.\(^1\)

An objection was raised: If the guilt-offering of a leper was slaughtered under any name other than its own, or if the blood thereof was not put upon the thumb and great toe [of the one to be cleansed], it may nevertheless be offered upon the altar, and it requires the drink-offerings;\(^3\) but another guilt-offering is necessary in order to render him fit. This is indeed a refutation of Rab's view.\(^4\)

R. Simeon b. Lakish said, If [the priest] took the handful from the meal-offering of the ‘Omer under any name other than its own, it is valid,\(^5\) but the rest of it may not be eaten until another ‘Omer meal-offering has been brought and rendered it permitted. But surely, if the rest of it may not be eaten, how may it [the handful] be offered? It is written, From the liquor of Israel,\(^6\) that is, from that which is permitted to Israel! — R. Adda b. Ahabah said, Resh Lakish is of the opinion that the prohibition of ‘out of time’ does not apply to the same day.\(^7\)

R. Adda the son of R. Isaac raised an objection: Some conditions apply to bird-offerings which do not apply to meal-offerings, and some conditions apply to meal-offerings which do not apply to bird-offerings. Some conditions apply to bird-offerings: a bird-offering may be brought as a voluntary offering by two people jointly,\(^8\) it is brought by those that lack atonement,\(^9\) and an exception to the general prohibition is made for consecrated birds;\(^10\) these, however, do not apply to meal-offerings. And some conditions apply to meal-offerings: a meal-offering requires a vessel,\(^11\) it requires waving and bringing nigh,\(^12\) it may be the offering of the community or of the individual;\(^13\) these, however, do not apply to bird-offerings. Now if [the aforesaid view] were correct,\(^14\) then with regard to meal-offerings it can also be said that an exception to the general prohibition was made for that which is consecrated, namely, in the case of the meal-offering of the ‘Omer!\(^15\) — Since the prohibition of ‘out of time’ does not apply to the same day, it is not regarded as a prohibition at all.\(^16\)

R. Shesheth raised an objection: If the application of the oil\(^17\) was performed before the application of the blood, he [the priest] must fill up the log of oil and must again
apply the oil after applying the blood. If [the oil] was applied on the thumb and great toe before it was sprinkled seven times before the Lord, he must fill up the log of oil and must again apply it on the thumb and great toe after the oil has been sprinkled seven times. Now if you are right in saying that the prohibition of ‘out of time’ does not apply to the same day, why must [the priest] do it again? After all, what is done is done!18 —

R. Papa answered, It is different with the rites of the leper since the expression ‘shall be’ is written with regard to them, as it is written, This shall be the law of the leper;19 ‘shall be’ implies that it shall always be so.20 R. Papa raised an objection: If his21 sin-offering was [slaughtered] before his guilt-offering, one should not be appointed to keep stirring the blood22 [until the guilt-offering had been brought], but the appearance [of the flesh] must be allowed to pass away and it must be taken away to the place of burning!23 But why does R. Papa raise this objection? Did not R. Papa say that the law is different with regard to the rites of a leper, since the expression ‘shall be’ is used with regard to them? —

R. Papa had felt this difficulty: perhaps this law only affected what was a ‘service’, but slaughtering is no ‘service’.24 Now if [it is correct to say that] the prohibition of ‘out of time’ does not apply to the same day, then some one might keep stirring the blood [of the sin-offering] whilst the guilt-offering is being offered and then the sin-offering can be offered! — Rather said R. Papa, This is the reason for Resh Lakish’s view: he is of the opinion that the daybreak25 [of the sixteenth day of Nisan] renders [the new harvest] permitted. For both R. Johanan and Resh Lakish said, Even when the Temple was in existence

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(1) Nazir 45a.
(2) Cf. Lev. XIV, 17.
(3) V. infra 90b.
(4) For according to Rab whatsoever is brought to render the person fit, if offered under any other name than its own, is invalid, i.e., one may not proceed to burn it upon the altar.
(5) I.e., it may be offered upon the altar.
(6) Ezek. XLV, 15; referring especially to drink-offerings, but the Rabbis have inferred from this expression that whatsoever is forbidden to Israel may not be offered upon the altar.
(7) The prohibition of ‘out of time’, i.e., that the time has not yet arrived when the matter may be offered upon the altar, does not apply where this same matter will later on this very day be permitted to all Israel. Here, after the offering of another ‘Omer, the new harvest will be permitted to all.
(8) But a meal-offering cannot be brought by two persons jointly, for the expression ‘a soul’ (Lev. II, 1) i.e., an individual, is used in connection with it; v. infra 104b. In cur. edd. this reason is, expressly stated in the text.
(9) I.e., those who had suffered uncleanness, viz., a man or woman that had an issue, a woman after childbirth, and a leper, and who had done all that was necessary for their purification except to present their offering. The offering in each case was a bird-offering.
(10) Generally to nip off the head of a bird would render the whole bird nebelah, i.e. carrion, and forbidden to be eaten. Nevertheless this was the prescribed method for ‘killing bird-offerings, and the flesh was eaten by the priests.
(11) I.e., the handful taken out by the priest had to be put into a sacred vessel, whereas the nipping of the head of a bird had to be done with the priest’s finger-nail.
(12) V. infra 60a.
(13) The meal-offering of the ‘Omer was brought on behalf of the whole community; bird-offerings, however, were brought only by individuals and never by the community.
(14) That if the meal-offering of the ‘Omer was offered under another name, the offering may be proceeded with, although the new harvest was still under the prohibition.
(15) For it is offered upon the altar although the new harvest is still forbidden. Consequently meal-offerings are similar to bird-offerings in that in each case there is an exception to a general prohibition.
(16) Hence one cannot speak of the offering of the ‘Omer, even though it was offered under another name, as an exception to a general prohibition, as there is really no prohibition at all.
(17) In the purification rites of a leper the following duties, inter alia, had to be strictly observed: first, the officiating priest must apply the blood of the guilt-offering on the tip of the right ear, the thumb of the right hand and the great toe of the right foot of the one to be
cleansed; secondly, from the log (v. Glos.) of oil the priest must sprinkle seven times before the Lord; thirdly, he must apply oil on those parts on which the blood was previously applied. V. Lev. XIV, 14-19.

(18) For the priority of services is not vital and the fact that one service was performed out of its time should not matter in the least.

(19) Ibid. XIV, 2.

(20) Without any variation in the routine.

(21) Sc. the leper's.

(22) That it should not become congealed.

(23) I.e., the flesh of the sin-offering must be allowed to remain overnight, when the freshness would be gone, and then burnt. The fact that it must be burnt proves that whatever is offered 'out of time' is invalid, thus in conflict with Resh Lakish's view.

(24) Since it does not require the services of a priest but a layman may slaughter the sacrifice. V. Tosaf. s.v. שחיטה 1.

(25) Lit., 'when the eastern sky has lit up'.

Menachoth 5b

it was the daybreak that rendered [the new harvest] permitted. This view of Resh Lakish was not expressly stated but was inferred from the following: We have learnt: One may not offer meal-offerings, first-fruits, or meal-offerings that accompany animal-offerings, before the ‘Omer; and if one did so it is invalid. Neither may one offer these before the Two Loaves; but if one did so it is valid. And R. Isaac said in the name of Resh Lakish. This rule applies only if the offering was brought on the fourteenth or fifteenth day [of Nisan], but if brought on the sixteenth day it would be valid. It is thus clear that he is of the opinion that the daybreak [of the sixteenth day of Nisan] renders [the new harvest] permitted.

Raba said, If [the priest] took the handful from the meal-offering of the ‘Omer under any name other than its own, it is valid, and the rest of it may be eaten; moreover there is no need of another ‘Omer meal-offering [to be brought in order] to render [the new harvest] permitted. For [Raba is of the opinion that] a wrongful intention does not affect the offering unless expressed by one fit for service, in respect of what is fit for service, and in the place that is fit for service. ‘By one fit for service’ — this excludes a priest with a physical-blemish; ‘in respect of what is fit for service’ — this excludes the ‘Omer meal-offering which is not fit for any other offering, for it is exceptional; ‘and in the place that is fit for service — this excludes an altar which has become chipped.

Our Rabbis taught: When it says in the next verse Of the herd — which is unnecessary — it does so only to exclude a trefah animal. But surely this can be arrived at by an a fortiori argument if a blemished animal which is permitted to man is forbidden to the Most High, how much more is a Trefah animal which is forbidden to man forbidden to the Most High! The fat and the blood [of the animal], however, can prove otherwise; for these are forbidden to man yet are permitted to the Most High. [And if you retort,] This is so of the fat and the blood since they emanate from that which is permitted, but will you say the same of a Trefah animal which is wholly forbidden? [I reply,] The rite of nipping off [the head of a bird-offering] which [would render the bird] wholly forbidden [to man] could prove otherwise: for it is forbidden to man yet is permitted to the Most High. [But you might retort,] This is so of the nipping since it is only rendered forbidden [to man] by this act which renders it consecrated; the same, however, cannot be said of a Trefah animal for it is not rendered forbidden by any act which renders it consecrated. And if you reply to this, then [I say that] when it reads in the next verse ‘Of the herd’ — which is unnecessary — it does so only to exclude the Trefah animal.

What was meant by ‘If you reply to this’? — Rab said, Because one could reply that the ‘Omer meal-offering can prove otherwise: for it is forbidden to man yet permitted to the Most High. But this is so of the ‘Omer meal-offering as it renders the new produce
permitted!\textsuperscript{19} — The ‘Omer meal-offering of the] Sabbatical year was meant.\textsuperscript{20} But that surely renders the after-growth permitted? — [It is indeed the ‘Omer meal-offering of] the Sabbatical year [that is meant], but the view is in accordance with that of R. Akiba who said that the after-growth is forbidden in the Sabbatical year.\textsuperscript{21}

R. Aha b. Abba said to R. Ashi, Even according to R. Akiba’s view one could refute the argument thus: This is so of the ‘Omer meal-offering since it renders permitted the new produce [of the Sabbatical year grown] outside the Land [of Israel].\textsuperscript{22} And even according to him who maintains that outside the Land [of Israel] the new produce is not forbidden by the law of the Torah, [one can refute the argument thus: This is so of the ‘Omer meal-offering,] since it serves to raise the prohibition that lies upon it.\textsuperscript{23}

R. Aha of Difti thereupon said to Rabina, If so, should not a Trefah animal also be permitted to be offered as a sacrifice and so it would raise the prohibition [of Trefah] that lies upon it?\textsuperscript{24} One could, however, refute the argument thus: This is so of the ‘Omer meal-offering since there is an express command that it shall be so.\textsuperscript{25}

Resh Lakish said, One could reply that the case of the compounder of the incense can prove otherwise: for he is forbidden to man yet permitted to the Most High.\textsuperscript{26} But the compounder is a person!\textsuperscript{27} — Say, rather, The compound forming the incense can prove otherwise: for it is forbidden to man yet permitted to the Most High.\textsuperscript{28} But this is so of the compound forming the incense since there is an express command that it shall be so!\textsuperscript{29}

Mar the son of Rabina said, One could reply that the Sabbath can prove otherwise: for it is forbidden to man yet permitted to the Most High.\textsuperscript{30} But this is so of the Sabbath since an exception to the general prohibition is allowed to the layman in the case of circumcision!\textsuperscript{31} — Surely circumcision is not for the sake of the layman. It is a precept [of the Law]! — One could therefore say, This is so of the Sabbath since there is an express command that it shall be so!\textsuperscript{32}

R. Adda b. Abba said, One could reply that a garment of diverse kinds [of stuff] can prove otherwise: for it is forbidden to the layman yet permitted to the Most High.\textsuperscript{33} But this is so of diverse kinds since an exception to the general prohibition is allowed to the layman in the case of the zizith!\textsuperscript{34} — Surely the zizith is not for the sake of the layman, it is a precept [of the Law]! — One could therefore say,

(1) V. infra 68a. The restriction against partaking of the new harvest is lifted at the dawn of the sixteenth day of Nisan, before the offering of the ‘Omer. Consequently the handful, even though taken under another name, may be burnt upon the altar, for the new harvest is already permitted to all.

(2) That the daybreak of the sixteenth day of Nisan renders the new harvest permitted, even before the offering of the ‘Omer.

(3) Infra 68b.

(4) Of the new harvest.

(5) For only that which is permitted to Israel may be offered upon the altar; cf. Ezek. XLV, 15, and supra p. 20.

(6) Which were offered on Shabuoth, the Feast of Weeks. These are referred to as ‘a new meal-offering’. I.e., the first (wheaten) meal-offering of the new harvest; v. Lev. XXIII, 16, 17.

(7) That whatsoever is offered before the ‘Omer is invalid.

(8) Although the ‘Omer meal-offering had not yet been brought.

(9) In that it was brought of barley (and of bruised grain in contradistinction from the meal-offering of jealousy which was of barley meal) whereas all other meal-offerings consisted of wheat.

(10) Cf. Ex. XX, 21: And thou shalt slaughter upon it, implying that the altar shall be whole at the time of the service and not chipped. V. Zeb. 59a, and Hul. 18a.

(11) Lev. I, 3. In the preceding verse 2, the particle ‘of’ that precedes each of the classes of animals mentioned is utilized to exclude from sacrifices such animals as were used for irreligious or immoral purposes.
(12) V. Glos.
(13) And no verse therefore is required to teach that a Trefah animal is unfit for a sacrifice.
(14) Sc. to be offered upon the altar.
(15) I.e., the whole of the animal is permitted to be eaten except for these parts.
(16) Sc. the nipping. It is with the rite of nipping that the bird becomes consecrated and so forbidden to a layman; before that it was permitted.
(17) For without consecration a Trefah animal is forbidden to man. And so no verse is really necessary to exclude a Trefah animal from being offered as a sacrifice.
(18) What reasoning could be adduced to refute the foregoing argument derived from the rite of nipping that it was found necessary to resort to the verse to exclude a Trefah animal?
(19) Whereas a Trefah animal does not render anything permitted.
(20) When there is no new produce to be rendered permitted, for in this year the fields were to rest and lie fallow (cf. Ex. XXIII, 10, 11). Hence the ‘Omer meal-offering of this year is on the same footing as any Trefah animal in that neither can render anything else permitted; consequently by analogy with the ‘Omer meal-offering a Trefah animal should be permitted as a sacrifice, and therefore the verse is necessary to exclude the Trefah animal.
(21) V. Pes. 51b. The ‘Omer of this year therefore does not render anything permitted and is on all fours with a Trefah animal.
(22) And so it is not on a par with a Trefah animal which renders naught permitted.
(23) Sc. the prohibition of the new produce. If in the Sabbatical year a man were to eat of the remnants of the ‘Omer meal-offering, he would not be liable for eating of the new produce, for this prohibition has been raised by the offering of the ‘Omer, but would only incur guilt for eating of the produce of the Sabbatical year. V., however, Tosaf. s.v. פנים.
(24) And whosoever ate thereof would not be liable for eating what was Trefah.
(25) The ‘Omer meal-offering must be brought from the new produce of the year, for that is the very essence of the precept; on the other hand, it is not essential that only a Trefah animal shall be offered, any other animal would serve just as well.
(26) Cf. Ex. XXX, 34ff. Likewise it would be said that a Trefah animal, though forbidden to man, is permitted to the Most High. Hence a verse is necessary to exclude a Trefah animal.
(27) And how can it be said that he is permitted to the Most High?
(28) Cf. ibid. 37.
(29) But there is no express command to offer a Trefah animal!
(30) I.e., work on the Sabbath is forbidden to the layman, yet it is permitted to offer thereon the prescribed sacrifices.
(31) Which may be performed on the Sabbath. On the other hand there are no exceptions to the general prohibition of Trefah!
(32) For the Sabbath sacrifices can only be offered on the Sabbath.
(33) I.e., a texture blended of wool and linen; v. Lev. XIX, 19; Deut. XXII, 11.
(34) The High Priest whilst officiating in the Temple wore a girdle that was blended of wool and linen.
(35) Sc. the fringes; cf. Num. XV, 38ff; Deut. XXII, 12. It is permitted to attach fringes of wool to a linen garment, for the prohibition of diverse kinds of stuff does not apply to the precept of zizith.

Menachoth 6a

This is so of the law of diverse kinds since there is an express command that it shall be so.  

R. Shisha the son of R. Idi said, One could reply, Let the argument revolve and the inference be made from what is common to both. Thus, the argument, ‘This is so of the nipping since it is only rendered forbidden to man by this act which renders it consecrated’, can be refuted by the argument, ‘The fat and the blood can prove otherwise’. And the argument, ‘This is so of the fat and the blood since they emanate from what is permitted’, can be refuted by the argument, ‘The rite of nipping can prove otherwise’. And so the argument goes round; the characteristic feature of this case is not that of the other, and the characteristic feature of the other is not that of this case; but they have this also in common, have they not, that in each case there is an express command that it shall be so?
R. Ashi therefore said, One could reply that the first proposition of the argument is unsound. Whence did you infer its at the outset? From the case of a blemished animal. But the case of a blemish is different, since in that case [the priest] who offers [the sacrifice] is on the same footing as the [animal] offered.6

Whereupon R. Aha the Elder said to R. Ashi, That which was extracted from the side of the mother's womb can prove otherwise: for in that case [the priest] who offers [the sacrifice] is not on the same footing as the [animal] offered,7 nevertheless such an animal is permitted to man and forbidden to the Most High.8 [And if the objection is raised:] But this is so only of that which was extracted from the side of the mother's womb since it is not holy as a firstling;9 [I reply,] The case of an animal with a physical blemish can prove otherwise.10 [And if this objection is raised:] But this is so only in the case of a blemish since in that respect [the priest] who offers [the sacrifice] is on the same footing as the [animal] offered, [I reply,] That which was extracted from the side of the mother's womb can prove otherwise. And so the argument goes round; the characteristic feature of this case is not that of the other, and the characteristic feature of the other is not that of this case; but what they have in common is that each is permitted to man yet forbidden to the Most High, then surely Trefah, which is forbidden to man, is all the more forbidden to the Most High.11

Indeed the argument could be refuted thus, The others have this further in common, for in each case the defect thereof is perceptible;15 will you then say the same of the case of Trefah seeing that its defect is not perceptible? The verse is therefore necessary [to exclude Trefah]. And is the case of trefah derived from here?17 Surely it is derived from the verse, From the liquor of Israel,18 that is, from that which is permitted to Israel; or from the verse, Whatsoever passeth under the rod,19 which excludes a Trefah animal since it cannot pass under!20 — All [three verses] are necessary; for from the verse, ‘From the liquor of Israel’, I should have excluded only those that were at no time fit [for a sacrifice], just as ‘orlah2 or diverse kinds in the vineyard;23 but where it was at one time fit I would say that it is permitted [to be offered]. Scripture therefore states, ‘Whatsoever passeth under the rod’. And had Scripture only stated the verse, ‘Whatsoever passeth under the rod’, I should have excluded only those animals that were first rendered Trefah and subsequently consecrated, as in the case of the Cattle Tithe;24 but where it was consecrated first and subsequently it became Trefah, since at the time when it was consecrated it was fit [for a sacrifice], I would say that it is permitted [to be offered], therefore all [three verses] are necessary.
MISHNAH. WHETHER IT IS A SINNER'S MEAL-OFFERING OR ANY OTHER MEAL-OFFERING, IF A NON-PRIEST, OR [A PRIEST] THAT WAS IN MOURNING,25 OR HAD IMMERSED HIMSELF DURING THE DAY,26 OR WAS NOT WEARING THE [OFFICIAL PRIESTLY] ROBES,27 OR WHOSE ATONEMENT WAS NOT YET COMPLETE,28 OR THAT HAD NOT WASHED HIS HANDS AND FEET,29 OR THAT WAS UNCIRCUMCISED30 OR UNELEAN, OR THAT MINISTERED SITTING,31 OR STANDING UPON VESSELS OR UPON A BEAST OR UPON ANOTHER'S FEET,32 HAD TAKEN THE HANDFUL THEREFROM IT IS INVALID. IF [A PRIEST] REMOVED THE HANDFUL WITH HIS LEFT HAND IT IS INVALID.

BEN BATHYRA SAYS, HE MUST PUT [THE HANDFUL] BACK AND TAKE IT OUT AGAIN WITH THE RIGHT HAND. IF ON TAKING THE HANDFUL THERE CAME INTO HIS HAND A SMALL STONE OR A GRAIN OF SALT OR A DROP OF FRANKINCENSE IT IS INVALID;33 FOR THEY HAVE RULED: IF THE HANDFUL WAS TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE IT IS INVALID. WHAT IS MEANT BY TOO MUCH? IF HE TOOK AN OVERFLOWING HANDFUL. AND ‘TOO LITTLE’? IF HE TOOK THE HANDFUL WITH THE TIPS OF HIS FINGERS ONLY.34

GEMARA. Why does the Mishnah state: ‘WHETHER IT IS A SINNER’S MEAL-OFFERING OR ANY OTHER MEAL-OFFERING’? Surely it should state, ‘Every meal-offering from which the handful was taken by a non-priest or a priest that was in mourning [etc.]’. — It was necessary [to state it so] according to R. Simeon’s view. For it was taught: R. Simeon said, By right the sinner’s meal-offering should require oil and frankincense, so that the sinner should have no advantage;35 why then does it not require them? In order that his offering be not sumptuous. Also, by right an ordinary sin-offerings36 should require drink-offerings.37 (1) That the High Priest’s girdle shall be of wool and linen; cf. Ex. XXVIII. (2) V. supra p. 24, nn. 1 and 2. (3) Consequently the verse of Lev. I, 3 is necessary in order to exclude the Trefah animal from sacrifice. (4) But this is not the case with Trefah; so that it would not have been possible to infer the Trefah animal from the common features of the other two (sc. the fat and the blood and the rite of nipping), and therefore the verse is rendered superfluous. (5) That a Trefah animal might not be offered upon the altar. (6) But this is not so with Trefah, for a priest with a physical blemish is disqualified from offering sacrifices (cf Lev. XXI, 17ff). whereas a priest who is Trefah, i.e., who suffers from a serious organic disease, is still qualified to officiate in the Temple; cf. Bek. 45b. (7) A priest who at birth was extracted by a Caesarean operation from his mother's womb is considered fit to serve in the Temple, whereas an animal so extracted from the dam’s womb is not fit for a sacrifice. V. Lev. XXII, 27 and Sifra thereon. (8) And a Trefah animal would a fortiori be forbidden to the Most High, since it is even forbidden to man; hence the verse excluding Trefah is superfluous. (9) Whereas an animal that was born a Trefah is nevertheless holy as a firstling. (10) For an animal that was born with a physical blemish, although holy as a firstling, is nevertheless not permitted to the Most High. The same therefore would be said of Trefah, that although it is holy as a firstling it is forbidden to be offered. (11) Accordingly it could be held that a Trefah animal may be offered as a sacrifice. (12) V. Kid. 24b. (13) And with regard to the Most High it has been shown that there is also an exception to the general prohibition of physical blemishes in the case of birds. (14) Sc. the animal that is blemished and that which has been extracted from the womb. (15) For only an animal with a blemish exposed to the full view is declared to be unfit for sacrifice. Likewise an animal extracted from the side of its dam would be regarded as an object of curiosity, and so its peculiarity would soon be known to all. Trefah, on the other hand, is not always a perceptible taint, for it may be that only an internal organ has become affected. (16) That it is not fit to be offered as a sacrifice. (17) I.e., from Lev. I, 3; v. supra p. 23. (18) Ezek. XLV, 15; v. supra p. 20.
(19) Lev. XXVII, 32, with reference to the Cattle Tithe, but the rule that is here derived is applied to all sacrifices; cf. Bek. 57a.
(20) A Trefah animal, inasmuch as it cannot continue to live for more than twelve months (cf. Hul. 42a), is not deemed to possess vitality, and therefore cannot be said to pass of its own volition under the rod. Cf. however Rashi on Hul 136b where the suggestion is made that a Trefah animal, e.g., one whose hind-legs were cut off above the knee-joint (v. l.c. 76a), on account of its defect cannot physically pass under the rod. 
(21) E.g., an animal that was born Trefah. According to Rabbinic interpretation the verse in Ezek. contains an allusion to ‘orlah and to diverse kinds in the vineyard, and these were at no time ever allowed for any purpose. 
(22) Lit., ‘uncircumcised’. The fruit of newly-planted trees is during the first three years forbidden for all purposes. Cf. Lev. XIX, 23. 
(23) V. Deut. XXII, 9. 
(24) For the verse merely implies that a Trefah animal, since it cannot pass under the rod, is not subject to the law of Cattle Tithe; but an animal consecrated as the tithe always remains consecrated even though it subsequently becomes Trefah. 
(25) Heb. יושב a mourner while his dead relative is awaiting burial. Such a priest is forbidden to minister in the Temple, cf. Zeb. 16a. 
(26) Heb. מטבל יום; one who having suffered uncleanness has taken the ritual bath during the day but must now await sunset before he is deemed fully clean. He may not enter the Temple or minister therein. 
(27) V. Zeb. 17b. 
(28) One who, having suffered the uncleanness of leprosy or of an issue, has performed all the rites of purification but is not deemed fully clean until he has brought an offering as an atonement. V. Zeb. 19b. 
(29) Every priest was obliged to wash his hands and feet from the Temple laver daily before taking part in the service. Cf. Ex. XXX, 19, 20. 
(30) Whose brothers had died by reason of their circumcision. 
(31) For it is written, To stand to minister (Deut. XVIII, 5). 
(32) The priest must stand on the floor and nothing should interpose between his feet and the floor of the Temple. V. Zeb. 24a. 
(33) For the handful is not quite full since there is lacking flour to the extent of the volume of the stone or other substance that came up with it. 
(34) Instead of extending his fingers over the palm of his hand, v. infra 11a. 
(35) By being spared the cost of these ingredients. 
(36) Lit., ‘a sin-offering (to be brought on account) of (eating forbidden) fat’. This is the usual example of a transgression involving a sin-offering. 
(37) V. Num. XV, where are prescribed the quantities of flour and oil for the meal-offering and wine for the drink-offering which must accompany the burnt-offering and the peace-offering. 

so that the sinner should have no advantage; why then are they not required? In order that his offering be not sumptuous. Now I might have thought that, since R. Simeon laid down the principle ‘So that his offering be not sumptuous’, it should be valid even where an unfit person took out the handful, we are therefore informed [that even according to R. Simeon it is invalid]. If so, theretoo the Mishnah should have stated: ‘Whether it is an ordinary sin-offering or any other offering, if a non-priest or a priest that was in mourning received the blood... [it is invalid]’, and we would have explained that it was necessary [to be so stated] according to R. Simeon’s view. But it is clear that the expression ‘all’ stated in that [Mishnah], since it is not followed by the term ‘except’, includes every offering:2 then in our [Mishnah] too, had it stated ‘all’, inasmuch as it is not followed by the term except’, it would have included every offering! — It was indeed necessary [to be so stated]; for I might have thought that since we had established that the first Mishnah was not in accordance with the view of R. Simeon, the second Mishnah also was not in accordance with the view of R. Simeon, we are therefore informed [that even according to R. Simeon it is invalid].

Rab said, If a non-priest took the handful [from the meal-offering], he should put it back again [and it is valid]. But have we not learnt, IT IS INVALID? — ‘IT IS INVALID means, it is invalid so long as he had not put it back again. If so, is not
this identical with Ben Bathyra's view? — In the case where the handful is still here the Rabbis do not differ with Ben Bathyra at all;5 they differ only where the handful is no longer here, the Rabbis maintaining that one may not bring other flour from one's house to make up [the tenth],6 while Ben Bathyra maintains that one may bring other flour from one's house to make up [the tenth].7

But then, how can Ben Bathyra say, HE MUST PUT THE HANDFUL BACK AND TAKE IT OUT AGAIN WITH THE RIGHT HAND?8 He surely should have said, He should bring other flour from his house to make up [the tenth] and then take out the handful with the right hand! — Rather we must say that Rab said so according to Ben Bathyra.9 But is not this obvious? — [No, for] one might have thought that Ben Bathyra declared it valid only [in the case where the handful was taken out] with the left hand, but not where it was taken out by any of the persons that are unfit;10 he [Rab] therefore teaches us [that according to Ben Bathyra it is valid in all the cases]. But why [would the offering be valid where the handful was taken out] with the left hand? It is, is it not, because we find it11 allowed in the service of the Day of Atonement? Then in the case of a non-priest too, we find that he was allowed to perform a service, namely, the slaughtering! — The slaughtering is not regarded as a service.12 But is it not?

Has not R. Zera said in the name of Rab: If a non-priest slaughtered the Red Cow it is invalid; and Rab had explained the reason for it, namely, because the expressions ‘Eleazar’ and ‘statute’ are used in connection with it?13 — The case of the Red Cow is different, for it is in the category of things consecrated to the Temple treasury.14 But is it not all the more so here? For if in regard to things consecrated to the Temple treasury the priest is essential, how much more so in regard to things consecrated to the altar?15 —

R. Shisha the son of R. Idi said, It might be compared with the inspection of leprosy plagues, which is certainly not a Temple service, and yet requires a priest.16 Why do we not prove [that a non-priest may perform a service] from the case of the high place?17 Should you say, however, that we cannot prove it from the case of the high place;18 but surely it has been taught: Whence do we know that [sacrificial portions] which had been taken out [of the Sanctuary], if brought up upon the altar must not come down again?19 From the fact that at the high place what had been taken out was still valid to be offered!20 — The Tanna [there] really relies upon the verse, This is the law of the burnt-offering.21

Now we know this22 only because Rab informed us of it, but otherwise we should have said that [where the handful was taken out] by one of those that are unfit, Ben Bathyra declares it to be invalid; but surely it has been taught: R. Jose son of R. Judah and R. Eleazar b. R. Simeon said, Ben Bathyra declares it valid even [where the handful was taken out] by one of those that are unfit! Moreover it has been taught: It is written, And he shall take his handful from there,23 that is, from the place where the feet of the non-priest may stand.24

Ben Bathyra says, Whence do we know that if he took the handful with the left hand, he should put it back again and then take it out with the right hand? Because the verse says, ‘And he shall take his handful from there’, that is, from the place from which he has already taken a handful.25 Now since the verse does not specify [the causes why the handful should have been returned], then it is all the same whether [it was originally taken] with the left hand or [taken] by any one of those that were unfit? —

Rather it is this that Rab teaches us, that if he had taken out the handful and had even hallowed it [by putting it into the vessel of
ministry, it may nevertheless be put back again]. Rab thus rejects the view of the following Tannaim; for it was taught: R. Jose b. Yassian and R. Judah the baker said, This is so only where he had taken out the handful and had not yet hallowed it, but where he had also hallowed it, it is invalid.

Others report [that this is what Rab teaches us], that only if he had taken out the handful it is [valid], but if he had also hallowed it, it is not [valid] — Rab thus agrees with the view of those Tannaim and rejects the view of the first Tanna.

R. Nahman demurred: What is the view of those Tannaim? If they hold that the taking of the handful by persons unfit is regarded as a service, [then it should be invalid] even though it had not been put into a vessel? And if they hold that the taking of the handful by persons unfit is not regarded as a service, then what does it matter even if it had been put into a vessel? — Later, however, R. Nahman said, It is indeed regarded as a service, but the service is not complete until [the handful] has been put into a vessel.

(1) In Zeb., at the opening of Chap. II, 15b, the Mishnah states: ‘All offerings are invalid if a non-priest... received the blood’. That Mishnah, following the example of our Mishnah, should surely have specified the case of the sin-offering, thereby indicating that it was also in accordance with R. Simeon’s view.

(2) Even the sin-offering and with this R. Simeon does in no wise disagree.

(3) Even the sinner’s meal-offering. And so the original question stands: Why does not our Mishnah state ‘All meal-offerings...’?

(4) V. supra p. 4.

(5) All hold that the handful should be put back and taken out again by the proper person.

(6) The vessel, which held a tenth part of an ephah, in which, according to the view of the Rabbis, the meal-offering was consecrated. If after the consecration in this vessel the flour of the meal-offering had been diminished it at once becomes invalid.

(7) For he is of the opinion that it is the taking of the handful that renders the meal-offering consecrated and not merely the putting of the flour into the vessel.

(8) Since it is assumed that the handful is no longer here, how can Ben Bathya say, ‘He must put it back’?

(9) I.e., Rab interpreted Ben Bathya’s ruling to apply not only to the case where the handful was taken out with the left hand but also to all the preceding cases enumerated in the Mishnah where the handful was taken out by a person unfit.

(10) Lit., ‘the other (cases of) unfit persons’.

(11) Sc. the left hand. On the Day of Atonement the High Priest used both hands in the course of the day’s service; cf. M. Yoma 47a.

(12) For in no instance do we find that it was essential that the priest shall perform the slaughtering; v. Tosaf. supra 5a, s.v. שְׁחִיטָה, 1.

(13) Cf. Num. XIX, 2, 3. Thus showing that the slaughtering must be performed by Eleazar i.e., by a priest and by none else, for the expression ‘statute’ indicates that that requirement is indispensable. Hence it is obvious that the slaughtering is considered a service of importance.

(14) The reason why the slaughtering of the Red Cow must not be performed by a non-priest is not that the slaughtering is a service, for there are no ‘services’ in regard to things consecrated to the Temple treasury; but it is an express decree of the Torah that it shall be performed by a priest.

(15) Nevertheless it is established that animals consecrated to the altar may be slaughtered by a non-priest. Hence we find that a service performed by a non-priest is allowed just in the same way as a service performed with the left hand; and the same equality should be upheld in the case of the handful taken from the meal-offering.

(16) Cf. Lev. XIII. And so it is with the slaughtering of the Red Cow: it is not a Temple service, nevertheless it requires a priest.

(17) For whenever the high places (i.e., private altars) were allowed—which was before the Tabernacle had been set up in the wilderness—non-priests were allowed to perform the services there (v. Zeb. 118a), so that Rab’s statement is superfluous.

(18) Since at that time Aaron and his sons had not yet been consecrated for service; so that one cannot infer from the conditions prevailing at the high places that a non-priest may perform a service.

(19) V. Zeb. 84a.

(20) For there were no restrictions as to place in connection with a sacrifice offered at a high place. It is seen however, that a rule of law is actually inferred from the case of the high place.

(21) Lev. VI, 2. These are the laws of the High Place, i.e., there is one law for all offerings that are brought up upon the
altar, for even though they have been rendered unfit, once they have been brought up upon the altar they must not come down again. The Heb, עולה, rendered ‘burnt-offering’, is from the root עלי, meaning ‘to come up’. The Tanna of the Baraitha certainly did not intend to draw the authority for the law stated from the case of the high place; he merely used it as a support for that law.

(22) That, according to Ben Bathyra, where an unfit person took the handful from the meal-offering, he should put it back again and the offering remains valid.

(23) Ibid. II, 2.

(24) I.e., the rite of taking the handful from the meal-offering may be performed anywhere in the Temple court, even in the space of eleven cubits, on the east side of the court, where laymen were allowed to stand (cf. Yoma 16b).

(25) But which was put back again, as it was not in accordance with the law.

(26) And it is valid according to Ben Bathyra.

(27) In cur. edd. ‘R. Jose b. Jose b. Yasian’. The repetition ‘Jose b.’ is no doubt due to a scribal error; it is not found in MS.M. nor in Rashi.

(28) That according to Ben Bathyra the handful may be put back again and another taken out.

(29) Who disagrees with R. Jose and R. Judah and who presumably holds that Ben Bathyra declares it valid even though it had already been put into a vessel of ministry.

(30) For it has already been rendered invalid by the service performed by the unfit person, and this can in no wise be remedied.

(31) Since what was performed by persons unfit is not regarded as a service, then even if it was put into a vessel of ministry by such persons it would still be of no consequence; it should therefore be put back again, and once again taken out by the proper person.

(32) So that the act of an unfit person will render invalid only if he performed a complete service; in this case by putting the handful which he had taken out into a vessel of ministry.

Menachoth 7a

But surely when he puts the handful back again into its place it thus becomes holy, consequently it should be invalid! —

R. Johanan said, This proves that vessels of ministry hallow what they [intentionally] put into vessels of ministry so that it should be permitted to offer it [upon the altar] in the first instance?’ and he replied, ‘They cannot hallow it’? — [He meant.] They cannot hallow it so that it should be permitted to be offered up, but they can hallow it so that [through their act] it is rendered invalid.

R. Amram said, We must suppose here that he put it back into a heaped up bowl. Then how could he have taken out the handful originally [from this vessel]? Rather [say] he put it back into a brimful bowl. But surely when he took out the handful he left a hollow, so that when he puts it back again he puts it into the vessel, does he not? — He put it back on to the sides of the vessel and he then shook it so that it fell back of its own into the vessel; and it is the same as though it were put back by a monkey.

R. Jeremiah said to R. Zera, Why not suggest that he put it back into a vessel which was upon the ground? We can then infer from this that one may take out the handful from a vessel which is upon the ground! — He replied, You are now touching upon a question that was raised by our [colleagues]. For Abimi was studying the Tractate Menahoth under R. Hisda. (But did Abimi even study under R. Hisda? Did not R. Hisda say, ‘Many were the blows that I received from Abimi upon the following subject: If [the Court] intend to announce [the sale of the property] daily, it must be done during thirty days; if only on Mondays and Thursdays, it must be done during sixty days?’)

Abimi had forgotten this Tractate and so he went to R. Hisda that he might be reminded of it. Why did he not send for him, that he [R. Hisda] should come to him? — He thought that in this way he would make better progress.) R. Nahman once met him [Abimi] and asked him, ‘How does one take out the
handful?’ He replied. ‘Out of this vessel’. Said the other, ‘And may one take the handful out of a vessel that is upon the ground?’ He replied, ‘A priest has to lift it up’. ‘And how does one hallow the handful taken from the meal-offering?’ [asked R. Nahman]. He replied, ‘One should put it into this vessel’. ‘But may one hallow it by putting it into a vessel that is upon the ground?’ He replied, ‘A priest has to lift it up’.

Said R. Nahman, ‘Then you require three priests?’ He replied, ‘[I don’t mind] if thirteen are required as with the Daily Sacrifice’. He raised the following objection: [We have learnt:] This is the general rule: if one took out the handful or put it into the vessel or brought it nigh or burnt it, [intending] to eat a thing that it is usual to eat [outside its proper place], etc. Now there is no mention here of lifting up [the vessel]! — The Tanna merely teaches the order of the various services.

The question was put to R. Shesheth: May one take the handful from a vessel that is upon the ground? He answered, Go and see what is done within [the Temple]: Four priests entered in, two having in their hands the two rows [of Showbread] and two the two dishes [of frankincense]; and four priests went in before them, two to take away the two rows and two to take away the two dishes.

(1) The words ‘if so even though he had not hallowed it’, inserted here in cur. edd., are obviously superfluous and are omitted by MS.M., and Sh. Mek.

(2) For when the non-priest puts back the handful he thereby completes the service, for it surely does not matter into which particular vessel of ministry he returns the handful, whether into another vessel or into the same vessel from which it was taken.

(3) In order to become hallowed. In this case, however, the unfit person puts the handful back again into the vessel out of which it was taken without intending it to become holy thereby.

(4) Even though it had been put in by a non-priest or by any other person that was unfit.

(5) Since it was intentionally put into a vessel of ministry by an unfit person for the purpose of hallowing it, the service has been completed by an unfit person, and so it is invalid and there can be no remedy. But is it quite different in-the case where the handful was put back into the vessel but not for the purpose of hallowing it thereby.

(6) This is the reason why the handful is not hallowed when put back into the vessel from which it was taken.

(7) For only that which is in the vessel of ministry is hallowed by the vessel and not that which is above it.

(8) Since he must take the handful from that which is in the vessel.

(9) I.e., it was put back into the vessel not directly by the act of man; it is therefore not hallowed. Cf. infra 100b.

(10) And that is the reason why it does not become hallowed.

(11) Since this suggestion is not made.

(12) And that likewise one may put the handful into a vessel of ministry that is upon the ground.

(13) When the Court have valued the property of orphans and are proposing to sell it in order to meet the father's debts, they must announce the sale either daily for a period of thirty days, or on Mondays and Thursdays (these being the days when the Courts sat) for a period of sixty days. V. ‘Ar. 22a.

(14) Since R. Hisda was the pupil.

(15) By Abimi putting himself out so as to go to R. Hisda to study. Cf. Meg. 6b.

(16) At that moment there happened to be a vessel lying before them on the ground.

(17) One to hold the vessel containing the meal-offering, a second to hold the vessel into which the handful is to be put, and a third to take the handful out of the one and put it into the other. This number of priests was necessary as, it must be remembered, only the right hand was to be used in any service, and therefore one priest could not hold the two vessels, one in each hand. It was, however, possible for the one priest to hold both vessels, one after the other, so that only two priests would be necessary. V. Sh. Mek.

(18) V. Yoma 25a.

(19) Infra 12a.

(20) Which can all be performed by the same priest; the Tanna, however, did not intend to give the number of priests employed in each service. The words ‘but not the order of the priests’, found in cur. edd., are obviously a gloss, and are omitted in MS.M. and also in Sh. Mek.

(21) V. Infra 99b.
Menachoth 7b

Now there is no mention here of lifting up [the table]. But was not the answer given in the former case that the Tanna merely stated the order of the services? Then in this case too [we can say that] he only states the order of the services! — Surely there is no comparison; there the Tanna does not state the number of priests, but here he does state the number of the priests. Now if [your contention were] right, he certainly should have mentioned [the priest] who lifts up [the table]! This proves that one may take the handful from a vessel that is upon the ground. This indeed proves it.

Raba said, I am certain that one may take the handful from a vessel that is upon the ground, for we find that this was so at the taking away of the dishes [of frankincense]. Also that one may hallow the meal-offering by putting [the meal] into a vessel that is upon the ground, for we find that this was so at the setting down the dishes. Raba however was in doubt, What is the law with regard to the hallowing of the handful? Are we to derive it from the meal-offering itself or from the receiving of the blood? Later Raba decided that we must derive it from the receiving of the blood. But could Raba have said so? Surely it has been stated: If the handful was divided [and put] into two vessels, R. Nahman says, It is not hallowed; and Raba says, It is hallowed. Now if [the above decision] were right, then this too he should derive from the blood. — Raba retracted from that opinion. Whence do we know that if the blood was divided [in separate vessels] it is not hallowed? —

From the following which R. Tahlifa b. Saul learnt: If one mixed less than the quantity required for sprinkling in one vessel and again less than the quantity required for sprinkling in another vessel, the mixing is not valid. And the question was raised, How is it with regard to the blood? Is that a traditional law, and from a traditional law one may not draw any inferences; or is it so there because it is written, And he shall dip it in the water, then here also it is written, And he shall dip [his finger] in the blood? And it was stated: R. Zerika said in the name of R. Eleazar, Even in the case of the blood it is not hallowed.

Raba said, There has been taught [a Baraita] also to this effect: It is written, And he shall dip, but not wipe up; in the blood, that is, there must be at the very beginning sufficient blood [in the one vessel] for dipping; [and shall sprinkle] of the blood, that is, of the blood spoken of in the context. And the expressions ‘and he shall dip’ and ‘in the blood’ are both necessary. For had the Divine Law only stated, ‘And he shall dip’. I might have said that [it was valid] even though [the priest] had not received at the very beginning sufficient blood [in the one vessel] for dipping; it therefore stated, ‘In the blood’. And had the Divine Law only stated, ‘In the blood’, I might have said that he may even wipe up [the blood]; it therefore stated, ‘And he shall dip’. ‘[Of the blood], that is, of the blood spoken of in the context’. What does this exclude? —

Raba said, It excludes the blood that is still clinging to the finger. This supports R. Eleazar who said, The blood that is still clinging to the finger is not valid [for sprinkling].

Rabin son of R. Adda said to Raba, Your pupils report that R. ‘Amram raised [an objection from the following]: It was taught: If, while sprinkling, some blood dripped from his hand [on to a garment], if this happened before he had made the sprinkling it must be washed, but if after he had made the sprinkling it need not be washed. Presumably the meaning is: before he had finished the sprinkling, and after he had finished the
sprinkling.  — No, the meaning is: if it happened before the blood had left his hand in an act of sprinkling it must be washed, but if after the blood had left his hand it need not be washed.

Abaye raised an objection: [We have learnt:] When he had finished sprinkling he wiped his hand on the cow's body. [Now] only when he had finished then did he [wipe his hand], but before he had finished he did not! He replied. When he had finished he wiped his hand, before he had finished he wiped his finger only. It is well [to say] 'When he had finished he wiped his hand on the cow's body', for it is written, And the cow shall be burnt in his sight; but [to say] 'Before he had finished he wiped his finger' [is difficult], for on what would he wipe it? — Abaye answered, On the edge of the basin, as it is written, Bowls of gold.

But could R. Eleazar have said that? Behold it has been stated: The meal-offering of the High Priest R. Johanan says, is not hallowed [if brought] a half at a time. R. Eleazar says. Since it is offered a half at a time it is hallowed [if brought] a half at a time.

(1) So as to avoid taking away the frankincense from a table that is standing upon the ground. Obviously then this does not matter at all. And it is to be observed that the services touching the frankincense and the Showbread correspond with the services relating to the handful and the meal-offering in the following respects: the frankincense was taken away each week from the table, the handful was taken from of the meal-offering; frankincense was put upon the table each week, the meal for the meal-offering was put into a vessel of ministry. And just as the burning of the frankincense rendered the Showbread permitted to be eaten, so the burning of the handful rendered the rest of the meal-offering permitted to be eaten, for each is described in the Torah as 'a memorial', cf. Lev. II, 2, and XXIV, 7.

(2) I.e., the main services; whereas lifting up is a service of little significance.

(3) That whatsoever is put into a vessel of ministry that is upon the ground is not thereby hallowed.

(4) v. p. 38, n. 5.

(5) And just as the other services in connection with the meal-offering may be performed in a vessel that is upon the ground, so the handful would be hallowed if put into a vessel that is on the ground.

(6) It has already been stated that the four main services in the procedure of a meal-offering, viz., taking out the handful, hallowing it by putting it into a vessel, bringing it nigh to the altar and burning it, correspond respectively to the four main services of animal sacrifices, viz., slaughtering, receiving the blood, bringing it nigh to the altar and sprinkling it.

Now just as the blood of an animal-offering may not be received in a vessel that is on the ground (v. Lev. I, 5: And Aaron's sons, the priests, shall present the blood, and Sifra thereon), so the handful of the meal-offering may not be hallowed by putting it into a vessel that is upon the ground.

(7) And the blood of an animal-offering may not be received in two separate vessels (v. infra).

(8) And he subsequently accepted R. Nahman's view, namely that if the handful was divided and put into two vessels it is not hallowed.

(9) Lit., 'sanctified'. The reference is to the mixing of the ashes of the Red Cow with water; cf. Num. XIX, 17.

(10) Even though subsequently the two quantities when combined in one vessel amounted to the required quantity. For the required quantity v. Parah XII, 5: 'Sufficient for the tips of the hyssop stalks to be dipped therein and water sufficient to be sprinkled.'

(11) Sc. the ruling in connection with the mixing of the ashes of the Red Cow.

(12) Sc. the blood of offerings which had to be sprinkled seven times within, i.e., upon the golden altar and towards the veil. The question is: May the priest receive the blood, say sufficient for four sprinklings in one vessel and sufficient for three in another vessel?

(13) Num. XIX, 18. The use of the definite article, 'in the water', indicates that all the water must be in one vessel.

(14) Lev. IV, 6. Here too the definite article is used, 'in the blood'.

(15) If the blood was received half in one vessel and half in another.

(16) Lev. ibid.

(17) The priest must dip his finger in the blood and not scrape up the blood from the sides of the bowl with his finger.

(18) The priest must dip his finger in the bowl of blood for each sprinkling and not sprinkle twice with one dipping. He must sprinkle each time of the blood that is mentioned in the context, that is of the blood in the bowl and not of the blood that is on his finger.
(19) Lit., ‘the remnant’.

(20) Sc., the splashing of the blood on to the garment.


(22) I.e., if some blood had splashed on the garment at any time during the course of the seven sprinklings. e.g., after the second sprinkling but before the priest had dipped his finger into the bowl a third time, it must be washed, for the blood that fell upon the garment might well have been used for a further sprinkling; hence it is evident that blood still clinging to the finger is valid for sprinkling, contra R. Eleazar and Raba. On the other hand, if the blood fell on to the garment after the seven sprinklings had been performed, it does not require to be washed, for the blood could not have been used for sprinkling.

(23) I.e., after an act of sprinkling some blood that was still clinging to his finger fell upon the garment.

(24) Sc. the blood of the Red Cow seven times towards the Holy of Holies. V. Parah III, 9.

(25) For presumably the blood still clinging to his finger is valid for sprinkling, and therefore he need not wipe it away; contra R. Eleazar and Raba.

(26) I.e., between each sprinkling.

(27) Num. XIX, 5. After sprinkling the blood towards the Holy of Holies the priest would come down from the Temple mount, wipe his hand on the cow’s body, and then the cow would be burnt in his presence.

(28) It surely cannot be suggested that after each of the seven sprinklings the priest must come down from the Temple mount and wipe his finger on the cow’s body. Indeed if he did so the sprinkling that followed might be invalid, for some hairs of the cow’s body might adhere to his finger. In cur. edd. there is an obvious gloss added in the text, but it has been struck out by all commentators. It is not found in MS.M.

(29) Ezra I, 10. The sprinkling bowls are here designated מessoa, which word is derived from the root מס ‘to wipe’; i.e., bowls on whose rim the priests used to wipe away the blood from their fingers.

(30) That if the blood was received half in one vessel and half in another, it is not hallowed thereby.

(31) V. Lev. VI, 13, 14. This meal-offering prepared on a griddle (המבשון ממחבת) consisting of a tenth part of an ephah of fine flour, was offered by the High Priest daily; half of it in the morning and half in the evening.

Now if he held that view, he would surely derive [the ruling in the case of the High Priest's meal-offering] from the blood! And should you say that R. Eleazar does not derive one case from another, but R. Eleazar has actually ruled: If the taking of the handful from the meal-offering was performed in the Temple, it is valid, since we find that the taking away of the dishes [of frankincense was regularly performed there]! — He derives [the rules of] one meal-offering from another meal-offering, but he does not derive [the rules of] a meal-offering from the blood. But does he derive one meal-offering from another meal-offering? Surely it has been taught: If a loaf was broken before its had been removed, the Showbread is invalid, and [the priest] may not burn on account of it the dishes of frankincense; if a loaf was broken after its had been removed, the Showbread is invalid, but he may burn on account of it the dishes of frankincense.

Whereupon R. Eleazar had said, [The expression ‘after it had been removed’] does not mean that its had actually been removed, but rather that the time for removing it had come about, and although it had not yet been removed it is regarded as already removed. But why is this so? Surely it ought to be regarded as a meal-offering which was found to be lacking before the handful had been taken therefrom! — That is really no difficulty, for in a meal-offering the handful is not separate, whereas here [in the Showbread] the handful is separate. But this is a difficulty: surely this case ought to be on a par with the remainder of a meal-offering which was found to be lacking after the handful had been taken therefrom but before it had been burnt, in which case the handful may not be burnt! — There is, is there not, a difference of opinion about this?
R. Eleazar is of the same opinion as him who says that where the remainder of the meal-offering was found to be lacking after the handful had been taken therefrom but before it had been burnt, the handful may indeed be burnt. The text [above] stated: ‘The meal-offering of the High Priest, R. Johanan says, is not hallowed [if brought] a half at a time. R. Eleazar says, Since it is offered a half at a time it is hallowed [if brought] a half at a time’. R. Aha said, What is R. Johanan’s reason? Because the verse reads, For a meal-offering... half of it in the morning;12 that is to say, he must bring a meal-offering13 and then he shall divide it in halves.

An objection was raised: [We have learnt:] The meal-offering of the High Priest may not be brought in [two separate] halves, but he must bring a whole tenth and then divide it. And it has been taught: Had Scripture stated, ‘For a meal-offering a half’, I should then have said that he must bring a half tenth from his house in the morning and offer it, and a half tenth from his house in the evening and offer it; but Scripture states, ‘Half of it in the morning’, that is, he must offer half of the whole tenth!14 — This is only a recommendation.15 Thereupon R. Gebiha of Bekathil said to R. Ashi, But is not the term ‘statute’16 used in connection with it? — He replied: That merely indicates that he must bring the whole [tenth] from his house.17

But did R. Johanan actually say that?18 Behold it has been stated: If a man set aside [in a vessel of ministry] a half tenth [of flour for his meal-offering]19 intending to add to it [to make up the tenth], Rab says, It is not hallowed; R. Johanan says, It is hallowed. Now if he held that view,18 he would surely derive [the ruling in this case] from that of the High Priest’s meal-offering.20 Should you say, however, that R. Johanan does not derive one case from another, but R. Johanan has actually ruled: If a peace-offering was slaughtered in the Temple it is valid, for it is written, And he shall slaughter it at the door of the tent of meeting,21 and surely the accessory cannot be more important than the principal!22 — It is different where he intended to add to it.23 For it has been taught: It is written Full;24 and full means nothing else but the whole amount. And R. Jose said, When is this so?25 Only when there is no intention to make up [the full amount], but when there is an intention to make up [the full amount], then each part26 [as it is put into the vessel of ministry] is hallowed.

Whose view does Rab accept with regard to the High Priest's meal-offering? If you say R. Eleazar's, then he should surely derive [the ruling in the case of an ordinary meal-offering] from the High Priest's meal-offering.28 And should you say that Rab does not derive one case from another, but Rab has actually said, A meal-offering is hallowed [even though it was put into the vessel of ministry] without oil, since we find it so in the case of the Shewbread;29 without frankincense, since we find it so in the case of the drink-offerings;30 without oil and without frankincense, since we find this in the case of the sinner's meal-offering?31 —

We must therefore say that Rab accepts R. Johanan's view.32 The text [above] stated: ‘Rab said, A meal-offering is hallowed [even though it was put into the vessel of ministry] without oil, since we find it so in the case of the Showbread; without frankincense, since we find it so in the case of the drink-offerings; without oil and without frankincense, since we find this in the case of the sinner's meal-offering’. Moreover the oil and the frankincense are hallowed [in the vessel of ministry] alone, one without the other: the oil [without the flour and the frankincense], since we find it so in the case of the log of oil of the leper;33 and the frankincense [without the flour and oil], since we find it so in the case of the dishes of frankincense. But R. Hanina said,

(1) And he would declare the meal-offering of the High Priest invalid if it was brought a half tenth at
a time, just as it is invalid, according to R. Eleazar, if the blood of an animal offering was received in two vessels.
(2) The taking of the handful from the meal-offering was usually performed in the Temple court and not in the Temple proper.
(3) And the taking away of the dishes of frankincense was considered equal to the taking of the handful from the meal-offering (v. supra p. 38, n. 5).
(4) I.e., from the Showbread which is regarded as a meal-offering.
(5) Sc. the two rows of loaves and the dishes of frankincense.
(6) I.e., at the seventh hour of the day (that is an hour after mid-day) on the Sabbath; v. Pes. 58a.
(7) That the frankincense may be burnt when a loaf was broken after the time for the removal of the Showbread from the table had arrived.
(8) In which case the handful may not be burnt upon the altar; and here the Showbread has not in fact been removed from the table. Since, however, the ruling is that the frankincense may be offered, it is evident that R. Eleazar does not derive one meal-offering from the other.
(9) I.e., from the Showbread which is regarded as a meal-offering.
(10) Sc. the dishes of frankincense. These stand apart from the bread, so that when the time for their removal has arrived one can well consider them as already having been removed.
(11) V. infra 9a.
(12) Lev. VI, 13.
(13) I.e., a whole meal-offering which must consist of a tenth part of an ephah of flour.
(14) Hence an objection against R. Eleazar.
(15) Lit., ‘for a precept’. I.e., it should be performed in this manner; nevertheless it is hallowed even though brought a half tenth at a time.
(16) Ibid. VI, 15. The term ‘statute’ implies that there must be no infringement or variation of the prescribed rites.
(17) But as for hallowing in a vessel of ministry this may be done a half tenth at a time.
(18) That the High Priest’s meal-offering is not hallowed if brought half at a time.
(19) The minimum quantity of flour for a meal-offering is one tenth part of an ephah.
(20) And as the High Priest’s meal-offering is not hallowed, according to R. Johanan, if brought a half at a time, so it should be also with every meal-offering.
(21) Lev. III, 2.
(22) If the slaughtering may take place in the Temple court, how much more so in the Temple itself! Thus R. Johanan derives the slaughtering in the Temple from the slaughtering in the Temple court.
(23) In that case each part as it is put into the vessel of ministry is hallowed.
(24) Num. VII, 13: Both of them full of fine flour.
(25) That anything less than the whole amount is not hallowed.
(26) Lit., ‘the first, the first’.
(27) Who in the case of an ordinary meal-offering ruled that if only part of it was put into a vessel of ministry it was not hallowed.
(28) And just as the High Priest's meal-offering is hallowed in part (so according to R. Eleazar) so it should be with an ordinary meal-offering too. Nevertheless in the latter case Rab expressly said that it was not hallowed in part.
(29) Which is deemed to be a meal-offering and yet no oil went with it.
(30) Which accompanied most sacrifices, consisting of quantities of flour and oil for a meal-offering and wine for a libation, but no frankincense went with it. V. Ibid. XV, 1ff.
(31) V. Lev. V, 11, We thus see that Rab derives one case from the other by analogy.
(32) That the High Priest’s meal-offering may not be hallowed a half at a time, just as Rab himself expressly ruled in connection with an ordinary meal-offering.
(33) Which was not accompanied by flour and frankincense; V. Lev. XIV, 10ff.

Menachoth 8b

The one is not hallowed without the other.1 Then according to R. Hanina why was the tenth measure anointed?2 — To measure the sinner's meal-offering.3 And why was the log measure anointed? — To measure the log of oil of the leper. Samuel, too, is of the same opinion as Rab.4 For we have learnt:5 The vessels for liquids hallow liquids, and the measuring vessels for dry stuffs hallow dry stuffs; the vessels for liquids cannot hallow dry stuffs neither can the measuring vessels for dry stuffs hallow liquids. And Samuel had said, This applies only to the measuring vessels [for liquids], but the sprinkling bowls hallow also dry stuffs, for it is written, Both of them full of fine flour mingled with oil for a meal-offering.6

R. Aha of Difti said to Rabina. But this meal-offering is moist!7 — He replied. It refers
particularly to the dry parts of the flour.8 Alternatively,8 I may say, In comparison with blood a meal-offering [though mingled with oil] is regarded as dry stuff. The text [above] stated: ‘R. Eleazar said, If the taking of the handful from the meal-offering was performed in the Temple it is valid, since we find that the taking away of the dishes [of frankincense was regularly performed there]’.’10

R. Jeremiah raised an objection: It is written, And he shall take his handful from there,11 that is, from the place where the feet of the non-priest may stand.12 Ben Bathya says, Whence do we know that if he took the handful with the left hand he should put it back again and then take it with his right hand? Because the verse says, ‘And he shall take his handful from there’, that is, from the place from which he has already taken a handful! — Some say that he [R. Jeremiah] raised the objection and he himself answered it [as stated below].

Others report that R. Jacob said to R. Jeremiah b. Tahlifa, I will explain it to you: That [verse] merely serves to teach us that [the rite of taking the handful] may be performed in any part of the Temple court; and you should not argue that since the burnt-offering is most holy and the meal-offering is most holy, therefore as the burnt-offering must be [slaughtered] on the north side [of the Temple court]13 so the meal-offering must be [attended to] on the north side. But surely the case of the burnt-offering is different, since it is wholly burnt!14 — Then [one could argue in the same way] from the sin-offering.15 But surely the case of the sin-offering is different, since it atones for those [who committed an act inadvertently which, had they committed it willfully, would have made them] liable to kareth!16 — Then [one could argue in the same way] from the guilt-offering.15 Again the case of the guilt-offering is different, since it effects atonement by blood!17 Nor [could one argue in the same way] from all these [sacrifices taken together].18 since all these [are different from the meal-offering since they] effect atonement by blood! — That [verse] is indeed necessary, for I might have thought that since it is written, And it shall be presented unto the priest, and he shall bring it unto the altar,19 and [then it says] ‘and he shall take out the handful’,20 therefore just as the meal-offering was brought unto the south-west corner of the altar21 so the handful was to be taken out at the south-west corner of the altar; we are therefore taught22 [that it may be performed in any part of the Temple court]. The text [above] stated: ‘R. Johanan said, If a peace-offering was slaughtered in the Temple it is valid, for it is written, And he shall slaughter it at the door of the tent of meeting,23 and surely the accessory cannot be more important than the principal!’

An objection was raised: R. Judah b. Bathya said, Whence do we know that, if the Temple court was surrounded by gentiles,24 the priests may enter the Temple and eat there the most holy meat and the remainder of the meal-offerings? Because the verse says,

(1) I.e., all the ingredients of the meal-offering must be put in together into the vessel of ministry.
(2) To render it consecrated as a vessel of ministry. The tenth measure was a vessel of ministry holding the tenth part of an ephah which was used for measuring the flour of a meal-offering. But as the flour by itself, without oil and without frankincense, is not hallowed when put into this measuring vessel, then it was obviously unnecessary to have anointed this vessel as a sacred vessel. The same argument applies to the log, a vessel of ministry used for measuring oil only.
(3) Which consisted of flour only, without oil and frankincense; v. Lev. V, 11.
(4) That the vessel of ministry hallows the flour alone without the other ingredients.
(5) Zeb. 88a.
(6) Num. VII, 13. It is evident that the sprinkling bowl (mentioned previously in this verse) hallowed the flour that was put into it.
(7) For it is mingled with oil. Hence there is no proof from this verse that the sprinkling bowl can hallow dry goods.
(8) Although the flour was mingled with oil, it is inconceivable that every particle of the flour was moistened; nevertheless all the flour was hallowed in this bowl, obviously because the sprinkling bowl can hallow dry goods.

(9) In cur. edd. there is found here a passage of several lines enclosed within brackets. It is not found in any MS., and has been struck out by all commentators as a gloss.

(10) V. p. 42, nn. 7 and 8.

(11) Lev. II, 2.

(12) V. supra p. 34, n. 7. It is, however, evident from this that the rite of taking the handful must be performed in the Temple court only, and not in the Temple, contra R. Eleazar. The teaching of Ben Bathrya which follows is merely the continuation of the Baraitha quoted but it does not affect the argument at all.

(13) Ibid I, 11.

(14) How then could one apply the same to the meal-offering?

(15) Which is also a most holy offering and must be slaughtered in the north.

(16) V. Glos.

(17) Cf. Lev. XVII, 11. The meal-offering, however, does not effect atonement by blood.

(18) By arriving at the points they all have in common, viz., they are all most holy, and all must be slaughtered on the north side of the Temple court. Similarly it would be said of the meal-offering, that the rite of taking the handful must be performed at the north side of the Temple court only!

(19) Ibid II, 8.

(20) This is the purport of verse (9) which follows: And the priest shall take off from the meal-offering the memorial thereof.

(21) V. infra 19b.

(22) By the verse And he shall take the handful from there (ibid 2).

(23) Lev. III, 2. V. supra 45, n. 2.

(24) And so it became dangerous to remain in the Temple court or to eat there consecrated meat.

It was stated: If the meal-offering was mingled outside the walls of the Temple court. R. Johanan says, It is invalid; Resh Lakish says, It is valid. ‘Resh Lakish says, it is valid’, for it is written, And he shall pour oil upon it, and put frankincense thereon, and then, And he shall bring it to Aaron's sons the priests; and he shall take thereout his handful; hence from the taking of the handful begins the duty of the priesthood. This therefore teaches us that the pouring [of the oil upon the meal-offering] and the mingling [of the oil with the flour] are valid [even if done] by non-priests. Now since [the mingling] does not require the services of the priesthood, it likewise need not be performed within [the Temple court]. ‘R. Johanan says, it is invalid’, for since it must be prepared in a vessel [of ministry], even though it does not require the services of the priesthood, it must nevertheless be performed within [the Temple court]. There is a Baraitha in support of R. Johanan's view; for it has been taught: If a non-priest mingled it, it is valid; if it was mingled outside the walls of the Temple court it is invalid.

It was stated: If the meal-offering had diminished before the handful was taken from it, R. Johanan says, He may bring [flour] from his house to fill up the measure; Resh Lakish says, He may not bring [flour] from his house to fill up the measure. R. Johanan says, He may bring [flour] from his house to fill up the measure, for it is the taking of the handful that determines it [for a meal-offering]. ‘Resh Lakish says, He may not bring [flour] from his house to fill up the
measure’, for it is the hallowing of the vessel that determines it [for a meal-offering].

9 R. Johanan then raised this objection against Resh Lakish: We have learnt: If the [oil in the] log was found to be lacking before it was poured out, he may fill up the measure.

This is indeed a refutation.

It was stated: If the remainder of the meal-offering was found to be lacking between the taking of the handful and the burning thereof, R. Johanan says, He may burn the handful on account of it; Resh Lakish says, He may not burn the handful on account of it. According to R. Eliezer's view there can be no difference of opinion; they differ only according to R. Joshua's view. For we have learnt: If the remainder of the meal-offering became unclean or was burnt or lost, according to the rule of R. Eliezer it is lawful [to burn the handful], but according to the rule of R. Joshua it is unlawful. Now he who says it is unlawful [to burn the handful], clearly agrees with R. Joshua; but he who says it is lawful, [distinguishes the cases thus]: only in that case did R. Joshua say [that it was unlawful], since nothing [of the meat] remained available, but here where some [of the meal-offering] remained available, even R. Joshua admits [that it is lawful to burn the handful].

For it has been so taught: R. Joshua says, If of any animal-offering mentioned in the Torah there remained an olive's bulk of flesh or an olive's bulk of fat, one may sprinkle the blood; if there remained a half-olive's bulk of flesh and a half-olive's bulk of fat, one may not sprinkle the blood.

In the case of a burnt-offering, however, even if there remained a half-olive's bulk of flesh and a half-olive's bulk of fat, one may sprinkle the blood, since it is wholly burnt. And in the case of a meal-offering, even though all of it remains, one may not sprinkle the blood.

How does the meal-offering come in here? Said R. Papa, It refers to the meal-offering offered with drink-offerings. For I might have said that, since it accompanies the animal-offering, it is deemed to be part of the animal-offering; we are therefore taught [that it is not so]. And he who says it is unlawful [to burn the handful, what can he say to this]? — Here [in the case of the meal-
offering] it is different, for the verse says, And the priest shall offer up from the meal-offering the memorial thereof, and shall burn it upon the altar; and the expression ‘the meal-offering’ implies that the meal-offering must be there in its entirety. And [what does the other [say to this]? — He would say that the expression ‘from the meal-offering’ implies only that the meal-offering was once whole. R. Johanan raised this objection against Resh Lakish. It was taught: If a loaf was broken before it had been removed, the Showbread is invalid, and [the priest] may not burn on account of it the dishes of frankincense; if a loaf was broken after it had been removed, the Showbread is invalid, but he may nevertheless burn on account of it the dishes of frankincense. Whereupon R. Eleazar had said, [The expression ‘after it had been removed’] does not mean that it had actually been removed, but rather that the time for its removal had arrived, even though it had not yet been removed. —

He replied, The author of that Baraitha is R. Eliezer. He [R. Johanan] then said to him, I quote you an undisputed Mishnah, and you merely say that the author is R. Eliezer! If it is R. Eliezer, why does [the Baraitha] speak of only part [of the Showbread] being broken, even if it were entirely burnt or lost he would also permit [the burning of the frankincense], would he not? —

The other remained silent. And why did he remain silent? Surely he could have replied that it is different with the offering of the community, for just as uncleanness is permitted for the community so the diminution [of an offering] is also permitted for it! R. Adda b. Abaha said, This proves that diminution is on a par with a physical blemish, and no [animal with a] physical blemish is permitted [even] for the community.

R. Papa was sitting reciting the above teaching when R. Joseph b. Shemaiyah said to him, Is it not the case that the dispute between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish refers also to the ‘Omer meal-offering which is a communal offering?’

R. Malkio said, One [Baraitha] teaches: The expression ‘of the fine flour thereof’ implies that if it had diminished, however little, it is invalid; and ‘of the oil thereof’. implies that if it had diminished, however little, it is invalid. And another [Baraitha] teaches: The expression ‘of the meal-offering’ excludes the case where the meal-offering or the handful had diminished, or where nothing at all of the frankincense was burnt. Now why are two verses necessary to exclude any diminution? Surely it must be that one refers to the case where the meal-offering had diminished before the handful was taken, and the other to the case where the remainder had diminished between the taking of the handful and the burning thereof. This then is a refutation of both views of R. Johanan, is it not? —

No, one verse refers to the case where the meal-offering had diminished before the taking of the handful, in which case if he brings more [flour] from his house and makes up the measure it is [valid], otherwise it is not [valid]. The other refers to the case where the remainder had diminished between the taking of the handful and the burning thereof, in which case the remainder is forbidden to be eaten although he may burn the handful on account of it. For the question was raised: According to him who says that where the remainder had diminished between the taking of the handful and the burning thereof he may burn the handful on account of it, what is the position with regard to the eating of the remainder? — Ze’iri said, It is written, And that which is left [of the meal-offering],’ but not that which is left of the remainder. R. Jannai said, It is
written, of the meal-offering,\(^\text{27}\) that is, the meal-offering which was once whole.\(^\text{28}\)

IF [THE PRIEST] TOOK THE HANDFUL WITH HIS LEFT HAND [IT IS INVALID]. Whence do we know this? — R. Zera said, The verse states, And he presented the meal-offering, and filled his hand therefrom.\(^\text{29}\) Now I do not know which hand was meant, but when another verse states, And the priest shall take of the log of oil, and pour it into the palm of his own left hand,\(^\text{30}\) [I know that] only here ['hand' means] the left hand, but elsewhere wherever ‘hand’ is stated it means the right. But is not this expression required for its own purpose?\(^\text{31}\) —

‘The left hand’ is mentioned once again.\(^\text{32}\) But should I not apply here the principle: ‘a limitation followed by a limitation extends the scope of the law’?\(^\text{33}\) — ‘The left hand’ is mentioned yet once again;\(^\text{34}\) so that we may say that only here ['hand' means] the left hand, whereas elsewhere ['hand'] cannot mean the left hand. perhaps I should say quite the contrary: just as here ['hand' means] the left hand so elsewhere ['hand' means] the left hand! — ‘The left hand’ is in fact stated four times: twice in the case of the poor man and twice in the case of the rich man.\(^\text{35}\)

R. Jeremiah said to R. Zera. For what purpose is it written, Upon the thumb of his right hand and upon the great toe of his right foot?\(^\text{36}\) —

(1) How can one speak of the sprinkling of blood in connection with a meal-offering? (2) Which accompanied most animal-offerings; cf. Num. XV, 4-10. (3) And the blood of the offering may be sprinkled, even though all the flesh and the fat had gone, since the whole of the meal-offering that belongs to the animal-offering remains. (4) Surely Resh Lakish admits this distinction in R. Joshua made by R. Johanan, for R. Joshua himself expressly differentiates so in the Baraitha quoted. (5) Lev. II, 9. (6) At the time of the burning of the handful; otherwise it may not be burnt. (7) R. Johanan. (8) I.e., at the time of the taking of the handful. (9) V. supra p. 43. (10) Sc. the dishes of frankincense. (11) I.e., on behalf of the Showbread that remained. (12) Hence it is evident that if the remainder of the meal-offering had diminished between the taking and the burning of the handful — which corresponds to the diminution of the Showbread between the taking away and the burning of the frankincense — one may nevertheless burn the handful; contra Resh Lakish. (13) This is mentioned only incidentally as the continuation of the cited passage. (14) According to whom the diminution, and even the entire destruction, of the remainder of the meal-offering does not prevent the burning of the handful upon the altar; v. supra. (15) Lit. ‘whole’.

(16) [This is really a Baraitha but is nevertheless, as is frequently the case, designated Mishnah, v. Higger אוצר הבריתות I, p. 37ff]. (17) The Showbread and the burning of the frankincense was a regular weekly service on behalf of the community. Cf. Lev. XXIV, 4-9. (18) If the whole community of Israel or the greater part thereof became unclean it is then permitted to offer the communal sacrifices, e.g., the Daily sacrifice, in uncleanness. V. Pes. 77a. (19) The fact that Resh Lakish remained silent and did not put forward the suggested answer. (20) That Resh Lakish remained silent and did not distinguish between communal and private offerings. (21) MS.M., Rashi and Sh. Mek. omit the word "Omer", and the sense of R. Joseph’s remark is that the dispute between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish related also to the Showbread which is a communal meal-offering. (22) Lev. II, 2. The amount of the flour of a meal-offering is fixed at a minimum of one tenth part of an ephah, and of oil at one log. (23) Ibid. 3. (24) But where some of the frankincense had been burnt upon the altar and then it was found to be wanting, the meal-offering is valid. (25) In which case the meal-offering is invalid, for the deficiency cannot be made up by bringing more flour, contra R. Johanan. (26) In which case the handful may not be burnt, again contra R. Johanan. (27) Lev. II. 3. (28) I.e., if at the time of the taking of the handful the remainder was intact, it is immaterial if later it was found to have diminished, and it may be
eaten; R. Jannai accordingly is in conflict with Ze'iri. Rashi, however, gives another interpretation according to which R. Jannai is in agreement with Ze'iri: the meal-offering was once whole, i.e., at the time of the burning of the handful.

(29) Ibid. IX, 17.
(30) Ibid. XIV, 15, in reference to the purificatory rites of a leper.
(31) That only the left hand shall be employed and not the right, and one therefore cannot draw any conclusion or inference from this expression.
(32) Ibid. 16.
(33) Since ‘the left hand’ is stated twice, and inasmuch as each by itself serves as a limitation to exclude the right hand, the result is that the successive limitations actually amplify the law and include the right hand, that it, too, may be used in the purificatory rites of the leper.
(34) Ibid. 26. This third expression precludes the suggestion stated that the first two are to be regarded as limitation following limitation resulting in amplification, for if that were so this third expression would be superfluous.
(35) Lev. XIV, 14, 16 and 27; the first two referring to the rites of a rich man that is being cleansed of his leprosy, and the latter two to those of a poor man. The result is therefore thus: the first expression ‘the left hand’ is required for its own purpose, the second to indicate that only here ‘hand’ means the left hand but not elsewhere, the third to preclude the suggestion that the first two are to be regarded as limitation following limitation, and the fourth to preclude the inference, suggested last, that wherever ‘hand’ is stated the left hand is meant.
(36) Ibid 17 and 28, with reference to the application of oil upon these parts, the former verse dealing with the case of the rich man and the latter with the poor man. In both cases, however, the passage is superfluous for in each verse appears the direction that the oil shall be applied on the place where the blood of the guilt-offering had been applied, and the latter, as expressly stated both in the case of the rich man and of the poor man (v. ibid. 14 and 25 respectively), was applied upon the thumb of the right hand and the great toe of the right leg. It must be observed that the thumb and the great toe are expressed in the Heb. by the same word הֶן; thus the expression תָּ֖פֵל הֶנֶּֽן stated twice in this verse, is redundant.

Raba therefore said, Since there have been stated [with regard to the application of the oil] the expressions ‘Upon the blood of the guilt-offering’ and ‘Upon the place of the blood of the guilt-offering’, and moreover since with regard to the application of the blood the term ‘right’ is used, for what purpose then does the verse state, concerning the application of the oil upon the leper. ‘Upon the thumb of his right hand and upon the great toe of his right leg’, both in the case of the rich man and of the poor man?

R. Shisha the son of R. Idi answered, In order to rule out the use of the priest's right hand in the case of the leper; lest you argue as follows: if in the case where the left hand is not allowed the right hand nevertheless is, in the case where the left hand is allowed surely the right hand is allowed too. And therefore is ‘the left’ stated again?
For the reason taught at the school of R. Ishmael: Any Biblical passage that was stated once, and then repeated, was repeated only for the sake of some new point contained therein.

Rabbah b. Bar Hannah said in the name of R. Simeon b. Lakish, Wherever the words ‘priest’ and ‘finger’ are stated [in connection with a service of the Temple] they signify the right [hand] only. Now it was assumed that both these terms ‘priest’ and ‘finger’ were necessary [to signify this], as in the verse, And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin-offering with his finger, and [there the finger of the right hand is meant for] it is inferred from the case of the leper where it is written, And the priest shall dip his right finger. But there is the case of the taking of the handful, with regard to which only the word ‘priest’ is written, and yet we have learnt: IF [THE PRIEST] TOOK THE HANDFUL WITH HIS LEFT HAND IT IS INVALID! — Raba answered, It is either the word ‘priest’ or the word ‘finger’ [that is meant]. Thereupon Abaye said to him, Take the case of the bringing of the limbs to the [altar] ascent, with regard to which the word ‘priest’ is written, and yet we have learnt: The right [hind]-leg was carried in the left hand with the part covered with the skin outermost! — The rule [that the word ‘priest’ or ‘finger’ implies the right hand] we apply only to such services as would invalidate the atonement [by their omission]. Then take the case of receiving [of the blood in a vessel]; it is surely a service that would invalidate the atonement [by its omission], and yet we have learnt: If [the priest] received the blood in his left hand, It is invalid; but R. Simeon declares it valid!

You raised this [difficulty] according to R. Simeon’s view, did you not? But R. Simeon requires both terms. Does then R. Simeon require both terms? Surely it has been taught: R. Simeon says. Wherever the term ‘hand’ is stated it signifies the right hand only, likewise the term ‘finger’ signifies the right finger only! — The term ‘finger’ does not require with it the term ‘priest’, but the term ‘priest’ requires with it the term ‘finger’. Why then is the term ‘priest’ stated at all? [That he shall be clad] in the priestly robes.

(1) Sc. of the thumb and of the great toe; for the Hebrew particle עַל may mean ‘close to’ as well as ‘upon’.
(2) I.e., the inner side of the thumb (facing the palm), and the lower side of the great toe (facing the ground).
(3) Ibid. 17 and 28. Surely one of them is superfluous (Rashi). According to Tosaf, the question is, Why the variation in the expressions; why in the second verse is ‘the place of’ added?
(4) For the oil must touch the body of the leper on the parts specified directly without any other substance interposing.
(5) The question is concerning the superfluous word ‘right’ stated with regard to the hand and the leg; for even if Scripture had omitted the word in each case we should still have known that the right hand and right leg were intended, either because the application of the blood was upon these limbs and the oil was to be applied upon the blood, or because of the original opinion expressed by R. Zera that ‘hand’ generally means the right hand. V. Tosaf. s.v. אמר.
(6) Raba on account of this last question abandons the conclusions of R. Zera that were derived from the expression ‘the left hand’ being stated four times, whereby the rule was established that ‘hand’ generally means the right hand and therefore the taking of the handful must be performed with the right hand, but proceeds to interpret anew all the expressions employed in this passage dealing with the purificatory rites of the leper.
(7) The word ‘hand’ is stated here in connection with the rites of a rich man (Lev. XIV, 17) and also in connection with the taking of the handful from the meal-offering (ibid IX, 17): as in the former case the right hand is meant for it is expressly stated so, so in the latter case, too, the right hand is meant.
(8) The word ‘leg’ is stated here in connection with the rites of the rich man (ibid. XIV, 17) and also in connection with the ceremony of halizah (the drawing off of the shoe, v. Deut. XXV, 5-10): as here the right leg is meant, so there too the right leg is meant.

(9) The word ‘ear’ is stated here in connection with the rites of the rich man (Lev. ibid.) and also in connection with the boring of the ear of an Israelite slave who desired to continue in servitude (v. Ex. XXI, 5, 6): as here the right ear is meant, so there too the right ear is meant.

(10) In Lev. XIV, 16, in connection with the rites of the rich man: And the priest shall dip his right finger in the oil that is in his left hand. In the preceding verse (15) ‘the left hand’ is admittedly required for its own purpose, that the priest shall pour the oil into his left hand.

(11) Scripture therefore repeated ‘the left hand’ to indicate that the service shall be performed with the left hand only.

(12) Lev. XIV, 27, in connection with the rites of the poor man. This question applies to all the expressions used in connection with the rites of the poor leper.

(13) The new point being that the offerings for purification vary according to the means of the leper.

(14) Ibid. IV, 25.

(15) Ibid. XIV, 16. And as in this verse where both the expressions ‘priest’ and finger’ are stated the right must be used, so wherever these two expressions are found they imply the use of the right hand.

(16) i.e., the occurrence of either of these terms in connection with any service signifies that that service shall be performed with the right hand or with the right finger.


(18) Cf. Zeb. 4a and elsewhere.

(19) Tamid 31b.

(20) Hence although the term ‘priest’ is used in connection with the service of ‘bringing nigh’, it nevertheless may be performed with the left hand!

(21) Whereas the service of ‘bringing nigh’ is not indispensable, for even if it were omitted, e.g., if the sacrifice was slaughtered close to the altar ascent so that there was no need for bringing the limbs to the altar, the atonement would not be impaired.

(22) Zeb. 15b. In cur. edd. before ‘we have learnt’ are inserted the following lines: ‘and with regard to which the term “priest” is stated, as it is written, And Aaron's sons, the priests, shall present the blood (Lev. I, 5), which refers to the receiving of the blood’. These lines are not found in any of the MSS. and apparently they were not in the text that was before Rashi. They are also omitted by Sh. Mek.

(23) Notwithstanding the expression ‘priest’ used in connection with the service, v. prec. n.

(24) Both the expressions ‘priest’ and ‘finger’ are necessary in order to signify the right hand.

(25) In order to signify the right finger.

(26) In a case where the term ‘finger’ is used the addition of the term ‘priest’ is of no significance whatsoever. This question and the answer which follows are omitted in all MSS.

Consider the case of the sprinkling [of the blood], with regard to which only the term ‘priest’ is used, yet we have learnt: If [the priest] sprinkled the blood with his left hand it is invalid; and R. Simeon does not differ!—

Abaye answered, He does indeed differ in the Baraitha, for it was taught: If he received the blood in his left hand it is invalid, but R. Simeon declares it valid. If he sprinkled the blood with his left hand it is invalid, but R. Simeon declares it valid. But then Raba's statement that the term ‘hand’ [is required for the purposes of analogy] with ‘hand’ in respect of the taking out of the handful,1 is quite unnecessary, for it would have been inferred from the expression ‘priest’!2 — One [teaching] is required for the taking out of the handful and the other for the hallowing of the handful.3 But according to R. Simeon who holds [according to one view] that the hallowing of the handful is not essential,4 and even according to the other view that the hallowing of the handful is indeed essential but that it is valid if performed with the left hand, is not Raba's analogy by means of the common word ‘hand’ necessary? It cannot serve to indicate that the actual taking out of the handful [shall be performed with the right hand],5 as this is already established by the teaching of R. Judah the son of R. Hyya.

For R. Judah the son of R. Hyya said, What is the reason for R. Simeon's view?5 Because the verse says, It is most holy as the sin-offering and as the guilt-offering;7 that is to
say, if [the priest] comes to perform the service with his hand, he must do so with his right hand as the sin-offering, and if he comes to perform it in a vessel he must do so with his left hand as the guilt-offering! — It is only necessary with regard to the handful of the sinner's meal-offering; for I might have said that, since R. Simeon has expressed the view that his [the sinner's] offering shall not be sumptuous, then even if the handful were taken out with the left hand it should be valid, we are therefore taught [by Raba's analogy that it must nevertheless be performed with the right hand].

IF ON TAKING THE HANDFUL THERE CAME INTO HIS HAND A SMALL STONE OR A GRAIN OF SALT

(1) Namely that it shall be performed with the right hand; v. supra p. 56.
(2) The term ‘priest’ is used in connection with the taking ‘of the handful, and this alone, according to the view of the Rabbis as stated by Raba, indicates that the service must be performed with the right hand.
(3) Raba's analogy is required to teach that the hallowing of the handful, i.e., putting it into a vessel of ministry, must also be performed with the right hand.
(4) But that the handful taken out by the Priest may be carried directly to the altar and burnt thereon. V. infra 26a.
(5) Since R. Simeon does not accept the view that the term ‘priest’ by itself signifies the use of the right hand. V. supra p. 58.
(6) That the offering is valid even though the handful was not hallowed in a vessel of ministry.
(7) Lev. VI, 10, with reference to the meal-offering.
(8) I.e., he does not put the handful into a vessel of ministry, but places it on the altar directly from his hand.
(9) The sprinkling of the sin-offering — which corresponds to the burning of the handful of the meal-offering — must be performed with the right hand, since in connection therewith both the expressions ‘priest’ and ‘finger’ are employed.
(10) Sc. the guilt-offering of the leper with regard to which the left hand is expressly required. It is evident, however, from this teaching of R. Judah that any service that is performed with the hand, as the taking of the handful from the meal-offering, must be performed with the right hand; hence Raba's analogy is unnecessary.
(11) And therefore it must be offered without oil and frankincense; v. supra 6b.

Menachoth 11a

OR A DROP OF FRANKINCENSE IT IS INVALID. Why are all these mentioned? — They are all necessary; for had [the Mishnah] only stated a small stone, [I should have said that it is invalid] because it is something that cannot be offered [upon the altar], but as for salt, since it is offered, I would say that it does not render [the handful] invalid. And had the Mishnah stated salt only, [I should have said that it was invalid] because it is not prescribed to be brought with the meal-offering in the beginning, but as for frankincense, since it is prescribed to be brought with the meal-offering in the beginning, I would say that it does not render [the handful] invalid. We are therefore taught them all.

FOR THEY HAVE RULED: IF THE HANDFUL WAS TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE IT IS INVALID. Why is the reason given because it is too much or too little? Surely [it is invalid] because of the interposition? — R. Jeremiah answered. It might have been at one side. Abaye asked Raba, How is the handful taken? — He replied, As people usually take a handful. He then raised the following objection against him: It was taught: This one is [for measuring] the span, this one [for taking] the handful, this one [for measuring] the cubit, this one [for measuring] the thumb! — It is used only in order to smooth the edge. How then was it done?—

R. Zutra b. Tobias said in the name of Rab, He bends his three fingers until he reaches the palm of his hand and then takes the handful. [A Baraitha] has been taught to this effect: It is written, And he shall take out a full handful. Now one might suppose that it
should be overflowing, another verse therefore says, In his handful. But from the verse, In his handful, one might suppose that it may be taken with the finger tips, it is therefore written, A full handful. How is it then to be? He should bend his three fingers over on to the palm of his hand and thus take the handful. In the case of a meal-offering prepared on a griddle or in a pan he must level it with his thumb on top and with his little finger below. And this was the most difficult service in the Temple. This, and none other? Was there not the nipping? and the taking of ‘both hands full’? — Render: And this was one of the most difficult services in the Temple. R. Papa said, I have no doubt at all that the expression ‘a full handful’ means in the manner in which people usually take a handful. But, asked R. Papa, what if he took out the handful with his fingertips, or with the sides, or if he took it from below upwards? These questions remain undecided.

R. Papa said, I have no doubt at all that the expression ‘his hands full’ means in the manner in which people usually fill the hands. But, asked R. Papa, what if he filled his hands with his finger tips, or with the sides, or if he filled each hand separately and brought them together? — These questions remain undecided.

R. Papa raised the question: What if he stuck the handful to the side of the vessel? Must it be put inside the vessel, which is the case here; or must it be put down inside the vessel, which is not the case here? — This remains undecided.

Mar b. R. Ashi raised the following question: What if he turned the vessel upside down and put down the handful on the bottom of the vessel? Must it be put inside the vessel, which is the case here; or must it be put down in a normal manner, which is not the case here? — This remains undecided.

MISHNAH. HOW SHOULD HE DO IT? HE SHOULD STRETCH OUT HIS FINGERS ON TO THE PALM OF HIS HAND. IF HE PUT IN TOO MUCH OF ITS OIL OR TOO LITTLE OF ITS OIL, OR TOO LITTLE OF ITS FRANKINCENSE, THE OFFERING IS INVALID.

GEMARA. What is meant by TOO MUCH OF ITS OIL? R. Eleazar said, If, for example, one set apart for it two logs of oil. And why did he not suggest that ordinary [unconsecrated] oil or oil from another [meal-offering] was added to it? Should you, however, retort that [the addition of] ordinary [unconsecrated] oil or oil from another [meal-offering] would not render the offering invalid, then there is the objection (raised by R. Zutra b. Tobiah): How can the ruling, that the sinner’s meal-offering is rendered invalid by the addition of oil, ever be applied? If [you say that oil was especially set aside] for it — but it does not require any; and if [you say that] ordinary [unconsecrated] oil or oil from another [meal-offering] was added to it — but you have now said that this would not render the offering invalid? And R. Eleazar [what does he say to this]? — It is a case of ‘it goes without saying’; thus, it goes without saying that the offering is rendered invalid by the addition of ordinary [unconsecrated] oil or oil of another [meal-offering]; but in the case where a man set aside for it two logs of oil, since each [log separately] is suitable for the purpose. I would say that it is not invalid; he therefore teaches us [that it is invalid]. But whence does R. Eleazar know this? —

Raba said, Our Mishnah presented a difficulty to him. Why does it use the expression. IF HE PUT IN TOO MUCH OF ITS OIL? It should have stated, ‘If he put in too much oil for it’. But its teaches us that [it is invalid] even though he set aside for it two logs of oil.
IF HE PUT IN TOO LITTLE OF ITS FRANKINCENSE. Our Rabbis taught: If the frankincense had diminished until there remained one grain only, the offering is invalid; if there remained two grains, it is valid. So R. Judah. R. Simeon says. If there remained one grain, it is valid; if less than that it is invalid.

(1) For after the handful was placed upon the altar salt was sprinkled over it.
(2) When there is a stone or some other substance included in the handful it interposes or separates between the flour and the fingers, and this renders it invalid. And even where the stone happens to lie in the middle of the flour and does not touch the fingers it is also invalid for it interposes between the flour and divides it into two!
(3) The stone might have been at the end of the handful i.e., near the thumb or the little finger, so that there is no question of interposition, but it is invalid only because the handful is too little, since there is lacking flour to the extent of the volume of the stone.
(4) Using all the fingers of the hand, even the little finger.
(5) V. Keth. 5b.
(6) The little finger.
(7) I.e., the distance from the tip of the little finger to the tip of the thumb of a spread hand. The span was the measure of the breastplate of the High Priest; v. Ex. XXVIII, 16.
(8) The finger next to the little one.
(9) This finger was the limit on the one end of the handful, the thumb limiting it at the other end; so that the little finger was not used in taking the handful, contra Raba.
(10) The middle finger.
(11) I.e., the distance from the tip of the middle finger to the point of the elbow.
(12) The fourth from the little finger.
(13) Which is used in the priestly service, as when the priest dips his finger in the blood for the sprinkling.
(14) The fifth from the little finger.
(15) Which was the subject of special rites in the purification ceremony of the leper.
(16) The little finger was to be employed only to smooth level the side of the handful so that none of the flour should appear to be bursting out; this leveling was also performed at the other end by the thumb. It is clear, however, that the actual handful was made up by bending the middle three fingers over the palm. In cur. edd. there appears here in the text an explanatory gloss which is not found in any MS., it is struck out by Sh. Mek.
(17) Lev. II, 2.
(18) Ibid. VI, 8: the meaning of this expression being that the flour shall be entirely within the handful, so that none should burst out at the ends or between the fingers.
(19) These meal-offerings were first baked into cakes, the cakes broken into pieces, and then the priest took out a handful. They were not, however, broken fine, and therefore when the handful was taken, particles of the cakes would be protruding on all sides; the thumb and little finger were then brought into operation so as to smooth the sides— an awkward and difficult manipulation.
(20) Nipping off the head of a bird-offering. (v. Lev. I, 15) was an act which required considerable skill; cf. Zeb. 64b.
(21) V. ibid. XVI, 12, where it is stated that the High Priest on the Day of Atonement took both hands full of incense and offered it in the Holy of Holies. The circumstances in which he took these were such as to render the taking a very difficult task. V. Yoma 49b.
(22) I.e., by inserting the side of the hand, held at an angle, into the flour and scooping up a handful.
(23) With the palm of his hand facing downwards he inserted his finger-tips and scooped up the flour little by little into the palm of his hand.
(24) By laying his hand, palm upwards, upon the surface of the flour and moving it to and fro he gradually scooped up a handful. Another interpretation is: he took the handful from the flour at the side of the vessel and not from the middle.
(25) He cupped his hand and pressed it, palm upwards, into the flour and thus took out a handful.
(26) Ibid. XVI, 12. V. supra n. 3.
(27) I.e., by cupping the hands, inserting them into the heap, drawing them towards each other, and taking out two hands full.
(28) By laying the hands flat, palms upwards, on the incense and heaping up the incense on them via the space between the thumb and the first finger.
(29) When putting back the handful to be hallowed in a vessel of ministry, the priest did not put it down in the bottom of the vessel but stuck it on the side of the vessel.
(30) The vessel was overturned and the handful was put down on the now concave base of the vessel.
(31) Lit. ‘in its ordered manner’.
(32) The amount of oil prescribed is one log (v. Glos.) for each tenth part of an ephah of flour.
(33) The prescribed amount of frankincense is one handful; v. infra 106b.
(34) And the oil was then mixed with the flour, so that to all appearances there are here two meal-offerings.

(35) The bracketed words are deleted by Sh. Mek.

(36) The sinner’s meal-offering was to be without oil (v. Lev. V, 11); if any oil was put into it, it is invalid, v. infra 59b.

(37) And therefore what was set aside for it does not become consecrated.

(38) Why then did he not suggest an addition of ordinary unconsecrated oil?

(39) The expression ‘Too much of its oil’ implies that a large quantity had been set aside for this meal-offering at the very beginning.

Menachoth 11b

But have we not been taught [in another Baraitha]:

1 If the handful of frankincense had diminished, no matter how little, it is invalid? — Render: If the [last] grain of frankincense had diminished, no matter how little, it is invalid. Alternatively I may say. Onea [Baraitha] refers to the frankincense that was offered together with the meal-offering, and the other to a separate offering of frankincense.

R. Isaac b. Joseph said in the name of R. Johanan. In this matter there are three different views: R. Meir holds that there must be a handful [of frankincense] at the outset and also a handful in the end; R. Judah holds, a handful at the outset and two grains in the end; R. Simeon holds, a handful at the outset and one grain in the end. All these three [Rabbis] derived their opinions from the same verse, vis., And all the frankincense which is upon the meal-offering. R. Meir is of the opinion that [the offering is invalid] unless there is present now all the frankincense that was prescribed to be offered with the meal-offering at the outset. R. Judah maintains that the expression ‘all’ implies even one grain, and the particle ‘eth’ adds to it another grain. R. Simeon, however, does not interpret the particle ‘eth’.

R. Isaac b. Joseph also said in the name of R. Johanan. They12 differ only with regard to the frankincense that is offered together with the meal-offering, but with regard to frankincense that is offered by itself, all agree that there must be a handful at the outset and a handful in the end. Therefore the words ‘which is upon the meal-offering’ are expressly stated to indicate that this is so only [with regard to the frankincense] that is offered with the meal-offering, but not with regard to that offered by itself. R. Isaac b. Joseph further said in the name of R. Johanan, They12 differ only with regard to the frankincense that is offered together with the meal-offering, but as for the frankincense offered in the dishes, all agree that there must be two handfuls at the outset and two handfuls in the end. Surely this is obvious! — You might have thought that since [the frankincense in the two dishes] is brought together with the Showbread it is in the same category as that which is offered with a meal-offering; we are therefore taught [that it is not so].

This, however, is a matter of dispute between R. Ammi and R. Isaac Nappaha. One says, They17 differ only with regard to the frankincense that is offered together with the meal-offering, but with regard to the frankincense offered by itself, all agree that there must be a handful at the outset and a handful in the end. The other says, Just as they differ in the former case so they differ in the latter case too.

IF HE PUT IN TOO LITTLE OF ITS FRANKINCENSE THE OFFERING IS INVALID. It follows, however, that if he put in too much, it is valid; but we have been taught. If he put in too much it is invalid? — Rami b. Hama answered, That was a case where he set apart two handfuls. Rami b. Hama also said, If a man set apart two handfuls [of frankincense], and one of them was lost before the taking of the handful [of flour, the offering is valid, for] they had not yet been appointed [for this meal-offering]; if one was lost] after the taking of the handful,
[the offering is invalid, for] they had already been appointed [for this meal-offering].

Rami b. Hama also said, If he set apart four handfuls [of frankincense] for the two dishes, and two of them were lost before the taking away of the dishes, [it is valid, for] they had not yet been appointed [for the Showbread]; if [two were lost] after the taking away of the dishes, [it is invalid, for] they had already been appointed [for the Showbread].

Wherefore was this case necessary? It is the same as the other! — You might have thought that, since in this case the handful is separate as soon as the time for its removal has arrived it is regarded as already removed; we are therefore taught otherwise.


(1) The words ‘R. Simeon says’ are deleted by all commentators on the strength of Rashi’s remark: ‘I believe that R. Simeon is the author of the statement’.

(2) There is here a contradiction between the views of R. Simeon, for the view expressed in the second Baraitha is also that of R. Simeon.

(3) The first quoted Baraitha which contains the dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon.

(4) In which case the offering is valid as long as there remained one grain of frankincense.

(5) In which case there must be nothing less than a handful at all times.

(6) The anonymous author of our Mishnah.

(7) I.e., at the time of the taking of the handful of flour there must be in the vessel a handful of frankincense. This is admitted by all authorities; v. infra 106b.

(8) Lev. VI. 8, Heb. כל.

(9) The expression ‘all’ is interpreted here, by R. Judah and R. Simeon, in the same sense as the Rabbinic כל הוא ‘anything’, ‘aughtsoever’.

(10) Hence there must be left at least two grains.

(11) As having any particular significance apart from its grammatical use.


(13) That a diminution of the frankincense does not invalidate the offering according to R. Judah and R. Simeon.

(14) V. infra 106b.

(15) I.e., there must be a handful of frankincense in each dish from the time that they are set upon the table up to the time they are removed to be burnt.

(16) Since there is here no Biblical term or expression, like כל, to indicate that a diminution of the prescribed quantity is allowed.


(18) Which is an excessive amount and therefore invalid; anything more than one handful but less than two would be valid. According to another interpretation, it is valid where two handfuls were set apart, for each handful can serve separately for the purpose.

(19) And the amount of frankincense was excessive. Or it is invalid, according to the aforementioned view of R. Meir, because there is a diminution of the frankincense appointed for the offering.

(20) I.e., of frankincense which had remained on the table the past week and which were removed on the Sabbath and burnt upon the altar.

(21) For it is contained in dishes and stands apart from the rest of the offering.

(22) So that as soon as the time for the removal of the dishes of frankincense of the past week has come about (which is immediately after the offering of the Sabbath additional sacrifice), the frankincense that has been set apart may be regarded as already appointed for their purpose; and therefore it is invalid if thereafter a part of it was lost.

(23) The rule here stated applies equally well to each of the four main services of the meal-offering-taking out the handful, putting it into a vessel, bringing it nigh to the altar, and burning it.

(24) The wrongful intention must be in respect of those parts of the offering that are usually eaten, but the term ‘eat’ includes also what is ‘eaten’ by the altar, i.e., burnt thereon, in this case the
handful and the frankincense. This is derived from the fact that in Lev. VII, 18 there is a duplicated expression for eating, יאכל יאכל, thus referring to two kinds of eating.

(25) V. Glos.

(26) If a priest actually, ate the remainder or actually burnt the handful or the frankincense outside the Temple court.

(27) Which is ‘outside the proper time’, for a meal-offering must be eaten the same day and evening until midnight.

**Menachoth 12a**

THE OFFERING IS PIGGUL,1 AND THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS INCURRED.

THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF ONE TOOK THE HANDFUL OR PUT IT INTO THE VESSEL OR BROUGHT IT NIGH OR BURNED IT, [INTENDING] TO EAT A THING THAT IS USUAL TO EAT OR TO BURN A THING THAT IS USUAL TO BURN, OUTSIDE ITS PROPER PLACE, THE OFFERING IS INVALID BUT THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS NOT INCURRED; BUT IF [HE INTENDED THE LIKE] OUTSIDE ITS PROPER TIME, THE OFFERING IS PIGGUL AND THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS INCURRED; PROVIDED THAT THE MATTIR2 WAS OFFERED ACCORDING TO ITS PRESCRIBED RITE.3


OR IF IT WAS A SINNER’S MEAL-OFFERING OR A MEAL-OFFERING OF JEALOUSY.7 AND HE TOOK THE HANDFUL THEREFROM UNDER ANY NAME OTHER THAN ITS OWN, AND PUT IT INTO THE VESSEL AND BROUGHT IT NIGH AND BURNED IT UNDER ANY NAME OTHER THAN ITS OWN; OR IF HE TOOK OUT THE HANDFUL AND PUT IT INTO THE VESSEL AND BROUGHT IT NIGH AND BURNED IT UNDER ANY NAME OTHER THAN ITS OWN — SUCH IS A CASE WHERE THE MATTIR IS OFFERED NOT ACCORDING TO ITS RITE.
[IF HE INTENDED]8 TO EAT AN OLIVE'S BULK OF THE REMAINDER OUTSIDE ITS PROPER PLACE AND ANOTHER OLIVE'S BULK THEREOF ON THE MORROW, OR TO EAT AN OLIVE'S BULK THEREOF ON THE MORROW AND ANOTHER OLIVE'S BULK THEREOF OUTSIDE ITS PROPER PLACE, OR TO EAT A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK THEREOF OUTSIDE ITS PROPER PLACE AND A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK ON THE MORROW,9 OR TO EAT A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK THEREOF ON THE MORROW AND AN HALF-OLIVE'S BULK OUTSIDE ITS PROPER PLACE,9 THE OFFERING IS INVALID BUT THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS NOT INCURRED.


GEMARA. The question was raised: According to him who holds that if the remainder of the meal-offering had diminished in the time between the taking of the handful and the burning thereof he may nevertheless burn the handful on account of it; and we had established that that remainder may not be eaten11 — [the question arises], can the burning of the handful have any effect [upon this remainder] that it should become piggul,12 and that it should no more be subject to the law of Sacrilege or not?13 —

R. Huna said, Even according to R. Akiba who said that the sprinkling [of the blood] has an effect upon [the consecrated meat] that was taken out, since it is entirely here but has become invalid only through some extrinsic cause,15 but upon that which has diminished, which is an intrinsic defect, the burning surely can have no effect.16 Thereupon Raba said, On the contrary,17 even according to R. Eliezer who said that the sprinkling of the blood has no effect upon what was taken out, that is so only with regard to what was taken out, since it is no longer inside [the Sanctuary], but upon that which has diminished, since it is still inside [the Sanctuary], the burning surely can have an effect.

Raba said, How do [arrive at the above? Because we have learnt: IF HE TOOK THE HANDFUL FROM THE MEAL-OFFERING [INTENDING] TO EAT THE REMAINDER OUTSIDE [THE TEMPLE COURT]. OR AN OLIVE'S BULK OF THE REMAINDER OUTSIDE; and R. Hyya when learning this Mishnah quoted, ‘IF HE TOOK THE HANDFUL FROM THE MEAL-OFFERING’, etc., but he did not include in it OR AN OLIVE’S BULK. Now why did he not include OR AN OLIVE’S BULK? Surely [because he assumed the Mishnah to be dealing with] the case where the remainder had diminished until there was only an olive’s bulk left;18 and since with regard to the services of putting the handful into a vessel, of bringing it nigh, and of burning it, [R. Hyya] could not have stated

(1) Heb. פיגול, lit., ‘an abomination’. This term Piggul which also involves the penalty of kareth (v. Glos.) applies only to a wrongful intention concerning the time of the eating of the offering, in contradistinction from the wrongful intention concerning the place which merely renders the sacrifice פסול ‘invalid’, but which does not involve the penalty of kareth.

(2) Heb. מתיר; lit., ‘that which renders permissible’. This refers to the handful of flour and the frankincense of a meal-offering which, on being burnt, render the remainder permissible to be eaten. It also refers to the blood of an animal-offering which, on being sprinkled upon the altar, renders the meat thereof permissible to be eaten.
(3) I.e., there was no other imperfection or fault in the course of the services of the offering save the wrongful intention of ‘out of time’. If, however, there was some other fault during the course of the services, either before or after the wrongful intention of ‘out of time’, the offering is not Piggul but merely invalid, and the penalty of kareth is not incurred by them that eat thereof. The Mishnah now proceeds to exemplify the two rules stated.

(4) For the only defect in this offering was the ‘out of time’ intention, even though it was expressed during the other services too.

(5) During one of these services, however, the intention was expressed of eating the remainder outside its proper time; thus in this offering there were two defects: the ‘out of time’ intention and the ‘out of place’ intention.

(6) This sentence is struck out by Sh. Mek., and it is not found in MS.M. and other MSS.

(7) These meal-offerings can also be rendered invalid by a wrongful intention concerning the nature of the offering. i.e., by treating the offering as if it were something else. V. supra 2a.

(8) During one service two wrongful intentions as exemplified in the Mishnah; and it is immaterial which intention was expressed first. This is in contradistinction from the foregoing cases of the Mishnah where two wrongful intentions were expressed during two services.

(9) In this case the two half-olive’s bulks are reckoned together so as to invalidate the offering. V. supra 9a and b.

(10) This rule of R. Judah applies to two wrongful intentions expressed during two services as well as during one service.

(11) V. supra 9a and b.

(12) I.e., if while burning the handful the priest expressed the intention of eating this remainder (which in fact may not he eaten since it was found to be lacking) outside its proper time. This case may be put in the same category as where a wrongful intention was expressed concerning ‘a thing that it is not usual to eat’, which according to our Mishnah is not included in the law of Piggul. On the other hand, since the burning of the handful is carried out according to law, it is in no wise different from the burning in any other meal-offering, and it can render the offering Piggul.

(13) The general rule is that after the burning of the handful the remainder of the meal-offering is not subject to the law of Sacrilege since it is now permitted to the priests (Me’il I, 1); and therefore if a layman were to derive any enjoyment whatsoever from the remainder, he would not be liable to bring a guilt-offering for Sacrilege. In this case, however, since even after the burning of the handful, the priests are not permitted to eat the remainder, it might rightly be said that the law of Sacrilege still applies.

(14) It is also established law that after the sprinkling of the blood of the animal-offering the consecrated meat is no more subject to the law of Sacrilege, since it may now be eaten by the priests. This rule, according to R. Akiba, applies even to what was taken out of its bounds and which consequently may not be eaten; v. Me’il. 7a.

(15) By being taken out of its prescribed bounds; nothing however of the meat was lacking.

(16) It is therefore still subject to the law of Sacrilege.

(17) Raba is of the opinion that consecrated matter that was taken out of the Temple is a more serious matter than if it had diminished.

(18) This of course can be the case with the other services but not with the service of the taking of the handful, for if at the time of taking the handful the meal-offering had diminished it is invalid, and can in no wise be affected by any wrongful intention.

Menachoth 12b

‘or an olive's bulk’,1 he therefore did not state ‘or an olive's bulk’ even with regard to the service of taking out the handful. Nevertheless, he states in the later clause, THE OFFERING IS PIGGUL AND THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS INCURRED; hence, it is evident, that the burning [of the handful] has an effect [upon the diminished remainder!] Said to him Abaye, It is not so,2 but the author is R. Eleazar; for we have learnt: If a man offered outside [the Temple court] an olive’s bulk of the handful,3 or of the frankincense,4 or of the incense-offering,5 or of the meal offering of the priests.6 or of the meal-offering of the anointed [High] Priest, or of the meal-offering offered with the drink-offerings, he is liable;6 but R. Eleazar declares him exempt unless he offered the whole thereof. Since therefore the expression ‘or an olive's bulk’ cannot be stated in connection with the [burning of the] handful, this same expression ‘or an olive's bulk’ is not stated in connection with the remainder.7 But if it is R. Eleazar, why is it stateda "[Intending] to burn the handful”? It should state, ‘[Intending] to burn the handful and the frankincense”! For we have learnt:b If
MISHNAH. [IF HE INTENDED] TO EAT A
HALF-OLIVE'S BULK AND TO BURN A
HALF-OLIVE'S BULK, THE OFFERING IS
VALID, FOR EATING AND BURNING
CANNOT BE RECKONED TOGETHER.

GEMARA. Now the reason [why they cannot
be reckoned together] is that [there was an
intention] to eat and to burn, but it follows
that where [there was the intention] to eat
[what it is usual to eat] and also to eat what it
is not usual to eat, they can be reckoned

Later Raba said, What I said before was
wrong. For it has been taught: The
expression It is implies that if one of the
loaves was broken all are invalid. It follows
however, that if one was taken out of the
Sanctuary those that are inside are valid.
Now whom have you heard say that the
sprinkling [of the blood] has an effect upon
what was taken out?13 [Obviously] it is R.
Akiba, and yet it states that if one of the
loaves was broken they are not [valid].14

Thereupon Abaye said to him, Does [the
Baraita] expressly state ‘But if one was
taken out [the others are valid]’? Perhaps the
correct inference is: If one became unclean
the others are valid, and that is because the
[High Priest's] plate renders it acceptable,
whereas if one was taken out the others
would not [be valid].16 for the teaching is in
accordance with R. Eleazar's view who
maintains that the sprinkling of the blood has
no effect upon what was taken out. And by
right the Tanna [of the Baraita] should have
also stated the case where one [of the loaves]
was taken out, but he only stated the case
where one was broken to teach us that, even
though it is still inside [the Sanctuary], the
‘burning’ has no effect upon it. According to
R. Akiba, however, who said that the
sprinkling of the blood has an effect upon
what was taken out, the ‘burning’ likewise
will have an effect upon that which had
diminished.17

MENOCHOS – 2a-26b

a man offered either the handful or the
frankincense outside [the Temple court], he is
liable; but R. Eleazar declares him exempt
unless he offered both! — It refers to the
handful of the sinner's meal-offering.10 And
did the Tanna trouble to teach us the case
concerning the handful of the sinner's meal-
offering? — He did. And likewise when R.
Dimi came [from Palestine] he reported in
the name of R. Eleazar that it referred only
to the handful of the sinner's meal-offering,
and it was in accordance with R. Eleazar's
view.

 Said R. Jeremiah: The author [of our
Mishnah] is R. Eliezer, who maintains that a
wrongful intention to consume upon the altar
what is usually eaten by man, or to eat what is
usually consumed upon the altar is of
consequence.21 For we have learnt: If he took
out the handful from the meal-offering
[intending] to eat a thing that it is usual to eat
or to burn a thing that it is usual to burn’. Hence [a wrongful intention
to eat] is of consequence only in respect of a
thing that it is usual to eat, but not in respect
of a thing that it is not usual to eat!20 —

Abaye said, You may even say that [this
Mishnah] is in accordance with the view of
the Rabbis, but you must not infer from it
that where [there was the intention] to eat [a
half-olive's bulk of what it is usual to eat] and
to eat [the same of] what it is not usual to eat
[they can be reckoned together], but rather
infer this, that where the intention was to eat
[a half-olive's bulk] and also to eat [the same
of] a thing that it is usual to eat [they can be
reckoned together].22 What does it teach
us?23 We have expressly learnt this case in
the earlier [Mishnah]: If he intended to eat
an olive's bulk [of the remainder] outside its
proper place and another olive's bulk thereof
on the morrow, or to eat an olive's bulk thereof on the morrow and another olive's bulk thereof outside its proper place, or to eat a half-olive's bulk thereof outside its proper place and another half-olive's bulk thereof on the morrow, or to eat a half-olive's bulk thereof on the morrow and another half-olive's bulk thereof outside its proper place, the offering is invalid, but the penalty of kareth is not incurred.

(1) For once it is assumed as a fact that after the taking out of the handful the remainder had diminished until there was only an olive's bulk left, then it is absurd to state ‘if he put the handful into a vessel (or brought it nigh, or burnt it) intending to eat the remainder or an olive’s bulk of the remainder outside its proper time...’ for the two, the remainder and the olive's bulk, are identical. This being so, R. Hiyya for the sake of consistency omitted the expression ‘or an olive’s bulk’ even in the case of the taking of the handful where this expression is indeed meaningful. The condition of the text both in the Gemara and in Rashi is very doubtful and at present most unsatisfactory. The translation is based on the interpretation of R. Meir and his son Rashbam, given in cur. edd. at the end of Chapter I, infra 13a.

(2) The reason why R. Hiyya omits ‘or an olive’s bulk’ was not as suggested above by Raba, but because R. Hiyya stated the teaching in accordance with the view of R. Eleazar, v. Zeb. 109b.

(3) Of an ordinary meal-offering.

(4) Which was offered daily in the Temple, morning and evening.

(5) Every meal-offering of the priest was to be wholly burnt. So too was the meal-offering of the High Priest which he was to bring daily, known as "הסרתות בתים גדול". Likewise, the meal-offerings that were offered with the drink-offerings that accompanied most sacrifices (v. Num XV, 4ff) were wholly burnt.

(6) To the penalty of kareth; v. Lev. XVII, 8, 9.

(7) Hence, according to R. Eleazar, to burn only an olive's bulk of the handful is no ‘burning’, and an intention to do so outside its proper time expressed during another service (say, during the taking out of the handful) would not render the offering Piggul. Accordingly one must omit the expression ‘or an olive’s bulk’ from the first clause, which deals with a wrongful intention in connection with the burning of the handful, and for the sake of consistency the expression was omitted by R. Hiyya throughout.

(8) In the Mishnah as taught by R. Hiyya.

(9) Zeb. 110a.

(10) I.e., the Mishnah taught by R. Hiyya on the authority of R. Eleazar refers specifically to the sinner’s meal-offering in which there was no frankincense at all, so that the ‘burning’ consists only of the burning of the handful.

(11) Lev. XXIV, 9: For it is most holy unto him; with reference to the Showbread.

(12) In all MSS. the following is added here in the text: ‘or if one was rendered unclean’. So also Sh. Mek.

(13) For here it is said that the burning of the frankincense of the Showbread-offering — which corresponds to the sprinkling of the blood of an animal-offering — has an effect upon what was taken out, insofar as the number of the loaves is considered complete, the result being that those loaves which remained inside are now permitted to be eaten.

(14) Hence, although the burning can have an effect upon what was taken out, it is admitted, even according to R. Akiba, that it can have no effect upon that which had diminished, and if one loaf was broken all are invalid, Raba thus agrees with R. Huna, and retracts his former view.

(15) Heb, קָרֵץ: the High Priest’s plate of pure gold worn on the forehead which had the power of propitiation (v. Ex. XXVIII, 36ff); i.e., it secured the Divine acceptance of the sacrifice even though the flesh or the blood or any other part thereof had become unclean.

(16) For the burning of the frankincense must be on behalf of the whole Showbread, i.e., twelve loaves, and here there is not this number.

(17) Thus contrary to R. Huna’s view.

(18) Each either outside the proper time or outside the proper place.

(19) E.g., if while taking the handful he intended to eat a half-olive’s bulk of the remainder outside the Sanctuary and also to eat outside a half-olive’s bulk of the handful (which is to be burnt and not eaten), these two intentions would be reckoned as one in respect of an olive’s bulk and the offering would be invalid.

(20) Such an intention even in respect of a whole olive’s bulk is of no consequence whatsoever; so that there can then be no question at all of reckoning this intention together with another in order to render the offering invalid.

(21) The handful is a thing that it is usual to burn upon the altar, and the remainder is a thing that it is usual to eat. Hence, according to R. Eliezer (v. infra 17a), a wrongful intention made in respect of a thing that it is not usual to eat or to burn renders the offering invalid and a fortiori if made partly in respect of a thing that it is usual to eat.
and partly in respect of a thing that it is not usual
to eat.

(22) The one to be eaten outside its proper place
and the other on the morrow. Our Mishnah, by
inference, teaches that these intentions combine
and the offering is invalid.

(23) From this point until the end of the chapter
the text is very doubtful and in many parts
obviously corrupt; as is indeed evident from the
many bracketed lines and words. In fact the entire
passage seems to have been taken over bodily
from Zeb. 31b, and altered in parts so as to suit
the context in our tractate; hence the confusion. V.
Tosaf. s.v. אַלָּא. The translation given is based
entirely upon Rashi and upon the text that was
apparently before him. V. also D.S. on this
passage.

**Menachoth 13a**

What further does our Mishnah teach us? If
it suggests the inference that where there was
the intention to eat [a half-olive's bulk of
what it is usual to eat] and also to eat [a half-
olive's bulk] of what it is not usual to eat they
can be reckoned together — but you already
know from the first clause; and if [it teaches]
that where there was the intention to eat and
burn [a half-olive's bulk they cannot be
reckoned together] — but you surely know
this by inference from the preceding
Mishnah: for if the intentions to eat [what it
is usual to eat] and to eat what it is not usual
to eat, cannot be reckoned together, is it then
necessary to state that the intentions to eat
and to burn [cannot be reckoned
together]?—

Yes, it is necessary to state that the intentions
to eat and to burn [cannot be reckoned
together]; for you might have thought that
only in that cases [the intentions cannot be
reckoned together], for there is an intention
there with regard to what is not proper; but
here, since each intention relates to what is
proper in each case, I might say that they
should be reckoned together; — we are
therefore taught [that they cannot be
reckoned together].

**CHAPTER II**

**MISHNAH.** IF HE TOOK OUT THE HANDFUL
[INTENDING] TO EAT THE REMAINDER OR
TO BURN THE HANDFUL ON THE MORROW,
IN THIS CASE R. JOSE AGREES THAT THE
OFFERING IS PIGGUL6 AND THAT THE
PENALTY OF KARETH6 IS INCURRED ON
ACCOUNT THEREOF.7 [IF HE INTENDED] TO
BURN THE FRANKINCENSE THEREOF ON
THE MORROW, R. JOSE SAYS, IT IS INVALID
BUT THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS NOT
INCURRED ON ACCOUNT THEREOF; BUT
THE SAGES SAY, IT IS PIGGUL AND THE
PENALTY OF KARETH IS INCURRED ON
ACCOUNT THEREOF. THEY SAID TO HIM,
HOW DOES THIS DIFFER FROM AN
ANIMAL-OFFERING?8 HE SAID TO THEM,
WITH THE ANIMAL-OFFERING THE BLOOD,
THE FLESH AND THE SACRIFICIAL
PORTIONS ARE ALL ONE;9 BUT THE
FRANKINCENSE IS NOT OF THE MEAL-
OFFERING.

**GEMARA.** Why does the Mishnah state, IN
THIS CASE R. JOSE AGREES? — Because
the Tanna wished to state the next clause: [IF
HE INTENDED] TO BURN THE
FRANKINCENSE THEREOF ON THE
MORROW, R. JOSE SAYS, IT IS INVALID
BUT THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS NOT
INCURRED ON ACCOUNT THEREOF.
Now you might have thought that the reason
for R. Jose's opinion [in the last clause] was
that a wrongful intention in respect of half
the Mattir does not render piggul10 and that
consequently [R. Jose] differs even in the first
clause.

(1) I.e., from the preceding Mishnah that these
two intentions cannot combine; v. supra 12a.
(2) For if two ‘eatings’ cannot combine, surely
‘eating’ and ‘burning’ cannot!
(3) Where the intention was to eat outside the
Sanctuary a half-olive's bulk of the remainder and
a half-olive's bulk of the handful.
(4) I.e., to eat a thing that it is not usual to eat, sc.
the handful.
(5) In our Mishnah where the intention is to eat of the remainder outside and to burn of the handful outside, each action being the proper practice.

(6) V. Glos.

(7) Should one eat it.

(8) For if one slaughtered an animal-offering intending to burn the sacrificial portions on the morrow the offering is certainly Piggul. The same surely should be the case with the meal-offering, for the frankincense corresponds to the sacrificial portions of the animal-offering.

(9) Explained in the Gemara.

(10) The Mattir (Heb. בָּטַיר lit., ‘that which renders permissible’) of the meal-offering is the handful and the frankincense, for only after the burning of those two upon the altar is the remainder of the meal-offering rendered permitted to be eaten. It is now suggested that the reason for R. Jose’s view in the second clause of our Mishnah is that a wrongful intention expressed during a service in respect of the frankincense, which is only half the Mattir, is of no consequence. According to this principle, R. Jose should also hold in the first clause of our Mishnah that the offering is not Piggul, since the wrongful intention was only in respect of the burning of the handful which is also only half the Mattir.

Menachoth 13b

We are therefore taught [that there he agrees].

[IF HE INTENDED] TO BURN THE FRANKINCENSE THEREOF ON THE MORROW, R. JOSE SAYS, IT IS INVALID BUT THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS NOT INCURRED. Resh Lakish said, R. Jose laid down the principle that a ‘Mattir cannot render Piggul the other mattir’. So, too, you may say of the two dishes of frankincense of the Showbread, that one Mattir cannot render Piggul the other mattir. What is the point of ‘So, too, you may say’? — You might have supposed that R. Jose's reason in the case of the frankincense is not ‘that it is not of the same substance as the meal-offering’? Surely it is expressly so stated in the last clause: THEY SAID TO HIM, HOW DOES THIS DIFFER FROM AN ANIMAL-OFFERING? HE SAID TO THEM, WITH THE ANIMAL-OFFERING THE BLOOD, THE FLESH AND THE SACRIFICIAL PORTIONS ARE ALL ONE; BUT THE FRANKINCENSE IS NOT OF THE MEAL-OFFERING! —

The expression ‘IS NOT OF THE MEAL-OFFERING’ means, it is not dependent upon the [handful of the] meal-offering: for it is not right to say, as the handful is indispensable to the remainder—for so long as the handful has not been burnt the remainder may not be eaten—so it is indispensable to the frankincense; but in fact if he wishes he may burn this first and if he wishes he may burn that first. And what do the Rabbis [say to this]? — [They hold that] we apply the principle, ‘a Mattir cannot render Piggul another Mattir’, only to such a case as where [the Mattirs] are not ordained to be in one vessel, but where they are ordained to be in one vessels they are regarded as one [Mattir].

R. Jannai said, If a non-priest gathered up the frankincense, it is invalid. Why? — R. Jeremiah said, This touches upon the law of ‘bringing nigh’. He is of the opinion that ‘bringing nigh’ without even moving the feet is quite a proper act, and [it is established that] if a non-priest brought it nigh, it is invalid.

R. Mari said, We have also learnt the same: This is the general rule: If one took the handful or put it into the vessel or brought it nigh or burnt it [etc.]. Now it is clear that the taking of the handful corresponds to the slaughtering [of the animal-offering], the bringing nigh [of the handful] to the bringing nigh [of the blood], the burning [of the
handful] to the sprinkling [of the blood], but as to the putting [of the handful] into a vessel what [service] is he performing! Should you say that it corresponds to the receiving [of the blood], but surely there is no comparison between them, for there [the blood] comes in of itself [into the vessel], whereas here [the handful] is taken and put into the vessel. We must therefore say that, since it cannot in no wise be omitted, it is an important service, and perforce is regarded as corresponding to the receiving [of the blood]; here, too, since it cannot in no wise be omitted, it is an important service, and perforce is regarded as the ‘bringing nigh’! — It is not so, for in fact it corresponds to the receiving of the blood; and as for your objection ‘There it comes in of itself, whereas here it is taken and put into the vessel’, I reply that, seeing that in both cases the subject is hallowed in a vessel, there can be no difference, surely, whether it comes into the vessel of itself or it is taken and put into the vessel!


GEMARA. R. Huna said, R. Jose maintains that if one expressed an intention which makes Piggul in connection with the right thigh, the left thigh is not thereby rendered piggul. What is the reason? You may say it is based upon a logical argument, or you may say it is based upon a verse. ‘You may say it is based upon a logical argument’, for surely the wrongful intention is not stronger than actual uncleanness! And if one limb became unclean is the whole unclean? ‘Or you may say it is based upon a verse’, for it is written, And the soul that eateth of it shall bear his iniquity, that is, of it but not of any other part.

R. Nahman raised an objection against R. Huna from the following: ‘There is never the penalty of kareth incurred unless he expressed an intention which makes Piggul with regard to an olive's bulk from both’. Thus an olive's bulk from both, but not from one. Now who is the author of this Baraita? Should you say it is the Rabbis — but according to them even though [the intention was] in respect of one loaf only [both are Piggul]. Obviously then it is R. Jose. Now if you say that they are regarded as one body [there], then it is evident why they can be combined [here].

(1) For R. Jose's reason is not as suggested above, but as given by Resh Lakish infra; v. next note.
(2) R. Jose holds that in every offering in which there are two Mattirs, a wrongful intention expressed during the service of one Mattir with regard to the other Mattir is of no consequence; thus an intention expressed during the burning of the handful (the first Mattir) to burn the frankincense (the second Mattir) on the morrow, would not render the offering Piggul.
(3) The two dishes of frankincense are the Mattirs of the Showbread, for only after the burning of both dishes are the twelve loaves of the Showbread permitted to be eaten by the priests. Now if a wrongful Intention was expressed during the burning of the one dish in respect of the other dish (e.g., to burn the other dish on the morrow), it is of no consequence.
(4) It is surely an obvious application of R. Jose's principle!
(5) The Mattirs of the meal-offering, the handful and the frankincense, are of different substances, and it might therefore be said that only in such a case does R. Jose hold that a Mattir cannot render...
Piggul the other Mattir, but not where the Mattirs are alike as in the case of the Showbread.

(6) And the meaning presumably is this: the blood and the sacrificional portions of an animal-offering all come from the one animal; the frankincense, on the other hand, is a different substance and does not come from the meal-offering.

(7) This then is the position of R. Jose: a Mattir does not render Piggul another Mattir; yet, says R. Jose, there is a distinction between an animal-offering and a meal-offering. In the case of an animal-offering the blood and the sacrificional portions are one, so that they are not regarded as separate Mattirs; and therefore if a wrongful intention was expressed during the sprinkling of the blood with regard to the burning of the sacrificional portions, this would render the offering Piggul. On the other hand, in the case of the meal-offering, the handful and the frankincense are two separate Mattirs, for they are of different substances, and are independent of each other, for either may be offered before the other; therefore the principle of a Mattir not rendering Piggul another Mattir will apply.

(8) E.g., the two lambs offered at the Feast of Weeks; cf. Lev. XXIII, 19. These lambs are also Mattirs, for by their slaughtering the ‘two loaves’ (ibid. 17) are rendered permissible unto the priests. This example is inserted in the text in brackets, but is wanting in MS.M., and has been struck out by Sh. Mek.

(9) The handful and the frankincense of a meal-offering were both originally in the same vessel.

(10) After the burning of the handful the frankincense was picked from the flour and then burnt upon the altar. V. Sotah 14b.

(11) For when the non-priest hands over the frankincense to the officiating priest he has certainly reduced the distance of ‘bringing nigh’, which being an essential service must be performed by the priest only, whereas here it was partly performed by the non-priest.

(12) Lit., ‘its name is bringing nigh’. Therefore even if the non-priest did not move his feet at all, but merely handed over the frankincense which he had gathered up to the priest, this action is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the ‘bringing nigh’; and therefore if performed by a non-priest it is invalid.

(13) V. supra 12a. R. Mari desires to prove from this Mishnah that the gathering up of the frankincense is a vital service.

(14) For as the slaughtering separates the blood (i.e. the altar’s portion) from the flesh (i.e., the priests’ portion), so the taking of the handful separates the handful (i.e., the altar’s portion) from the remainder (i.e., the priests’ portion).

(15) Sc. the putting of the handful into the vessel.

(16) I.e., the gathering up of the frankincense.

(17) Thus between these two services there is at least a point in common, but the gathering up of the frankincense is in no wise comparable with either of these services, and therefore is not regarded as a vital service.

(18) Offered as peace-offerings on the Feast of Weeks, accompanied by two loaves as first-fruits; v. Lev. XXIII, 17,19. Throughout the whole of this chapter the expression ‘lamb’ refers to this special peace-offering.

(19) V. ibid. XXIV, 5ff.

(20) I.e., if a person while slaughtering the sacrifice expressed the intention of eating the right thigh outside the time prescribed for it, that thigh only is Piggul and whosoever eats of it incurs the penalty of kareth, but the rest of the flesh of the animal is not Piggul. R. Huna arrived at this by taking R. Jose’s view expressed in our Mishnah to an extreme length; viz., just as each loaf is a separate body or entity and the wrongful intention with regard to one loaf will not affect the other, so is each limb a separate body and the wrongful intention with regard to one limb will not affect the other.

(21) Certainly not! Of course the limb spoken of here had been detached from the animal.

(22) Lev. VII, 18.

(23) Which was the subject of a wrongful intention.

(24) I.e., if the wrongful intention was in respect of both loaves, even though only to the extent of a half-olive’s bulk of each loaf, they are both Piggul and the penalty of kareth is incurred by them that eat thereof.

(25) I.e., if the wrongful intention was in respect of an olive’s bulk of one loaf only, the other loaf would not be Piggul.

(26) V. our Mishnah.

(27) I.e., that two limbs (as the right and left thigh) are not regarded as separate entities but as one ‘body’ derived from the one animal; so that if a wrongful intention was expressed with regard to one limb both would be Piggul, contra R. Huna.

(28) For the two loaves are, by reason of the form of the intention expressed (not ‘a half-olive’s bulk from each loaf’, but ‘an olive’s bulk from the two loaves’), also regarded as one entity. In our Mishnah, however, the two loaves are admittedly regarded as two separate entities, for they were in no wise combined in one, not even by the intention expressed.
MENOCCHOS – 2a-26b

Menachoth 14a

But if you say that they are regarded as two bodies [there], why are they combined [here]?

The author of that [Baraitha] is Rabbi. For it was taught: If he slaughtered the lamb intending to eat a half-olive's bulk of the one loaf [on the morrow], and likewise [he slaughtered] the other lamb intending to eat a half-olive's bulk of the other loaf [on the morrow], Rabbi says, I maintain that this offering is valid. Now this is so only because he referred to two halves, but had he referred to an olive's bulk of both [loaves] they would be combined. Whose ruling does Rabbi follow?

If you say that of the Rabbis, but [according to them] even though the intention was in respect of one loaf only [both would be Piggul]; and if you say that of R. Jose, then our original question confronts us again. It must be that he follows the ruling of the Rabbis, but read not [in the above mentioned Baraitha] ‘unless he expressed an intention which makes Piggul with regard to an olive's bulk from both’, but rather ‘unless he expressed an intention which makes Piggul with regard to an olive's bulk in both’, even though the intention was only [in respect of an olive's bulk] of one [loaf]. He thus rejects the view of R. Meir who said, A wrongful intention expressed during the service of half the Mattir renders the offering Piggul; and he teaches us [that it is not so]. If so, why is this introduced by the expression ‘It must be’?

If, of course, you would have said that the author of that Baraitha meant from both [loaves] and in both [lambs], adopting thus the view of R. Jose and rejecting the views of R. Meir and the Rabbis, the expression ‘It must be’ would be quite in order. But if you merely say that he adopted the view of the Rabbis, rejecting only the view of R. Meir, why then the expression ‘It must be’? Moreover R. Ashi had raised an objection [against R. Huna from the following]: Come and hear: Rabbi says in the name of R. Jose, If [whilst performing a service outside] he expressed an intention which makes Piggul in respect of another service which is performed outside, the offering is Piggul, if in respect of another service which is performed inside, it is not Piggul. Thus, if whilst standing outside he said, ‘Behold I am slaughtering with the intention of sprinkling the blood thereof on the morrow’, it is not Piggul, for this is an intention expressed whilst serving outside in respect of a service performed inside. If whilst standing inside he said, ‘Behold I am sprinkling the blood with the intention of burning the sacrificial portions on the morrow’, or, ‘of pouring out the residue of the blood on the morrow’, it is not Piggul for this is an intention expressed whilst serving outside in respect of a service performed outside. If whilst standing outside he said, ‘Behold I am slaughtering with the intention of pouring out the residue of the blood on the morrow’, or ‘of burning the sacrificial portions on the morrow’, it is Piggul; for this is an intention expressed whilst serving outside in respect of a service performed outside. Now [in the latter case] where the intention was of pouring out the residue of the blood, what is it that becomes piggul? Should you say that it is the blood that becomes piggul, but does the blood become Piggul? Behold we have learnt: For the following things the penalty of Piggul is not incurred: viz., the handful, the frankincense, the incense-offering, the meal-offering of the priests, the meal-offering offered with the drink-offerings, the meal-offering of the anointed [High] Priest, and the blood! Obviously then it is the flesh that becomes Piggul. Now if in that case where no intention was expressed with regard to the flesh at all R. Jose holds that it nevertheless becomes Piggul, how much more so in this case where he actually expressed an intention with regard to the [flesh of the] offering!
Moreover Rabina had raised an objection [against R. Huna] from the following: Come and hear: if he took out the handful intending to eat the remainder or to burn the handful on the morrow, in this case R. Jose agrees that the offering is Piggul and that the penalty of kareth is incurred on account thereof. Now where the intention was to burn the handful, what is it that becomes Piggul? Should you say that it is the handful that becomes Piggul, but does the handful become Piggul? Behold we have learnt: For the following things the penalty of Piggul is not incurred: viz., the handful, etc. Obviously then it is the remainder that becomes Piggul. Now if in that case where no intention was expressed with regard to the remainder at all

(1) For if the two limbs which are derived from the one body are regarded as two entities so that the wrongful intention in respect of one will not affect the other, then the two loaves are a fortiori regarded as two entities and can by no means be combined in one merely by the form of intention expressed. Why then is it held that where the intention was in respect of an olive's bulk of the two loaves both are Piggul?

(2) Lit., 'half', 'half'. I.e., the wrongful intention was expressed each time in respect of a half-olive's bulk only of the loaf, and therefore the two intentions cannot be combined to make the offering Piggul.

(3) Thus identical with the view stated in the Baraitha quoted by R. Nahman.

(4) V. supra, beginning of 14a: ‘But if you say... ‘, v. p. 83, n.9.

(5) I.e., from the two loaves. Heb. מ��ית, the fem. form referring to the loaves.

(6) I.e., in the course of the slaughtering of the two lambs. Heb. מניין, the masc. form referring to the lambs. The wrongful intention which makes Piggul must be expressed during the service of both lambs, which together form the Mattir, i.e., that which renders the loaves permissible, and not during the slaughtering of one of the lambs which is only half the Mattir. This clearly conflicts with R. Meir’s view.

(7) Heb. סトレ, a dialectic term usually employed when a view is suggested rejecting all others.

(8) So that there must be an intention which makes Piggul expressed during the slaughtering of both lambs and in respect of both loaves. This would be in accordance with R. Jose's view as stated in our Mishnah.

(9) Who maintains that a wrongful intention expressed during the slaughtering of one of the lambs, which is but half the Mattir, renders Piggul. This view is rejected by the statement in the Baraitha ‘in both’.

(10) Who maintain that the wrongful intention expressed in respect of one loaf renders the other Piggul too. This view is rejected by the expression ‘from both’.

(11) This refers to the bullocks and the he-goats that were to be wholly burnt (Lev. IV, 1-12; 13-21; XVI, 3 and 5; Num. XV, 24). The procedure in these offerings (v. Zeb. V, 2) was as follows: the animals were slaughtered outside in the courtyard; the blood was sprinkled inside the Temple, i.e., on the veil and on the golden altar; the sacrificial portions, i.e., the entire beast, were burnt outside upon the outer altar; and the residue of the blood was poured out at the western base of the outer altar which stood in the Temple courtyard.

(12) In this passage the term ‘outside’ signifies outside the Temple building, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, and the term ‘inside’ within the Temple building.

(13) I.e., what portion of this offering must one eat in order to incur the penalty of kareth for eating Piggul?

(14) So that if one were to eat the blood of this sacrifice in error one would be liable to bring two sin-offerings for the two counts of kareth, (a) for eating blood, and (b) for eating Piggul.

(15) Zeb. 42b.

(16) I.e., if the offering was rendered Piggul and one ate of the parts enumerated, the penalty of kareth is not incurred, for the law of Piggul does not apply to that part of the offering which is the Mattir, i.e., which renders other parts permissible. V. Zeb. 42b, 43a.

(17) Thus the Piggul-intention expressed in connection with the right thigh will certainly render the left thigh also Piggul-contra R. Huna. This sentence is found in the text in cur. edd., but it is wanting in MS.M. Sh. Mek. strikes it out as a gloss.

It nevertheless becomes Piggul how much more so in this case where he actually expressed an intention with regard to the [flesh of the] offering! —
Rather said R. Johanan, This is the reason for R. Jose's opinion: Scripture regards [the two loaves] as one body and Scripture also regards them as two bodies. As one body—since one cannot be offered without the other; and as two bodies—since the Divine Law ordains that each [loaf] shall be prepared separately. Therefore if they were reckoned as one, they are thereby united, since Scripture regards them as one body; if they were separated, they remain thus separated, since Scripture regards them also as two bodies.

R. Johanan raised the following questions: What is the position if one expressed an intention which makes Piggul in respect of the loaves of the thank-offering? or in respect of the baked meal-offering? — Thereupon R. Tahlifa the Palestinian recited to him the following teaching: You must say the same of the loaves of the Thank-offering, and you must say the same of the baked meal-offering.

Our Rabbis taught: If during the slaughtering he intended to eat a half-olive's bulk [of the flesh after its prescribed time], and during the sprinkling [of the blood] he also intended to eat a half-olive's bulk [after its prescribed time], the offering is Piggul, for the slaughtering and the sprinkling can be reckoned together as one. Some explained that this applied only to the slaughtering and the sprinkling since they are both mattirin, but not to the receiving and the bringing nigh; whilst others explained that this applied even to those services which are not consecutive, and all the more to those services which are consecutive. This surely cannot be, for Levi has taught: The four services, viz., slaughtering, receiving, bringing nigh, and sprinkling cannot be reckoned together so as to render Piggul! —

Raba answered, There is no contradiction: the one represents the view of Rabbi, the other the view of the Rabbis. For it was taught: If he slaughtered the lamb intending to eat a half-olive's bulk of the one loaf [on the morrow], and likewise [he slaughtered] the other lamb intending to eat a half-olive's bulk of the other loaf [on the morrow], Rabbi says, I maintain that this offering is valid.

Said Abaye to him, perhaps Rabbi held that view only in the case of a [wrongful intention expressed during] half the mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating, but he might not uphold that view in the case of [a wrongful intention expressed during] the whole Mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating?

Raba son of R. Hanan then said to Abaye, But if [as you say,] Rabbi holds that in the case of [a wrongful intention expressed during] the whole Mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating, [the offering is Piggul], then he should declare the offering Piggul even in the case of [a wrongful intention expressed during] half the Mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating, as a precautionary measure against the case of [a wrongful intention expressed during] the whole Mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating; for R. Jose adopts such a precautionary measure against the case of [a wrongful intention expressed during] the whole Mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating; for R. Jose adopts such a precautionary measure, and the Rabbis also adopt such a precautionary measure. ‘R. Jose adopts such a precautionary measure’, as we have learnt: If he intended to burn the frankincense thereof on the morrow, R. Jose says, it is invalid, but the penalty of kareth is not incurred on account thereof; but the Rabbis say, it is Piggul and the penalty of kareth is incurred on account thereof. ‘And the Rabbis also adopt such a precautionary measure’, as we have learnt: If he expressed an intention which makes Piggul during the [burning of the] handful and not during the [burning of the] frankincense, or during the [burning of the] frankincense and not during the [burning of the] handful, R. Meir says, it is invalid, but the penalty of kareth is incurred; but the Rabbis say, The penalty of
kareth is not incurred unless the intention which makes Piggul was expressed during the service of the whole of the mattir.\textsuperscript{16} —

He replied, There is no comparison between the cases. I grant you that there R. Jose declares invalid the case [where the wrongful intention was in respect] of the handful of frankincense as a precautionary measure against the case [where the wrongful intention was in respect] of the handful of the meal-offering;\textsuperscript{17} and also that the Rabbis declare invalid the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the handful as a precautionary measure against the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the handful of the sinner's meal-offering;\textsuperscript{18} and that they declare invalid the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the frankincense as a precautionary measure against the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the frankincense of the dishes.\textsuperscript{18} And in the case of the lambs too,\textsuperscript{19} they declare invalid the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the slaughtering] of one lamb as a precautionary measure against the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the slaughtering] of the other lamb too;\textsuperscript{19} and they declare invalid the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the slaughtering] of one dish of frankincense as a precautionary measure against the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the other dish too.\textsuperscript{20} In our case, however, is there ever a case of [a wrongful intention expressed during the service of] half a Mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating [that renders Piggul], so that we should take here precautionary measures?\textsuperscript{21}

Indeed it stands to reason that this\textsuperscript{22} is the explanation of the view of the Rabbis, for in the next clause [of that Mishnah]\textsuperscript{19} it states: The Rabbis, however, agree with R. Meir that if it was a sinner's meal-offering or a meal-offering of jealousy, and he expressed an intention which makes Piggul during the burning of the handful, the offering is Piggul and the penalty of kareth is incurred on account thereof, since the handful [alone] is the [entire] Mattir. Now why was it necessary for this [last expression] to be stated? It is quite obvious, for is there then [in these cases] any other Mattir? We must therefore say that it teaches us this: namely, the reason [why the Rabbis declare the offering invalid in the case where a wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the handful [of the 'ordinary meal-offering'] is that there is the handful of the sinner's meal-offering which is similar to it [and which is a real case of Piggul].


GEMARA. R. Eleazar said, They differ only [in the case where one loaf became unclean] before the sprinkling of the blood,\textsuperscript{25} but [where it became unclean] after the sprinkling, all agree that the unclean one is treated as unclean and the clean one may be eaten. And [in the case where one became unclean] before the sprinkling, on what principle do they differ? —

R. Papa said, They differ as to whether the [High Priest's] plate renders [the offering] acceptable [where] the eatable portions [had become unclean].\textsuperscript{26}

(1) R. Huna's view is untenable, for it is accepted by all that a wrongful intention in respect of one limb certainly affects the other; nevertheless the case of the two loaves dealt with by R. Jose in our
Mishnah is a special one, as R. Johanan proceeds to show.

(2) In the case where there was expressed an intention to eat one olive's bulk of the two loaves. This intention certainly reckoned the two loaves as one 'body' or entity, and therefore both are Piggul, as stated in the Baraitha quoted supra p. 83 by R. Nahman.

(3) In the case where the expressed intention referred to one loaf only. The other loaf is not affected by this intention, as stated in the Mishnah.

(4) The thank-offering consisted of an animal-sacrifice and an offering of forty cakes, ten cakes of each of the four different kinds prescribed, v. Lev. VII, 12, 13. Now if during one of the services in connection with the animal-offering a wrongful intention was expressed with regard to the eating of the cakes of one kind, the question is: would R. Jose in this case also suffer with the Rabbis and maintain that the other kinds of cakes are in no wise affected, or would he agree with them, seeing that all the kinds are rendered permissible by the offering of one sacrifice?

(5) The baked meal-offering consisted of either ten unleavened cakes or ten unleavened wafers (v. ibid II, 4), whilst according to R. Simeon it may consist of five cakes and five wafers; v. infra 63a. The question arises here according to R. Simeon's view: If a wrongful intention was expressed in respect of the cakes only or in respect of the wafers only, would R. Jose agree with the Rabbis that the other kind is also affected, seeing that only one handful was taken from this meal-offering on behalf of both kinds, or not?

(6) R. Jose in this case too differs with the Rabbis.

(7) It is regarded as though during one service an intention was expressed in respect of one whole olive's bulk.

(8) These services are alike in that each renders some part of the offering permissible: the slaughtering renders the blood permissible for sprinkling, and the sprinkling renders the flesh permissible to be eaten.

(9) Lit., 'which are far apart from each other'.

(10) The order of the services is: slaughtering, receiving, bringing nigh, and sprinkling. Now if the first and the last services are reckoned together as one, how much more can those services which are consecutive be reckoned together!

(11) The Baraitha taught by Levi that services cannot be reckoned together.

(12) I.e., during the slaughtering of one of the two lambs which is only half of the Mattir, for it is only the slaughtering of the two lambs which renders the two loaves permissible to be eaten.

(13) Sc. a half-olive's bulk.

(14) Indeed Rabbi would also agree that if an intention which makes Piggul was expressed during the slaughtering of an ordinary offering (which is a whole Mattir, v. supra n. 2) in respect of a half-olive's bulk of the flesh, and a similar intention was expressed during the sprinkling of the blood (which is also a whole Mattir, ibid.), these intentions would be reckoned together to make the offering Piggul.

(15) Strictly the offering should be valid for there is no Piggul here; R. Jose, however, declares it invalid only as a precautionary measure, since this case is similar to a real case of Piggul, namely, where the intention was to burn the handful of the meal-offering on the morrow.

(16) The offering, however, is invalid, as a precautionary measure against a real case of Piggul where the burning of the handful of the meal-offering alone constitutes the whole Mattir (as in the case of the sinner's meal-offering), or where the burning of the frankincense alone constitutes the whole Mattir (as in the case of the frankincense of the Showbread); v. infra 16a.

(17) Which is undoubtedly a real case of Piggul; v. p. 89, n. 1.

(18) Which is a real case of Piggul; v. supra p. 89, n. 2.

(19) Infra 16a, Mishnah.

(20) Which is admittedly a real case of Piggul.

(21) There is no such case, hence there is no ground for a precautionary measure.

(22) I.e., that in every case where the offering is declared to be invalid it is only as a precautionary measure against a case of absolute Piggul which is similar to it.

(23) The two loaves offered with the two lambs on the Feast of Weeks; cf. Lev. XXIII, 19, 20.

(24) And if a part of the offering was rendered unfit for eating, as here on account of uncleanness, the whole may not be eaten.

(25) Or, in the case of the Showbread-offering, before the burning of the dishes of the frankincense which corresponds to the sprinkling of the blood in an animal-offering.

(26) The High Priest's plate worn on the forehead had a propitiatory effect (v. Ex. XXVIII, 36-38), and if a part of the sacrifice became unclean the offering was nevertheless acceptable, and the sprinkling of the blood was deemed to be a valid sprinkling. The Rabbis and R. Judah differ as to what portions of the sacrifice are comprehended within the propitiating effect of the plate, whether it includes even those portions usually eaten by the priests (Heb. אכילות), or only those portions offered upon the altar (Heb. שילוח), as the blood and the fat, and the frankincense.
The Rabbis are of the opinion that the plate renders [the offering] acceptable [even though] the eatable portions [had become unclean]; but R. Judah is of the opinion that the plate does not render [the offering] acceptable [where] the eatable portions [had become unclean].

Thereupon R. Huna the son of R. Nathan said to R. Papa, Behold the plate certainly renders [the offering] acceptable [where] the sacrificial portions [had become unclean], and yet they differ! For it has been taught: If one of the dishes of frankincense became unclean, R. Judah says, Both are offered in conditions of uncleanness, for an offering of the congregation may not be divided. But the Rabbis say, The unclean is offered in conditions of uncleanness and the clean in cleanness.

Moreover R. Ashi had raised an objection thus: Come and hear: R. Judah says, Even though one tribe only was unclean and all the other tribes were clean, [all the Passover-offerings] shall be offered in conditions of uncleanness, for the offering of the congregation may not be divided. But the Rabbis say, The unclean is offered in conditions of uncleanness and the clean in cleanness.

Furthermore Rabina had raised an objection thus: Come and hear: IF ONE OF THE [TWO] ROWS [OF THE SHEWBREAD] BECAME UNCLEAN, R. JUDAH SAYS, BOTH MUST BE TAKEN OUT TO THE PLACE OF BURNING, FOR THE OFFERING OF THE CONGREGATION MAY NOT BE DIVIDED. BUT THE SAGES SAY, THE UNCLEAN [IS TREATED] AS UNCLEAN, BUT THE CLEAN ONE MAY BE EATEN. Now if that were so, then it should have stated: ‘for the plate does not render [the offering] acceptable [where] the eatable portions [had become unclean]’. — R. Johanan therefore said, It is an accepted teaching in the mouth of R. Judah that the offering of the congregation may not be divided.


GEMARA. Why is it? Should you say it is because of R. Kahana’s teaching, who said, Whence do we know that the cakes of the thank-offering are called ‘the thank-offering’? From the verse, He shall offer for the sacrifice of the thank-offering unleavened cakes. Then the reverse should also be true. This, however, is no difficulty, for the bread is referred to as ‘the thank-offering’, whereas the thank-offering is nowhere referred to as ‘the bread’. But when [the Mishnah] states: THE LAMBS CAN RENDER THE BREAD PIGGUL BUT THE BREAD CANNOT RENDER THE LAMBS PIGGUL, the question will be asked, Where do we find the bread ever referred to as ‘the lambs’? — It must be that this is the reason [for our Mishnah]: the bread is appurtenant to the thank-offering but the thank-offering is not appurtenant to the bread; the bread is appurtenant to the lambs but the lambs are not appurtenant to the bread. Now both cases had to be stated [in our Mishnah]. For had it
stated only the case of the thank-offering, I would have thought that only in that case is it held that an intention which makes Piggul expressed in respect of the bread does not render the thank-offering Piggul since they are not dependent upon each other for the rite of waving, but in the case of the lambs, since they are dependent upon each other with regard to the rite of waving, I would say that an intention which makes Piggul expressed in respect of the bread would render the lambs Piggul too. Therefore [both cases] had to be stated.

R. Eleazar put this question to Rab: What is the law if he slaughtered the thank-offering intending to eat an olive's bulk of it and of its bread on the morrow? Of course, as to whether the thank-offering becomes Piggul thereby, I have no doubt at all [that it does not], for if where the intention was in respect of a whole olive's bulk of the bread the thank-offering does not become Piggul, can there be any question where [the intention was in respect of an olive's bulk made up] of it and of the loaves? My question is as to whether the bread becomes Piggul or not. Is the thank-offering to be reckoned with [the bread] so as to render the bread Piggul or not? —

He answered, In this case too, the bread is Piggul but the thank-offering is not Piggul. But why is this so? Surely one can apply here an a fortiori argument thus, if what helps to make the other Piggul does not itself become piggul, then surely what cannot even help to make the other piggul does not itself become Piggul! And do we apply an a fortiori argument of such a kind? Behold, it has been taught: It once happened that a man

(1) Of course, there is no question at all that the unclean portions are forbidden to be eaten; for there is an express prohibition against it (Lev. VII, 19). They hold, however, that where one loaf became unclean the offering is acceptable, and the sprinkling is a valid sprinkling; consequently the other loaf is permitted to be eaten.

(2) And as the sprinkling is not valid, even the clean loaf may not be eaten. R. Papa apparently ignores the reason stated by R. Judah in our Mishnah, FOR THE OFFERING OF THE CONGREGATION MAY NOT BE DIVIDED, and submits quite a new argument for R. Judah’s view.

(3) It is established law (Pes. 80a) that an offering of the congregation may be offered in conditions of uncleanness. And as the unclean dish of frankincense is offered in conditions of uncleanness, the other dish may be made unclean and offered together with the first. It is thus manifest that the reason for R. Judah’s view is as stated here and also in our Mishnah, namely that the offering of the congregation may not be divided, and it has nothing whatever to do with the effectiveness of the plate, for we see that he put forward this reason in our Mishnah where it was suggested that R. Judah held that the plate does not render the offering acceptable where the eatable portions had become unclean, and he also gives this reason in the Baraita quoted where he admits that the plate renders the offering acceptable where the sacrificial portions had become unclean.

(4) Where all the members of one tribe of Israel became unclean on the fourteenth day of Nisan, the day for the offering of the Passover-lamb, they are permitted, according to R. Judah, to offer the Passover-lamb in conditions of uncleanness; and since the offering of the congregation may not be divided, all the Passover-lambs are to be offered in conditions of uncleanness.

(5) There can be no question here of the plate rendering the offering acceptable for the plate exercises a propitiatory effect only where part of the offering became unclean but not where the person officiating became unclean. Again it is clear from this that the reason stated, ‘For the offering of the congregation may not be divided’, has nothing whatever to do with the propitiating effect or otherwise of the plate.

(6) That the reason for R. Judah’s view is that the plate does not render the offering acceptable where the eatable portions had become unclean.

(7) In truth it has no relation to the propitiatory effect of the plate.

(8) The thank-offering consisted of an animal-offering and a bread-offering of forty cakes, ten cakes of each of the four different kinds specified; v. Lev. VII, 12, 13. The entire thank-offering had to be consumed on the same day of offering until midnight.

(9) Of the special peace-offering offered on the Feast of Weeks and accompanied by a bread-offering of two loaves as first-fruits, v. Lev. XXIII,
17-19. This peace-offering and the loaves had to be eaten on the same day of offering.

(10) That a wrongful intention which makes Piggul expressed during the service of the thank-offering renders the bread Piggul too.

(11) Ibid. VII, 12.

(12) I.e., a wrongful intention expressed in respect of the bread should also render the thank-offering Piggul. Yet this is not the case.

(13) The slaughtering of the thank-offering renders the bread consecrated; so too does the slaughtering of the lambs at the Feast of Weeks.

(14) Sc. the animal-offering and the bread-offering.

(15) In the thank-offering the breast was waved before the Lord (Lev. VII, 30) but not in conjunction with the bread-offering; on the Feast of Weeks, however, the lambs were waved together with the loaves (ibid. XXIII, 20).

(16) And, on the other hand, had the Mishnah only stated the case of the lambs, I should have thought that only there is it held that an intention which makes Piggul expressed in respect of the lambs renders the bread Piggul too, since they are dependent upon each other for the rite of waving; but since this is not the case with the thank-offering and its bread I would say that an intention which makes Piggul expressed in respect of the thank-offering does not render the bread Piggul.

(17) I.e., the olive's bulk that he proposes to eat on the morrow is made up of a half-olive's bulk of the flesh of the offering and a half-olive's bulk of the bread.

(18) The half-olive's bulk of the thank-offering helps by combining with the half-olive's bulk of the bread to render the other (sc. the bread Piggul, although the thank-offering does not itself become Piggul thereby.

(19) Lit., ‘which came to render Piggul but did not actually make Piggul’. The half-olive's bulk of the bread does not combine with the half-olive's bulk of the thank-offering to render the other (sc. the thank-offering) Piggul.

**Menachoth 15b**

sowed [with his own seeds] his neighbor’s vineyard which was in the budding stage; the case came before the Rabbis and they pronounced the seeds forbidden and the vines permissible. But why? Surely one could apply there [this kind of] a fortiori argument thus, If what makes the other forbidden but did not do so surely does not itself become forbidden! —

There can be no comparison. There [with regard to diverse kinds] the Torah has forbidden hemp and arum, but other seeds are forbidden only Rabbinically; therefore he who transgressed the law was penalized by the Rabbis, and he who did not transgress the law was not penalized by the Rabbis. In our case, however, one must certainly apply the a fortiori argument. Others refer the above argument to the case of the lambs thus: R. Eleazar put this question to Rab: What is the law if he slaughtered the lambs intending to eat an olive's bulk of them and of the bread [on the morrow]? Of course, as to whether the lambs become Piggul thereby, I have no doubt at all [that they do not] for if where the intention was in respect of a whole olive’s bulk of the bread the lambs do not become Piggul, can there be any question where [the intention was in respect of an olive's bulk made up] of them and of the bread?

My question is as to whether the bread becomes Piggul or not. Are the lambs to be reckoned with [the bread] so as to render the bread Piggul or not? He answered, In this case too, the bread is Piggul but the lambs are not. But why is this so? Surely one can apply here an a fortiori argument thus, If what helps to make the other Piggul does not itself become Piggul, then surely what cannot even help to make the other Piggul does not itself become Piggul! And do we apply an a fortiori argument of such a kind?

Behold, it has been taught: It once happened that a man sowed [with his own seeds] his neighbor’s vineyard which was in the budding stage, etc. But why? Surely one could apply there [this kind of] a fortiori argument thus, If what makes the other forbidden does not itself become forbidden, what might have made the other forbidden, but did not do so, does not itself become forbidden! — There can be no comparison.
There [with regard to diverse kinds] the Torah has forbidden hemp and arum, but other seeds are forbidden only Rabbinically; therefore he who transgressed the law was penalized by the Rabbis, and he who did not transgress the law was not penalized by the Rabbis. In our case, however, one must certainly apply the a fortiori argument. Now those who refer it to the case of the thank-offering refer it all the more to the case of the lambs; but those who refer it to the case of the lambs maintain that it applies only to the case of the lambs since they are dependent upon each other with regard to the rite of waving, but not to the case of the thank-offering since they are not dependent upon each other with regard to the rite of waving.

R. Abba the Younger stated the question thus, R. Eleazar enquired of Rab: What is the law if he slaughtered the lamb intending to eat an olive's bulk of the other on the morrow? Does ‘the other’ mean the [other] lamb, in which case there is no Piggul at all; or does it mean the bread, in which case [the bread becomes] Piggul? —

He answered, You have learnt it: If he slaughtered one of the lambs intending to eat a part of it on the morrow, that [lamb] is Piggul and the other [lamb] is valid; if he intended to eat of the other [lamb] on the morrow, both are valid. Hence it is clear that ‘the other’ means the other lamb. Perhaps [however in that Mishnah] he expressly said ‘the other lamb’.


**GEMARA.** Our Rabbis taught: For the drink-offerings of an animal-sacrifice the penalty of Piggul is incurred, since the blood of the animal-offering renders them permissible to be offered [upon the altar]. So R. Meir. They said to R. Meir, Is it not the fact that a man may bring his animal-offering to-day and the drink-offerings thereof in ten days’ time? He replied, I also only spoke of the case where they were brought together with the animal-offering. But surely they may be transferred to another animal-offering! —

Raba said, R. Meir is of the opinion that with the slaughtering they became appropriated [to this offering] like the cakes of the thank-offering. Our Rabbis taught: For the leper's log of oil the penalty of Piggul is incurred, since the blood of the guilt-offering renders it permissible to be applied to the thumb and the great toe. So R. Meir. They said to R. Meir, Is it not the fact that a man may bring his guilt-offering to-day and the log of oil in ten days’ time? He replied, I also only spoke of the case where it was brought together with the guilt-offering. But surely it may be transferred to another [leper's] guilt-offering! —

Raba said, R. Meir is of the opinion that with the slaughtering it became appropriated [to this guilt-offering] like the cakes of the thank-offering.

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(1) The sowing of seeds in a vineyard is expressly prohibited, cf. Deut. XXII, 9.
(2) Sc. the vines, on account of which the seeds are declared forbidden.
(3) Sc. the seeds, on account of which the vines would have been forbidden were it not for the reason stated infra in the Gemara.
(4) Nevertheless the seeds are forbidden and such an a fortiori argument is not applied.
(5) Of course in addition to the five kinds of grain (R. Nissim, Hul. X). V. however Sh. Mek. note 2.
(6) Of all seeds only these kinds are forbidden to be sown in a vineyard, for they ripen only after three years, and their seed does not perish in the ground but they leave roots behind them; moreover they grow in clusters like grapes. In the cur. edd. there is here quoted the Mishnah Kil. I, 5; but it is omitted in all MSS.

(7) So that in the above case where a man sowed seed in his neighbor’s vineyard the prohibition involved was only a Rabbinic one, and the Rabbis penalized only him who transgressed their enactment but not the owner of the vineyard. Thus there is no place for the a fortiori argument, for even the seeds are not forbidden strictly but only as a penalty.

(8) Concerning Piggul, v. supra p. 95 at end.

(9) Sc. Rab’s answer to the question, namely that the offering combines with the bread to render the latter Piggul.

(10) Sc. the bread and the offering. V. supra P. 95, n. 2.

(11) For, since the slaughtering of both lambs is the Mattir, i.e., that which renders the loaves permissible, a wrongful intention expressed during the slaughtering of one lamb, which is only part of the Mattir, in respect of the other part of the Mattir, i.e., the other lamb, does not make Piggul.

(12) Infra 16a.

(13) And whosoever partakes of the drink-offerings incurs the penalty of kareth on the ground of Piggul. The drink-offerings consisted of prescribed quantities of flour and oil for the meal-offering and of wine for the libation; they accompanied most sacrifices (cf. Num. XV, 4-10).

(14) And it is established law: Whatsoever is rendered permissible (דבר שיש לו מתירין), whether for man or for the altar, by a certain rite is subject to the law of Piggul. V. Zeb. 43a; Yoma 60a.

(15) Hence it is evident that the drink-offerings are not part of the offering and are not affected by any intention concerning them expressed during the slaughtering of the offering.

(16) In cur. edd. ‘They said to him’. This is not found in the MSS. and is deleted by Sh. Mek.

(17) Consequently they cannot be rendered Piggul through any intention expressed during the slaughtering of the animal-offering, since they are not specifically bound to that offering.

(18) And they may not be transferred to be used for another offering.

(19) Cf. Lev. XIV, 10ff. If therefore while slaughtering the leper’s guilt-offering he intended to deal with the oil on the morrow, the latter becomes Piggul, and whosoever partakes of it incurs the penalty of kareth.

(20) I.e., the oil may be applied only after the rites in connection with the blood of the guilt-offering have been performed. It is thus.

v. supra p. 98,n. 4.

Menachoth 16a


THE SAGES, HOWEVER, AGREE WITH R. MEIR THAT, IF IT WAS A SINNERS MEAL-OFFERING2 OR A MEAL-OFFERING OF JEALOUSY,2 AND HE EXPRESSED AN INTENTION WHICH MAKES PIGGUL DURING THE [BURNING OF THE] HANDFUL, IT IS PIGGUL AND THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS INCURRED ON ACCOUNT THEREOF, SINCE THE HANDFUL IS THE ENTIRE MATTIR.

MENOCHOS – 2a-26b


GEMARA. Rab said, The dispute is only where he offered the handful in silence and then the frankincense with the expressed intention, but where he offered the handful with the expressed intention and then the frankincense in silence, all agree that it is Piggul, for everything that a man does [in silence] he does in accordance with his first resolve.7 But Samuel said, There is still a dispute in that case too.8

Raba was once sitting and reciting this statement [of Rab], when R. Aha b. R. Huna raised against Raba the following objection: Thiss applies only to the service of taking the handful, or of putting it in the vessel or of bringing it nigh;10 but if he had already reached the service of burning, and he offered the handful in silence and then the frankincense with the expressed intention, or if he offered the handful with the expressed intention and then the frankincense in silence, R. Meir says, It is Piggul and the penalty of kareth is incurred on account thereof. The Sages say, The penalty of kareth is not incurred unless he expressed an intention which makes Piggul during the service of the whole mattir.20 Now here it states: ‘If he expressed an intention which makes Piggul either during the first [sprinklings] or the second or the third’, and yet they differ!21 Should you, however, reply that there too there were two minds,22 I grant you that this is satisfactory according to him who holds that the expression ‘with a bullock’23 means also ‘with the blood of the bullock’;24 but what can be said according to him who holds that the expression ‘with a bullock’ excludes the blood of the bullock?25—

Raba said, We must suppose here that he26 expressed an intention which makes Piggul during the first sprinklings, was silent during the second, and again expressed an intention which makes Piggul during the third; in which case we say, If you accept the principle that whatsoever a man does [in silence] he does according to his first resolve, why then did he express again an intention which makes Piggul during the third [sprinklings]? R. Ashi demurred, saying, Does [the Baraita] actually state ‘he was silent’? —

Rather, said R. Ashi, We must suppose here that he he26 expressed an intention which makes Piggul during the first [sprinklings] and also during the second;27 in which case we say, If you accept the principle that whatsoever a
man does [in silence] he does according to his first resolve, why then did he again express an intention which makes Piggul during the second [sprinklings]?27

(1) V. supra p. 89, n. 2.
(2) Which is offered without frankincense; cf. Lev. V, 11 and Num. V, 15.
(3) Which is but half the Mattir; for two lambs were offered as peace-offerings on the Feast of Weeks, along with a bread-offering of two loaves; v. Lev. XXIII, 17ff.
(4) Also half the Mattir; for two dishes of frankincense were offered with the Showbread. V. ibid. XXIV, 7.
(5) Between R. Meir and the Sages in our Mishnah.
(6) Lit., ‘put it in’ sc. the vessel, in readiness for the burning upon the altar. It must be remembered that the handful of flour was first burnt upon the altar and then the frankincense.
(7) And as his first resolve expressed during the offering of the handful was an intention of Piggul-namely, of eating the remainder on the morrow — it is to be assumed that such was also his intention-though unexpressed during the offering of the frankincense.
(8) MS.M. adds: And so also said R. Johanan, There is still a dispute in that case too.
(9) The ruling that a wrongful intention expressed whilst dealing with the handful alone renders Piggul.
(10) For each of these services is performed once only and that in connection with the handful, hence at each of these services the intention is in respect of the whole Mattir; whereas the burning is performed twice, viz., the burning of the handful of flour and of the frankincense.
(11) Thus contrary to Rab's view.
(12) Where the first service was performed in silence, for it is immaterial whether that first service was the burning of the handful or of the frankincense.
(13) Although in the Baraitha cited by R. Aha the expression ‘and’ may be explained as meaning ‘having already’, this cannot be so in the other Baraitha which expressly states ‘and then’.
(14) I.e., two Priests had performed the rites of the meal-offering, one burnt the handful of flour with an intention of Piggul and the other burnt the frankincense in silence. In such a case the principle, ‘Whatever a man does in silence he does in accordance with his first resolve’, cannot apply; for this can only be said of one person but not of two.
(15) The law that a wrongful intention expressed during one single sprinkling of the blood renders the offering Piggul.
(16) For since with these offerings one single sprinkling would effect atonement (v. Zeb. 36b) that sprinkling is accounted as the whole Mattir and can therefore render Piggul.
(17) Made up as follows: eight sprinklings (one above and seven below) between the staves of the ark, of the blood of the bullock, and likewise eight of the blood of the he-goat; these same sprinklings repeated in the Sanctuary upon the veil; four sprinklings of the blood of the bullock and of the he-goat when mixed together, i.e., one upon each of the four corners of the golden altar, and seven upon the cleansed surface (i.e. the top) of the golden altar. V. Yoma Ch. V. (18) These are: the seven sprinklings of the blood towards the veil, and the four sprinklings, one upon each of the four corners of the altar. Cf. Lev. IV, 6,7 and 17, 18.
(19) The first, second and third sprinklings refer to the sprinklings of the blood in the Holy of Holies between the staves of the ark, towards the veil, and upon the altar respectively.
(20) I.e., during all the three sprinklings.
(21) The Sages holding that where the intention which makes Piggul was expressed during the first sprinklings only, the others being performed in silence, the offering is not Piggul. Apparently the principle, Whatsoever a man does in silence he does according to his first resolve, is not adopted; contra Rab.
(22) I.e., the sprinklings were performed by two High Priests, the High Priest who performed the first sprinklings having died immediately thereafter or The Master stated: ‘R. Meir says, It is Piggul and the penalty having become unclean; in which case the sprinklings in silence by the second High Priest can have no reference to or bearing upon the resolve of the former High Priest.
(23) Lev. XVI, 3.
(24) If the High Priest, after having slaughtered the bullock, could not continue to serve, his successor continued the service, and was not required to begin all the services anew and slaughter another bullock for himself; for the verse, Herewith shall Aaron (sc. the High Priest) come into the holy place; with a bullock (ibid.) does not imply that the High Priest shall begin his service with a living bullock, but he may even take the blood of the bullock which was slaughtered by his predecessor. V. Yoma 49b.
(25) According to him the service can never be performed by two High Priests, for the successor must begin anew.
(26) The High Priest.
(27) ‘And also during the third’ — so in curr. edd. but wanting in all MSS. and struck out by Sh. Mek. The case is clearly one where the High Priest was silent during the third sprinklings; so that only a part and not the whole of the Mattir was performed with an intention which makes Piggul.

Menachoth 16b

But does not the Baraitha state: Either. . .or?1 — This is a difficulty. of kareth is incurred on account thereof’. Consider: the penalty of kareth is incurred only after all the mattirin have been offered, for a Master has stated:3 The expression ‘accepted’ suggests, as the acceptance of a valid offering so is the acceptances of an invalid offering; that is to say, as the acceptance of a valid offering is effected only after all the Mattirin have been offered, so the acceptance of an invalid offering is effected only after all the Mattirin have been offered. Now in this case since he expressed a wrongful intention [when sprinkling] within,6 he has thereby rendered it invalid, consequently when he later sprinkles in the Sanctuary it is as though he were sprinkling water!7 —

Rabbah said, It can happen where four bullocks and four he-goats were used.8 Raba said, You may even hold that there was only one bullock and one he-goat, but [the sprinklings] are acceptable in regard to the law of piggul.9 ‘Forty-three [sprinklings]’. But we have been taught: Forty-seven! —

Raba said, R. Johanan is of the opinion that any service which is not an absolute mattir is regarded as a service complete in itself with regard to piggul.16 Whereupon Abaye said to him, Behold the slaughtering of one of the lambs [on the Feast of Weeks] is a service which is not an absolute mattir,17 and yet they differ! For we have learnt: IF HE SLAUGHTERED ONE OF THE LAMBS INTENDING TO EAT THE TWO LOAVES ON THE MORROW, OR IF HE BURNT ONE OF THE DISHES OF FRANKINCENSE INTENDING TO EAT THE TWO ROWS [OF THE SHEWBREAD] ON THE MORROW, R. MEIR SAYS, IT IS PIGGUL AND THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS INCURRED ON ACCOUNT THEREOF; BUT THE SAGES SAY, THE PENALTY OF KARETH IS NOT INCURRED UNLESS HE EXPRESSED THE INTENTION WHICH MAKES PIGGUL DURING THE SERVICE OF THE WHOLE OF THE MATTIR! — He replied, Do you imagine that the loaves are hallowed already in the oven? It is the slaughtering of the lambs that hallows them; and whatsoever serves to hallow is on the same footing as whatsoever serves to render permissible.

R. Shimi b. Ashi raised an objection. It was taught: Others say, If he had in mind first the circumcised persons and then the uncircumcised, it is valid; if he had in mind first the uncircumcised persons and then the circumcised, it is invalid.19 And it was established that they differ concerning half the mattir!20 — He replied, Do you think that the blood [of an animal-offering] is
already hallowed in the throat? It is the knife [of slaughtering] that hallows it; and whatsoever serves to hallow is on the same footing as that which serves to render permissible.

Come and hear: This applies only to the services of taking the handful, or putting it in the vessel or bringing it nigh; [but if he had already reached the service of burning, etc.] Now ‘bringing nigh’ surely means bringing nigh for the purposes of burning, does it not? — No, it means bringing nigh in order to put it in the vessel. But if so, why is it stated [in this order] ‘putting it in the vessel or bringing it nigh’? It ought surely to have stated ‘bringing it nigh or putting it in the vessel’! — This is no difficulty, for you may render it thus. But [it will be asked], why does it state ‘but if he had already reached the service of burning’? It ought to have stated ‘but if he had already reached the service of bringing nigh’? — This, too, is no difficulty, for since the bringing nigh is for the purposes of burning he refers to it as the burning. But [it will be asked], why does it state ‘and he offered’? It ought to have stated, ‘and he brought it nigh’? — This is indeed a difficulty. If he burnt the size of a sesame seed of the handful intending to eat the size of a sesame seed of the remainder [on the morrow, and he repeated this again and again] until the handful was entirely burnt up, in this case R. Hisda, R. Hamma and R. Shesheth differ. One holds that it is Piggul, the other that it is invalid, and the third that it is valid. Now shall we say that he who holds that it is Piggul is in agreement with R. Meir, he who holds that it is invalid is in agreement with the Rabbis, and he who holds that it is valid is in agreement with Rabbi? —

But is this so? Perhaps R. Meir is of that opinion only there where he expressed [the intention which makes Piggul] during a complete service. Moreover, perhaps the Rabbis are of their opinion only there where he did not express an intention [which makes Piggul] during the service of the whole Mattir, but here where he actually expressed an intention [which makes Piggul] during the service of the whole Mattir [they would agree that] it is Piggul. And again, perhaps Rabbi is of his opinion only there where he did not make up [the minimum quantity] later in the same service, but here where he made up the quantity in the same service [he would agree that] it is invalid! — We must therefore say that he who holds that it is Piggul holds thus according to all views; he who holds that it is invalid holds thus according to all views, and he who holds that it is valid holds thus according to all views. ‘He who holds that it is Piggul holds thus according to all views’, for he maintains that that is a way of eating as well as a way of burning. ‘He who holds that it is invalid holds thus according to all views’, for he maintains that that is a way of eating but not a way of burning, and it was as though [the handful of] the meal-offering had not been burnt at all. ‘And he who holds that it is valid holds thus according to all views’, for he maintains that that is a way of burning but not a way of eating.

(1) This implies that the intention which makes Piggul was expressed only during one of the three sprinklings mentioned.
(2) מתירין of מתיר, that which renders the offering permissible; v. Glos. The penalty of kareth for eating Piggul is not incurred unless the whole Mattir was offered according to its prescribed rite except for the expressed intention which made it Piggul. Thus where the Mattir consists of a number of sprinklings, and at the first sprinklings there was expressed an intention which makes Piggul, then it is essential, if the penalty of kareth is to apply, that the subsequent sprinklings be performed according to the prescribed rite.
(3) Zeb. 28b, 42b.
(4) Lev. XIX, 7 and XXII, 27; the former referring to an offering which has been made Piggul and the latter to a valid offering.
(5) Regarding the liability for Piggul.
(6) Sc. in the Holy of Holies between the staves of the ark, this being the first of the sprinkling services.

(7) The penalty of kareth cannot therefore be incurred; how then can R. Meir say that kareth is incurred in those circumstances? It must be observed that at first sight this same question could also be raised in the case where a Piggul intention was expressed during the slaughtering or during the receiving of the blood, for since the offering is rendered invalid by that intention the subsequent sprinkling is no service, consequently the penalty of kareth cannot be incurred. Rashi, however, suggests this distinction: in this case the slaughtering or the receiving was performed entirely in sanctity, for the intention of Piggul related to some subsequent service, whereas in the case of our text the sprinkling was not performed entirely in sanctity, for the intention of Piggul related to the other sprinklings of this same service. V. also Rashi in Zeb. 42b, s.v. מ"; and Tosaf. here s.v. מ".

(8) Where after the High Priest had sprinkled the blood of the bullock and of the he-goat in the Holy of Holies between the staves of the ark, the residue of the blood had splitt, so that it was necessary to slaughter another bullock and he-goat to obtain their blood for sprinkling in the Sanctuary. Again after the second sprinklings the residue of the blood had splitt and so another bullock and he-goat were once more slaughtered in order to perform the sprinklings upon the four corners of the altar. Once again owing to this same mishap, a fourth bullock and he-goat were slaughtered in order to perform the final sprinklings seven times upon the cleansed portion of the altar. In these circumstances the offering would be valid (v. Yoma 61a), for each of the sprinklings is considered as a separate service. Now if an intention which makes Piggul had been expressed at the first sprinklings the offering would be Piggul, for here the subsequent three sprinklings were admittedly in themselves valid and were not affected by the wrongful intention of the first sprinklings. In the normal case, however, where only one bullock and one he-goat had been used in the service, R. Meir would agree that, where an intention which makes Piggul was expressed at the first sprinklings, the penalty of kareth cannot be incurred.

(9) Since the subsequent sprinklings had been performed without any further intention they are considered as vital services offered according to rule, and not as ‘sprinklings of water’. The offering therefore is Piggul.

(10) But the blood of the bullock and of the he-goat must each separately be sprinkled upon the four corners of the altar; hence an addition of four to the total number of sprinklings. V. Yoma 57b.

(11) The pouring out of the residue of the blood to the base of the altar, being an important service, is added to the number of the sprinklings, making thus a total of forty-eight. V. Yoma 60b.

(12) The service of bringing nigh to the altar applies both to the handful of flour and to the frankincense, so that it can be said that the bringing nigh of one is but half the Mattir, and the dispute between the Sages and R. Meir would hold good here too.

(13) Which is a complete service, a whole Mattir, for the handful was only taken from the flour but not from the frankincense.

(14) Of which there are two services: the burning of the handful and of the frankincense. And therefore the dispute between the Sages and R. Meir applies also to the service of bringing nigh.

(15) I.e., it can be dispensed with; the bringing nigh can in certain cases be dispensed with for the handful can be passed on from priest to priest till it reaches the altar (Rashi). Aliter: it does not render aught permissible; in this respect the service of bringing nigh is different from other services, for the receiving the blood of the animal-offering renders the sprinkling possible, and the sprinkling renders the flesh permissible (v. Sh. Mek. n. 4).

(16) And the ruling of the Sages that Piggul does not apply to half a Mattir does not apply here, since this service is not a Mattir in the strict sense of the word.

(17) For it does not render aught permissible. V. supra n. 3.

(18) So that the slaughtering is on a par with an absolute Mattir, and therefore the Sages hold that it is Piggul only when the whole of this Mattir (i.e., the slaughtering of both lambs) was affected by the wrongful intention.

(19) V. Pes. 62b. The Baraita refers to the case of a person who, whilst slaughtering the Passover-lamb on behalf of a number of people, circumcised and uncircumcised, cut one organ of the animal’s throat on behalf of one class of people and then the second organ on behalf of the other class too. The view here stated is introduced by the expression ‘Others say’, which usually represents the view of R. Meir; the Sages, however, differ.

(20) I.e., whether a wrongful intention expressed during the service of half the Mattir can invalidate the offering or not; and here the cutting of the first organ is, as it were, but half the Mattir. Now the Mattir here spoken of, namely the slaughtering, is not an absolute Mattir since it does not render aught permissible, and yet the Sages differ with R. Meir and hold that the wrongful intention in regard to half the Mattir is
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of no consequence; contra Raba’s interpretation of R. Johanan.
(21) That a wrongful intention expressed whilst dealing with the handful alone renders Piggul. V. supra p. 101.
(22) And the Sages agree that a wrongful intention expressed during the bringing nigh renders Piggul; contra Resh Lakish.
(23) Which is a complete service, for only the handful was put into a vessel and not the frankincense.
(24) And reverse the order of the Baraitha.
(25) For the service of bringing nigh is prior to the burning, and the Sages and R. Meir differ herein, too, according to Resh Lakish.
(26) For even if it is accepted, as suggested, that the term ‘burning’ includes the bringing nigh, when describing the service the Tanna of the Baraitha should have mentioned the first act thereof, namely the bringing nigh, and not the act of offering (lit., ‘the putting’ upon the altar, i.e., the burning).
(27) And so he did too with the frankincense.
(28) That an intention which makes Piggul expressed during the service of a portion of the Mattir — in this case during the burning of the size of a sesame seed of the handful and of the frankincense — renders the offering Piggul. The Sages, however, in such a case declare the offering invalid.
(29) V. supra 14a where Rabbi holds the view that the two parts of the Mattir cannot be reckoned together to affect the offering, where each intention was made in respect of less than the minimum quantity that constitutes eating, namely an olive’s bulk.
(30) Viz., during the burning of the handful which, though but half of the Mattir, for there is also the burning of the frankincense, is nevertheless a complete service. In this case only does R. Meir maintain that the offering is Piggul.
(31) For in the case dealt with by Rabbi the Piggul intention was expressed during the slaughtering of one lamb about a half-olive’s bulk of one loaf and a similar Piggul intention was expressed during the slaughtering of the other lamb about the same quantity of the other loaf.
(32) The taking of quantities the size of a sesame seed at a time.
(33) So that this case is no-different from the usual cases of Piggul where during the burning of an olive’s bulk of the handful there was an intention expressed to eat an olive’s bulk of the remainder on the morrow.
(34) And therefore it is invalid.
(35) The burning in this manner is regarded as a normal burning of the handful, whereas the intention concerning the eating of the remainder is no intention in law so as to invalidate the offering.

Menachoth 17a

The keen intellects of Pumbeditha1 said, An intention which makes Piggul expressed during one service of burning concerning another service of burning renders the offering piggul.2 And this is so even according to the Rabbis who ruled that an intention which makes Piggul expressed during the service of half the Mattir does not render Piggul, for that is their ruling only in the case where he expressed an intention [which makes Piggul] about the remainder [of the meal-offering], the frankincense, however, remaining unaffected; but in this case where he expressed an intention [which makes Piggul] about the frankincense, it is as though he had expressed the intention during the service of the whole Mattir.

Raba said, We have also learnt to the same effect: This is the general rule: If one took the handful or put it into the vessel or brought it nigh, or burnt it, intending to eat a thing that it is usual to eat or to burn a thing that it is usual to burn, outside its proper place, the offering is invalid but the penalty of kareth is not incurred; but if [he intended the like] outside its proper time, the offering is Piggul and the penalty of kareth is incurred.3 Now presumably the service of burning is similar to the other [services],4 and as with the others [the intention which makes Piggul may be] either concerning the eating [of the remainder] or concerning the burning [of the frankincense], so with the service of burning [the intention which makes Piggul may be] either concerning the eating [of the remainder] or concerning the burning [of the frankincense]! — No; with the others the intention may be either concerning the eating or concerning the burning, but with the service of burning the intention can be only concerning the eating but not concerning the burning.
R. Menasiah b. Gadda was once sitting before Abaye and recited the following in the name of R. Hisda: An intention which makes Piggul expressed during one service of burning concerning another service of burning does not render the offering Piggul. And this is so even according to R. Meir who ruled that an intention which makes Piggul expressed during the service of half the Mattir renders Piggul; for that is his ruling only where the intention expressed was concerning the remainder, since it is the handful that renders the remainder permissible; in this case, however, since the handful does not render the frankincense permissible, it cannot make the offering piggul.

Thereupon Abaye said to him, Tell me, Sir, was that [statement] in the name of Rab? He replied, Yes. And it has been so reported: R. Hisda said in the name of Rab, An intention which makes Piggul expressed during one service of burning concerning another service of burning does not render the offering Piggul.

R. Jacob b. Abba said in the name of Abaye, We have also learnt the same: IF HE SLAUGHTERED ONE OF THE LAMBS INTENDING TO EAT A PART OF IT ON THE MORROW, THAT [LAMB] IS PIGGUL BUT THE OTHER [LAMB] IS VALID; IF HE INTENDED TO EAT OF THE OTHER [LAMB] ON THE MORROW, BOTH ARE VALID. Now what is the reason? It is, is it not, because [the one lamb], not being the Mattir of the other, cannot make the offering Piggul by reason of an intention concerning [that other]? — No, there the reason is because they are not joined in one vessel; here, however, since they are joined in the one vessel, they are considered as one.

R. Hamnuna said, The following was taught me by R. Hanina and is equal in worth to me to all my studies: If he burnt the handful intending to burn the frankincense [on the morrow], [and] to eat the remainder on the morrow, the offering is Piggul. What is it that he teaches us? If he teaches us that an intention which makes Piggul expressed during one service of burning concerning another service of burning renders the offering Piggul, then he should [only] have said, If he burnt the handful intending to burn the frankincense [on the morrow]. And if he teaches us that an intention which makes Piggul expressed during the service of half the Mattir renders Piggul, then he should have [only] said, If he burnt the handful intending to eat the remainder on the morrow. And if he teaches us both these rules, then he should have said, If he burnt the handful intending to burn the frankincense [on the morrow] and to eat the remainder on the morrow! —

R. Adda b. Ahabah said, Actually he is of the opinion that an intention which makes Piggul expressed during one service of burning concerning another service of burning does not render Piggul, and he holds also that an intention which makes Piggul expressed during the service of half the Mattir does not render Piggul, yet in this case it is different since the wrongful intention has spread over the entire meal-offering.

A Tanna once recited before R. Isaac b. Abba: If he burnt the handful intending to eat the remainder [on the morrow], all hold it to be Piggul. But surely this is a matter of dispute? — Rather render: All hold it to be invalid. But could he not have corrected himself thus: It is Piggul, that is, according to R. Meir? — The Tanna evidently was taught the ruling ‘all hold’, and he confused in his mind ‘Piggul’ with ‘invalid’; but he would not confuse ‘it is [Piggul]’ with ‘all hold’.
MISNAH. IF HE TOOK THE HANDFUL FROM THE MEAL-OFFERING INTENDING TO EAT\[19\] A THING THAT IT IS NOT USUAL TO EAT\[20\] OR TO BURN\[19\] A THING THAT IT IS NOT USUAL TO BURN,\[21\] THE OFFERING IS VALID; BUT R. ELIEZER DECLARES IT TO BE INVALID. IF HE INTENDED TO EAT\[19\] LESS THAN AN OLIVE'S BULK OF A THING THAT IT IS USUAL TO EAT, OR TO BURN\[19\] LESS THAN AN OLIVE'S BULK OF A THING THAT IT IS USUAL TO BURN, THE OFFERING IS VALID. IF HE INTENDED TO EAT\[19\] A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK AND TO BURN\[19\] A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK, THE OFFERING IS VALID, FOR EATING AND BURNING CANNOT BE RECKONED TOGETHER.

GEMARA. R. Assi said in the name of R. Johanan, What is the reason for R. Eliezer's view? Because the verse reads, And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be at all eaten.\[22\] The verse here speaks of two 'eatings'. the 'eating' by man and the 'eating' by the altar, to inform you that as there can be a wrongful intention concerning what is usually eaten by man, so there can be a wrongful intention concerning what is usually 'eaten' by the altar; and furthermore, as there can be a wrongful intention concerning what is usually eaten by man in regard to man's eating thereof\[23\] and concerning what is usually 'eaten' by the altar in regard to the altar's 'eating' thereof, so there can be a wrongful intention concerning what is usually eaten by man in regard to the altar's 'eating' thereof\[24\] and concerning what is usually 'eaten' by the altar in regard to man's eating thereof. And why is this? Because the Divine Law expressed [the burning upon the altar] by the term 'eating'. And the Rabbis, [what would they say to this]? — The reason why the Divine Law expressed it by the term 'eating' was [to teach you]

(1) V. Sanh. 17b. This title of honor was applied to ‘Efah and Abimi, the sons of Rehahbah the Pumbedithan.
(2) I.e., if during the burning of the handful of the meal-offering the officiating priest expressed the intention of burning the frankincense on the morrow, the offering is Piggul.
(3) Supra 12a.
(4) Which are stated in this Mishnah in connection with the handful.
(5) For the frankincense is not dependent upon the burning of the handful; v. supra 13b, p. 80.
(6) Where the Piggul intention was expressed during the burning of the handful concerning the frankincense.
(7) So in all MSS. and Sh. Mek.; in cur. edd. ‘ldi’.
(8) That both are valid.
(9) Just as the burning of the handful, not being the Mattir of the frankincense, cannot render the offering Piggul by reason of a Piggul intention concerning the latter.
(10) The two lambs, which are the two Mattirs, are not united by any act or service, but are separate and distinct; and therefore one is not affected by the other.
(11) The handful and the frankincense are placed together in the same vessel, and so regarded as one Mattir.
(12) Lit., ‘I was made to swallow’.
(13) The word לכבשה ‘and the frankincense’, found in all edd. is wanting in the MSS. and is struck out by Sh. Mek. The translation in the text is based upon the text and interpretation of Rashi. Maim. apparently included the word לכבשה in the text, and the translation would read thus: If he burnt the handful intending to burn the frankincense on the morrow, and (then he burnt) the frankincense intending to eat the remainder on the morrow, the offering is Piggul. V. Maim. Yad, Pesule Hamuk. XVI, 8; and also לכהי הלכות on Men. a.l. by Israel Meir Hakohen.
(14) The ‘and’ however would be taken, as often, in the sense of ‘or’.
(15) Although each intention by itself would not render Piggul, the two together affect the whole of the meal-offering and render it Piggul.
(16) Between R. Meir and the Sages; and according to the latter it is not Piggul since the intention was expressed during the service of half the Mattir only.
(17) The Sages agree that such an intention renders the offering invalid.
(18) It is more probable that the Tanna confused in his mind מוסר.listFiles with ‘invalid’, rather than that he confused ויהי ולך ‘it is’ withﻢפרישилось they all hold’.
(19) On the morrow.
(20) E.g., the frankincense or the handful.
(21) E.g., the remainder of the meal-offering.
(22) Lev. VII, 18. Heb. אמר אכל薄膜 אכל, lit., ‘If eaten there shall be eaten’; hence the verse contemplates two kinds of eating.
(23) I.e., an intention expressed during the burning of the handful that what is usually eaten by man (sc. the remainder) shall be eaten by man beyond the time prescribed for the eating thereof. This intention renders the offering Piggul. Similarly the intention that what is usually consumed by the altar shall be burnt upon the altar outside the prescribed time renders the offering Piggul.
(24) I.e., the intention that what is usually eaten by man shall be burnt upon the altar outside the prescribed time also renders the offering Piggul.

It must therefore be that of R. Eliezer. And thereupon R. Eleazar had said, ‘Even in this case, R. Eliezer declares it to be invalid, and the Sages declare it to be valid’. Is not R. Eleazar identical with R. Judah? It must therefore be said that the difference between them is on the question of kareth. The first Tanna is of the opinion that in the case of ‘leaving’16 [R. Eliezer holds that] it is invalid only, but in the other cases17 [R. Eliezer holds that] he is even liable to kareth; whereas R. Eleazar comes to tell us that in both these cases [R. Eliezer holds that] it is invalid only but the penalty of kareth is not incurred! — No, all are of the opinion that there is no penalty of kareth involved; but in this dispute there are three different views. The first Tanna is of the opinion that only in the other cases do they18 differ,19 but in the case of ‘leaving’ all18 agree that it is valid. [ 

(1) I.e., if the priest whilst taking the handful expressed the intention that the handful shall be ‘eaten’ by the altar on the morrow, the offering is Piggul
(2) In order to render the intention effective so as to make the offering Piggul.
(3) The handful to be burnt upon the altar and the remainder to be eaten by man; only in these cases is the intention of consequence.
(4) האכל האכל i.e., the repetition of the verb in the infinitive.
(5) אכל אכל, both in the finite mood.
(6) האכל האכל, the first verb being in the infinitive and the second in the finite mood.
(7) (a) That for the burning there must be an intention in respect of an olive’s bulk, and (b) that an intention to burn upon the altar what is eaten by man, or an intention that what is usually burnt on the altar shall be eaten by man, is of consequence.
(8) As given above, derived from the verse in Lev. VII, 18.
(9) In which case the penalty of kareth would be incurred.
(10) I.e., what is usually consumed by the altar to be eaten by man.
(11) I.e., what is usually eaten by man to be consumed on the altar.
(12) I.e., what is R. Judah’s view in the first case where the intention expressed was to drink the blood on the morrow, etc?
(13) To drink and to burn upon the altar are acts included under the term ‘eating’.
(14) Where there was no intention of eating at all, but merely to leave the blood for the morrow.
(15) Sc. R. Judah. In cur. edd. ‘R. Judah’ is also found in the text; evidently an explanatory gloss.
(16) I.e., the second clause of the abovementioned Baraitha, where there was an intention of leaving over some of the blood for the morrow.
(17) I.e., those cases mentioned in the first clause of the abovementioned Baraitha, where there was an intention of drinking the blood on the morrow or burning the flesh on the morrow.
(18) R. Eliezer and the Sages.
(19) R. Eliezer holding that where there was an intention of burning on the morrow what is usually eaten, the offering is invalid by Rabbinical law, merely as a precautionary measure against an intention of burning on the morrow what is usually burnt, in which case the offering would be Piggul by the law of the Torah.

Menachoth 18a

R. Judah is of the opinion that only in the other cases do they differ, but in the case of ‘leaving’ all agree that it is invalid, the reason being that we must declare the offering invalid [in the case where the intention was in respect of leaving] part of the blood [for the morrow] as a precautionary measure against [an intention of leaving] all the blood [for the morrow], and [an intention of leaving] all the blood [for the morrow] renders the offering invalid by Biblical law. For it was taught:1 Said R. Judah to them, ‘You would agree with me, would you not, that if he actually left [the blood] for the morrow the offering is invalid? Then even where he intended to leave it for the morrow it is also invalid’. R. Eleazar then comes to tell us that even in this case,2 R. Eliezer declares it to be invalid and the Sages declare it to be valid. Is then R. Judah of the opinion that in the case where there was an intention of leaving part of the blood for the morrow all agree that it is invalid?

But it has been taught: Rabbi said, When I went to R. Eleazar b. Shammua’ to have my learning examined (others say: To sound the learning of R. Eleazar b. Shammua’). I found there Joseph the Babylonian sitting before him. Now he [Joseph] was very dear to him.4 He [Joseph] then said to him, ‘Master, what is the law if one slaughtered an offering intending to leave the blood for the morrow?’ ‘It is valid’, he replied. In the evening he again replied. ‘It is valid’. On the next morning he again replied. ‘It is valid’ — At midday he again replied. ‘It is valid’ In the afternoon he replied. ‘It is valid, but R. Eliezer declares it to be invalid’. Thereupon Joseph’s face lighted up.

Said to him [R. Eleazar], ‘Joseph, it seems to me that our traditions did not correspond until now’ — ‘Quite so, Master’, he replied. ‘Quite so. For R. Judah had taught me the view that it was invalid; and when I sought out all his disciples so as to find a supporter of this view, I could not find any.5 But now that you have taught me the view that it is invalid, you have thus restored to me what I had lost’. Thereupon the eyes of R. Eleazar b. Shammua’ streamed with tears and he exclaimed, ‘Happy are ye, O scholars, to whom the words of the Torah are so dear!’

He then applied to him [Joseph] the following verse: ‘O how I love thy law! It is my meditation all the day.6 For it was only because R. Judah was the son of R. Ila’i, and R. Ila’i was the disciple of R. Eliezer that he [R. Judah] taught you the view of R. Eliezer.’

Now if it be assumed that [R. Judah] taught that all hold it is invalid, then what did he [Joseph] mean when he said ‘You have thus restored to me what I had lost’? He [R. Eleazar b. Shammua’] had only told him [in the end] that there was a difference of opinion in the matter!7 — What then would
you say? That he [R. Judah] taught him ‘It is valid, but R. Eliezer declares it to be invalid’! If so, why the expression ‘For it was only because’?

If we also learnt [from R. Eleazar b. Shammua] that there was a difference of opinion in the matter! — We must indeed say that he [R. Judah] taught him that all hold it is invalid; but what did he [Joseph] mean by saying, ‘You have thus restored to me what I had lost’? He meant that he had brought the view ‘it is invalid’ to light.

**Mishnah.** If he did not pour in [the oil], or if he did not mingle it, or if he did not break up [the meal-offering] in pieces, or if he did not salt it, or wave it, or bring it nigh, or if he broke it up into large pieces, or did not anoint it [with oil], it is valid.

**Gemara.** What is meant by he did not pour in [the oil]? Shall we say that he did not pour in [any oil] at all? But Scripture has indicated that this is indispensable! — We must say therefore that it means, the priest did not pour in [the oil] but a non-priest did. If so, the next item he did not mingle it, would also mean, the priest did not mingle it but a non-priest did; from which it follows that if it was not mingled at all it would be invalid.

(1) V. Zeb. 36a.
(2) Where there was an intention of leaving over some of the blood for the morrow.
(3) Lit., ‘to drain my measures to the last drop’; i.e., to overhaul my studies and to have all matters of doubt cleared up.
(4) Heb. יִרְדָּהוּ יַע, corresponding to the Aramaic אַלְלִים = very much. (R. Nissim, in Tosaf. ad. loc. s.v. יַע). According to Rashi: ‘until one’, i.e., until they had reached the subject dealt with here; or, everything that R. Eleazar said was dear to Joseph and accepted by him unhesitatingly until they had reached this law, which he did not accept until the end.
(5) And I therefore thought that I must have mistaken in my report of R. Judah since the other disciples of R. Judah had not heard of it.
(6) Ps. CXIX, 97.
(7) So that even the final reply of R. Eleazar b. Shammua’ did not correspond with the teaching Joseph had received from R. Judah. It must therefore be said that R. Judah had also taught his disciple Joseph that there was a difference of opinion in the matter, and so contrary to the premise set out at the beginning of this passage.
(8) For when R. Eleazar b. Shammua’ had remarked ‘For it was only because...’ he evidently meant to say that R. Judah had taught his disciple Joseph that particular view only out of admiration and reverence for his teachers, whereas in fact the law was not in accordance with that view. But as matters now stand the teachings of R. Eleazar b. Shammua’ and of R. Judah are identical.
(9) For until the final reply of R. Eleazar b. Shammua’ there was not even the vaguest hint that any Rabbi held the view that it is invalid; and this so disturbed Joseph that he was led to doubt the accuracy of his memory concerning R. Judah’s teaching. The final reply of R. Eleazar b. Shammua’ gave him some measure of reassurance.
(10) The fixed procedure in the preparation of the meal-offering was: first some oil was poured in a vessel and the fine flour was then put in; then more oil was poured in and it was mingled with the flour. It was then baked into cakes and thereafter broken in pieces. The remainder of the oil was then poured on it, and the handful was taken therefrom. V. infra 74b. The first case of the Mishnah means that no oil was poured in at the end but it had all been poured in at first.
(11) Cf. Lev. II, 6. All meal-offerings which were baked before the taking out of the handful had to be broken up in pieces; v. infra 75b. In this case only an amount sufficient for the handful was broken up, but the rest remained unbroken (Rashi).
(12) Ibid. 13. Only the handful was salted but not the rest of the meal-offering (Bertinoro and Tosaf. Yom-Tob; and cf. prec. n.). According to others: the handful was not salted by a priest but by a layman (Maim. and Tif. Yisrael; and cf. infra the Gemara’s interpretation of the first item of our Mishnah).
(14) To the southwestern horn of the altar; cf. Lev. II, 8.
(15) Or, he broke it up too fine; v. Gemara infra 18b.
(16) Those cakes which were not mingled with oil but were, after baking, anointed with oil; cf. ibid. VII, 12.
(17) For the rite of pouring in oil is stated twice (Lev. II, 1 and 6), and whatsoever rite is repeated
in connection with the meal-offering is accounted indispensable. V. infra 19b.

Menachoth 18b

but we have learnt: Sixty [tenths] can be mingled together2 but not sixty-one. And when we were considering this [and it was asked], What does it matter if they cannot be mingled together? Have we not learnt: IF HE DID NOT MINGLE IT... IT IS VALID?

R. Zera answered, Wherever proper mingling is possible the mingling is not indispensable, but wherever proper mingling is not possible the mingling is indispensable?3 — Is this an argument? Surely this has its own meaning and that has its own meaning. The item HE DID NOT POUR IN means, the priest did not pour in [the oil] but a non-priest did; whereas the item HE DID NOT MINGLE IT means, it was not mingled at all.

OR IF HE BROKE IT UP INTO LARGE PIECES. But surely if where he did not break it up at all it is valid, is it then necessary to state [that it is valid if he broke it up into] large pieces? — The expression ‘LARGE PIECES’ really means many pieces.4 Or, if you will, I may say that actually large pieces were meant, [nevertheless it had to be stated in our Mishnah]. For you might have thought that only thees [is it valid] since they retain the character of cakes, but [not] here6 since they are neither cakes nor crumbs. We are therefore taught [that here,6 too, it is valid]. Shall we say that our Mishnah7 is not in agreement with R. Simeon?

For it was taught:  R. Simeon says, A priest who does not believe in the service has no portion in the priesthood. Now I know it only of this [service stated in the verse], but whence do I know it also of the fifteen services, viz., pouring in [the oil], mingling, breaking it up, salting it, waving it, bringing it nigh, taking the handful, burning it, nipping off [the head of a bird-offering], receiving [the blood], sprinkling it, giving the water to a woman suspected of adultery, breaking the heifer's neck, purifying the leper, and raising the hands in blessing both within [the Temple] and without? The verse therefore adds, ‘Among the sons of Aaron’, that is, all services that are entrusted to the sons of Aaron; and the priest who does not believe in it has no portion in the priesthood!8 —

There is no difficulty, said R. Nahman. There17 it deals with the meal-offering of a priest, here with the meal-offering of an Israelite. In the case of the meal-offering of an Israelite, from which the handful must be taken, the duty of the priesthood begins with the taking out of the handful; we thus learn that the pouring in [of the oil] and the mingling are valid [even though performed] by non-priests. In the case of the meal-offering of a priest, from which the handful is not taken, the services of the priesthood are required from the very beginning. Thereupon Raba said to him, Just see, whence do we deduce that the rite of pouring in the oil applies also to meal-offerings from which the handful is not taken? From the meal-offering of an Israelite,9 do we not? Well, as there [the pouring in] may be performed by a non-priest, in this case too it may be performed by a non-priest! (Others have the following version.

There is no difficulty, said R. Nahman. Here it deals with meal-offerings from which the handful is taken, there20 with meal-offerings from which the handful is not taken.21 Thereupon Raba said to him, Just see, whence do we deduce that the rite of pouring in the oil applies also to meal-offerings from which the handful is not taken? From those meal-offerings from which the handful is
taken, do we not? Well then they must be like unto those from which the handful is taken, and as in the latter case [the pouring in] may be performed by a non-priest, here too it may be performed by a non-priest!) — Obviously, then, our Mishnah is not in agreement with R. Simeon. What is the reason of the Rabbis?

— It is written, And he shall pour oil upon it, and put frankincense thereon. And he shall bring it to Aaron's sons the priests; and he shall take thereout his handful. From the taking of the handful and onwards is the function of the priesthood; we thus learn that the pouring in [of the oil] and the mingling are valid [even though performed] by non-priests. And R. Simeon? — [He says,] The Scriptural expression ‘Aaron's sons

Menachoth 19a

the priests’ is to be interpreted as referring to what precedes as well as to what follows. And is R. Simeon of the opinion that a Scriptural expression is to be interpreted as referring to what precedes as well as to what follows? But it has been taught: It is written, And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin-offering with his finger, and put it upon the horns of the altar. ‘And... shall take... with his finger’, this teaches us that the sprinkling shall be with [the finger of] the right hand only.

R. Simeon said, Is the expression ‘hand’ written in connection with the taking [of the blood]? Since the expression ‘hand’ is not written in connection with the taking [of the blood], if he took the blood with the left hand it is still valid. And Abaye said that they differ as to whether a Scriptural expression is to be interpreted as referring to what precedes as well as to what follows or not! —

This rather is the reason for R. Simeon’s view: It is written, And he shall bring it; the term ‘and’ indicates conjunction with the preceding subject. But is R. Simeon of the opinion that the term ‘and’ indicates conjunction with the preceding subject? Then consider this: It is written, And he shall slaughter the bullock before the Lord; and Aaron's sons, the priests, shall present the

(1) Infra 103b. The line quoted from this Mishnah is actually stated in the form of a question.
(2) In the one vessel with one log (v. Glos.) of oil.
(3) It is evident, therefore, that according to R. Zera our Mishnah teaches that the mingling can be dispensed with entirely, provided it were possible to do so if desired. Similarly the first case of our Mishnah would mean that no oil at all was poured in.
(4) i.e., he broke it up too small.
(5) In the case where the cakes were not broken up at all.
(6) Where they were broken up into a few large pieces.
(7) Which permits the rite of pouring in the oil to be performed by a non-priest.
(8) i.e., he is not entitled to a portion in the distribution of the priestly gifts. V. Hul. 132b.
(9) Lev. VII, 33.
(10) This and the following seven services relate to the various kinds of meal-offerings.
(11) Ibid. I, 15; V, 8.
(13) Deut. XXI, 4.
(14) Lev. XIV, 1ff.
(15) For the priestly benediction, whether in the Temple at Jerusalem (ibid IX, 22) or in the synagogues in every town in Israel (Num. VI, 22ff.)
(16) It is clear, however, that R. Simeon counts the pouring in of the oil as a special service of the priests and which may not be performed by a layman, contrary to the view of our Mishnah.
(17) In the Baraitha taught by R. Simeon.
(18) From which no handful was taken but the whole meal-offering was burnt upon the altar. Cf. Lev. VI, 16.
(19) The rite of pouring in the oil over the flour is stated only in connection with the meal. offering of an Israelite, but it is extended so as to apply to all meal-offerings; v. infra 75a.
(20) In the Baraitha taught by R. Simeon.
(21) The meal-offering of a priest and also the meal-offering which accompanied most sacrifices; cf. Num. XV, 4ff.
(22) Who hold the view of our Mishnah.
(23) Lev. II,1,2.
blood, and sprinkle the blood, from which it is clear that only from the act of receiving [the blood] and onwards is the function of the priesthood; we thus learn that the slaughtering may be performed by a non-priest. But according to R. Simeon, since the term ‘and’ indicates conjunction with the preceding subject, the slaughtering by a non-priest should not be permitted! Here it is different, for it is written, And he shall lay his hand, and he shall slaughter; and as the laying of the hands is performed by non-priests so the slaughtering may be performed by non-priests. Then should it not follow, as the laying of the hands must be performed by the owner [of the offering], so the slaughtering, too, shall be performed by the owner! —

You cannot say that, as there is an a fortiori argument against it. For if the sprinkling which is the chief service of atonement is not performed by the owner, a fortiori the slaughtering which is not the chief service of atonement! And should you retort, But surely the possible is not to be inferred from the impossible! then [I say], the fact that the Divine Law enjoined with regard to the service on the Day of Atonement, And he shall slaughter the bullock of the sin-offering which is for himself, indicates that elsewhere the slaughtering need not be performed by the owners.

Rab said, Wherever the expressions ‘law’ and ‘statute’ occur [in connection with any rites], their purpose is only to indicate the indispensability [of those rites]. Now it was assumed that both expressions were necessary for this purpose, as in the verse, This is the statute of the law.

(Mnemonic: Nataz Yikmal.)

But is there not the case of the Nazirite, where only the expression ‘law’ is used, and yet Rab has said that the [absence of the] rite of waving invalidates [the service]? — That case is different, for since there is written, so he must do, it is as though the expression ‘statute’ were used. And is there not the thank-offering, where only the expression ‘law’ is used, yet we have learnt: Of the four [kinds of cakes] of the thank-offering the [absence of] one invalidates the others? — The case of the thank-offering is also different, since it has been placed side by side with the Nazirite in the verse, With the sacrifice of his peace-offerings for thanksgiving, and the Master has taught that the term ‘peace-offerings’ includes the peace-offerings of the Nazirite. And is there not the case of the leper, where only the expression ‘law’ is used, yet we have learnt: Of the four kinds [used in the purification] of the leper the [absence of] one invalidates the others? — That case is different, for since there is written, This shall be the law of the leper, it is as though the word ‘statute’ were also written. And is there not the Day of Atonement, where only the expression ‘statute’ is used, yet we have learnt: Of the two he-goats of the Day of Atonement the [absence of] one invalidates the other? —

Hence we must say that either the expression ‘law’ [by itself] or ‘statute’ [by itself indicates indispensability]. But with all other offerings only the expression ‘law’ is found, and yet the rites [in each offering] are not indispensable! — We must therefore say that the expression ‘law’ requires with it the expression ‘statute’ [in order to indicate indispensability], whereas statute does not require with it ‘law’. But did not Rab say, The expressions ‘law’ and ‘statute’? — He meant to say this: Even though the expression ‘law’ is used, only if there is also used the expression ‘statute’ is [indispensability implied], otherwise it is not so. But in the case of the meal-offering only the expression ‘statute’ is used, and yet Rab has stated, Every rite of the meal-offering which is repeated in another verse is
indispensable; which shows that only if it is repeated is it indispensable, otherwise it is not!33 —

That case is different, for the expression ‘statute’ relates only to the eating.34 And is there not the Showbread, where undoubtedly the expression ‘statute’ relates only to the eating,35 yet we have learnt:36 Of the two rows [of the Showbread] the [absence of] one invalidates the other, of the two dishes [of frankincense] the [absence of] one invalidates the other, of the rows and the dishes the [absence of] one invalidates the other? — Therefore we must say that even where [the expression ‘statute’] is used in connection with the eating [of the offering], it relates to all [the rites of that offering]; in that case, however, it is different, for since it is written, Of the bruised corn thereof and of the oil thereof37 [it is clear that only]

(1) So that the rites prior to the taking of the handful, namely the pouring in of the oil and the mingling, must also be performed by the priests alone.
(2) Ibid. IV, 25. It is to be particularly observed that the expression ‘with his finger’ (which in conjunction with the term ‘priest’, according to Rabbinic interpretation, signifies the use of the right hand or of the finger of the right hand; v. supra 10a) is so placed in the middle of the verse that it might be said to refer to the rite of taking the blood which precedes, or to the rite of sprinkling which follows, or even to both.
(3) The expression ‘finger’ is here meant.
(4) The first Tanna holds that the expression ‘with his finger’ refers to what precedes as well as to what follows, and therefore both services must be performed with the right hand; whereas R. Simeon holds that ‘with his finger’ refers to what follows, namely the sprinkling, and therefore the taking of the blood may be performed even with the left hand.
(5) Lev. II, 2.
(6) And the former service (sc. the pouring in of the oil) is determined by the latter (sc. the taking of the handful); as the latter is performed by the priest only, so the former may be performed by the priest only. To reason the same with regard to the sin-offering thus: since the second service is introduced by the term ‘and’, therefore as the second service, sc. The sprinkling, must be performed with the right finger so the preceding service, sc. the receiving of the blood, shall also be performed with the right hand, is not admissible, for the two services of the verse are separated by the expression ‘with his finger’ (Rashi).
(7) Ibid. I, 5.
(8) Which is understood by the expression ‘present the blood’.
(9) For the services which follow the term ‘and’, namely the receiving and the sprinkling, may be performed by none other than priests.
(11) Whereas the sprinkling is ‘impossible’, i.e., may not be performed by the owner, since that would be in direct conflict with the Scriptural precept, the slaughtering on the other hand is ‘possible’, i.e., may be, and therefore should be, performed by the owner.
(12) Ibid. XVI, 11.
(13) Num. XIX, 2.
(14) נת יקמל (he dashes and will pluck off), a mnemonic of the initial or characteristic letters of the cases adduced here in argument against Rab’s principle.
(16) Ibid. 21: This is the law of the Nazirite.
(17) Cf. Ibid. 19, 20.
(18) Ibid. 21.
(20) Infra 27a.
(21) Sc. leavened, cakes, unleavened cakes, wafers, and soaked cakes; cf. Lev. VII, 12, 13.
(22) Ibid. 13.
(23) Infra 27a.
(24) Ibid. XIV, 2.
(25) Sc. Cedar-wood, scarlet, hyssop, and two clean birds; cf. ibid. 4’
(26) For the expression ‘shall be’ also signifies indispensability.
(27) Cf. Ibid. XVI, 29.
(28) Cf. ibid. VII, 37: This is the law of the burnt-offering, etc.
(29) E.g., the offering is valid even though the sacrificial portions of the guilt-offering were not burnt upon the altar (supra 4a). and the meal-offering even though it was not brought nigh unto the altar (supra 18a).
(30) It is clear that the expressions are on an equal footing and one is not more significant than the other.
(31) Cf. Lev. VI, 11.
(32) The meal-offering is dealt with primarily in Lev. II, and also in VI, 7-11.
(33) In spite of the fact that the expression ‘statute’ is used.
(34) As it is written (ibid. VI, 11): Every male among the children of Aaron shall eat of it, it is a perpetual statute. It cannot be taken as a general term indicating indispensability.
(35) For it is written (ibid. XXIV, 9): And they shall eat it in a holy place, for it is most holy unto him... by a perpetual statute.
(36) Infra 27a.
(37) Sc. of the meal-offering.
(38) Ibid. II, 16.

Menachoth 19b

the bruised corn and the oil are indispensable, but no other thing is indispensable.1 [To turn to] the main text: ‘Rab said, Every rite of the meal-offering which is repeated in another verse is indispensable. Samuel, however, said, The bruised corn and the oil are indispensable, but no other thing is indispensable.2 Is it then suggested that according to Samuel even though the rite is repeated in another verse it is not indispensable?3 —

Rather [the position is this]: Wherever any rite is repeated in another verse it is certainly indispensable; they differ only as to [the effect of] the interpretation of the phrases ‘his handful’ and ‘with his hand’. For it was taught: The phrases ‘his handful’4 and ‘with his hand’5 signify that he shall not use a measure for the taking of the handful.6 Now Rab maintains that this too has been stated in another verse, as it is written, And he presented the meal-offering and filled his hand therefrom;7 Samuel, however, says that we cannot derive a permanent law from a temporary enactment.8

Is Samuel then of the opinion that we cannot derive a permanent law from a temporary enactment? But we have learnt: The vessels for liquids hallow liquids, and the measuring vessels for dry stuffs hallow dry stuffs; the vessels for liquids cannot hallow dry stuffs, neither can the measuring vessels for dry stuffs hallow liquids.9 And thereupon Samuel had said, This applies only to the measuring vessels [for liquids], but the sprinkling bowls hallow [also dry stuffs], for it is written, Both of them full of fine flour!10 — This case is different since the verse is repeated twelve times.11

R. Kahana and R. Assi said to Rab, But is not the bringing nigh [of the meal-offering to the altar] repeated in Scripture, nevertheless it is not indispensable?12 — Where is it repeated? Because it is written, And this is the law of the meal-offering: the sons of Aaron shall bring it nigh before the Lord, [to the front of the altar]?13 But surely that verse merely determines the place [whither it shall be brought]. As it has been taught: [If the verse had only stated,] ‘Before the Lord’, I might have thought that it meant on the west [side of the altar],14 the verse therefore added, To the front of the altar.15 And [if the verse had only stated,] To the front of the altar, I might have thought that it meant on the south side, the verse therefore stated, ‘Before the Lord’. So what was the procedure? He brought it nigh unto the south-west corner opposite the point of the altar's horn, and that sufficed. R. Eliezer says, It is possible [to think that the meaning is] he can bring it nigh either to the west corner or to the south corner;16 but you can answer, Wherever you find two texts, one self-confirmatory and confirming the words of the other, whereas the second is self-confirmatory but annuls the words of the other, we abandon the latter and accept the former. Thus when you emphasize ‘before the Lord’, i.e., on the west side [of the altar], you annul ‘to the front of the altar’, which is on the south side; but when you emphasize ‘to the front of the altar’, i.e., on the south side, you confirm ‘before the Lord’, which is on the west side. But how do you confirm it?17 —

R. Ashi said, This Tanna holds that the whole of the altar stood in the north.18 R. Huna demurred, But the salting [of the meal-offering] is not repeated in Scripture, nevertheless it is indispensable! For it has been taught: The verse, It is a covenant of salt for ever,19 signifies that there is
MENOCHOS – 2a-26b

(1) It is evident that the expression ‘statute’ used in connection with the meal-offering is of no significance, seeing that it was found necessary to derive the teaching that the measures of the bruised corn and of the oil shall each be full, from the emphatic and indeed superfluous particles ‘thereof’ attached to each, and not by inferring it from the expression ‘statute’ (Rashi). According to Tosaf. (s.v..vector) the interpretation is: the fact that Scripture repeats here (v. 16) practically the same rite that is mentioned in v. 2, signifies that in this instance the expression ‘statute’ is of no significance.

(2) Even though the rite is repeated in another verse.

(3) Surely not; for what else could be the purpose of the repetition of that rite if not to indicate indispensability?

(4) Lev. II, 2.

(5) Ibid. VI, 8. So literally.

(6) From these two phrases we learn that the priest must take out the handful with his hand and may not use a measure which holds as much as a handful for the purpose.

(7) Ibid. IX, 17. This verse clearly repeats the injunction that the handful must be taken out with the hand; hence it is indispensable, and if it was taken with a measure it is invalid.

(8) The above verse referred to relates to the meal-offering brought by Aaron at his installation as High Priest, and the provisions stated with regard thereto are obviously temporary enactments only and not rules for all time. Hence, according to Samuel, if the handful was taken with a measure the offering is valid.

(9) Supra 8b; Zeb. 88a.

(10) Num. VII, 13, and frequently in the chapter. ‘Both’ refers to the silver dish and the silver sprinkling bowl mentioned previously in the verse in connection with the presentation of gifts and offerings by the Princes of the twelve tribes at the dedication of the altar. These vessels obviously hallowed the flour that was put into them; hence Samuel derives the rule for all time that a sprinkling bowl hallows also dry stuffs.

(11) With the presentation of each of the princes. This oft repeated rite was clearly intended for all times.

(12) As we have learnt in our Mishnah: OR (IF HE DID NOT) BRING IT NIGH . . IT IS VALID.

(13) Lev. VI, 7. This rite has already been stated previously: And he shall bring it nigh unto the altar (ibid II, 8).

(14) As this side of the altar faced the entrance of the Temple (wherein was the Holy of Holies) which was located in the west of the Temple court.

(15) I.e., the south, for here was the ascent leading up to the altar.

(16) So Tosaf. and Rashi in Sotah 14b. Here Rashi interprets: ‘both to the west... and to the south’.

(17) If the meal-offering is brought to the south side of the altar it can by no means be said to be ‘before the Lord’, i.e., opposite the entrance of the Temple which is on the west.

(18) Of the Temple court. So that the south side of the altar, being in fact nearest to the entrance of the Temple, is described as ‘before the Lord’. V. fig. 2.

(19) Num. XVIII, 19.

Menachoth 20a

a covenant declared in regard to salt.1 So R. Judah. R. Simeon says, Here it is said, It is a covenant of salt for ever, and there it is said, The covenant of an everlasting priesthood,2 as it is impossible to conceive of sacrifices without the priesthood so it is impossible to conceive of sacrifices without salt!3—

R. Joseph answered, Rab agrees with the Tanna of our [Mishnah] who said, IF HE DID NOT SALT IT... IT IS VALID. Thereupon Abaye said to him, Are you then suggesting that ‘HE DID NOT POUR means he did not pour in [any oil] at all? It surely means that the priest did not pour in [the oil] but a non-priest did it; then here, too, it must be explained that the priest did not salt it but a non-priest did it.4— He replied, How can it even enter your mind that a non-priest shall draw near to the altar?5 Alternatively, I can say, since with regard to [the salting] the expression ‘covenant’ is used, it is as though it were repeated in a verse.6 And is not [the salting actually] repeated in a verse? But it is written, And every offering of thy meal-offering shalt thou season with salt!7—

This verse is required for the following which had been taught: If the verse had stated, ‘And every offering shalt thou season with salt’, I would have concluded that it also applied to the wood and the blood,8 since these are also termed ‘offering’;9 the verse therefore adds meal-offering; thus as the
meal-offering is distinguished in that other things are requisite for it, so everything for which other things are requisite [must be seasoned with salt]. But I can argue: as the meal-offering is distinguished in that it renders something permissible, so everything which renders something permissible [must be seasoned with salt]; I would thus include the blood since it renders something permissible! The verse therefore states, [Neither shalt thou suffer the salt... to be lacking] from thy meal-offering, but not ‘from thy blood’. I might conclude then that the whole meal-offering requires salting; the verse therefore states, offering, signifying that only what is offered requires salting, but the whole meal-offering does not require salting. I know now that the handful requires salting but whence do I know to include the frankincense? I include the frankincense since it is offered with [the handful] in the same vessel. And whence do I know to include the frankincense that is offered by itself, the frankincense that is offered in the dishes, the incense-offering, the meal-offering of priests, the meal-offering of the anointed [High] Priest, the meal-offering that is offered together with the drink-offerings, the sacrificial parts of the most holy and the lesser holy sacrifices, the limbs of the burnt-offering [of an animal] and the burnt-offering of a bird? The verse therefore states, With all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt.

The Master stated: ‘I know now that the handful requires salting, but whence do I know to include the frankincense? I include the frankincense since it is offered with [the handful] in the same vessel’. But have you not stated previously, ‘As the meal-offering is distinguished in that other things are requisite for it’? This is what he meant: I might argue that the expression ‘offering’ is a general proposition and ‘meal-offering’ a particular item, so that we would have here a general proposition followed by a particular item, in which case the scope of the proposition is limited to the particular item specified, hence only the meal-offering [would require salting] but no other thing!

The verse therefore added, With all thine offerings, which is another general proposition; so that we have now two general propositions separated from each other by a particular item, in which case they include only such things as are similar to the particular item specified: as the item specified is clearly something for which other things are requisite, so everything for which other things are requisite [requires salting]. And what are the other things that are requisite for it? It is the wood. So that everything [which requires] wood [must be seasoned with salt]. But perhaps it is the frankincense, so that I would include the blood since there go with it the drink-offerings!

The drink-offerings go rather with the burning of the sacrificial parts, for eating and drinking’ [go together]. On the contrary atonement and joy [go well together]! This is what was meant: the frankincense goes together [with the handful] in the same vessel, whereas the drink-offerings do not go together [with the blood] in the same vessel; the wood, on the other hand, just as it is essential for the meal-offering so it is essential for all offerings. But I could argue thus: As the item specified is clearly something for which other things are requisite and also renders aught permissible, so everything for which other things are requisite and which renders aught permissible [requires salting]; and in this way only the frankincense that is in the dishes [would be included] since it renders the Showbread permissible, but no other offering! — Since the expression, ‘From thy meal-offering’ was necessary to exclude the blood, it follows that everything else is included by [its similarity with the meal-offering] one respect.
The Master stated: ‘[Neither shalt thou suffer the salt... to be lacking] from thy meal-offering, but not from thy blood’. But perhaps it is to be interpreted: From thy meal-offering, but not from thy sacrificial limbs! It is more reasonable to include the limbs since (mnemonic: A. Sh. B. N. T. M. A.) other things are requisite for them as for [the meal-offering], they are burnt by fire like it, they are treated outside like it, they are subject to the law of nothar like it, to the law of uncleanness like it and to the law of sacrilege like it.

(1) I.e., salt must not be omitted from any sacrifice.
(2) Ibid. XXV, 13.
(3) Hence it is clear that salting is indispensable even though it is not repeated in Scripture, thus contrary to Rab’s principle.
(4) So that even the Tanna of our Mishnah is of the opinion that the salting cannot be dispensed with entirely.
(5) The suggestion that a non-priest salted the meal-offering cannot be entertained, since the salting took place at the head of the altar, and it is inconceivable that a non-priest would approach so near the altar.
(6) And so the salting is, according to Rab, indispensable; thus in agreement with R. Judah and R. Simeon of the foregoing Baraitha.
(7) Lev. II, 13; and the verse concludes: With all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt.
(8) That the wood which is burnt upon the altar must first be salted, likewise the blood before the sprinkling.
(9) Cf. Neh. X, 35: And we cast lots for the offering of wood. The blood can well be designated ‘offering’ since it is the chief part of the offering.
(10) Namely, wood for the burning of the handful of the meal-offering.
(11) The burning of the handful renders the remainder of the meal-offering permitted to be eaten; likewise the sprinkling of the blood renders the sacrifice permissible, i.e., the sacrificial portions to be burnt and the flesh to be eaten. The result of this argument would be that the blood would require salting since it is similar to the meal-offering in one respect (vis., it renders permissible), and all other offerings would require salting since they, too, are similar to the meal-offering in another respect (viz., for each wood is requisite), and only the wood is excluded. V. Rashi s.v. ‘אכelah 'ofoodstuff').
obvious to be mentioned. The last letter of this mnemonic, however, is wanting in MS.M.

(29) I.e., both the sacrificial limbs and the meal-offering are offered upon the altar that is outside in the Temple Court, whereas the blood in the case of certain offerings is sprinkled inside the Temple upon the veil and between the staves.

(30) Heb. יולו "what is left over". A person is liable if he eats of the meal-offering or of the sacrificial limbs outside the appointed time, or if he eats them whilst in a state of uncleanness. This is not so with regard to the blood.

(31) The law of sacrilege (i.e., the profane appropriation or use of sacred objects) does not apply to the blood. V. Yoma 60a.

Menachoth 20b

On the contrary, it is more reasonable to include the blood since it renders something permissible like [the meal-offering] and is rendered invalid at sunset like it! — The others [the limbs] have more points in common.

The Master said: 'I would have concluded that it also applied to the wood and the blood since these are also termed "offering"'. Whom have you heard express the opinion that the wood is termed 'offering'? It is Rabbi, is it not? But according to Rabbi it actually requires salting. For it was taught: The term 'offering' signifies that one may offer wood as a freewill-offering. And how much must it be? Two logs. And it is written, And we cast lots for the offering of wood. Rabbi says, The wood-offering is included under the term 'offering' and, therefore it requires salting and also to be brought near[ the altar]. And Raba had said that according to Rabbi's view it is essential to take a handful out of the wood. And R. Papa had said that according to Rabbi's view an offering of wood entails other wood too? — Strike out 'wood' from here. Then what does the verse exclude? It surely cannot exclude the blood, for this is excluded by the expression 'from thy meal-offering'.

(1) The sprinkling of the blood renders the sacrifice permissible, just as the handful renders the rest of the meal-offering permissible to be eaten.

(2) The blood may not be sprinkled at night and if it remained overnight it is invalid, likewise with the handful of the meal-offering; whereas the sacrificial portions may be burnt throughout the whole night.

(3) Lev. II. I. V. infra 106b.

(4) Neh. X. 35.

(5) To the south-western corner of the altar like the meal-offering.

(6) The wood must be cut up into small thin strips and a handful of these be taken and burnt upon the altar, like the handful of the meal-offering.

(7) As with every offering, wood from the Temple store is required for the burning of the offering, so here wood from the Temple store is required to burn the wood offered.

(8) I.e., from the argument in the passage stated by the Master.

(9) In the original Baraita, supra p. 129, it will be seen that the first argument established that the expression 'meal-offering' excludes the blood and the wood. Later this Baraita excluded the blood from another phrase of the verse 'from thy meal offering'. If now we strike out 'the wood' from the first argument then we are left in this position, that the Baraita by the interpretation of two different expressions each time excludes the blood and nothing more.

Menachoth 21a

Leave out 'the wood' and insert 'the drink-offerings' in its place. For it was taught: But the wine, the blood, the wood and the incense do not require salting. Who is the author of this Baraita? If Rabbi, then the [inclusion of the] wood is a difficulty; and if the Rabbis, then the [inclusion of the] incense is a difficulty. — It is the following Tanna, for it was taught: R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan b. Beroka says, Just as the particular item specified is clearly something which can contract uncleanness, is consumed by fire and is offered upon the outer altar, so everything which can contract uncleanness, is consumed by fire and is offered upon the outer altar [requires salting]. Hence the wood is excluded since it cannot contract uncleanness, the blood and the wine are excluded since they are not consumed by fire,
and the incense is excluded since it is not offered upon the outer altar.

Now this is so clearly because the verse excluded the blood, but otherwise I should have said that the blood must be salted. Surely by salting it, it loses the character of blood! For Ze'iiri said in the name of R. Hanina, If blood was cooked [and then one ate of it], one does not thereby commit a transgression. And Rab Judah said in the name of Ze'iiri, If blood was salted [and one ate of it], one does not thereby commit a transgression. Moreover Rab Judah on his own authority said, If the sacrificial limbs were roasted and then brought up [on the altar], they are no longer under the denomination of ‘a sweet savour’! — One might have thought that in compliance with the precept a little [salt] should be sprinkled therein, we are therefore taught [that it is excluded from this law]. The text [above stated]: ‘Ze'iiri said in the name of R. Hanina, If blood was cooked [and then one ate of it], one does not thereby commit a transgression’.

Raba was sitting reciting this statement, when Abaye raised against him the following objection: If a man coagulated blood and ate it, or if he dissolved forbidden fat and gulped it down, he is culpable! — This is no difficulty, in the one case he coagulated it by the fire, in the other he coagulated it in the sun; if by the fire it will not resolve into its former state, if in the sun it will do so. But even though [it was coagulated] in the sun should we not say that once it has been set aside it must remain so? For did not R. Mani enquire of R. Johanan, ‘What is the law if one ate congealed blood?’ and he replied, ‘Once it has been set aside it must remain so’? — He remained silent. Then said [Abaye] to him, perhaps the one case deals with [the blood of] external sin-offerings, and the other with [the blood of] internal sin-offerings. You have now, he exclaimed, reminded me of the law.

For Rabbah said in the name of R. Hisda, If one ate the congealed blood of an external sin-offering, one is culpable, for the Divine Law says, And he shall take... and put it, and such is fit for taking and putting [upon the horn of the altar]. If one ate [the congealed blood] of an internal sin-offering, one is not culpable, for the Divine Law says, And he shall dip... and sprinkle, and such is not fit for dipping and sprinkling. And Rabbah on his own authority said, Even if one ate [the congealed blood] of an internal sin-offering one is culpable, since with external sin-offerings [blood] in such a condition is fit for the ritual purpose. (Therefore, said R. Papa, If one ate the congealed blood of an ass one is culpable, since with external sin-offerings [blood] in such a condition is fit for the ritual purpose).

R. Giddal said in the name of Ze'iiri, Blood is regarded as an interposition, whether it be moist or dry. An objection was raised: Blood, ink, honey and milk, if dry constitute an interposition; if moist, they do not constitute an interposition. — This is no difficulty, in one case [the blood] was viscid, in the other it was not. For what purpose does Scripture state, Thou shalt salt? — For the following which was taught: [If the verse had only stated] ‘with salt’, I might have thought that it meant tebonehu, the verse therefore stated, Thou shalt salt. [And if the verse had only stated,] Thou shalt salt, I might have thought that it meant even with salt water, the verse therefore stated, ‘With salt’. Neither shalt thou suffer the salt to be lacking, that is, bring that salt which has no Sabbath, and that is the salt of Sodom. And whence do we know that if one cannot obtain the salt of Sodom one may bring salt of Istria? Because the verse states, ‘Thou shalt offer’; ‘Thou shalt offer’, whatever [salt] it is; ‘thou shalt offer’, from whatever place it comes; ‘thou shalt offer’, even on the Sabbath; ‘thou shalt offer’, even in
conditions of uncleanness. What is the meaning of tebonehu? —

Rabbah b. ‘Ulla said, This is what was meant: I might have thought that one should heap the salt upon it as straw in clay. If so, said to him Abaye, it should have said yetabnenu! Rather said Abaye: I might have thought that one should pile up the salt like a building. If so, said Raba to him, it should have said yibnenu! Rather said Raba: I might have thought that it meant tebonehu. And what does tebonehu mean?

R. Ashi explained: I might have thought that one should apply to it [salt] only to give it a taste, just as the understanding, the verse therefore stated, Thou shalt season. How should one do it? One takes the limb, spreads salt over it, turns it over and again spreads salt over it, and then offers it. Abaye said, And so, too, it should be done for [cooking meat in] the pot.

(1) Since according to Rabbi the wood like the meal-offering requires salting.
(2) For the principle enunciated by the Rabbis, namely that every offering for which other things (sc. wood) are requisite must be seasoned with salt, assuredly applies to the incense. V. supra p. 129.
(3) Sc. the meal-offering, expressly mentioned in Lev. II, 13.
(4) That the blood does not require salting.
(5) And is certainly not fit for sprinkling.
(6) For once it has been cooked it has lost the character of blood.
(7) According to the principle that whatsoever is salted is counted as hot i.e., as roasted or cooked. V. Hul. 97b.
(8) And are not acceptable. Similarly cooked blood would not be acceptable.
(9) He rendered it into a solid mass by much cooking.
(10) So that it has lost entirely its character as blood, and therefore Ze’iri maintains that no transgression is committed when one eats thereof.
(11) I.e., once it has lost the character of blood during coagulation, it cannot again assume that character when melted down, on the principle that once a thing has been rejected it can no more be fit again.
(12) And whosoever eats thereof — it being assumed that the congealed blood was not of a consecrated animal—does not commit a transgression.
(13) Raba.
(14) I.e., sin-offerings whose blood must be applied to the horns of the altar which stood in the Temple Court.
(15) The blood of these sin-offerings, even though hardened in the sun, is still fit for its ritual purpose, and it still retains its character as blood. Likewise the blood of non-consecrated animals when hardened by the sun is also counted as blood, and therefore whosoever eats thereof commits a transgression.
(16) Ze’iri’s case.
(17) I.e., sin-offerings whose blood must be sprinkled upon the veil and upon the golden altar, e.g., the bullocks and the he-goats which were to be wholly burnt, v. Lev. IV, ff.
(18) In this case the coagulated blood is absolutely unfit for its purpose. as is soon to be explained.
(19) Lev. IV, 30.
(20) Ibid. 6.
(21) It is therefore regarded as blood.
(22) This passage is omitted in all MSS.
(23) Blood adhering to the body interposes between the body and the water so that the immersion is not valid. For immersion to be valid no part of the body may be untouched by the water.
(24) And almost dry; it therefore interposes.
(27) This word is explained in the text presently.
(28) Ibid. Heb. את תשביא, the verb being interpreted as of the same root as שבשא.
(29) I.e., is generated at all times and is cast up by the sea, both in winter and summer. This is identified with salt of Sodom, which is a fine sea salt.
(30) A town in Pontus where there were salt mines. This name is applied to all coarse rock salt.
(31) The offerings of the congregation may be brought on the Sabbath and in certain circumstances even in conditions of uncleanness. The salting of the offering is evidently a vital service and overrides the rules of Sabbath and of uncleanness.
(32) I.e., ‘straw’, meaning ‘to mix with straw’, ‘to put in much straw’, and then to apply a large quantity (of any substance).
(35) Just as the understanding gives ‘taste’ and distinction to man (Rashi). Or, that one might ‘understand’ that salt has been sprinkled on it (Aruch).

(36) I.e., the meat must be salted on both sides.

Our Rabbis taught: The salt which is upon the sacrificial limb is subject to the law of sacrilege, but that which is upon the ascent or upon the head of the altar is not subject to the law of sacrilege.

R. Mattenah said, There is Scriptural authority for this, for it is written, And thou shalt present them before the Lord, and the priests shall cast salt upon them, and they shall offer them up for a burnt-offering unto the Lord. We have learnt elsewhere: [The Beth din ordained] concerning the salt and the wood [of the Temple stores] that the priests may use them freely.

Samuel said, They allowed this [use of salt] only for their offerings but not for eating. Now it was thought that ‘for their offerings’ meant for salting their [own] offerings, and ‘for eating’ meant the eating of consecrated meat. But surely if we provide them [with salt from the Temple stores] in order to salt the hides of animal-offerings, shall we not provide them with salt to eat the consecrated meat? For it was taught: And so you find that salt was used in three places: in the salt chamber, on the ascent, and at the head of the altar. In the salt chamber where they used to salt the hides of animal-offerings; on the ascent where they used to salt the sacrificial limbs; at the head of the altar where they used to salt the handful, the frankincense, the incense-offering, the meal-offering of the priests, the anointed Priest’s meal-offering, the meal-offering that is offered with the drink-offerings, and the burnt-offering of a bird! — We must therefore say that ‘for their offerings’ means for the eating of consecrated meat, and ‘for eating’ means the eating of unconsecrated food. Unconsecrated food! [you say], surely this is obvious, for how does it come to be there? — Although the Master stated: ‘They shall eat signifies that if the remainder of the meal-offering is insufficient] they should eat with it unconsecrated food and terumah, so that it should be eaten after the appetite is satisfied’, nevertheless we do not provide them with salt from the Temple.

Rabina said to R. Ashi, This indeed is most logical; for should you say that ‘for their offerings’ meant for salting their [own] offerings, so that [they are entitled to this] only because the Beth din granted them this concession, but had not the Beth din granted them this concession they would not be entitled to it, but surely if we provide the Israelites [with salt for their offerings], shall we not provide the priests too? For it was taught: I might have thought that if a man said, ‘I take upon myself to offer a meal-offering’, he must provide the salt himself just as he must provide the frankincense himself. And the following argument [supports the contention]: It is enjoined that with a meal-offering there must be salt, and it is also enjoined that with a meal-offering there must be frankincense; therefore just as the frankincense he must provide himself, so the salt too he must provide himself.

Or perhaps argue this way: It is enjoined that with a meal-offering there must be salt, and it is also enjoined that with a meal-offering there must be wood; therefore just as the wood is taken from the communal store so the salt too is taken from the communal store. Let us then see to which it is most similar. We derive the law concerning a matter that is essential to all offerings from another matter which is essential to all offerings, and let not the frankincense prove against this, since it is not a matter which is essential to all offerings.

Or perhaps argue this way: we derive the law concerning a matter which is offered with the
meal-offering in one vessel from another matter which is also offered with the meal-offering in one vessel and let not the wood prove against this, since it is not a matter which is offered with the meal-offering in one vessel. Scripture therefore states [concerning the salt], it is a covenant of salt for ever, and elsewhere [concerning the Showbread] it says, It is on behalf of the children of Israel a covenant for ever; as the one was taken out of the supplies of the community, so the other was also taken out of the supplies of the community! —

Thereupon R. Mordecai said to R. Ashi, Thus said R. Shisha the son of R. Idi, It was necessary to be stated only according to Ben Bokri’s view. For we have learnt: Ben Bokri testified at Jabneh that a priest who paid the shekel has committed no sin. — Rabban Johanan b. Zakkai said to him, Not so, but rather a priest who did not pay the shekel has committed a sin. The priests, however, used to expound the following verse to their advantage, And every meal-offering of the priest shall be wholly burnt; it shall not be eaten; since the ‘Omer-offering and the Two Loaves and the Showbread are ours, how can they be eaten? But according to Ben Bokri, since they are not in the first instance liable to pay the shekel, when they do pay it they have surely committed a sin, for they have brought unconsecrated matter into the Temple! — They bring it and deliver it [whole-heartedly] to the public funds. Now one might have thought that

(1) And no profane use may be made of this salt. For the law of sacrilege (i.e., the misappropriation of property of the Sanctuary) v. Lev. V, 15, 16.
(2) And it may be used for ordinary purposes since it is no longer fit for any sacred purpose.
(3) Ezek. XLIII, 24. The salt which is upon the limb is, in this verse, stated to be part of the burnt-offering.
(4) Shek. VII, 7.
(5) I.e., the offerings which the priests offer on their own behalf may be salted with salt from the Temple stores.
(6) I.e., the priests may not use this salt at table when eating consecrated meat (e.g., the breast and the thigh) which they receive as their portion from the sacrifices.
(7) Which belonged to the priests.
(8) For it is forbidden to bring unconsecrated food into the Temple precincts (Rashi).
(9) Tem. 23a.
(10) Lev. VI, 9.
(11) I.e., in order to appease their hunger they should first eat some unconsecrated food or terumah (v. Glos.) outside the Temple Court, and then enter the Temple Court where they would finish their meal to satisfaction with the remainder of the meal-offering.
(12) Lit., ‘bring from his home’.
(13) Lit., ‘bring a meal-offering and bring salt’.
(14) For it is written, ibid. II, 1: And put frankincense thereon, and then it says in the next verse, And he shall bring it to the sons of Aaron.
(15) V. infra.
(16) Salt and wood are essential to all offerings.
(17) The salt and the frankincense were placed together with the handful of the meal-offering in one vessel.
(18) Num. XVIII, 19.
(19) Lev. XXIV, 8.
(20) Sc. the Showbread, which was in the nature of an offering on behalf of the community of Israel.
(21) Sc. the salt for the offerings.
(22) According to Ben Bokri’s view the priests did not contribute the shekel to the Temple funds and therefore were not entitled to any of the Temple’s supplies; hence it was necessary for the Beth din to grant them a concession that they may use the Temple’s supplies of wood and salt for their own offerings.
(23) Shek. I, 4.
(24) The annual contribution, corresponding to the half shekel ordained in the Torah (Ex. XXX, 13), paid before the first of Nisan by every Israelite towards the upkeep of the public offerings in the Temple.
(25) According to law a priest is not liable to pay the shekel, for the expression ‘every one that passeth among them that are numbered’ (Ex. ibid.) does not apply to the priests (or the Levites), since these were not numbered together with the rest of the tribes of Israel, but separately.
(26) The expression in the verse (v. prec. n.) is accordingly interpreted thus: Every one that passeth, that is, every one that passed through the Red Sea; among them that are numbered, that is, however they were numbered, whether separately or with the other tribes of Israel. Hence the priests are Biblically liable to pay the shekel.
(27) Lev. VI, 16.
(28) If the priests were liable to contribute the shekel to the Temple funds, out of which the three named public meal-offerings were provided, it would follow that these meal-offerings should be wholly burnt and not eaten by the priests; and this would be contrary to Scripture. Hence, the priests argued, they were not to pay the shekel.

(29) This continues the argument as given above 'It was necessary to be stated only according to Ben Bokri's view'. V. supra p. 139, n. 7.


GEMARA. We have learnt elsewhere: If the blood [of a sacrifice] was mixed with water and it still has the appearance of blood, it is valid. If it was mixed with wine, it must be regarded as though it was water. If it was mixed with the blood of [unconsecrated] cattle or of a wild animal, it must be regarded as though it was water. R. Judah says, Blood cannot neutralize blood. Both derived their views by expounding the same verse, viz., And he shall take of the blood of the bullock and of the blood of the goat.

The difference between them is [as to whether] news [wood is necessary or not]. And [can it be said that] old wood is not allowed? But it is written, And Araunah said unto David, Let my lord the king take and offer up what seemeth good unto him: behold, the oxen for the burnt-offering, and the morigim and the furniture of the oxen for the wood! These were also new. What are morigim?

1. Ulla said, It is a 'turbel bed', and what is a 'turbel bed'? — Rab Judah said, A 'goat with hooks', wherewith the threshers thresh. Said R. Joseph, What is the Scriptural evidence? It is written, Behold, I make thee a new morag having sharp teeth; thou shalt thresh the mountains.


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(7) II Sam. XXIV, 22.
(8) **, a threshing sledge consisting of a wooden platform studded with sharp pieces of flint or with iron teeth (Jast.)
(9) V. A.Z. 24b (Sonc. ed., p. 122, n. 1).
(10) Isa. XL, 15. It is evident from this verse that מกระเป is a threshing instrument.
(11) These meal-offerings are wholly burnt and therefore correspond to the handful of an ordinary meal-offering.
(12) Sc. the handful, as well as the other meal-offering.
(13) Sc. the handful of the ordinary meal-offering. It had one log of oil to the tenth of an ephah of flour.
(14) The High Priest’s meal-offering required three logs of oil to the tenth of an ephah of flour; while for the meal-offering offered with the drink-offerings the mixture was one tenth of an ephah of flour and three logs of oil for a lamb, two tenths and four logs for a ram, and three tenths and six logs for a bullock.
(15) Both are therefore invalid; the handful because it sucked some oil from the other meal-offering so that it has had too much oil, and the other meal-offering because it has had too little oil.
(16) Zeb. 77b, Hul. 87b.
(17) For sprinkling upon the altar.
(18) And if an equal quantity of water when mixed with this blood would not alter the appearance of the blood, it is valid.
(19) So that the blood of a sacrifice, even though mixed in a considerably larger quantity of unconsecrated blood, still retains its identity and sacred character, and the mixture is valid for sprinkling. For R. Judah is of the opinion that in a mixture of like kinds, either liquids with liquids or solids with solids, one element cannot neutralize the other, irrespective of the quantities of each.
(20) I.e., the first Tanna (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rabbis’) and R. Judah.
(21) Lev. XVI, 18, in connection with the service on the Day of Atonement. The priest had to mix the blood of both animals and sprinkle it upon the altar; cf. Yoma 53b.
(22) Nevertheless the goat’s blood, whose quantity is considerably less than that of the bullock, has not ‘lost itself’ i.e., it has not become neutralized in the mixture, since Scripture expressly names each blood separately.

Menachoth 22b

from this that in a mixture of things which are offered up one element cannot neutralize the other. R. Judah, however, concludes from this that in a mixture of like kinds neutralization does not take place. ‘The Rabbis conclude from this that in a mixture of things which are offered up one element cannot neutralize the other’. But perhaps the reason [why one does not neutralize the other] is because here is a mixture of like kinds!2 — Had this been merely a mixture of like kinds and not of things which are offered up, it would be as you say; but since it is here a mixture of things which are offered up, it is clear that the reason is that it is a mixture of things which are offered up, perhaps then we can conclude from this that only in a mixture of like kinds of things which are offered up [one element cannot neutralize the other]! — This is a difficulty. 

‘R. Judah concludes from this that in a mixture of like kinds neutralization does not take place’. But perhaps the reason [why one does not neutralize the other] is because here is a mixture of things which are offered up! — Had this been merely a mixture of unlike kinds of things which are offered up, it would be as you say; but since it is a mixture of like kinds, it is clear that the reason is that here it is a mixture of like kinds. Perhaps then we can conclude from this that only in a mixture of like kinds of things offered up [one element cannot neutralize the other]! — This is a difficulty.

[An objection was raised.] We have learnt: R. JUDAH SAYS, IF [IT WAS MIXED] WITH THE MEAL-OFFERING OF THE ANOINTED [HIGH] PRIEST OR WITH THE MEAL-OFFERING OFFERED WITH THE DRINK-OFFERINGS, IT IS INVALID, FOR SINCE THE CONSISTENCY OF THE ONE IS THICK AND THE CONSISTENCY OF THE OTHER IS THIN, EACH ABSORBS FROM THE OTHER. But what does it matter if one does absorb from the other? The mixture here is of like kinds!4 —

(1) E.g., the blood of two consecrated animals. On the other hand, if the blood of a consecrated animal was mixed with that of an unconsecrated
animal or with water or wine, one would neutralize the other, according to the quantities of each.
(2) I.e., the blood of the goat mixed with the blood of the bullock.
(3) Sc. the case indicated in Lev. ibid.
(4) It is of no consequence even if the oil in the handful did absorb some of the oil from the other meal-offering, since the latter is not neutralized in the mixture; and therefore the handful cannot be reckoned to have had any addition in oil.

Menachoth 23a

Raba answered, R. Judah is of the opinion that where an element is mixed with like kind and also with another kind, you must disregard the like kind as if it were not there, and the other kind, if more in quantity, will neutralize [the element].

It was reported: If [the priest] poured oil on the handful taken from the sinner's meal-offering, R. Johanan maintains it is invalid; but Resh Lakish says, He should in the first instance wipe up with it the remains of the log of oil and then offer it. But is it not written, He shall put no oil upon it, neither shall he put any frankincense thereon? — That verse means that one should not apportion for it a quantity of oil as for the other [meal-offerings].

R. Johanan raised an objection against Resh Lakish. It was taught: If a dry meal-offering was mixed with one mingled with oil, it may be offered up. R. Judah says, It may not be offered up. presumably the handful of a sinner's meal-offering was mixed with the handful of a freewill meal-offering! — No, the meal-offering that is offered with a bullock or with a ram was mixed with the meal-offering that is offered with a lamb. But this is expressly stated, viz., If the meal-offering that is offered with a bullock or with a ram was mixed with the meal-offering that is offered with a lamb, or if a dry meal-offering was mixed with one mingled with oil, it may be offered up. R. Judah says, It may not be offered up. — One [clause] merely illustrates the other.

Raba raised the question: What is the law if oil was squeezed out of the handful on to wood? Do we say that whatsoever is joined to the thing offered is like the offering itself, or not? Rabina said to R. Ashi, Is not this question similar to the case disputed by R. Johanan and Resh Lakish? For it was reported: If a man offered up [outside the Temple court] a limb which was not as large as an olive but the bone brought it up to an olive's bulk, R. Johanan says, He is liable [to the penalty of kareth]; but Resh Lakish says, He is not liable. ‘R. Johanan says, He is liable’, because what is joined to the thing offered is like the offering itself; ‘Resh Lakish says, He is not liable’, because what is joined to the thing offered is not like the offering! —

The question can indeed be asked, both according to R. Johanan and according to Resh Lakish. It can be asked according to R. Johanan, for [it may be that] R. Johanan held that view only in regard to the bone, since it is of the same kind as the flesh, but not in regard to [the wood] for it is not of the same kind as the handful. And Resh Lakish, too, perhaps he held that view only in regard to the bone, since it can become separated, and if separated there is no obligation to put it back, but not in regard to the oil for it cannot be separated. Or perhaps these differences do not count! — The question remains unanswered.

Mishnah

If two meal-offerings from which the handfuls had not yet been taken were mixed together, but it is still possible to take the handful from each separately, they are valid; otherwise they are invalid. If the handful [of a meal-offering] was mixed with a meal-offering from which the handful had not yet been
TAKEN, IT MUST NOT BE OFFERED. IF, HOWEVER, IT WAS OFFERED, THEN THE MEAL-OFFERING FROM WHICH THE HANDFUL HAD BEEN TAKEN DISCHARGES THE OWNER'S OBLIGATION WHILST THE OTHER FROM WHICH THE HANDFUL HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN DOES NOT DISCHARGE THE OWNER'S OBLIGATION. IF THE HANDFUL WAS MIXED WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE MEAL-OFFERING OR WITH THE REMAINDER OF ANOTHER MEAL-OFFERING, IT MUST NOT BE OFFERED; BUT IF IT WAS OFFERED IT DISCHARGES THE OWNER'S OBLIGATION.

GEMARA. R. Hisda said, Nebelah meat is neutralized in ritually slaughtered meat, since slaughtered meat cannot assume the character of nebela meat; ritually slaughtered meat is not neutralized in nebela meat, since nebela meat can assume the character of slaughtered meat, for when it has putrefied the uncleanness thereof has gone. But R. Hanina said, Whatsoever can become like the other is not neutralized, and whatsoever cannot become like the other is neutralized. According to whose view [do they differ]? It cannot be according to the view of the Rabbis, for they have said that only things which are offered up do not neutralize one another, but in a mixture of like kinds neutralization takes effect. Neither can it be according to R. Judah, for

(1) The case dealt with by R. Judah in our Mishnah is where the handful, which is made up of oil and flour, was mixed with one of the meal-offerings mentioned, which also contains oil. Now the oil in the handful is disregarded, so that the flour of the handful will neutralize the oil of the other meal-offering which it has absorbed, with the result that the handful has had too much oil and is therefore invalid.
(2) It is the proper thing, maintains Resh Lakish, to scrape up with the handful of the sinner's meal-offering any oil that may be found remaining in the log measure which had been used for some other meal-offering. Accordingly if he actually poured some oil on the handful it is certainly valid.
(3) Lev. V, 11.
(4) Before the taking of the handful. After that, however, he may add a little oil to it.
(5) This Tanna applies here the principle laid down by the Rabbis that things which are offered up do not neutralize one another; therefore in this mixture one is not affected by the other, and the whole is offered upon the altar.
(6) The former meal-offering being dry, and the latter mingled with oil. Now it is clear that the first Tanna permitted the offering of these meal-offerings only because he holds that things offered up when mixed together do not neutralize each other, so that each is considered as though it were by itself; where, however, oil was poured on to a dry meal-offering they would also declare it to be invalid, contra Resh Lakish.
(7) The meal-offering offered with a bullock or with a ram is called 'dry' as compared with that offered with a lamb, since the former had two logs of oil to each tenth of an ephah of flour, whereas the latter had three logs of oil to the same quantity of flour.
(8) Thus clearly showing that the second clause is a case quite different from the first, and 'dry' no doubt means the sinner's meal-offering which contains no oil at all.
(9) Consequently there would be too little oil in the handful.
(10) Since the wood with the oil on it will be later joined to the handful and together burnt on the altar it is as though the oil were still in the handful so that none of the oil can really be said to be lacking, consequently it is valid. V. Rashi and Tosaf. a.l. for further interpretations.
(11) Sc. the bone.
(12) I.e., the bone might spring off from the altar.
(13) According to the first interpretation of Rashi which has been adopted here it should read ‘the wood’, V. Sh. Mek. n. 6.
(14) There remained from each meal-offering a quantity sufficient for the taking of the handful that had not mixed with the other.
(15) Sc. the whole mixture.
(16) נבלת, an animal which had died a natural death or was slaughtered in any manner than that prescribed by Jewish ritual law. The carcass may not be eaten (Deut. XIV, 21), and it conveys uncleanness by carrying and by contact (Lev. XI, 39, 40).
(17) If a morsel of nebela meat was confused with a large quantity of ritually slaughtered meat, it is neutralized in the mixture and is regarded as nonexistent, so that whosoever touches this mixture in any part thereof remains clean.
(18) The latter conveys uncleanness, whilst the former does not; the mixture is therefore considered to be a mixture of different kinds (in view of the difference between them as to the law

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(18) The latter conveys uncleanness, whilst the former does not; the mixture is therefore considered to be a mixture of different kinds (in view of the difference between them as to the law
of uncleanness), so that the one is neutralized in the other according to all views.
(19) And if a morsel of ritually slaughtered meat was confused with a large quantity of nebela\m meat, the whole is regarded as a mixture of like kinds and no neutralization takes place. Consequently if terumah (v. Num. XVIII, 8ff) produce were to be brought into contact with this mixture it would not be unclean of a certainty, but would always be considered to be in a state of doubtful uncleanness, since it might only have touched the morsel of slaughtered meat in the mixture. R. Hisda is of the opinion that it is the neutralizer, i.e., the substance which is in the majority in the mixture, which is to be considered; and if it is, or can become, like the substance which is about to be neutralized, the mixture is then considered to be a mixture of like kinds.
(20) R. Hanina is of the opinion that it is the substance which is about to be neutralized, i.e., the substance which is in the minority in the mixture, which is to be considered, and if it can become like the neutralizer, only then is the mixture considered to be a mixture of like kinds.

We have learnt: IF TWO MEAL-OFFERINGS FROM WHICH THE HANDFULS HAD NOT YET BEEN TAKEN WERE MIXED TOGETHER, BUT IT IS STILL POSSIBLE TO TAKE THE HANDFUL FROM EACH SEPARATELY, THEY ARE VALID; OTHERWISE THEY ARE INVALID, Now in this case we see that when the handful is taken from one, whereby the rest becomes the remainder, this remainder does not neutralize the other meal-offering from which the handful has not yet been taken.6 Whose view is represented here? It cannot be that of the Rabbis, for they have said that only things which are offered up do not neutralize one another;7 but in a mixture of like kinds neutralization takes effect. Obviously it is the view of R. Judah. Now this is well according to him who holds that we must consider what is to be neutralized, for here what is to be neutralized can become like the neutralizer,8 seeing that when the handful will have been taken from the other meal-offering there will be a remainder like that of the first meal-offering.10 But according to him who holds that we must consider the neutralizer, [it will be asked here,] Can the remainder ever become like that from which the handful has not yet been taken?11 Are we to say then that our Mishnah is not in accordance with R. Hiyya [as interpreted by R. Hisda]? — It is to be explained there according to R. Zera's dictum; for R. Zera said,12 ‘Burning’ is stated with regard to the handful,13 and ‘burning’ is also stated with regard to the remainder;14 therefore as in the case of the handful, concerning which the expression ‘burning’ is used, [it is established that] one handful cannot neutralize the other,15 so too in the case of the remainder, concerning which the

Menachoth 23b

R. Judah adopts the criterion of appearance,1 and [by that criterion] in either case it would be a mixture of like kinds! — Rather it is according to R. Hiyya's view, for R. Hiyya taught: In a mixture of nebela\m meat and ritually slaughtered meat neutralization takes place.2 And whose view does R. Hiyya follow? It cannot be that of the Rabbis, for they have said that only things which are offered up do not neutralize one another, but in a mixture of like kinds neutralization takes effect.3 Neither can it be that of R. Judah, for according to R. Judah in any mixture of like kinds neutralization does not take effect! — In fact he follows the opinion of R. Judah, for R. Judah laid down the rule that in a mixture of like kinds neutralization does not take effect only in that case where it is possible for one kind to become like the other, but where it is not possible for one kind to become like

Menachoth 23b
expression ‘burning’ is also used, the remainder cannot neutralize the handful.16

Come and hear: IF THE HANDFUL [OF A MEAL-OFFERING] WAS MIXED WITH A MEAL-OFFERING FROM WHICH THE HANDFUL HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN, IT MUST NOT BE OFFERED. IF, HOWEVER, IT WAS OFFERED, THEN THE MEAL-OFFERING FROM WHICH THE HANDFUL HAD BEEN TAKEN DISCHARGES THE OWNER'S OBLIGATION, WHILST THE OTHER FROM WHICH THE HANDFUL HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN DOES NOT DISCHARGE THE OWNER'S OBLIGATION. We see then that the meal-offering from which the handful had not been taken does not neutralize the handful. Whose view is this? It cannot be that of the Rabbis, for they have said that only things which are offered up do not neutralize one another; but in a mixture of like kinds neutralization takes effect. Obviously it is the view of R. Judah. Now it is well according to him who holds that we must consider the neutralizer, for here the neutralizer can become like that which is to be neutralized, seeing that every particle thereof is appropriate to be taken up in the handful.18 But according to him who holds that we must consider what is to be neutralized, [it will be asked,] Can the handful ever become like the meal-offering from which the handful has not yet been taken? Are we to say then that our Mishnah is not in accordance with R. Hiyya [as interpreted by R. Hanina]?19 — This too must be explained in accordance with R. Zera's dictum.

Come and hear: If one seasoned it with cumin or with sesame seed or with any other kind of spice, it is fit;23 for it is unleavened bread, only that it is called seasoned unleavened bread. Now it was assumed that there were more spices than unleavened dough. According to him, then, who holds that we must consider what is to be neutralized, it is well, for what is to be neutralized can become like the neutralizer, seeing that when it becomes moldy it is like the spices.25 But according to him who holds that we must consider the neutralizer, [it will be asked,] Can the spices become like the unleavened bread?26 — We are dealing here with the case where there was not so much spices; indeed the larger part was the unleavened bread, and therefore it is not neutralized. This too is to be inferred [from the words of the Baraita], for it reads, ‘It is unleavened bread, only that it is called seasoned unleavened bread’27 This is conclusive.

When R. Kahana went up [to Palestine] he found the sons of R. Hiyya sitting and discoursing as follows: If one divided a tenth

(1) V. supra 22a. Things that have the same appearance are regarded as of like kind; and nebelah meat and slaughtered meat would always
be considered as of like kind, so that neutralization would not take effect.

(2) But only in one case, either where nebelah meat was confused with a larger quantity of slaughtered meat as R. Hisda would have it, or where slaughtered meat was confused with a larger quantity of nebelah meat as R. Hanina would have it.

(3) Whereas R. Hiyya holds that neutralization does take place in a mixture of nebelah meat and slaughtered meat, even though only in one case, v. prec. n.

(4) Sc. the substance which is in the majority in the mixture. If this substance can become like the substance which is in the minority, the mixture is deemed to be one of like kinds, and neutralization will not take place.

(5) Sc. the substance which is in the minority in the mixture. V. p. 147, n. 7

(6) It is certain that neutralization does not take place, for otherwise it would not be permitted subsequently (as stated in the Mishnah) to take the handful from the second meal-offering.

(7) The remainder, however, is not a thing that is offered up, consequently it should neutralize the other meal-offering, even though the mixture is of like kinds.

(8) Sc. the other meal-offering from which the handful has not yet been taken.

(9) Sc. the remainder of the meal-offering from which the handful has been taken.

(10) And it is deemed to be a mixture of like kinds and neutralization does not take place.

(11) Obviously it cannot. The mixture is therefore one of unlike kinds and neutralization should take effect, so that it should not be permitted subsequently to take the handful from the second meal-offering.

(12) Infra, and Zeb. 110a,

(13) Lev. II, 2.

(14) Lev. II, 10, For whatever offering has a portion thereof burnt upon the altar comes under the law of ‘ye shall not burn’.

(15) This is admitted even by R. Judah. V. supra p. 141.

(16) The effect of R. Zera’s teaching is that the law of neutralization does not apply to any mixture of remainders and handfuls in any circumstances.

(17) Sc. the meal-offering from which the handful had not yet been taken.

(18) Consequently the mixture is deemed to be one of like kinds, and therefore neutralization does not take place. In cur. edd. this is added in the text. It is omitted in MS.M.

(19) This sentence is omitted in all MSS.

(20) Neutralization therefore should take effect.

(21) V. p. 149, nn. 1, 2 and 3.

(22) Sc. unleavened dough.

(23) To be used on the Passover night for fulfilling the command of eating unleavened bread.

(24) Here the unleavened dough.

(25) And it is no more unleavened bread.

(26) Of course not; consequently neutralization should take place and it should not be regarded as unleavened bread at all.

(27) Thus clearly showing that the main part is the unleavened bread and not the spices.

(28) The tenth part of an ephah of flour set aside for a meal-offering.

Menachoth 24a

and put [the two halves] into the mixing vessel, and then a Tebul yom1 touched one of them, what would be the law?2 Does the rule which we learnt that with consecrated things a vessel unites all that is therein,3 apply only when they4 are touching one another, but not when they do not touch one another; or perhaps this makes no difference? — Said he5 to them, Did we learn, ‘a vessel joins’?6 We learnt ‘a vessel unites’; that is, in all circumstances.7 If one placed another [half-tenth] between them, what is the law?8 — He replied to them, [The rule is:] What stands in need of a vessel, the vessel unites; what does not stand in need of a vessel, the vessel does not unite.9 And what if a Tebul Yom inserted his finger between them?10 — He replied: There is nothing other than earthenware vessels that can convey uncleanness through its air-space.11 He5 then put to them this question: May the handful be taken from one [half] in respect of the other?12 Is the principle of ‘[the vessel uniting [its contents]]’ Biblical or only Rabbinical?13 —

They answered him, We have not heard of that, but we have heard of a similar case; for we have learnt: IF TWO MEAL-OFFERINGS FROM WHICH THE HANDBULS HAD NOT YET BEEN TAKEN WERE MIXED TOGETHER, BUT IT IS STILL POSSIBLE TO TAKE THE HANDBUL FROM EACH SEPARATELY, THEY ARE VALID; OTHERWISE THEY ARE INVALID. Now where it is possible to take the handful [from each separately, it
states that] they are valid. But why? The rest that is mixed together surely does not touch [the handful]?14 — Raba, however, suggested that perhaps the masses were spread in the shape of a comb.15 What is then the ruling? Said Raba, Come and hear, for it has been taught: And he shall take up therefrom, that is, from the whole; one may not therefore bring the tenth [divided] in two vessels and have the handful taken. It follows, however, that from one vessel which is like two vessels17 the handful may be taken. Said Abaye to him, perhaps by ‘two vessels’ is meant, e.g., a kapiza-measure fixed in a kab-measure;18 for although on top the contents are united, since the sides of the kapiza-measure form a partition below, one may not [bring the meal-offering therein]. And by one vessel which is like two vessels’ is meant, e.g., a hen trough,19 in which the contents, although separated by a partition, are nevertheless in contact. But in this case where they are not in contact the question still remains.

R. Jeremiah raised this question: How is it where the vessel unites [the two half-tenths within] and there is a connection by water [with another half-tenth lying outside]?20 Does the rule which we learnt that with consecrated things a vessel unites all that is therein,21 apply to what is inside but not to what is outside; or perhaps since there is a connection it is united thereby?22 And if you were to decide that since there is a connection it is united thereby, this further question will arise: How is it where there is a connection by water [with one of the halves inside the vessel] and the vessel unites [the halves that are therein], and then a Tebul Yom touched the part that was outside?23 Does the rule which tacles, since the sides of the inner receptacle separate the contents of the one we have learnt that with consecrated things a vessel unites all that is therein, apply only to the case where [the uncleanness] came into contact with what was inside but not where it came into contact with what was outside; or perhaps this makes no difference? — These questions remain undecided.

Raba raised the following question: What is the position if a tenth was divided into halves and one of the halves became unclean; afterwards these two halves were placed in the mixing vessel24 and a Tebul Yom touched that [half] which was already unclean? Do we say that it is sated with uncleanness25 or not? Said Abaye to him, Do we then say that a thing can be sated with uncleanness? Surely we have learnt:26 If a sheet which had contracted midras27 uncleanness

(1) מִדְרָס, a person who, having been unclean, had immersed himself during the day and must await sunset before he is deemed fully clean. He suffers now only a slight degree of uncleanness; he is deemed to be unclean in the second degree and can affect with uncleanness terumah and consecrated things.
(2) Would the other part, not touched by the Tebul Yom, be unclean or not?
(3) And if only a part of the contents of the vessel becomes unclean, everything that is therein is unclean; v. Hag. III, 2; 20b.
(4) Sc. the contents of the vessel.
(5) R. Kahana.
(6) Which would imply that the contents of the vessel were in contact.
(7) Even when they are not in contact.
(8) I.e., after having divided a tenth into halves he added another half-tenth, placing it between the two previous halves, and then this extra half was touched by a Tebul Yom. The question is whether the other halves are affected with uncleanness or not.
(9) This extra half-tenth has no need of this vessel, and indeed could not be used together with the other halves in this vessel; consequently the other halves are not affected with uncleanness.
(10) Without having touched either the vessel or its contents.
(11) And therefore the contents of this vessel are clean.
(12) I.e., when taking the handful is it necessary to take some from each half, or may it be taken entirely from one half in respect of the whole vessel? It must be noted that there was no contact whatsoever between the two halves of the meal-offering.
(13) If the principle is Biblical then it is to be applied to all cases, even though the result would be one of leniency, as here with the taking of the
handful. On the other hand, were it only Rabbinical, it would be applied only to such cases as would result in a stringent ruling, as in the case of uncleanness.

(14) For only the quantities sufficient for the taking of the handfuls stand apart by themselves, the remainders of each meal-offering being mixed together, so that the remainder of one meal-offering is entirely separate from the handful of that same meal-offering. Nevertheless the offering is valid, presumably because all parts are united by the vessel; thus proving that the principle of ‘uniting’ is Biblical.

(15) Like the teeth of a comb, joined at one end and separate at the other. In our Mishnah, the two meal-offerings were lying side by side and separated only at the ends wherefrom the handfuls might be taken. Where, however, the two halves were quite apart the question still remains.

(16) Lev. VI, 8.

(17) I.e., where the flour is divided into halves in the one vessel and there is no contact at all between them.

(18) I.e., the kab vessel was constructed with a kapiza vessel fixed in its hollow, the two forming in fact only one vessel but with two separate receptacles. The result is that when both receptacles are filled to the brim with the flour of a meal-offering there is no contact between the contents of the two vessels from the other. And even if the flour was heaped up to cover the sides of the kapiza or inner vessel, so that ostensibly there is contact between the contents of both receptacles, it is still invalid, for the contact between the contents is not made in the vessel, but outside the vessel. Kapiza is a small measure; for kab v. Glos.

(19) I.e., a vessel separated into two divisions by a low bar placed at the bottom of the vessel (Rashi). According to Maim. the division of the bar is at the top only, so that the contents, although appearing divided, are really united below; v. Yad. Pesule ha-Mukdashim, XI, 22.

(20) There were two half-tenths in the vessel not in contact, and another half-tenth lying outside the vessel was connected by water (i.e., a pipe or conduit running from the vessel to the place where the outside half-tenth lay) with one of the halves inside the vessel. Now the other half-tenth that lay in the vessel and which was in no wise connected with the outside half-tenth was rendered unclean; and the question is whether or not the uncleanness can be passed on to the half-tenth that is lying outside in the following stages: first the uncleanness is passed on by reason of the uniting force of the vessel to the other half-tenth that is with it in the vessel, and then the latter passes on the uncleanness to what is lying outside by reason of the water connection.

(21) Hag. III, 2.

(22) And the half-tenth that is outside becomes unclean too,

(23) The question is whether in the reverse process, where the uncleanness is to be brought in from the outside into the vessel, the connection mentioned would serve as a link so as to convey the uncleanness within.

(24) And there was no contact between them. At this stage there is no doubt at all that the other half-tenth is not unclean, since at the time when one half-tenth contracted uncleanness it was not in the vessel with the other half-tenth.

(25) I.e., once it has been rendered unclean it cannot suffer any further uncleanness, so that the other half-tenth that is now with it in the vessel remains clean.

(26) Kel. XXVII, 9.

(27) Heb. מדרס. That degree of uncleanness arising when an unclean person, of those mentioned in Lev. XV, 4 and 25, lies or sits or treads upon or leans with the body against an object, provided that such object was fit and generally used for one of the above purposes.

Menachoth 24b

was used as a curtain, it becomes free of Midras uncleanness but remains unclean by reason of contact with Midras uncleanness. R. Jose said, What Midras uncleanness has it touched? If, however, one that had an issue had touched it, it would be unclean by reason of contact with one that had an issue. At any rate, it says, if one that had an issue had touched it, it would be unclean, presumably even though [this contact was] subsequent [to the Midras uncleanness], that is to say, it first had contracted Midras uncleanness and then further uncleanness by reason of contact with one that had an issue. Now why is this? Should we not say it was sated with uncleanness?

He replied, Whence do you know to say that this contact by one that had an issue was subsequent [to the madras uncleanness]? Perhaps it was prior to the Midras uncleanness, so that it was a case of a graver uncleanness being imposed upon a lighter uncleanness. Here, however, since at each
[contact] there is only a light uncleanness, it is not so! One might prove it, however, from the subsequent [Mishnah] which reads: R. Jose agrees that where two sheets lay folded one above the other and one that had an issue sat upon them, the upper has contracted Midras uncleanness, and the lower has contracted Midras uncleanness and also uncleanness by reason of contact with Midras uncleanness. Now why is this? Should we not say it was sated with uncleanness? —

There they come simultaneously, whilst here they come one after another. Raba said, Where a tenth was divided [into halves] and one [half] was lost so that another was brought as a substitute, and then it was found again, and now all three [half-tenths] are in the mixing vessel — if that which had been lost became unclean, then it is united with the first half-tenth,8 but not with the substituted half-tenth.9 If the substituted half-tenth became unclean, then it is united with the first half-tenth but not with the lost half-tenth. If the first half-tenth became unclean, then it is united with each of the others.10 Abaye said, Even if any one of the half-tenths became unclean, it is united with each of the others, since they all belong together.11 And so it is with regard to the taking of the handful. If the handful was taken from the half-tenth which had been lost, then what was left of it and the first half-tenth may be eaten but not the substituted half-tenth. If it was taken from the substituted half-tenth, then what was left of it and the first half-tenth may be eaten but not the half-tenth which had been lost. If it was taken from the first half-tenth, then [what was left of it may be eaten but] the others may not be eaten.12

Abaye said, Even though the handful was taken from any one half-tenth, the other two may not be eaten, since they all belong together. R. Papa demurred, [You say that] what was left of it may be eaten, but one third of the handful has not been offered!14 R. Isaac the son of R. Mesharsheya also demurred, How may the handful be offered, is not one third thereof unhallowed? — R. Ashi answered, The taking of the handful rests with the mind of the priest, and clearly when the priest takes the handful he does so only in respect of a tenth.15

(1) Since it is no longer intended to be used for any of the purposes (specified in the prec. n.) which make it susceptible to Midras uncleanness.
(2) Before it was used as a curtain. At this stage the sheet bears two kinds of uncleanness: Midras uncleanness and the uncleanness from contact with one that had an issue.
(3) For as soon as it is used as a curtain the Midras uncleanness vanishes and there remains now the uncleanness from contact with one that had an issue.
(4) And once it has contracted Midras uncleanness it was no more susceptible to any further uncleanness.
(5) And it is admitted by all that a thing which had contracted a lighter uncleanness (i.e., one which can only convey uncleanness to foodstuffs and liquids) cannot be so sated with uncleanness as to preclude any graver uncleanness (i.e., one which can convey uncleanness even to men and vessels).
(6) For foodstuffs can only suffer light uncleanness. In our case, therefore, since the half-tenth has already contracted a light uncleanness it cannot suffer a further similar uncleanness.
(7) The two kinds of uncleanness.
(8) I.e., the half-tenth which had not been lost will also be unclean for these two originally formed the tenth.
(9) And this half remains clean; for at no time was it contemplated that what was lost and what was substituted for it should together make up the tenth.
(10) For the first half-tenth was intended to be taken in the first place together with what was lost, and subsequently with what was substituted for it, so that a relation was set up between the first half-tenth and each of the others, and therefore all are unclean.
(11) Lit., ‘members of the same narrow house’; i.e., they all were intended to be used for the one meal-offering.
(12) Since originally these two made up the tenth for the meal-offering.
(13) The first half-tenth was intended to go with each of the other half-tenths and, inasmuch as the handful can serve only in respect of one tenth, there is one half-tenth which has not been rendered permissible by the handful; and as it is not known which it is, both may not be eaten.
(14) Presumably when the handful was taken out and offered up it was intended to serve everything that was in the vessel, so that one third of the handful should not have been offered, since that represented the superfluous half-tenth. Consequently the handful must be regarded as having been incomplete so that what was left of it cannot be permitted to be eaten. The reading ‘one third’ in the text is supported by MS. M. and Sh. Mek. In cur. edd. the text states ‘one sixth’; the meaning, however, is identical with the foregoing explanation, and is arrived at in this way. Since it is not known which of the two remaining half-tenths is the superfluous one which causes one third of the handful to be nullified, this result is therefore attributed in equal shares to each of the half-tenths, so that each is responsible for the nullification of one sixth of the handful. (15) The third half-tenth is disregarded by the priest when he takes the handful; therefore, the residue of that half-tenth from which the handful was taken may be eaten, whilst the two remaining half-tenths may not, since we do not know which was the half-tenth disregarded by the priest. Quaere: where the priest expressly declared which half-tenth he disregarded and which he took account of, would the latter be permitted to be eaten? V. Likkute Halakoth. a.l.

MENEOCHOS – 2a-26b

Mishnah. If the handful had become unclean and yet was offered, the plate renders it acceptable, but if it had been taken out [of the temple court] and was afterwards offered, the plate does not render it acceptable; for the plate only renders acceptable the offering which was unclean but not that which was taken out.

Gemara. Our Rabbis taught: It is written, And Aaron shall bear the iniquity of the holy things. What iniquity is it that it atones for? Should you say it is the iniquity of piggul — but it has already been said, it shall not be accepted. Should you say it is the iniquity of nothar — but it has already been said, neither shall it be imputed unto him. Hence it atones for nothing other than the iniquity of uncleanness, since an exception to the general rule has been made for the community. R. Zera demurred, Perhaps it is the iniquity of an offering having been taken outside [that the plate atones for], since an exception to the general rule had been made in the case of the high places?

Abaye answered, It is written, That they may be accepted before the Lord, that is, the iniquity committed before the Lord [is atoned for by the plate], but not the iniquity of an offering having been taken outside. R. Ela'a demurred, perhaps it is the iniquity of a service being performed with the left hand [that is atoned for by the plate], since an exception to the general rule has been made on the Day of Atonement?

Abaye answered him, The verse states ‘iniquity’, that is, the iniquity that was incurred is set aside; on the Day of Atonement, however, it is proper to serve with the left hand. R. Ashi answered thus, The verse says, ‘The iniquity of the holy things’, but not the iniquity of them that offer the offering.

R. Sima the son of R. Idi said to R. Ashi (others report: R. Sima the son of R. Ashi said to R. Ashi): perhaps it is the iniquity of a blemish in the offering [that is atoned for by the plate], since an exception to the general rule has been made in the case of bird-offerings, for a Master has said, The unblemished state and the male sex are prerequisite in animal-offerings but not in bird-offerings?

— He replied, It is for your sake that it is written, It shall not be accepted; and also, For it shall not be acceptable for you. Our Rabbis taught: If the blood of an offering became unclean and yet was sprinkled inadvertently it is acceptable, if deliberately it is not acceptable. This is the rule only with a private offering, but in the case of an offering of the community it is acceptable, whether inadvertently or deliberately. In the case of an offering by a gentile [the rule is] whether
inadvertently or deliberately, whether accidentally or intentionally,

(1) The High Priest's plate of pure gold worn on the forehead (v. Ex. XXVIII 36-38). Its function was to secure the Divine acceptance of a sacrifice which was offered although it had been rendered unclean.

(2) The meal-offering is valid and the remainder may be eaten.

(3) Ex. XXVIII, 38. This verse intimates that the High Priest's plate atones for some fault in connection with the offering.

(4) Heb. פיגול 'abomination', v. Glos. Here meaning: the intention expressed during one of the services of the sacrifice of eating the flesh thereof outside the prescribed place.

(5) Lev. XIX, 7. The text adopted in the translation is in accordance with the Sifra which is supported by Rashi (Pes. 16b s.v. אי זה) and Sh. Mek. But v. Tosaf. s.v. ונשא.

(6) Heb. נותר 'left over'; v. Glos. Here meaning: the intention expressed during one of the services of the sacrifice of eating the flesh thereof outside the prescribed time.

(7) Ibid., VII, 18.

(8) A sacrifice on behalf of the community may be offered even in a state of uncleanness.

(9) Although the prohibition against taking out the offering was already in force at the Tabernacle in the wilderness (v. Pes. 82a) it did not apply later on when the Tabernacle was housed at Nob and at Gibeon, for then it was permitted for every individual to set up a high place or altar in any place and offer sacrifices there.

(10) Ex. XXVIII, 38.

(11) I.e., whilst the offering is within the Temple Court.

(12) An iniquity which is not committed 'before the Lord'.

(13) When the High Priest performed service with his left hand too; v. Yoma 47a.

(14) Lit., 'I have set it aside'. Now the uncleanness of an offering is admittedly a defect, but since it is of no consequence in the case of the community, such defect in the offering of an individual will be atoned for by the plate.

(15) The plate therefore cannot atone for the guilt of a service performed with the left hand, for that is the guilt of the officiating priest and such guilt is expressly excluded.

(16) Supra 6a, Hul. 23a, and elsewhere.

(17) Lev. XXII, 23.

(18) Ibid, 20. These verses indicate that under no circumstances are blemished animals acceptable for an offering.

(19) V. infra as to the meaning of 'inadvertently', whether it refers to the contracting of the uncleanness or the sprinkling.

(20) Gentiles were also allowed to offer either freewill- or votive-offerings; v. infra 73b.

A contradiction was pointed out, for it was taught: For what guilt does the plate atone? For the blood or the flesh or the fat of an offering which became unclean, whether inadvertently or deliberately, whether accidentally or intentionally, whether in a private offering or in an offering of the community! — Said R. Joseph, There is no contradiction, for one [Baraita] states the view of R. Jose, the other the view of the Rabbis. For it has been taught: One must not set aside unclean produce as terumah for clean produce; if one did so inadvertently the terumah is valid, but if deliberately the terumah is not valid.4

R. Jose says, Whether one did it inadvertently or deliberately the terumah is valid.5 But perhaps all that R. Jose said was that we do not penalize him; have you heard him say that the plate atones for [the uncleanness of] the eatable portions of the offering?6 Has it not been taught: R. Eliezer says, The plate atones for [the uncleanness of] the eatable portions; but R. Jose says, The plate does not atone for [the uncleanness of] the eatable portions? You must reverse [the authorities and read thus]: R. Eliezer says, The plate does not atone for [the uncleanness of] the eatable portions; but R. Jose says, The plate does atone for [the uncleanness of] the eatable portions. But how can you reverse [the authorities]? Behold, it has been taught: I might have thought that [an unclean person who ate] of the flesh of a sacrifice which had become unclean before the sprinkling of the blood would be culpable on the ground of uncleanness,7 it is therefore written, Every one that is clean shall eat the flesh; but the
soul that eateth of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings, that pertain unto the Lord, having his uncleanness upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people, signifying that [the unclean person who eats of] what has been rendered permitted to those that are clean is culpable on account of uncleanness, but [the unclean person who eats of] what has not been rendered permitted to those that are clean is not culpable on account of uncleanness. But perhaps it is not so, but rather it signifies that [the unclean person who eats of] what may now be eaten by those that are clean is culpable on account of uncleanness, but [the unclean person who eats of] what may not now be eaten by those that are clean is not culpable on account of uncleanness. 

The verse therefore states, That pertain unto the Lord, an inclusive expression. I might then include the flesh that was Piggul and that which was left over — but is not that which was left over identical with that which had been left overnight?

Read therefore: [I might then include] the flesh that was Piggul, that it shall be like that which was left over — the verse therefore states, Of the sacrifice of peace-offerings, an exclusive expression. And why do you prefer to include the one class and exclude the other? Since the verse uses an inclusive and also an exclusive expression, I include those which were at one time permitted, but I exclude those which were at no time permitted. If you now ask, Why is [an unclean person] culpable on the ground of uncleanness for eating after the sprinkling of the blood flesh which had become unclean before the sprinkling? [I reply], It is because the plate atones for it. Now [one is culpable] only for that which became unclean but not for that which was taken out. And whom have you heard say that where the offering had been taken out [of the Temple court] the sprinkling is of no effect? It is R. Eliezer; and yet it states [in the Baraitha] that the plate atones for [the uncleanness of] the eatable portions. —

R. Hisda then said, There is no difficulty at all; for one [Baraitha] states the view of R. Eliezer, the other the view of the Rabbis. But perhaps all that R. Eliezer said was that the plate atones for [the uncleanness of] the eatable portions; have you heard him say that we do not impose any penalty? Indeed we have, for just as we assumed that to be R. Jose's view so we may assume it to be R. Eliezer's view too; for it has been taught: R. Eliezer says, Whether one [set apart unclean produce as terumah for clean produce] inadvertently or deliberately, the terumah is valid. But perhaps R. Eliezer said so only in the case of terumah which is less grave; have you heard him say so in the case of holy things which are more grave? — Then to whom will you attribute that [Baraitha]?

Rabina said, As to its uncleanness, whether [it was rendered unclean] inadvertently or deliberately, [the offering] is acceptable; but as to its sprinkling, if [it was sprinkled] inadvertently it is acceptable, but if deliberately it is not acceptable. R. Shila said, As to its sprinkling, whether [it was sprinkled] inadvertently or deliberately it is acceptable; but as to its uncleanness, if [it was rendered unclean] inadvertently it is acceptable, but if deliberately it is not acceptable. And how does R. Shila explain the Baraitha which reads, ‘Which became unclean, whether inadvertently or deliberately’? — It means, it was rendered unclean inadvertently, and it was sprinkled either inadvertently or deliberately.

(1) It is manifest that the plate effects atonement for uncleanness, even though deliberately caused, in the case of a private offering; thus in conflict with the first quoted Baraitha.

(2) The latter Baraitha.
(3) V. Glos.

(4) For the Rabbis penalized the one who acted deliberately in defiance of the law. As to the effect of this act, whether it is absolutely null and void or only that it does not render the rest of the produce permitted although what was set aside is terumah, v. Yeb. 89a.

(5) Accordingly the latter Baraitha which states that even if part of the offering was deliberately made unclean the plate atones for it represents the view of R. Jose.

(6) As opposed to the sacrificial portions, for the uncleanness of which all agree that the plate atones. For that is what the latter Baraitha, attributed to R. Jose, teaches when it says, inter alia, that the plate atones for the flesh which became unclean. But this view is not generally held, and on what grounds therefore do we attribute such a view to R. Jose?

(7) Before the sprinkling of the blood.

(8) Incurring the penalty of kareth.

(9) MS.M., reads: ‘I might have thought that (an unclean person who partook of the clean flesh of the offering) before the sprinkling of the blood would be liable on the ground of uncleanness.’ This reading is preferred by Rashi.


(11) I.e., flesh of an offering before the sprinkling of the blood.

(12) Even though it had once been rendered permitted to them, as in the case where the flesh, having been rendered permitted after the sprinkling of the blood, became unfit subsequently by being left overnight or by being taken out of the Temple court.

(13) And therefore whosoever eats of such flesh whilst in a state of uncleanness does not incur the penalty of kareth.

(14) And whosoever eats of the offering that became Piggul (v. Glos.) whilst in a state of uncleanness incurs the penalty of kareth, as is the case with the flesh that had been left overnight.

(15) Sc. the offering which had been left overnight or had been taken out of the Sanctuary after the sprinkling; for these had been rendered permitted with the sprinkling.

(16) Sc. the offering which was rendered Piggul through a wrongful intention expressed at the sprinkling of the blood, in which case the offering was never rendered permitted.

(17) For that flesh was at no time permitted to be eaten; nevertheless one is liable for eating it whilst in a state of uncleanness, v. Zeb. 106a and Hul. 101a, for only Piggul is excluded in the above Baraitha as being the only case of an offering at no time permitted.

(18) And the sprinkling of the blood is perfectly valid, so that the offering is ‘rendered permitted’, even though it may not be eaten, and therefore one is culpable.

(19) Thus if an unclean person ate, after the sprinkling, the flesh of the offering which had become unclean before the sprinkling he would be liable, but not if he ate after the sprinkling the flesh which had been taken out before the sprinkling, for in the former case the sprinkling is valid but not in the latter.

(20) V. Me’il. 6b.

(21) But according to the answer given above (‘Reverse the authorities’) R. Eliezer holds the opposite view!

(22) The Baraitha (p. 159) which teaches that the plate atones for the uncleanness deliberately caused even in a private offering represents the view of R. Eliezer, since therein is also taught that the plate atones for the uncleanness of the eatable portions, which is clearly R. Eliezer’s view.

(23) I.e., that the plate secures atonement where one deliberately sprinkled the blood which had become unclean.

(24) From R. Jose’s ruling in the case of terumah it was inferred that in all cases an act deliberately done in defiance of the law is valid and no penalty is to be imposed.

(25) That a wrongful act though deliberately done is nevertheless valid.

(26) Which teaches that even deliberately it is acceptable. It must be R. Eliezer.

(27) Rabina in this way explains away the contradiction between the two statements. The first Baraitha which states with regard to the private offering. ‘If inadvertently it is acceptable, if deliberately it is not acceptable’, deals with the sprinkling of the unclean blood. The second Baraitha which states that the plate atones for the blood which became unclean ‘whether inadvertently or deliberately’, obviously deals with the uncleanness; the sprinkling, however, would be acceptable only if done inadvertently.

Come and hear: It was taught: If the blood became unclean and It was sprinkled inadvertently, it is acceptable, if deliberately it is not acceptable! — It means, If the blood became unclean and it was sprinkled, whether it was sprinkled inadvertently or deliberately, if it was rendered unclean inadvertently it is acceptable, but if deliberately it is not acceptable.
MISHNAH. IF THE REMAINDER OF THE MEAL-OFFERING BECAME UNCLEAN OR WAS BURNT OR LOST, ACCORDING TO THE RULE OF R. ELIEZER IT IS LAWFUL [TO BURN THE HANDFUL], BUT ACCORDING TO THE RULE OF R. JOSHUA IT IS UNLAWFUL.

GEMARA. Rab said, That is so provided the whole of the remainder became unclean, but not if only a part of it became unclean. Now it was assumed that this provision applied only to the case where it became unclean but not to the case where it was burnt or lost. But what could be [Rab's] view? If he holds that what is left thereof is something of consequence, then the same should be the case where it was burnt or lost. And if he holds that what is left thereof is of no consequence, but that in the case where it became unclean the reason is that the plate atones [for the uncleanness of the eatable portions], then the same should be the case even where the whole of the remainder [became unclean]!

Indeed he holds that what is left thereof is something of consequence, and as it is in the case where it became unclean, so it is where it was burnt or lost; the only reason, however, why [Rab] dealt with the case where it became unclean was that it was the first [mentioned in our Mishnah]. And so it was taught [in the following Baraita]: R. Joshua says, If of any animal-offering mentioned in the Torah there remained an olive's bulk of the flesh or an olive's bulk of the fat, [the priest] may sprinkle the blood; if there remained a half-olive's bulk of the flesh and a half-olive's bulk of the fat, he may not sprinkle the blood. In the case of a burnt-offering, however, even if there remained a half-olive's bulk of the flesh and a half-olive's bulk of the fat, he may sprinkle the blood, since it is wholly burnt. And in the case of a meal-offering, even if all of it still remains, he may not sprinkle the blood. How does the meal-offering come in here?

R. Papa explained that it referred to the meal-offering offered with the drink-offerings. For one might have thought that since it accompanies the animal-offering it is deemed to be part of the animal-offering; we are therefore taught [that it is not so]. Whence do we know this?

R. Johanan said in the name of R. Ishmael (while some trace the tradition further back to R. Joshua b. Hananiah), The verse says, And he shall burn the fat for a sweet savor unto the Lord; hence [the blood be sprinkled on account of] the fat even if there is no flesh. We thus know it of the fat, but whence do we know it of the caul of the liver and of the two kidneys? For it has been stated [in the abovementioned Baraita], ‘And in the case of a meal-offering, even if all of it still remains, he may not sprinkle the blood’; that is, on account of the meal-offering he may not sprinkle the blood, but it is to be inferred that he may sprinkle on account of the caul of the liver or of the two kidneys. Whence do we know it?

R. Johanan explained on his own authority, It is written, ‘For a sweet savor,’ signifying that [the blood may be sprinkled on account of] everything that is offered up for a sweet savor. And it was absolutely necessary for the verse to have written ‘the fat’ as well as ”for a sweet savor’. For if only ‘the fat’ were written, I should have said that only on account of the fat [may the blood be sprinkled] but not on account of the caul of the liver or the two kidneys; the Divine Law therefore stated ‘for a sweet savor’. And if only ‘for a sweet savor’ were written, I should have said that even on account of the meal-offering [may the blood be sprinkled]; the Divine Law therefore stated ‘the fat’.

MISHNAH. IF [HE DID] NOT [PUT THE HANDFUL] INTO A VESSEL OF MINISTRY IT IS INVALID; BUT R. SIMEON DECLARES IT VALID, IF HE BURNT THE HANDFUL TWICE, IT IS VALID.
GEMARA. R. Judah the son of R. Hiyya said, What is the reason for R. Simeon’s view? It is written, It is most holy as the sin-offering and as the guilt-offering; that is to say, if he is about to perform the service with his hand, he must do so with his right hand as the sin-offering; but if he is about to offer it in a vessel, he may do so with his left hand as the guilt-offering. R. Jannai said. Since he took the handful from a vessel of ministry he may offer it up and burn it even in his girdle and even in a potsherd. R. Nahman b. Isaac said, All agree that the handful must be sanctified.

An objection was raised: If the fat, the limbs and the wood were brought up to be burnt [upon the altar] with the hand or with a vessel, with the right hand or with the left, they are valid. If the handful, the incense-offering and the frankincense were brought up [upon the altar] with the hand or with a vessel, with the right hand or with the left, they are valid. Is this not a refutation of the view of R. Judah the son of R. Hiyya?

R. Judah the son of R. Hiyya could answer you: It is to be taken as separate cases thus, If [brought up] with the hand, it must be with the right hand only; if with a vessel, it may be either with the right hand or with the left.

Come and hear: If he took out the handful from23 a vessel of ministry but neither sanctified it in a vessel of ministry nor offered it up to be burnt in a vessel of ministry, it is invalid. R. Eleazar and R. Simeon declare it valid if only it had been put into a vessel! — Render: After it had been put into a vessel.

Come and hear: But the Sages say, The handful requires vessels of ministry; thus he takes out the handful from a vessel of ministry, sanctifies it in a vessel of ministry and offers it up to be burnt in a vessel of ministry. R. Simeon says, As long as he has taken out the handful from a vessel of ministry he may offer it and burn it not in a vessel of ministry and that suffices!
left hand, and in the case of the leper's guilt-offering must be performed with the left hand (v. Sh. Mek.).

(20) R. Jannai interprets R. Simeon's view as he understands it.

(21) I.e., it must be put into a vessel of ministry. All that R. Simeon permits is to take out the handful after it had been sanctified in a vessel of ministry and offer it with the hand upon the altar.

(22) This Baraitha evidently represents R. Simeon's view since it declares valid the offering of the handful with the hand, yet it also permits the use of the left hand; contra R. Judah.

(23) The word שלא 'not', found in cur. edd., is struck out by Sh. Mek. and is wanting in MS.M.

(24) Though not necessarily a vessel of ministry; contra R. Nahman.

(25) The meaning is, after the handful had been sanctified in a vessel of ministry the services which follow, as the bringing nigh and the burning, do not, according to R. Eleazar and R. Simeon, require a vessel.

(26) Contra R. Nahman.

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he expressed the intention [of eating the remainder] outside the prescribed place or outside the prescribed time it is invalid, but there is no penalty of kareth; if; while it was in his right hand he expressed the intention [of eating the remainder] outside the prescribed place it is invalid but there is no penalty of kareth, but if [he intended to eat it] outside the prescribed time it is Piggul and there is also the penalty of kareth. This is the opinion of R. Eleazar and R. Simeon. But the Sages say, As soon as he transferred it into his left hand the transfer rendered it invalid, the reason being that it still required sanctification in a vessel, and since it has been transferred into the left hand it is on the same footing as when the blood of an offering had poured out from the throat on to the ground and had been gathered up, in which case it is invalid.2 Hence it is clear that according to R. Eleazar and R. Simeon the putting into the vessel of ministry is not essential. This surely refutes R. Nahman's view, and supports the view of R. Judah the son of R. Hiyya.3 Is it also a refutation of R. Jannai's view?4 — R. Jannai can answer, I am in agreement with the Tanna who taught the Baraitha concerning the burning [of the fat, etc.], and the terms thereof are not to be taken as separate cases.5

IF HE BURNT THE HANDFUL TWICE IT IS VALID. R. Joshua b. Levi said, Twice but not more than twice. But R. Johanan said, Twice and even more than twice. What is the issue between them? — R. Zera answered, The issue between them is as to whether the handful may be less than the quantity of two olives' bulk and whether the burning of a quantity less than an olive's bulk counts as an offering.6 R. Joshua b. Levi is of the opinion that the handful may not be less than two olives' bulk and also that the burning of a quantity less than an olive's bulk does not count as an offering;7 but R. Johanan maintains that the handful may be less than the quantity of two olives’ bulk and that the burning of a quantity less than an olive's bulk counts as an offering.8 It was stated: From what time does the handful render the remainder permissible to be eaten?

R. Hanina says, As soon as the fire has taken hold of it;9 and R. Johanan says, Only when the fire has burnt the greater part of it. Rab Judah said to Rabbah b. R. Isaac, I will explain to you the reason for R. Johanan's view; for it is written, And lo, the smoke of the land went up as the smoke of a furnace,10 and a furnace does not send up smoke until the fire has burnt up the greater part.11

Rabin b. R. Adda said to Raba, Your pupils report that R. Amram pointed out [the following difficulty]: It was taught: I only know that things that are usually offered by night, e.g., the limbs and the fat parts of the offering, may be offered up and burnt after sunset and are allowed to continue burning throughout the night; but whence do I know that things that are usually offered by day, e.g., the handful, the frankincense, the incense-offering, the meal-offering of the priests, the anointed High Priest's meal-
offering and, the meal-offering offered with the drink-offerings, may also be offered up and burnt after sunset? —

But have you not said, ‘Things that are usually offered by day’? Τι οὖν λέγεις: ἀντίθετα: ἐν τῇ δεσποτικῇ ἐν πρώτῳ ἡμέρα ἐπὶ τῷ θύματι τοῦ ἐν θυσία τῷ θυσία ἐν τῇ δεσποτικῇ ἐν πρώτῳ ἡμέρα. — Whence then do I know that these also are allowed to continue burning throughout the night? From the verse, This is the law of the burnt-offering, an inclusive expression. Now if it is offered up at sunset it can hardly be possible that the fire will have burnt the greater portion of it [by sunset]! —

This is no difficulty, for here [in the latter case] it deals with the handful being taken up, and there with it rendering the remainder permissible. R. Eleazar reads [in the above]: ‘after sunset’, and explains it as referring to the pieces that have burst off the altar. And so, too, when R. Dimi came [from Palestine] he explained it in the name of R. Jannai as referring to the pieces that had burst off the altar. But could R. Jannai have said so? Surely R. Jannai has said, Any part of the incense which had burst off the altar, even if it was a whole grain, may not be put back! Moreover, R. Hanina b. Minyomi taught at the school of R. Eliezer b. Jacob: It is written, Whereto the fire hath consumed the burnt-offering on the altar, [18] that is, you may put back unconsumed parts of the burnt-offering [if they had burst off the altar], but you must not put back unconsumed parts of the incense! —

Omit ‘incense’. R. Assi said, When R. Eleazar was studying the laws of the meal-offering he raised the following question: How is it if he placed the handful [upon the altar] and then put the wood-pile on top of it? Is this regarded as a way of burning or not? — This question remains undecided. Hezekiah raised the question: How is it if he placed the limbs [of an offering upon the altar] and then put the wood-pile above them? [Shall we say,] since the Divine Law says, Upon the wood, then they must actually be upon the wood; or, since there is another verse which reads, Whereto the fire hath consumed the burnt-offering on the altar, he may do it either the one way or the other? —

This, too, remains undecided. R. Isaac Nappaha raised the question: How is it if he placed the limbs by the side of the wood-pile? Of course according to him who maintains that ‘upon’ must be taken in its literal meaning, there can be no question here,
law applies to all things that are brought up on the altar.
(15) And if the handful has not been offered before the sunset of that day it becomes invalid; consequently, since it may be placed upon the altar just before sunset, as soon as the fire has taken hold of it, it is deemed to be offered, which is contrary to R. Johanan.
(16) It is true that as soon as the fire has taken hold of it, it is deemed to be offered, but only in the sense that it has been taken up and accepted by the altar as an offering on the same day before sunset, so that it is valid. But, maintains R. Johanan, it will only render the remainder permissible to be eaten when the fire has burnt the greater part of it.
(17) And these may be put back upon the altar throughout the night. The handful, however, had been placed on the altar before sunset.
(18) Ibid. VI, 3.
(19) From the Baraitha quoted by R. Amram according to which portions of incense which had burst off the altar may be put back.
(20) Normally the wood-pile is arranged upon the altar and the parts of the offering are put on top of the wood.
(21) Lev. I, 8: And Aaron's sons, the priests, shall lay the pieces... in order upon the wood... which is upon the altar.
(22) Ibid VI, 3, which verse shows that the burnt-offering was put actually upon the surface of the altar and not necessarily upon the wood.
(23) V. infra 96a.